FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 5, 2021 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court JOHN HAWLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 19-2183 (D.C. No. 1:18-CV-00489-JHR-SCY) FARM BUREAU PROPERTY & (D. N.M.) CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, McHUGH, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
John Hawley suffered injuries in an automobile accident. The other driver was at
fault and underinsured. Mr. Hawley recovered $25,000 from the at-fault driver’s insurer,
State Farm. He then asked his insurer, Farm Bureau, to pay the rest of his damages under
his uninsured motorist/underinsured motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage. Farm Bureau paid
$75,000—the UM/UIM policy limit of $100,000 less $25,000 to offset the State Farm
payment.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. When Mr. Hawley purchased his Farm Bureau policy, he selected UM/UIM
coverage, but he also signed an endorsement rejecting stacked coverage, limiting his
UM/UIM coverage to $100,000. After the accident, however, Mr. Hawley thought he
should be entitled to “stacked” UM/UIM coverage of $600,000 because he insured six
vehicles with Farm Bureau.
Mr. Hawley sued Farm Bureau, alleging his rejection of stacked coverage was not
valid under New Mexico law. The district court disagreed and granted summary
judgment to Farm Bureau. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. UM/UIM Coverage and Stacking
An at-fault driver in an automobile accident who lacks enough insurance to cover
the injured party’s damages is an uninsured or underinsured motorist. UM/UIM coverage
allows an injured party to recover from its own insurer in this circumstance, up to the
UM/UIM coverage limit. See Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior Servs., 245 P.3d
1209, 1211 (N.M. 2010).
“Stacked” coverage enables an insured to increase this coverage limit by
aggregating UM/UIM coverage across multiple vehicles for an accident involving any
one of the vehicles. As explained in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Safeco Insurance Co., 298 P.3d 452 (N.M. 2013), “The term ‘stacking’ refers to an
insured’s attempt to recover damages in aggregate under more than one policy or one
policy covering more than one vehicle until all damages either are satisfied or the total
2 policy limits are exhausted.” Id. at 454 (quotation omitted). For instance, the coverage
limit doubles when an injured party insures two vehicles and stacks coverage across those
vehicles.
B. Factual Background
Mr. Hawley’s Insurance Policy
Farm Bureau issued Mr. Hawley a motor vehicle insurance policy covering six
vehicles and providing bodily injury liability coverage of $100,000 per person and
$300,000 per accident. When Mr. Hawley bought the policy, he completed an
“Uninsured And Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage Stacking
Rejection/Coverage Selection” form. See App. at 91-92.
As described below, Farm Bureau allowed Mr. Hawley to (a) select UM/UIM
coverage and, if he did, (b) select stacked UM/UIM coverage. He chose UM/UIM
coverage but rejected stacked coverage. Farm Bureau then issued the policy showing Mr.
Hawley’s selections as (c) declarations.
a. UM/UIM selection
The selection form described base-level UM/UIM coverage—UM/UIM coverage
without stacking. It instructed Mr. Hawley that he could (1) purchase coverage up to his
liability limit, (2) purchase coverage in a lesser amount, or (3) reject coverage.
The form provided a menu of “Available UM Coverage Limit[s]”: the “[l]iability
limit” of “$100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident,” two intermediate offerings of
$50,000/$100,000 and $25,000/$50,000, and “$0 – REJECT UM coverage completely.”
3 Id. at 91. Next to the various coverage levels, the form listed the applicable premiums.
The following excerpt from his policy shows Mr. Hawley selected the maximum
coverage level ($100,000/$300,000).
Id. 1 Note that the policy offered non-stacked and stacked coverage at various levels of
base UM/UIM coverage.
The policy listed “[r]epresentations,” including that “UM coverage ha[d] been
explained” and that the insured “selected the UM coverage limit as indicated.” Id. at 92
(emphasis omitted). Mr. Hawley signed below these representations.
b. Stacking selection
The policy also allowed Mr. Hawley to select whether any UM/UIM coverage he
purchased would be stacked for all six vehicles. As the foregoing excerpt shows, the
selection form listed the options and applicable premiums for non-stacked and stacked
coverage. For example, the premium for the maximum level of non-stacked UM/UIM
coverage was $274.16, and the premium for the stacked equivalent was $726.56. Farm
Bureau did not offer Mr. Hawley a choice of stacked coverage on fewer than six vehicles.
1 The highlighting appears in the record.
4 The form then instructed that Mr. Hawley could reject stacked coverage. It also
explained the benefits from paying for stacked coverage: “Intra-Policy Stacked UM
Coverage refers to combining the UM coverage limits . . . for each vehicle specifically
insured for UM coverage under the policy.” Id.
The following excerpt from the policy shows Mr. Hawley selected the option
stating “I reject Intra-Policy Stacked UM Coverage and, instead, select Non-Stacked UM
Coverage.” Id. He signed his name under this selection. 2
Id. 3
c. Declarations
The declarations in Mr. Hawley’s policy reflected both the UM/UIM coverage
level he selected and his rejection of stacking for each of his six insured vehicles. Each
2 Mr. Hawley’s wife later completed a materially similar UM/UIM and stacking selection form, which was incorporated into the insurance policy before the accident. The parties and the district court focused on Mr. Hawley’s selection form. 3 The highlighting appears in the record.
5 entry said that the UM/UIM coverage was $100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident,
and “Uninsured and Underinsured Motor Vehicle Stacking Rejected.” Id. at 94-96.
The policy also explained the meaning of “stacking rejected”:
If stacking rejected is indicated in the Declarations for a particular vehicle then the limits provided for that vehicle to protect against damages “caused by” accidents with “uninsured motor vehicles” and “underinsured motor vehicles” are to be applied separately to that vehicle and cannot be stacked, added together or combined to determine the amount of insurance available from one “occurrence” . . . .
Id. at 101.
Accident and Claim
In 2015, Mr. Hawley was involved in a car accident and suffered injuries. He
recovered the policy limit of $25,000 from State Farm, the at-fault driver’s insurer. Farm
Bureau then paid Mr. Hawley $75,000, reflecting $100,000 of UM/UIM coverage minus
the statutory offset of $25,000 from the at-fault driver’s policy.4 Farm Bureau capped its
payment at the non-stacked coverage limit in Mr. Hawley’s policy.
C. Procedural Background
In 2018, Mr. Hawley sued Farm Bureau in New Mexico state court. Farm Bureau
removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico on diversity
4 The New Mexico UM/UIM “statute limits the insured’s recovery to the amount of uninsured motorist coverage purchased for the insured’s benefit; that amount will be paid in part by the tortfeasor’s liability carrier and the remainder by the insured’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier.” Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 704 P.2d 1092, 1099 (N.M. 1985); see N.M. Stat. § 66-5-301(B).
6 grounds. Mr. Hawley and Farm Bureau agreed to have a magistrate judge conduct the
proceedings.
Mr. Hawley voluntarily dismissed all of his claims except those relating to
stacking. Farm Bureau then moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Hawley
could not stack his UM/UIM coverages. The district court granted summary judgment
for Farm Bureau and dismissed the action with prejudice.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Hawley argues his rejection of stacked UM/UIM insurance was invalid
because Farm Bureau did not provide him an opportunity to “reject each and every
possible combination of stacking for each and every vehicle under his policy.” See Aplt.
Br. at 12. He insists that Farm Bureau—rather than offering a choice only between no
stacking at all or stacking coverage on all six of his vehicles—should have offered him
the choice of stacking on a per-vehicle basis.
For example, at his selected base UM/UIM coverage level of $100,000 per person,
Mr. Hawley contends that Farm Bureau should have offered him the opportunity to stack
his UM/UIM coverage across two vehicles (doubling his coverage to $200,000), or stack
his coverage across three vehicles (tripling his coverage to $300,000), or stack his
coverage across four vehicles (quadrupling his coverage to $400,000), and so on. 5 Only
then, he argues, would a rejection of stacked coverage be valid.
5 To the extent that Mr. Hawley suggests these choices should be available for each base UM/UIM coverage level, our analysis remains the same.
7 We conclude New Mexico law does not require insurers to offer such per-vehicle
stacking to obtain a valid rejection.
A. Additional Legal Background
Standard of Review
“We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the
same legal standard used by the district court.” Cornhusker Cas. Co. v. Skaj, 786 F.3d
842, 849 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). A court “shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In applying this
standard, [the court] view[s] the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Parker Excavating,
Inc. v. Lafarge W., Inc., 863 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).
“We also review legal questions de novo, including the district court’s
interpretation of [state] law . . . .” Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Ins. (UK), 882 F.3d
952, 957 (10th Cir. 2018). 6 “Where the state’s highest court has not addressed the issue
presented, the federal court must determine what decision the state court would make if
faced with the same facts and issue.” Bird v. W. Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1199 (10th
Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). In making this determination, we may look to “decisions
rendered by lower courts in the relevant state, appellate decisions in other states with
6 The parties agree New Mexico law governs.
8 similar legal principles, district court decisions interpreting the law of the state in
question, and the general weight and trend of authority in the relevant area of law.”
Patterson v. PowderMonarch, LLC, 926 F.3d 633, 637 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotation
omitted).
New Mexico Law on UM/UIM Coverage
a. UM/UIM statute
By statute, motor vehicle insurance issued in New Mexico must offer UM/UIM
coverage. See N.M. Stat. § 66-5-301(A), (B); see also N.M. Code R. § 13.12.3
(regulation addressing UM coverage). 7 The insurer must offer levels of UM/UIM
coverage above a statutory minimum and up to the liability coverage limit. See N.M.
Stat. § 66-5-301(A); Weed Warrior Servs., 245 P.3d at 1211. An insured may decline
UM/UIM coverage. See N.M. Stat. § 66-5-301(C).
b. New Mexico Supreme Court’s application of the statute
The New Mexico Supreme Court has observed that this “UM/UIM statute is
intended to expand insurance coverage and to protect individual members of the public
against the hazard of culpable uninsured motorists.” Weed Warrior Servs., 245 P.3d
at 1211 (quotation omitted). Thus, “the uninsured motorist statute must be liberally
7 Although the New Mexico statute requires UM/UIM coverage to be offered with motor vehicle insurance, the insurance follows the insured rather than a vehicle. See Chavez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 100, 103 (N.M. 1975). For instance, “UM coverage also insures one against bodily injury while a pedestrian or a passenger in someone else’s vehicle.” Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co., 92 P.3d 1255, 1258 (N.M. 2004).
9 construed to implement the purpose of compensating those injured through no fault of
their own.” Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 704 P.2d 1092, 1095 (N.M.
1985). Ambiguous policies “are construed against the insurer.” See Rodriguez v.
Windsor Ins. Co., 879 P.2d 759, 763 (N.M. 1994), modified, Montano v. Allstate Indem.
Co., 92 P.3d 1255, 1256 (N.M. 2004). As a result, “UM/UIM coverage [is] the default
when the insured has not exercised the right to reject.” Marckstadt v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 228 P.3d 462, 468 (N.M. 2009).
In Jordan v. Allstate Insurance Co., 245 P.3d 1214 (N.M. 2010), the New Mexico
Supreme Court identified the steps an insurer must take “to obtain a valid rejection” of
UM/UIM coverage. See id. at 1221. The court expressed concern that insurers were
“offer[ing] UM/UIM coverage in ways that are not conducive to allowing the insured to
make a realistically informed” or “knowing and intelligent” decision to reject UM/UIM
coverage. See id. at 1220. To remedy this problem, the court said that insurers must
(1) offer the insured UM/UIM coverage equal to his or her liability limits, (2) inform the insured about premium costs corresponding to the available levels of coverage, (3) obtain a written rejection of UM/UIM coverage equal to the liability limits, and (4) incorporate that rejection into the policy in a way that affords the insured a fair opportunity to reconsider the decision to reject . . . .
Id. at 1221.
If an insurer fails to meet these requirements, “the policy will be reformed to
provide UM/UIM coverage equal to the liability limits.” See id.
10 New Mexico Law on Stacked Coverage - Montano
Unlike UM/UIM coverage, no New Mexico statute specifically addresses stacked
coverage. Rather, “[s]tacking is a judicially-created doctrine.” Montano, 92 P.3d
at 1260. 8 This doctrine does not require insurers to provide stacking. See id. (declining
to find “anti-stacking provisions void as against public policy”). Instead, the New
Mexico Supreme Court “treat[s] stacked coverage as extra coverage for which the parties
have contracted.” Id. (quotation omitted). If an insurer fails to obtain a valid rejection of
stacked coverage that has been offered, “the insured is entitled [to stacking] by default.”
See id. (quotation omitted).
In Montano v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 92 P.3d 1255 (N.M. 2004), the policy
offered stacking limited to two vehicles, but the insured purchased liability coverage on
four vehicles. See id. at 1256-57. The insured claimed he was entitled to stack his
coverage across all four. See id. at 1256. Further, he argued the court should declare “all
anti-stacking clauses . . . void as against New Mexico’s public policy.” Id. at 1257. The
court declined to do so, see id. at 1256, and clarified what an insurer that has offered
stacked UM/UIM coverage must do to avoid providing it, see id. at 1260. The court read
New Mexico’s UM/UIM statute to “suggest that insurance companies obtain the written
rejection of each stacked coverage from [their] insureds in order to limit that coverage,”
and thus held that “an insurance company should obtain written rejections of stacking in
8 The New Mexico Legislature has not disapproved of stacking, however. Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co., 92 P.3d 1255, 1260 (N.M. 2004).
11 order to limit its liability based on an anti-stacking provision.” Id. This requirement
“effectuate[s] the two functions of [New Mexico’s] stacking jurisprudence: fulfilling the
reasonable expectations of the insured and ensuring that the insured receive what he or
she pays for.” Id. at 1261.
The Montano court also provided an example of what a valid stacking rejection
might look like:
As an illustration of our holding, in a multiple-vehicle policy insuring three cars, the insurer shall declare the premium charge for each of the three UM coverages and allow the insured to reject, in writing, all or some of the offered coverages. Thus, hypothetically, in the case of a $25,000 policy, if the premium for one UM coverage is $65, two coverages is an additional $60, and three coverages $57 more, the insured who paid all three (for a total premium of $182) would be covered up to $75,000 in UM bodily injury coverage. However, the insured may reject, in writing, the third available coverage and pay $125 for $50,000 of UM coverage; or the insured may reject, in writing, the second and third coverages and pay $65 for $25,000 of UM coverage; or the insured may reject all three UM coverages. In any event, the coverage would not depend on which vehicle, if any, was occupied at the time of the injury. Thus, the insured’s expectations will be clear, and an insured will only receive what he or she has paid for.
Id. at 1260-61.
Citing to this illustration, Jordan said “Montano . . . require[s] insurance carriers
to provide insureds with the premium costs for each available level of stacked coverage.”
245 P.3d at 1221; see also Whelan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 329 P.3d 646, 653
(N.M. 2014) (summarizing Montano as requiring “that insurers disclose the premium
12 costs for each available level of stacked coverage as a means of guaranteeing that
consumers can knowingly exercise their statutory rights to UM/UIM coverage”).
In sum, Montano holds that when an insurer has offered stacking of UM/UIM
coverage, it can avoid providing it by (1) stating the premium costs for the offered
coverage and (2) obtaining a written rejection from the insured.
Later Stacking Cases
Since Montano, New Mexico and federal courts have attempted to apply its
holding about rejection of stacked coverage. Some of these cases speak to the question
before us—whether an insurer must offer every possible combination of stacking for a
rejection to be valid.
In Arias v. Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Co., --- P.3d ----, 2013 WL 12439297
(N.M. Ct. App. 2013), the plaintiff insured two vehicles and “rejected UM/UIM
coverage.” See id. at *1. The New Mexico Court of Appeals found the insured’s
rejection invalid and reformed her policy to provide UM/UIM coverage. See id. It also
decided the reformed coverage limit should stack across the two insured vehicles, see id.
at *4, noting “Montano’s strong dicta indicating a preference for policies to treat vehicles
individually and, hence, requiring a policyholder’s specific rejection of stacked coverage
for each and every vehicle owned before stacking is validly rejected,” id. at *3. The
court explained, “[A]bsent the execution of a sufficient rejection of each and every
possible combination of stacking, stacking is something ‘to which the insured is entitled
by default.’” Id. (quoting Montano, 92 P.3d at 1260). Thus, “Montano demonstrates that,
13 when invalid rejection of stacking exists, our courts favor and extend stacking to all
vehicles covered by the policy.” Id. The court “h[e]ld that, as much as coverage itself to
the maximum limit of liability must be read into [the plaintiff’s] policy, stacking of
coverage for each of the two vehicles thus insured must now follow suit absent valid
rejection.” Id. at *4.
In Jaramillo v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 573 F. App’x 733 (10th
Cir. 2014) (unpublished), 9 we addressed whether New Mexico law requires insurers to
explain stacking to insureds. See id. at 739. We noted that “the Jordan court was silent
on the issue of stacking, and it did not clearly tie stacking to its new UM/UIM coverage-
rejection standard.” Id. at 744. We concluded “neither Jordan nor Montano expressly
requires the kind of ‘discussion of stacking’—viz., a totaling of the premium cost for all
vehicles and the provision of the associated amount of stacked coverage at each level of
coverage—that the [plaintiffs] suggest must be on a valid Option Form (and waiver of
UM/UIM coverage).” Id. at 749.
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Shroyer, No. 1:15-cv-00306
PJK/SCY, 2015 WL 12669885 (D.N.M. Dec. 1, 2015), the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico addressed a selection form that offered UM/UIM coverage on
only an “‘all cars’ or ‘no cars’ basis.” See id. at *1-3. The insured argued that because
9 Although not precedential, we find the reasoning of unpublished opinions cited in this order and judgment instructive. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (“Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value.”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
14 the form did not allow selection of “coverage on each car individually,” it was invalid.
See id. at *3. She thus asked the court to reform the policy to provide the maximum
amount of stacked coverage. See id. at *1. The court observed that the insured’s
argument for per-vehicle offerings, “[t]aken to its logical end, . . . would require an
infinite number of choices, an approach that is unworkable.” See id. at *4. Looking to
Montano and Jordan, it determined “[t]here simply is no requirement that an insurer
make available, let alone disclose, every permutation [of coverage] regardless of whether
it is offered as an option.” See id.; see also Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Trissell,
No. 1:17-cv-00362 PJK/GBW, 2017 WL 6028515, at *4 (D.N.M. Dec. 5, 2017) (“There
is no requirement that an insurer offer [stacked] UM/UIM coverage on a per-vehicle basis
in a multi-vehicle policy, nor is there a requirement that an insurer provide premium
amounts for options not available.”).
In Ullman v. Safeway Insurance Co., 404 P.3d 434 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017), cert.
granted, No. S-1-SC-36580 (N.M. Aug. 24, 2017), the New Mexico Court of Appeals
addressed an insurer’s duty to explain stacking to customers. See id. at 439-40, 444-47.
The court, adopting Jaramillo’s analysis of Montano and Jordan, found an insurer need
not present to an insured its UM/UIM coverage level if stacked. See id. at 446-47. It
generally held “an insurer has no duty to offer or explain stacking.” Id. at 440.
Finally, in Lueras v. GEICO General Insurance Co., 424 P.3d 665 (N.M. Ct. App.
2018), cert. granted, Nos. S-1-SC-37135, S-1-SC-37137 (N.M. Aug. 16, 2018), the New
Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the same questions presented in Ullman, see id.
15 at 666, and also whether an insurer may require insureds either to “purchase the same
level of UM/UIM insurance on each of their vehicles, or reject UM/UIM coverage on all
vehicles,” id. at 668-69. First, relying on Ullman, the court rejected the claim that an
insurer’s “not explain[ing] that UM/UIM benefits would be stacked”—and thus not
stating “the amount of UM/UIM coverage . . . actually available”—violated Jordan. See
id. at 668. Second, the court held that New Mexico law does not “impose . . . a
requirement” that “automobile insurers . . . offer policyholders UM/UIM coverage on a
per-vehicle basis.” Id. at 670. Thus, “New Mexico law does not preclude an insurer
from requiring an insured to choose the same UM/UIM coverage (or to reject UM/UIM
coverage entirely) for all vehicles covered by a single policy.” Id. at 666-67.
B. Analysis
In our view, New Mexico law does not require an insurer to offer every
combination of UM/UIM coverage stacking for an insured’s rejection of stacked
coverage to be valid. First, the New Mexico Supreme Court has not addressed the
question before us, and its cases do not imply such a requirement. Second, the relevant
case law suggests New Mexico law does not require an insurer to offer every
combination of stacking. Third, New Mexico public policy does not call for this
requirement.
New Mexico Supreme Court
The New Mexico Supreme Court did not address in Jordan or Montano whether
insurers must offer every combination of stacked UM/UIM coverage. In Jordan, it
16 identified the steps an insurer must take to obtain a valid rejection of base UM/UIM
coverage, not stacking. See 245 P.3d at 1221; see also Jaramillo, 573 F. App’x at 744
(“[E]xcept for the general reference to Montano, the Jordan court was silent on the issue
of stacking, and it did not clearly tie stacking to its new UM/UIM coverage-rejection
standard.”); Ullman, 404 P.3d at 447 (“As in Jaramillo, we will not graft stacking onto
our view of Jordan.”).
In Montano, the court addressed stacking, but narrowly “h[e]ld that insurance
companies must obtain written rejections of stacking in order to limit their liability.”
92 P.3d at 1256. As the policy before us shows, requiring insurers to receive a rejection
of stacking before limiting coverage is not the same as requiring insurers to offer and
receive rejections of every possible combination of stacking before limiting coverage.
See Lueras, 424 P.3d at 670 (“We conclude that [Montano] did not consider whether
automobile insurers should be required to offer policyholders UM/UIM coverage on a
per-vehicle basis, much less impose such a requirement.”). Rather, Montano holds that
insurers must obtain rejections “of the offered coverages,” Montano, 92 P.3d at 1261
(emphasis added), which is what happened with Mr. Hawley. Post-Montano decisions
correspondingly refer to the “available level[s] of stacked coverage.” See Jordan, 245
P.3d at 1221 (emphasis added); see also Whelan, 329 P.3d at 653.
The Montano court gave an “illustration of [its] holding” in which an insurer
offered per-vehicle stacking. See 92 P.3d at 1260-61. But an illustration is an example,
not a holding. See Lueras, 424 P.3d at 670 (identifying no authority “[o]ther than the
17 illustration in [Montano]” for the “contention that [an insurer] must offer UM/UIM
coverage on a per-vehicle basis,” and thus rejecting it). Nothing in the illustration
requires an insurer to offer every combination of stacked coverage. See id. (stating that
“[b]y its own terms, [Montano’s] ‘illustration’ does not describe a mandatory requirement
imposed on all insurers offering UM/UIM coverage”). Rather, the illustration shows how
an insurer could receive a valid stacking rejection if it offered stacking in this fashion.
See Trissell, 2017 WL 6028515, at *4 (stating that “[t]he illustration in Montano
concerns a policy where the insurer offers stacking on a per-vehicle basis (so a written
rejection of stacking on each vehicle would be appropriate), but it does not mandate such
an offering”).
Based on Jordan and Montano, we have no reason to predict that the New Mexico
Supreme Court would require insurers to offer every possible stacking combination
before a rejection can be valid, as Mr. Hawley contends. Even if Jordan’s requirements
to reject base UM/UIM coverage applied to stacking, we find nothing in Jordan that
would require an insurer to offer and then receive a rejection of every possible
combination of stacking, as opposed to a rejection of just the stacking options offered by
the insurer. See Trissell, 2017 WL 6028515, at *4 (stating that the requirements of
“premium disclosure and rejection are designed for available options, not every
permutation imaginable”).
18 Relevant Case Law from Other Courts
The foregoing analysis of New Mexico Supreme Court decisions accords with
decisions from other courts. In Shroyer and Trissell, the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico addressed similar questions and concluded New Mexico insurers
need not offer every combination of UM/UIM coverage or stacking. See 2015 WL
12669885, at *3-5; 2017 WL 6028515, at *3-4. In Lueras, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals likewise rejected a requirement for per-vehicle UM/UIM coverage offerings.
See 424 P.3d at 666-70. And in Ullman, the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated that an
insurer need not “offer or explain stacking to a customer,” 404 P.3d at 440—which also
would necessarily preclude a requirement to offer or explain per-vehicle stacking.
Similarly, we concluded in Jaramillo that neither Jordan nor Montano requires a
“discussion of stacking” for “available levels” of coverage, see 573 F. App’x at 744-49,
much less unavailable ones. 10
Mr. Hawley’s reliance on Arias is factually inapposite. First, in Arias the insured
rejected base UM/UIM coverage. See 2013 WL 12439297, at *1. Here, Mr. Hawley
10 Mr. Hawley correctly observes the district court improperly stated it was “bound” by Jaramillo. See App. at 145. Typically, “when a panel of this Court has rendered a decision interpreting state law, that interpretation is binding on district courts in this circuit, and on subsequent panels of this Court, unless an intervening decision of the state’s highest court has resolved the issue.” Patterson v. PowderMonarch, LLC, 926 F.3d 633, 637 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). Jaramillo is an unpublished opinion. And while unpublished opinions may have “persuasive value,” they “are not binding precedent.” United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005); see also 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). As our analysis reveals, despite this inaccurate statement by the district court, its ultimate conclusion of law proved accurate.
19 selected base UM/UIM coverage and rejected stacked coverage. Second, in Arias, the
court held the plaintiff’s rejection of UM/UIM coverage was invalid, and it reformed the
policy to provide base coverage. See id. Here, the policy already included base
UM/UIM coverage. Third, Arias addressed what stacking options should be available
when the court has reformed the policy to add base UM/UIM coverage. See id. at *3-4.
Here, Mr. Hawley’s policy already included base UM/UIM and stacking options without
reformation of the policy. See Jaramillo, 573 F. App’x at 746 (“[S]tacking in the
situation contemplated by Arias follows only after the court finds an invalid rejection of
UM/UIM coverage and reads that coverage into a policy.”). Fourth, the Arias policy
covered only two vehicles, so the only stacking possibility was to double the UM/UIM
coverage limit over two vehicles. See 2013 WL 12439297, at *1. Here, Mr. Hawley
could choose to stack his UM/UIM coverage over six vehicles. He argues he should have
had other options, but Farm Bureau gave him at least as many options as the court created
in Arias. The stark differences between Arias and this case render the Arias dicta (in turn
based on Montano dicta) on per-vehicle stacking coverage unpersuasive here.
Public Policy
New Mexico recognizes a “public policy in support of stacking.” Montano, 92
P.3d at 1259. But this policy does not help Mr. Hawley here. It has two goals:
“fulfilling the reasonable expectations of the insured and ensuring that the insured receive
20 what he or she pays for.” Id. at 1261. Mr. Hawley received the coverage that he
requested and for which he paid. 11
The Montano court recognized that stacking coverage across all vehicles only
could reduce consumers’ “freedom to decide how much coverage they can afford.” See
id. at 1259. But this preference for consumer choice does not require every conceivable
choice. Indeed, the law does not even require an insurer to offer every possible level of
UM/UIM coverage, and does not require an insurer to offer stacked coverage at all. See
Jordan, 245 P.3d at 1221 (explaining that the “menu of coverage options and
corresponding premium costs” an insurer must provide includes rejection of UM/UIM
coverage, coverage in “the minimum amount . . . allowed by [statute],” coverage in the
“amount equal to the policy’s liability limits,” and “any other levels of UM/UIM
coverage offered to the insured”).
Farm Bureau offered Mr. Hawley three base levels of UM/UIM coverage:
(1) $25,000; (2) $50,000; or (3) $100,000. It further offered him the choice of not
stacking his chosen base coverage or of stacking it across his six vehicles. As a result,
Mr. Hawley could pick (1) $25,000 non-stacked; (2) $50,000 non-stacked; (3) $100,000
11 In his reply brief, Mr. Hawley notes that Montano states as a matter of public policy that “it is unfair not to allow stacking when multiple premiums are paid,” Aplt. Reply Br. at 6 (quoting Montano, 92 P.3d at 1259 (emphasis omitted)), and argues he “paid separate UM/UIM premiums for each of his . . . covered vehicles,” id. By raising this argument only in his reply brief, Mr. Hawley waived it. See United States v. Pickel, 863 F.3d 1240, 1259 (10th Cir. 2017) (stating that an appellant “waived” an argument made “for the first time in his reply brief”). We thus do not address it.
21 non-stacked; (4) $25,000 stacked (equal to $150,000 of coverage); (5) $50,000 stacked
(equal to $300,000 of coverage); or (6) $100,000 stacked (equal to $600,000 of
coverage). Or he could (7) reject UM/UIM coverage entirely. Mr. Hawley argues these
seven options did not provide him with adequate choice. He contends the only way Farm
Bureau could have offered a sufficient range of choice was by providing every
combination of stacking for every vehicle, potentially necessitating a vastly expanded
number of options. The New Mexico Supreme Court has not indicated it would require
an insurer to do so.
* * * *
We do not read New Mexico law to require an insurer to offer every possible
combination of UM/UIM stacking to obtain a valid rejection. Farm Bureau therefore
received a valid rejection of stacking from Mr. Hawley. He was not entitled to stack his
UM/UIM coverage.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge