Hawkins v. Friendship Missionary Baptist Church

69 S.W.3d 756, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 1046, 2002 WL 193854

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 7, 2002
• Docket: 14-01-00138-CV
• Status: Published

Opinions

MAJORITY OPINION

RICHARD H. EDELMAN, Justice.

In this church governance dispute, Milford Hawkins, Robert McGowan, and Henry Smith (collectively, the “Deacons”) appeal a temporary injunction entered in favor of the Friendship Missionary Baptist Church (the “Church”) and Leroy J. Bailey, individually and as Chairman of the Church body (collectively, “Bailey”), on the grounds that the trial court: (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this ecclesiastical matter; and (2) abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction. We reverse and dismiss.

Background

After a dispute arose among the parties, the Church and Bailey sought injunctive relief to prohibit the Deacons from interfering with Bailey serving as Pastor of the Church or expending church funds, and from refusing Bailey or the Church body access to Church property and records. In response, the Deacons filed a plea in abatement and motion to dismiss arguing that Bailey had no authority or legal capacity to bring suit on behalf of the Church; the Deacons were not hable in the individual capacities in which they had been sued; and the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because it concerned ecclesiastical decisions that were made by the duly empowered Board of Deacons of the Church (the “Board”). The trial court denied the Deacons’ plea and motion and granted the temporary injunction (the “injunction”) sought by the Church and Bailey.¹ The injunction was based on the trial court’s finding therein that the Church “is a congregational form of church government, [and] that the congregation, through its meeting of church membership is the governing authority.”²

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

On appeal, the Deacons’ first issue reiterates that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case because it involves an ecclesiastical matter relating to the firing of a minister by the Board which has historically governed the Church. The Church and Bailey argue that a determination of which group within a church has authority to make decisions is a non-ecclesiastical matter which the courts have jurisdiction to decide.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of Religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). Therefore, among other things, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979). Similarly:

civil courts do not inquire whether the relevant [hierarchical] church governing body has power under religious law [to decide such a dispute].... Such a determination ... frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage. To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a [hierarchical] church as to decide ... religious law [governing church polity] ... would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.

Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) (citations omitted).³ However, a state may adopt an approach, including neutral principles of law, for resolving church disputes that involve no consideration of doctrinal matters. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604, 99 S.Ct. 3020. Under such an approach, a court may interpret church documents, such as a church constitution, in purely secular terms without relying on religious precepts in resolving the conflict. Id. at 604, 99 S.Ct. 3020.⁴ However, if the matter cannot be determined by the court without resolving a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body. Id.

In this case, there is no Church constitution, by-laws, or other document indicating how or by whom the Church is to be governed. The trial court based its granting of the injunction on: (1) the testimony of Church members and current and former church office holders regarding past practices; and (2) a determination that the Church is congregational. However, it is undisputed that the Deacons held some position of authority within the Church, and the fact that the Church is congregational does not establish what powers, if any, the Deacons held within the Church’s congregational form of government, under what circumstances those powers could have been revoked or overridden, if at all, by the congregation, or whether any such conditions were met in this case.⁵ Without governing Church documents which could be construed in purely secular terms, the power struggle between the Church, Deacons, and Pastor cannot be resolved based only on neutral principles of law, but apparently only by delving into religious doctrine or polity. Because we therefore agree with the Deacons that this dispute involves an ecclesiastical matter, we sustain their first point of error and need not address their second point of error challenging the injunction on the merits. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgement and dismiss the case.

WITTIG, Justice, dissents.

1 . The temporary injunction requires that the Deacons desist and refrain from (1) attempting to dismiss Bailey as pastor of the Church without authorization from the Church body; (2) taking action to prevent Bailey from pas-toring the Church; (3) taking action to ex-elude Bailey from the Church grounds; (4) threatening to have arrested, or causing to be arrested, Bailey because of his presence on the Church property; (5) expending Church funds; and (6) refusing access by Bailey or the Church body to: (a) keys to the locks of the Church, (b) keys to the Church's vehicles, (c) keys to the Church's post office, (d) keys to the Church's safety deposit box, (e) the Church’s gasoline credit cards, (f) the Church’s bank statements, (g) the Church’s checking accounts and checkbooks, (h) the Church's financial records, and (i) any other Church records.

2 . Churches which are governed primarily by their members are described as “congregational” whereas those which are governed primarily by a larger religious institution are described as "hierarchical.” See, e.g., Green v. Westgate Apostolic Church, 808 S.W.2d 547, 550-51 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, writ denied).

3 . See Smith v. Clark, 185 Misc.2d 1, 709 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358-59 (2000) (holding that court has no jurisdiction to decide whether former administrator of church had authority to enter into employment agreement or whether a pastor has the authority to terminate an employee holding a ministry position because such a determination would require the court to delve into the religious cannons and laws of the rights of an administrator versus a pastor); Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 426 Mass. 268, 688 N.E.2d 923, 933 (1997) (holding that court has no jurisdiction to decide church governance, even though whoever controls a church has control over its assets, because when resolution of a religious dispute affects the control of church property in addition to the structure and administration of the church, the case involves an ecclesiastical matter); Rolfe v. Parker, 968 S.W.2d 178, 181-84 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (holding that court has no jurisdiction to decide which body, the Quorum of Apostles or the administrative committee, was the legally constituted authority of the church and had ultimate authority over the affairs of the church because such a determination concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church). Even if wrongs exist in the ecclesiastical setting, and the administration of a church is inadequate to provide a remedy, the preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle that it overshadows the inequities that may result from its liberal application. Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54, 58-59 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), cert denied, 533 U.S. 902, 121 S.Ct. 2242, 150 L.Ed.2d 231 (2001); Patterson v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 858 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ) (holding that court cannot decide whether a church complied with its own procedural rules in removing a bishop).

4 . See Green, 808 S.W.2d at 552 (concluding that trial court correctly awarded church property to the appellees because they were the duly authorized church board under the governing church bylaws).

5 . We do not agree with the dissent that a congregational form of church government necessarily means that any decision within the church must or can be made by a majority vote of the congregation.