WORKMAN, Justice:
This case is before the Court upon the appeal1 of the Kanawha County Board of Education (hereinafter called Board) filed in this Court on May 4, 1989. It arises from the April 21, 1989, final order of the Kanawha County Circuit Court which granted a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to conduct a second public hearing and to conduct a second vote under the provisions of W. Va. Code §§ 18-5-13 [1988] and 18-5-13a [1985], prior to the closure of Loudendale Elementary School. Based upon the lower court’s decision, the appellants now argue two assignments of error: (1) the lower court erred in its holding that Code, 18-5-13a restricted the legal capacity to vote on the question of whether to close Loudendale Elementary School to those members of the Board who attended the public hearing conducted pursuant to said statute; and (2) the lower court erred in its holding that Code, 18-5-13 and Code, 18-5-13a prohibited the Board from legally voting to close Loudendale Elementary School on February 2, 1989, because such vote was not taken prior to the first Monday in April next following the public hearing which occurred on March 8, 1988. We find that the writ of mandamus was improperly issued by the lower court and reverse.
On March 8, 1988, a public hearing was conducted by the Board concerning the closure of Loudendale Elementary School. A quorum of the Board members were present at that public hearing.2 On April 21, 1988, the Board voted unanimously to table any action concerning the recommended closure of Loudendale Elementary School. The closure issue was to be returned to the administration for further study. The actual vote to close Loudendale Elementary School did not take place until February 2, 1989. The closure was to become effective at the beginning of the 1989-90 school year.3
It should be understood at the outset that the wisdom or correctness of the board’s decision to close the school is not an issue before this Court. Code, 18-5-13(3) and Code, 18-5-13(4) unquestionably reposes in the Board the authority to close and consolidate schools when it deems necessary. Further, “ ‘[m]andamus does not lie to control a board of education in the exercise of its discretion, in the absence of caprice, passion, partiality, fraud, arbitrary conduct, some ulterior motive, or misapprehension of law upon the part of such board.’ Point 1 Syllabus, State ex rel. Payne v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, 135 W.Va. 349 [, 63 S.E.2d 579 (1951) ].” Syl. Pt. 5, State ex rel. Withers v. Board of Education, 153 W.Va. 867, 172 S.E.2d 796 (1970). The focus of this appeal, therefore, is whether the Board, in its decision to close Loudendale, followed the proper procedures as set out in the West Virginia Code and the West Virginia Board of Education, Handbook on Planning School Facilities (1987 rev. ed.).
[437]*437Prior to the final decision of a Board to close a school, Code, 18-5-13a provides, in part, that
[t]he county board of education shall:
(2) Provide for a public hearing, notice of which shall be advertised by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality of the affected school at least once a week for four successive weeks prior to the date of the hearing. The notice shall contain the time and place of the hearing and the proposed action of the school board. A copy of such notice shall be posted at the affected school in conspicuous working places for all professional and service personnel to observe, and such notice shall remain posted for four successive weeks prior to the date of the required public hearing. At least a quorum of the school board members and the county superintendent from the county wherein the affected school is located shall attend and be present at the public hearing. Members of the public shall have the right to be present, to submit statements and testimony, and to question county school officials at the public hearing.
Any such proposal to close or consolidate any school by any county board of education shall be further subject to any current rules and regulations4 of the state board of education relating to school closing or consolidation-
(emphasis added)
There is no dispute that the Board complied properly with the procedures regarding the notice of the public hearing and the manner in which the public hearing was conducted. What was contested before the lower court and now before this Court is whether the members of the Board entitled to vote on the closure of a school subsequent to a public hearing are limited to the members who participated in and constituted the quorum at the public hearing. If such a restriction would apply, then a quorum would not have been available for the vote on closure which took place in February, 1982, due to the changes of the membership of the Board. However, we find no basis for such a restriction and therefore disagree with the lower court’s imposition of such a restriction. Neither the code nor the Handbook on Planning School Facilities suggests or mandates that only those members who constitute the quorum for the purposes of the public hearing may vote on the closure issue. See Code, 18-5-13 and Code, 18-5-13a; Handbook on Planning School Facilities § 105.07.
The reasons that no such restriction is found are twofold. First, the Board is a statutorily created corporation.5 Since the corporation is a continuing legal entity, [438]*438“[i]ts members may change, but the corporation does not change.” State ex rel. Campe v. Board of Education, 94 W.Va. 408, 118 S.E. 877, 879 (1928); See also State ex rel. Jones v. Board of Education, 178 W.Va. 378, 380-81, 359 S.E.2d 606, 608-09 (1987); Syl. Pt. 1, Evans v. Hutchinson, 158 W.Va. 359, 359, 214 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1975). Therefore, the activities that the members of the Board undertake, such as conducting a public hearing, do not become null and void just because the membership changes, for those activities were conducted by the members on behalf of the Board as a continuing corporate entity. The Board can act upon a public hearing in which former members participated. Second, Code, 18-5-13a “does not require public approval of a school board’s proposal to close or consolidate schools. Rather, ... it is intended to insure that, prior to the rendering of a final decision on such proposal, the public will be aware of and have an opportunity to comment upon it.” Jones, 178 W.Va. at 382, 359 S.E.2d at 610. The intent of the legislature in enacting the statute was clearly met in this case.
We also do not agree that the lower court was correct in finding that both the public hearing and the vote on the closure of a school must take place prior to the next first Monday in April following the date of the public hearing. Code,
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WORKMAN, Justice:
This case is before the Court upon the appeal1 of the Kanawha County Board of Education (hereinafter called Board) filed in this Court on May 4, 1989. It arises from the April 21, 1989, final order of the Kanawha County Circuit Court which granted a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to conduct a second public hearing and to conduct a second vote under the provisions of W. Va. Code §§ 18-5-13 [1988] and 18-5-13a [1985], prior to the closure of Loudendale Elementary School. Based upon the lower court’s decision, the appellants now argue two assignments of error: (1) the lower court erred in its holding that Code, 18-5-13a restricted the legal capacity to vote on the question of whether to close Loudendale Elementary School to those members of the Board who attended the public hearing conducted pursuant to said statute; and (2) the lower court erred in its holding that Code, 18-5-13 and Code, 18-5-13a prohibited the Board from legally voting to close Loudendale Elementary School on February 2, 1989, because such vote was not taken prior to the first Monday in April next following the public hearing which occurred on March 8, 1988. We find that the writ of mandamus was improperly issued by the lower court and reverse.
On March 8, 1988, a public hearing was conducted by the Board concerning the closure of Loudendale Elementary School. A quorum of the Board members were present at that public hearing.2 On April 21, 1988, the Board voted unanimously to table any action concerning the recommended closure of Loudendale Elementary School. The closure issue was to be returned to the administration for further study. The actual vote to close Loudendale Elementary School did not take place until February 2, 1989. The closure was to become effective at the beginning of the 1989-90 school year.3
It should be understood at the outset that the wisdom or correctness of the board’s decision to close the school is not an issue before this Court. Code, 18-5-13(3) and Code, 18-5-13(4) unquestionably reposes in the Board the authority to close and consolidate schools when it deems necessary. Further, “ ‘[m]andamus does not lie to control a board of education in the exercise of its discretion, in the absence of caprice, passion, partiality, fraud, arbitrary conduct, some ulterior motive, or misapprehension of law upon the part of such board.’ Point 1 Syllabus, State ex rel. Payne v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, 135 W.Va. 349 [, 63 S.E.2d 579 (1951) ].” Syl. Pt. 5, State ex rel. Withers v. Board of Education, 153 W.Va. 867, 172 S.E.2d 796 (1970). The focus of this appeal, therefore, is whether the Board, in its decision to close Loudendale, followed the proper procedures as set out in the West Virginia Code and the West Virginia Board of Education, Handbook on Planning School Facilities (1987 rev. ed.).
[437]*437Prior to the final decision of a Board to close a school, Code, 18-5-13a provides, in part, that
[t]he county board of education shall:
(2) Provide for a public hearing, notice of which shall be advertised by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality of the affected school at least once a week for four successive weeks prior to the date of the hearing. The notice shall contain the time and place of the hearing and the proposed action of the school board. A copy of such notice shall be posted at the affected school in conspicuous working places for all professional and service personnel to observe, and such notice shall remain posted for four successive weeks prior to the date of the required public hearing. At least a quorum of the school board members and the county superintendent from the county wherein the affected school is located shall attend and be present at the public hearing. Members of the public shall have the right to be present, to submit statements and testimony, and to question county school officials at the public hearing.
Any such proposal to close or consolidate any school by any county board of education shall be further subject to any current rules and regulations4 of the state board of education relating to school closing or consolidation-
(emphasis added)
There is no dispute that the Board complied properly with the procedures regarding the notice of the public hearing and the manner in which the public hearing was conducted. What was contested before the lower court and now before this Court is whether the members of the Board entitled to vote on the closure of a school subsequent to a public hearing are limited to the members who participated in and constituted the quorum at the public hearing. If such a restriction would apply, then a quorum would not have been available for the vote on closure which took place in February, 1982, due to the changes of the membership of the Board. However, we find no basis for such a restriction and therefore disagree with the lower court’s imposition of such a restriction. Neither the code nor the Handbook on Planning School Facilities suggests or mandates that only those members who constitute the quorum for the purposes of the public hearing may vote on the closure issue. See Code, 18-5-13 and Code, 18-5-13a; Handbook on Planning School Facilities § 105.07.
The reasons that no such restriction is found are twofold. First, the Board is a statutorily created corporation.5 Since the corporation is a continuing legal entity, [438]*438“[i]ts members may change, but the corporation does not change.” State ex rel. Campe v. Board of Education, 94 W.Va. 408, 118 S.E. 877, 879 (1928); See also State ex rel. Jones v. Board of Education, 178 W.Va. 378, 380-81, 359 S.E.2d 606, 608-09 (1987); Syl. Pt. 1, Evans v. Hutchinson, 158 W.Va. 359, 359, 214 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1975). Therefore, the activities that the members of the Board undertake, such as conducting a public hearing, do not become null and void just because the membership changes, for those activities were conducted by the members on behalf of the Board as a continuing corporate entity. The Board can act upon a public hearing in which former members participated. Second, Code, 18-5-13a “does not require public approval of a school board’s proposal to close or consolidate schools. Rather, ... it is intended to insure that, prior to the rendering of a final decision on such proposal, the public will be aware of and have an opportunity to comment upon it.” Jones, 178 W.Va. at 382, 359 S.E.2d at 610. The intent of the legislature in enacting the statute was clearly met in this case.
We also do not agree that the lower court was correct in finding that both the public hearing and the vote on the closure of a school must take place prior to the next first Monday in April following the date of the public hearing. Code, 18-5-13 gives the Board the authority “[t]o close any school which is unnecessary and to assign the pupils thereof to other schools: Provided, [t]hat such closing shall be officially acted upon and teachers and service personnel involved notified on or before the first Monday in April....”6 Neither the code provision, nor the regulation specifies that the vote must be taken “on or before the first Monday in April” immediately following the date the public hearing was held. Although there is some merit to the appellee’s argument that if the vote is not taken on the first Monday in April following the public hearing, then situations could arise where a vote is delayed by a board of education for years after a public hearing, that is not the situation in the case at hand. If such a situation were to arise, then at some point in time the board’s action would be considered arbitrary and capricious, and a writ of mandamus might be proper.
In the present case, a vote was taken on the closure of Loudendale Elementary School on April 21,1988. That vote was to table the action. Then, within a year, another vote was taken on February 2, 1989. This was prior to the first Monday in April, 1989. That vote was to close Loudendale Elementary School.
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the circuit court erred in holding that the Board failed to properly follow procedures outlined in Code, 18-5-13 and Code, 18-5-13a. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County is reversed, and the writ of mandamus previously issued is hereby discharged.
Judgment reversed; Writ discharged.