Haynes v. Ally Fin., Inc.

2024 Ohio 5673

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 4, 2024
• Docket: 31067
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Haynes v. Ally Fin., Inc., 2024-Ohio-5673.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

DOMINQUE HAYNES C.A. No. 31067

Appellant

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE ALLY FINANCIAL INC. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellee CASE No. CV-2024-02-0635

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 4, 2024

STEVENSON, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Appellant Dominque Haynes appeals from the order of the Summit County Court

of Common Pleas granting Appellee Ally Financial, Inc.’s motion to dismiss. This Court concludes

that Ms. Haynes sufficiently set forth a conversion claim as required by Civ.R. 8(A) and failed to

state a claim of fraud with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B). Accordingly, we reverse in part

and affirm in part the decision of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas.

I.

{¶2} Ms. Haynes commenced action when she filed a pro se complaint against Ally

Financial. Ms. Haynes alleges that she has tried to contact Ally Financial on multiple occasions

“to address [her] concerns of the fraudulent misrepresentation of the nature of [a] ‘Contract’ in

regard to a Blue 2018 Kia Sorento.”

{¶3} The complaint, which is not organized into counts, alleges that Ally Financial is the

claimed lienholder of the vehicle and that Ms. Haynes is the registered owner. Ms. Haynes asserts 2

that Ally Financial failed to respond to her “[n]otice to commence [s]uit[]” and that, therefore, its

“lien is void, wholly discharged, and Ally no longer [holds] a security interest in the [vehicle].”

{¶4} Ms. Haynes alleges that Ally Financial repossessed the vehicle and that she

sustained damages because of the repossession. She further alleges that Ally Financial repossessed

the vehicle without a valid lien and that it has refused to return the vehicle.

{¶5} Ally Financial moved to dismiss Ms. Haynes’ complaint. Ally Financial asserted

that the complaint does not contain a plain statement of any claim showing that Ms. Haynes is

entitled to relief as required by Civ.R. 8(A) and that it fails to plead fraud with the required

particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B). It asserted that the complaint fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted and that it must be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Ms. Haynes

argued in response that she had asserted valid claims against Ally Financial, including a claim that

Ally Financial has wrongfully taken her personal property.

{¶6} The trial court granted Ally Financial’s motion to dismiss. The court found that

dismissal was appropriate as “[t]he [c]omplaint does not contain a plain statement of any claim

showing that Ms. Haynes is entitled to relief” as required by Civ.R. 8(A), and because the

complaint failed to plead fraud with specificity as required by Civ.R. 9(B).

{¶7} Ms. Haynes appeals the trial court’s decision granting Ally Financial’s motion to

dismiss, setting fourth three assignments of error for our review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 8[(]A[)] AS THE COMPLAINT WAS A SHORT AND PLAIN STATEMENT SHOWING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RELIEF. 3

{¶8} Ms. Haynes argues in her first assignment of error that her complaint includes short

and plain statements of claims as required by Civ.R. 8(A) and that, therefore, the trial court erred

in dismissing her complaint. We conclude that Ms. Haynes has sufficiently stated a conversion

claim and, accordingly, we reverse on this basis.

Standard of Review

{¶9} An appellate court’s standard of review on a trial court’s ruling on a motion to

dismiss is de novo. Petty v. Lorain, 2024-Ohio-2110, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.). “A de novo review

encompasses an independent examination of the trial court’s decision without deference to the

underlying decision.” Id.

{¶10} A motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim “is a

procedural motion that tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint.” Pugh v. Capital One

Bank (USA), 2021-Ohio-994, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of

Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548 (1992). In construing such a motion, “the court must presume

that all factual allegations of the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of

the non-moving party.” Petty at ¶ 15. The trial court may grant a motion to dismiss “only if it

appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to relief.”

Garvey v. Clevidence, 2004-Ohio-6536, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.); O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants

Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), syllabus.

{¶11} The principles of notice pleading apply when ruling on a motion to dismiss. York v.

Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-145 (1991). A plaintiff need not “prove his or her

case at the pleading stage.” Id. at 145. Rather, “as long as there is a set of facts, consistent with

the plaintiff's complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not grant a

defendant's motion to dismiss.” Id. 4

Civ.R. 8

{¶12} The first basis of the trial court’s dismissal is that the complaint does not comply

with Civ.R. 8(A). Civ.R. 8(A) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the party is entitled to relief [.] . . .” Civ.R. 8(A) must be read in conjunction

with the remaining sections of Civ.R. 8, including Civ.R. 8(F) that provides “[a]ll pleadings shall

be so construed as to do substantial justice.”

{¶13} Civ.R. 8 is a liberal pleading rule. Bowers Constr. Co., Inc. v. Chuparkoff, 2010-

Ohio-419, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). Under Civ.R. 8(A)’s liberal pleading requirements, a plaintiff must

merely set forth operative facts in her complaint “which give fair notice of the action . . . .” Truaxx

v. Arora, 1993 WL 99893, *2 (9th Dist. Apr. 7, 1993); Bowers Constr. at ¶ 5. “Any legal theory

applicable to the stated facts will support a recovery.” Id.; Vagas v. City of Hudson, 2009-Ohio-

6794, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.) (a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss as long as it “sets forth adequate

facts demonstrating a claim for relief.”). If a complaint does not comply with Civ.R. 8(A), it may

dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). See Doe v. Greenville City Schools, 2022-Ohio-4618, ¶ 7-

8; Park Street Group, LLC v. White, 2017-Ohio-1188, ¶ 8-9 (9th Dist.).

Analysis

{¶14} Ms. Haynes argues that her complaint contains plain and short statements as

required by Civ.R. 8(A). Ms. Haynes states that her complaint alleges that Ally Financial does not

have a valid lien, that it took her property through an agent without her consent, and that it refuses

to return the property. Ms. Haynes argues that she has alleged a conversion claim.

{¶15} Ally Financial maintains that the trial court properly found the complaint fails to

meet Civ.R. 8(A) pleading requirements. Ally Financial asserts that absent an allegation that it

breached the peace, Ms. Haynes has failed to state any actionable claims. 5

{¶16} This Court recognizes that Ms. Haynes is a pro se litigant. However, pro se litigants

are “held to the same standard as attorneys admitted to the practice of law.” In re Guardianship of

P.S., 2024-Ohio-1310, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.), citing Zukowski v. Brunner, 2010-Ohio-1652, ¶ 8. This Court

has repeatedly noted that:

a pro se litigant is presumed to have knowledge of the law and correct legal procedures so that [s]he remains subject to the same rules and procedures to which represented litigants are bound. [She] is not given greater rights than represented parties[.] . . .

(Citations omitted.) In re Guardianship of P.S. at ¶ 6; Sherlock v. Myers, 2004-Ohio-5178, ¶ 3 (9th

Dist.); First Communications, L.L.C. v. Helms, 2016-Ohio-7586, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.).

{¶17} Ms. Haynes is only required to plead “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that” she is “entitled to relief” under Ohio’s notice pleading standard. Civ.R. 8(A). Ms.

Haynes did not identify the type of claims sought in her complaint but that is not required. Under

the Civ.R. 8(A) pleading standard, we conclude that the complaint sufficiently sets forth a

conversion claim.

{¶18} “Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to the exclusion

of the rights of the owner or the withholding of the property from the owner’s possession under a

claim inconsistent with the owner’s rights.” Bunta v. Superior VacuPress, L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-

4363, ¶ 20; Chef Italiano v. Crucible Dev. Corp., 2005-Ohio-4254, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.). To prevail on

a conversion claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that it owned or had the right to control the

property at the time of the conversion, (2) the defendant’s wrongful act or disposition of the

plaintiff’s property rights, and (3) damages.” Pelmar USA, L.L.C. v. Mach. Exchange Corp., 2012-

Ohio-3787, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). Contrary to Ally Financial’s argument, there is no requirement that a

plaintiff allege breach of peace when stating a conversion claim in her complaint. See Bugoni v.

C & M Towing, 2012-Ohio-4508, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.) (trial court’s order granting Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 6

motion to dismiss reversed on appeal; allegation that defendants took the plaintiff’s vehicle without

consent and are refusing to return the vehicle unless plaintiff pays them money sufficiently stated

a conversion claim); Pond v. E and E Towing and Recovery, LLC, 2024-Ohio-800, ¶ 23 (10th

Dist.) (plaintiffs complied with Civ.R. 8(A), and sufficiently stated a conversion claim, where they

alleged that they were the owners of the vehicles, the defendant removed the vehicles, and they

sustained damages). Further, whether a breach of peace occurred would require the court to

consider facts outside the complaint and not be appropriate for a motion to dismiss. See Haven v.

Lodi, 2022-Ohio-3957, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.).

{¶19} Here, Ms. Haynes alleges that she is “the registered ‘Owner’” of the vehicle at issue

and that Ally Financial repossessed the vehicle even though it does not have a valid lien on the

vehicle. These allegations satisfy the requirement that a conversion claim allege that the plaintiff

“owned or had the right to control the property at the time of the conversion” and that the defendant

engaged in a “wrongful act or disposition of the plaintiff’s property rights[.]” Pelmar USA at ¶

12. Ms. Haynes further alleges that she sustained damages because of the repossession, including

the loss of use of her vehicle and employment. This allegation satisfies the requirement that a

conversion claim allege that the plaintiff sustained “damages.” Id. With these allegations, Ms.

Haynes adequately stated a claim for conversion. See Bugoni, 2012-Ohio-4508, at ¶ 9 (9th Dist.).

{¶20} Ms. Hayes did not need to prove her claims at the pleading stage. Rather she had to

allege facts to sufficiently put Ally Financial on notice of her claim. York, 60 Ohio St.3d at 145.

Ms. Haynes’ complaint sufficiently sets forth facts to put Ally Financial on notice of a conversion

claim in accordance with the liberal pleading requirements of Civ.R. 8(A). Accordingly, we sustain

Ms. Haynes’ first assignment of error on this basis. 7

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [A] MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 9([B]) AS THE ALLEGATIONS (AVERMENTS) OF FRAUD OR MISTAKE AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONSTITUTING FRAUD OR MISTAKE [WERE] STATED WITH PARTICULARITY.

{¶21} Ms. Haynes argues in her second assignment of error that the trial court erred in

dismissing her fraud claim. Ms. Haynes asserts that she has plead fraud with particularity as

required by Civ.R. 9(B). We disagree.

{¶22} The standard of review on a motion to dismiss, as previously set forth, is de novo.

Petty, 2014-Ohio-2110, at ¶ 14.

Civ.R. 9

{¶23} The second basis for the trial court’s dismissal is that the complaint does not comply

with Civ.R. 9(B). The trial court found that Ms. Haynes “provides no factual support to what, if

anything, [Ally Financial] did that would constitute a fraudulent misrepresentation.”

{¶24} Civ.R. 9(B) states that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” The failure to plead fraud with

particularity justifies “dismissal of the complaint.” Bradley v. Bessick, 2000 WL 372322, *2 (9th

Dist. Apr. 12, 2000).

{¶25} This Court has stated that the requirements of Civ.R 9 must be applied in

conjunction with the directives of Civ.R. 8 that the complaint contain “‘a short and plain statement

of the claim.’” Bradley at *3, quoting F & J Roofing Co. v. McGinley & Sons, Inc., 35 Ohio App.3d

16, 17 (9th Dist. 1987), quoting Civ.R. 8. “This approach looks at the ‘nature and facts of the case

and the circumstances of the parties,’ and determines whether the complaint sufficiently apprises

the defendant of the act of which the plaintiff complains.” Id. 8

{¶26} Ms. Haynes argues that she has plead fraud “and the circumstances constituting

fraud” with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B). Ally Financial argues that the trial court

properly dismissed Ms. Haynes’ fraud claim because “[n]o misrepresentations of any kind by Ally

Financial are alleged . . . let alone what they specifically were, who made them, or when or how

they were made.”

{¶27} To maintain an actionable claim for fraud, a plaintiff must establish:

(1) a representation, or where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it; (5) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment; and (6) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.

Baughman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005-Ohio-6980, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.), citing Cohen v.

Lamko, Inc., 10 Ohio St.3d 167, 169 (1984).

{¶28} Ms. Haynes has failed to identify any false or fraudulent representation made by

Ally Financial or an employee of Ally Financial. Ms. Haynes has not alleged any duty on the part

of Ally Financial to make any required disclosures nor does she allege, for example, any special

or fiduciary relationship that existed that would give rise to a duty to disclose. There are no

allegations that Ally Financial made materially false representations and/or that Ms. Haynes

justifiably relied on false representations. Ms. Haynes does not allege what act she took in reliance

on the alleged misrepresentation. The only allegation is a generalized statement that Ally Financial

made a “fraudulent misrepresentation of the nature of [the] ‘Contract’ in regard to a Blue 2018 Kia

Sorento.” Ms. Haynes’ complaint fails to set forth a fraud claim with particularity as required by

Civ.R. 9(B). See Bradley, 2000 WL 372322 at *3 (trial court’s dismissal of fraud claim affirmed

where complaint failed to allege what fraud occurred, the misrepresentation that was made, what 9

action the plaintiff took in reliance on the misrepresentation, the reasonableness of the reliance, or

the resultant injury.)

{¶29} The complaint does not apprise Ally Financial of the alleged fraudulent act of which

Ms. Haynes complains. Ms. Haynes’ failure to plead the elements of fraud with particularity as

required by Civ.R. 9(B) “‘resulted in a defective claim which could not withstand a motion to

dismiss per Civ.R. 12(B)(6).’” Id., quoting Universal Coach, Inc. v. New York City Transit Auth.,

Inc., 90 Ohio App.3d 284, 292 (9th Dist. 1993). Ms. Haynes’ second assignment of error is,

accordingly, overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 12[(B)](6) AS COMPLAINT SHOWS CLEAR, SHORT, AND PLAIN CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

{¶30} Ms. Haynes argues in her third assignment of error that the trial court erred when it

granted Ally Financial’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The motion to dismiss

under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) was based solely on Civ.R.8(A) and Civ. R. 9(B) as discussed above. Based

on our resolution of the first and second assignments of error, this assignment of error is moot and

we decline to address it.

III.

{¶31} For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Haynes’ first assignment of error is sustained

and her second assignment of error is overruled. We decline to address Ms. Haynes’ third

assignment of error as it is moot. We remand to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judgment reversed in part, and affirmed in part, and cause remanded. 10

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed equally to both parties.

SCOT STEVENSON FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, J. FLAGG LANZINGER, J. CONCUR:

APPEARANCES:

DOMINQUE HAYNES, pro se, for Appellant.

JOEL SECHLER, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.