Shepherd, P.J.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Wayne Circuit Court granting the motion for summary disposition of defendant Colista, Green, Green & Adams (cgg & a) on the ground that plaintiff’s legal malpractice action was barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse.
In October, 1975, plaintiff retained defendant Philip Green of the firm of cgg & a to represent him in his federal district court employment discrimination action against Chrysler Corporation. [354]*354Following trial, the district court ruled in plaintiffs favor on February 26, 1980. In its order, the court directed the parties to submit to it within fifteen days an amount agreed upon for plaintiffs back pay. If the parties could not agree on the amount of back pay, they were to inform the court within twenty days, whereupon the court would fix the back pay upon submission of documentation. Plaintiffs judgment was dismissed on April 16, 1980, because Green failed to submit documentation of damages pursuant to court order. Unbeknownst to plaintiff, Green left the firm on June 1, 1980, to open his own office. Plaintiff discovered the fact after having some difficulty reaching Green about his case. After a vague discussion with Green about the status of his case, plaintiff initiated an investigation and learned through a search of his district court file that his case had been dismissed and that his appeal was delayed because his district court record had not been transcribed due to nonpayment. Plaintiff paid for the transcription himself so that his appeal could go forward. Green represented the plaintiff through an appeal to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in August, 1982. Plaintiff’s malpractice action against Green and cgg & A followed in November, 1982.
The statute of limitations for a malpractice action is set forth in MCL 600.5805(l)and (4); MSA 27A.5805G) and (4) and MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838. MCL 600.5805(1) and (4); MSA 27A.5805G) and (4) state:
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
[355]*355(4) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice.
MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838 defines when a claim for professional malpractice accrues. This statute states:
(1) . . . [A] claim based on the malpractice of a person who is, or holds himself or herself out to be, a member of a state licensed profession accrues at the time that person discontinues serving the plaintiff in a professional or pseudoprofessional capacity as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.
(2) . . . [A]n action involving a claim based on malpractice may be commenced at any time within the applicable period prescribed in sections 5805 or 5851 to 5856, or within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later. The burden of proving that the plaintiff neither discovered nor should have discovered the existence of the claim at least 6 months before the expiration of the period otherwise applicable to the claim shall be on the plaintiff. A malpractice action which is not commenced within the time prescribed by this subsection is barred.
There is no pertinent Michigan case law and we are faced with an issue of first impression, namely, what is the proper accrual date against a law firm for statute of limitations purposes when an attorney, while in the employ of the firm, commits actionable malpractice and then leaves the firm but keeps the file and continues to work on it?
The statute requires a plaintiff to bring his claim within two years of when it first accrued or within six months of the discovery of actionable [356]*356malpractice. The purpose behind the limitations statute is to suppress fraudulent or stale claims or claims which are difficult to defend due to the loss of evidence or witnesses after an extended period of time. Lenawee Co v Nutten, 234 Mich 391; 208 NW 613 (1926); Mosley v Federal Department Stores, Inc, 85 Mich App 333; 271 NW2d 224 (1978).
Plaintiff’s claim is neither fraudulent nor stale. Cgg & a was not prejudiced by the delay in filing the action here. It is worth emphasizing that Green’s failure to comply with the documentation order occurred while Green was a partner with the firm of cgg & a. On any view of the facts, cgg & a’s liability is premised on its relationship with Green. Had Green remained with the firm it could have been sued in this action by reason of Green’s continued work on the case. We fail to see why the mere fact of Green’s separation from the firm should allow the firm to better its position. Plaintiff acted as soon as his appeal failed and within six months of discontinuance of Green’s services. Cgg & a’s liability in this matter, if any, is based on agency principles, not upon any acts committed by the firm itself or by persons in the firm other than Green. Given cgg & a’s posture, plaintiff’s claim was filed in a timely manner.
To hold otherwise raises troubling practical implications. If we were to uphold the dismissal of cgg & a, we would be holding that in order to protect his claim against cgg & A plaintiff would have had to bring his action against cgg & a within six months of learning of Green’s departure or within two years of April 16, 1980, even though the appeal in the Sixth Circuit was still pending and Green still represented plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff would have been required to maintain two actions, one against Green and one against cgg & [357]*357a, on the same underlying facts. Such a result does not further the policies of judicial economy or consistency. To affirm the trial court would effectively require a plaintiff to maintain two suits on essentially the same facts in order to insulate himself in situations where an attorney has left the firm, voluntarily or involuntarily, after the alleged malpractice has occurred — even though the attorney who keeps the file may very well cure the malpractice or mitigate its effects through his or her efforts after leaving the firm.1 We believe plaintiff’s action was timely here, where the actionable facts occurred while Green was a full member of the firm, and where plaintiff filed his suit within six months of the termination of Green’s services to plaintiff.
We need to recognize that the practice of law is quite mobile with attorneys moving from one firm to another. Firms merge and dissolve and files frequently move, or remain, based upon the relationships between attorneys. Clients, such as plaintiff, are not necessarily aware of these relationships and often remain with the attorney who inherits the file as part of the arrangement terminating the relationship among the attorneys. We do not believe a firm should be allowed to insulate itself from liability by terminating an attorney and leaving the client under the false impression, even if passively, that his or her rights are fully protected by remaining with the departing attorney whose alleged malpractice occurred under the protective umbrella of the firm.
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Shepherd, P.J.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Wayne Circuit Court granting the motion for summary disposition of defendant Colista, Green, Green & Adams (cgg & a) on the ground that plaintiff’s legal malpractice action was barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse.
In October, 1975, plaintiff retained defendant Philip Green of the firm of cgg & a to represent him in his federal district court employment discrimination action against Chrysler Corporation. [354]*354Following trial, the district court ruled in plaintiffs favor on February 26, 1980. In its order, the court directed the parties to submit to it within fifteen days an amount agreed upon for plaintiffs back pay. If the parties could not agree on the amount of back pay, they were to inform the court within twenty days, whereupon the court would fix the back pay upon submission of documentation. Plaintiffs judgment was dismissed on April 16, 1980, because Green failed to submit documentation of damages pursuant to court order. Unbeknownst to plaintiff, Green left the firm on June 1, 1980, to open his own office. Plaintiff discovered the fact after having some difficulty reaching Green about his case. After a vague discussion with Green about the status of his case, plaintiff initiated an investigation and learned through a search of his district court file that his case had been dismissed and that his appeal was delayed because his district court record had not been transcribed due to nonpayment. Plaintiff paid for the transcription himself so that his appeal could go forward. Green represented the plaintiff through an appeal to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in August, 1982. Plaintiff’s malpractice action against Green and cgg & A followed in November, 1982.
The statute of limitations for a malpractice action is set forth in MCL 600.5805(l)and (4); MSA 27A.5805G) and (4) and MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838. MCL 600.5805(1) and (4); MSA 27A.5805G) and (4) state:
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
[355]*355(4) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice.
MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838 defines when a claim for professional malpractice accrues. This statute states:
(1) . . . [A] claim based on the malpractice of a person who is, or holds himself or herself out to be, a member of a state licensed profession accrues at the time that person discontinues serving the plaintiff in a professional or pseudoprofessional capacity as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.
(2) . . . [A]n action involving a claim based on malpractice may be commenced at any time within the applicable period prescribed in sections 5805 or 5851 to 5856, or within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later. The burden of proving that the plaintiff neither discovered nor should have discovered the existence of the claim at least 6 months before the expiration of the period otherwise applicable to the claim shall be on the plaintiff. A malpractice action which is not commenced within the time prescribed by this subsection is barred.
There is no pertinent Michigan case law and we are faced with an issue of first impression, namely, what is the proper accrual date against a law firm for statute of limitations purposes when an attorney, while in the employ of the firm, commits actionable malpractice and then leaves the firm but keeps the file and continues to work on it?
The statute requires a plaintiff to bring his claim within two years of when it first accrued or within six months of the discovery of actionable [356]*356malpractice. The purpose behind the limitations statute is to suppress fraudulent or stale claims or claims which are difficult to defend due to the loss of evidence or witnesses after an extended period of time. Lenawee Co v Nutten, 234 Mich 391; 208 NW 613 (1926); Mosley v Federal Department Stores, Inc, 85 Mich App 333; 271 NW2d 224 (1978).
Plaintiff’s claim is neither fraudulent nor stale. Cgg & a was not prejudiced by the delay in filing the action here. It is worth emphasizing that Green’s failure to comply with the documentation order occurred while Green was a partner with the firm of cgg & a. On any view of the facts, cgg & a’s liability is premised on its relationship with Green. Had Green remained with the firm it could have been sued in this action by reason of Green’s continued work on the case. We fail to see why the mere fact of Green’s separation from the firm should allow the firm to better its position. Plaintiff acted as soon as his appeal failed and within six months of discontinuance of Green’s services. Cgg & a’s liability in this matter, if any, is based on agency principles, not upon any acts committed by the firm itself or by persons in the firm other than Green. Given cgg & a’s posture, plaintiff’s claim was filed in a timely manner.
To hold otherwise raises troubling practical implications. If we were to uphold the dismissal of cgg & a, we would be holding that in order to protect his claim against cgg & A plaintiff would have had to bring his action against cgg & a within six months of learning of Green’s departure or within two years of April 16, 1980, even though the appeal in the Sixth Circuit was still pending and Green still represented plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff would have been required to maintain two actions, one against Green and one against cgg & [357]*357a, on the same underlying facts. Such a result does not further the policies of judicial economy or consistency. To affirm the trial court would effectively require a plaintiff to maintain two suits on essentially the same facts in order to insulate himself in situations where an attorney has left the firm, voluntarily or involuntarily, after the alleged malpractice has occurred — even though the attorney who keeps the file may very well cure the malpractice or mitigate its effects through his or her efforts after leaving the firm.1 We believe plaintiff’s action was timely here, where the actionable facts occurred while Green was a full member of the firm, and where plaintiff filed his suit within six months of the termination of Green’s services to plaintiff.
We need to recognize that the practice of law is quite mobile with attorneys moving from one firm to another. Firms merge and dissolve and files frequently move, or remain, based upon the relationships between attorneys. Clients, such as plaintiff, are not necessarily aware of these relationships and often remain with the attorney who inherits the file as part of the arrangement terminating the relationship among the attorneys. We do not believe a firm should be allowed to insulate itself from liability by terminating an attorney and leaving the client under the false impression, even if passively, that his or her rights are fully protected by remaining with the departing attorney whose alleged malpractice occurred under the protective umbrella of the firm. This is what hap[358]*358pened in this case even if Green’s departure was not designed for that purpose.
We are unpersuaded by the trial court’s reliance on Luick v Rademacher, 129 Mich App 803; 342 NW2d 617 (1983). In Luick, the defendant, the plaintiffs divorce attorney, placed on the record on July 31, 1979, a settlement agreement to which the plaintiff had not consented. On October 26, 1979, the plaintiff discharged the defendant and retained the services of another attorney who represented plaintiff through several unsuccessful appeals to overturn the consent judgment. The plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against the defendant on January 29, 1982, over two years after he had discharged defendant. Plaintiffs claim was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.
The instant case is readily distinguishable. In this case, plaintiff was represented by defendant Green continuously through the appeals process. Again, we emphasize that cgg & a’s liability is premised on its relationship with Green and the acts plaintiff contends constitute malpractice took place while Green was a full member of the firm. The problem of maintaining two malpractice lawsuits did not exist in Luick and in the instant case the appeal in the Sixth Circuit may very well have established a lack of malpractice, i.e., an argument in the Sixth Circuit was that the United States District judge and not Green or the law firm was at fault. Had plaintiff prevailed in the Sixth Circuit there might have been no malpractice case against anyone.
Reversed.
Cynar, J., concurred.