Hayden Brook Logging, Inc. v. State

574 A.2d 301, 1990 Me. LEXIS 137, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2632
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedMay 3, 1990
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 574 A.2d 301 (Hayden Brook Logging, Inc. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hayden Brook Logging, Inc. v. State, 574 A.2d 301, 1990 Me. LEXIS 137, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2632 (Me. 1990).

Opinion

HORNBY, Justice.

Hayden Brook Logging, Inc., an employer, brought this declaratory judgment action against the State to establish that federal labor law preempts a state statute regulating the hiring of replacement workers during a strike. The statute, 26 M.R. S.A. § 595 (1988), provides that an employer may not engage in specified hiring activities at any of its sites where a labor dispute, strike or walkout is occurring, that an employer must find a separate location at which to engage in these hiring activities and that an employer must notify the county and municipal law enforcement agencies of this new location at least ten days before it begins hiring activities.1 On the employer’s motion for summary judgment, the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Brody, C.J.) ruled that the National Labor Relations Act, 29 Ü.S.C. § 151-68 (1973), preempts the Maine statute. We conclude that this case does not present a justiciable issue. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and, without reaching the merits, remand with instructions to dismiss the action.

Hayden Brook’s employees notified the company that they were going to strike. Hayden Brook wanted to hire replacement workers. According to the evidence submitted on the motion, the company had planned to hire replacement workers by telephone. On advice of counsel, the company concluded that the Maine statute required it to notify the relevant county and town law enforcement agencies ten days before it began hiring. It contacted law enforcement authorities but, before the ten days elapsed, the strikers returned to work. Hayden Brook filed this declaratory judgment action after the work stoppage had ended. Thus, the company no longer wants to hire replacement workers. Although the company claims to have lost revenues during the period when it did not hire replacement workers, Hayden Brook is not seeking damages.

Hayden Brook's only claim is that the Maine statute is preempted by federal labor law and is unconstitutional. It is not clear to us, however, that the statute even applies to the hiring attempt in question here. Hiring by telephone is not clearly covered by the statute. The statute prohibits an employer from

[303]*303A. [Receiving persons for the purpose of soliciting or receiving applications for employment with the employer;
B. [conducting or having conducted interviews of applicants for employment with the employer....

at any of that employer’s places of business where a labor dispute involving the employees of that employer is in progress. See 26 M.R.S.A. § 595(3) (1988). Certainly voice communication by telephone is not “receiving persons” at the site. Although one can “conduct[] interviews” by telephone, there is no suggestion on this record that a labor dispute was occurring at any place where this employer would have made its telephone calls.2 Indeed, it seems unlikely that the Legislature intended to forbid telephone hiring even in an employer’s primary operating plants. After all, telephone calls made from inside an office in the plant do not present any of the confrontational difficulties of applicants visiting a strike-bound plant to file their applications, be interviewed, or have medical examinations performed.3 In this particular ease, the workers are timber harvesters and conduct their activities out in the woods, where the employer has a camp for their living accommodations and sites where they work. According to the testimony of Hayden Brook’s general manager, he would have hired replacement workers simply by phoning people whom he knew, then, after they were hired, picking them and their equipment up and delivering them to the worksite. That kind of hiring activity simply does not appear to fit within the language of the statute. Moreover, it does not fit within the legislative findings with which the statute begins, namely, that:

the practice of receiving applicants for employment, conducting interviews of job applicants or performing medical examinations of job applicants at the work-site of an employer who is currently engaged in a labor dispute with his employees tends to incite violence by bringing individuals who may be considered as replacements for workers to the physical focus of the labor dispute and by encouraging a direct confrontation between these individuals and the prior employees. ...

26 M.R.S.A. § 595(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis supplied). Here, the replacement workers would have arrived at the worksite only after they had been hired. The statute, however, is concerned with applicants, not those who have already been hired.

Finally, we observe that an important part of the employer’s complaint in this case is the ten-day waiting period between notifying law enforcement agencies and beginning off-site hiring. Even assuming that the employer’s telephone hiring is prohibited by subsection 3, and that the employer must therefore proceed with the ten-day notification to law enforcement authorities under subsection 4, paragraph A, there is no apparent penalty for violating this paragraph.4 See 26 M.R.S.A. §§ 595(3) & (4 A) (1988). If we assume that the criminal penalty provided for violation of subsection 4, paragraph B, also applies to paragraph A, we are left with the fact that there is no suggestion on this record that any prosecution is or would be contemplated for telephone hiring.

Because the application and effect of the statute are so uncertain in this factual context as to both this employer and future disputes, we conclude that this controversy does not provide us an appropriate instance in which to rule upon the important question whether federal labor law preempts [304]*304the Maine statute. “A justiciable controversy is a claim of present and fixed rights, as opposed to hypothetical or future rights....” Connors v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 447 A.2d 822, 824 (Me.1982); see also Maine Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. Tierney, 425 A.2d 187, 189 (Me.1981); Bancroft & Martin, Inc. v. Local No. 340, Truck Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, 412 A.2d 1216, 1217 (Me.1980).

The entry is:

Judgment vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint as non-justiciable.

All concurring.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ten Voters of Biddeford v. City of Biddeford
2003 ME 59 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
574 A.2d 301, 1990 Me. LEXIS 137, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2632, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hayden-brook-logging-inc-v-state-me-1990.