Hawkins v. Gerber Products Co.

924 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 2013 WL 627066
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedFebruary 20, 2013
DocketCase No. 12-cv-465-MMA (JMA)
StatusPublished
Cited by47 cases

This text of 924 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (Hawkins v. Gerber Products Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hawkins v. Gerber Products Co., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 2013 WL 627066 (S.D. Cal. 2013).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

[Doc. No. 25]

MICHAEL M. ANELLO, District Judge.

Defendants Gerber Products Company and Nestlé USA, Inc. (respectively, “Gerber” and “Nestlé,” and collectively “Defendants”), move pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for a transfer of venue to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. [Doc. No. 25.] In the alternative, Defendants request the Court decline jurisdiction under the first-to-file rule and order transfer. Plaintiff filed an opposition [Doc. No 27], to which Defendants replied. [Doc. No. 28.] For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.

[1212]*1212I. Background

On February 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Defendants alleging violations of California, Michigan, and New Jersey laws. [Compl. at 11-16.] Between February 2012 and April 2012, ten similar lawsuits were filed against Defendants in six different federal districts.1 On October 16, 2012, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPMDL”) entered an order denying centralization of this case with the other similar lawsuits, explaining that “transfer under Section 1404 is preferable to centralization.” [Doc. No. 17 at 3.] Shortly after the JPMDL denial, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging that Defendants misleadingly advertise and market infant formula and cereal (“probiotic products”) as promoting immunity and digestive health because the foods contain probiotic and prebiotic cultures. [FAC ¶ 1.] Plaintiffs FAC eliminated the original claims based on Michigan and New Jersey laws, but retained the claims under the California Unfair Competition Law, California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and warranty law. [FAC ¶¶ 49-69.]

The FAC further establishes that all Plaintiffs are domiciled in California, and purchased Defendants’ products there. [Id. at ¶¶ 5-7.] Gerber is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in the District of New Jersey. [Id. at ¶ 2.] Nestlé is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in the Central District of California. [Id. at ¶3.] Defendants filed the present motion to transfer on November 29, 2012.

II. Legal Standard

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil matter to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The purpose of section 1404(a) is to “prevent the waste of time, energy, and money to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A motion for transfer lies within the broad discretion of the district court and must be determined on an individualized basis. See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir.2000).

To support a motion for transfer of venue, the moving party must establish “that venue is proper in the transferor district; that the transferee district is one where the action might have originally been brought; and that transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and will promote the interests of justice.” Vu v. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc., 602 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1155-56 (N.D.Cal.2009) (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 820 F.Supp. 503, 506 (C.D.Cal.1992)).

Once venue is determined to be proper in both districts, “[t]he Court must consider public factors relating to ‘the in[1213]*1213terest of justice’ and private factors relating to ‘the convenience of the parties and witnesses.’ ” Decker Coal Co. v. Commonw. Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir.1986). Such factors include: (1) plaintiffs choice of forum; (2) convenience of the parties; (3) convenience of the witnesses; (4) ease of access to the evidence; (5) familiarity of each forum with an applicable law; (6) feasibility of consolidation with other claims; (7) any local interest in the controversy; and (8) the relative court congestion and time of trial in each forum. Vu, 602 F.Supp.2d at 1156. In general, “[t]he defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiffs choice of forum.” Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843.

III. Discussion

Five of the original ten actions2 have been consolidated and are pending in the District of New Jersey,3 where Gerber is headquartered and the marketing and advertising at issue purportedly emanated. Among those five actions is the first-filed Siddiqi action,4 which was filed in the Central District of California and subsequently transferred to the District of New Jersey. Defendants now move to transfer this action to the District of New Jersey on the grounds that it would be more convenient for the witnesses and parties and in the interest of justice. [Mot. at 1.]

As Defendants correctly observe, this transfer motion is unlike the typical binary “either-or” transfer motion, because the consolidated In re Gerber action will continue in New Jersey regardless of the outcome of this transfer motion. Thus, the Court cannot simply weigh the benefits and costs of California versus New Jersey as the forum for Plaintiffs case; instead, the question is whether this suit should be consolidated with In re Gerber in New Jersey, or whether it should proceed simultaneously — and separately — in California.

A. The “Could Have Been Brought” Requirement

As a threshold matter, Defendants must establish that venue is proper in the Southern District of California and that this action could have been brought in the District of New Jersey. Vu, 602 F.Supp.2d at 1155-56. Defendants readily satisfy these requirements. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), venue is proper for corporations in any district in which a court has personal jurisdiction over that corporation. Defendants have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the Southern District of California to be subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction. See WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Therefore, Defendants are deemed to reside in the Southern District of California, and venue is proper.

Defendants also have sufficient minimum “minimum contacts” with the District of New Jersey to be subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction because Gerber’s principal place of business is located in Florham Park, New Jersey. Many of the marketing representations concerning the probiotic products were made at Gerber’s Florham Park, New Jersey headquarters.

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924 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 2013 WL 627066, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawkins-v-gerber-products-co-casd-2013.