Hawkins v. Conley

District Court, N.D. Indiana·Decided August 2, 2024·No. 3:24-cv-00315·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JOHN ANTHONY HAWKINS-EL, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CAUSE NO.: 3:24-CV-315-JVB-JEM ) TONYA CONLEY, et al., ) Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER John Anthony Hawkins-El, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a “Petition for Certificate of Appealability.” [DE 8]. The certificate of appealability requirement applies only to habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This case is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the motion will be denied as unnecessary. Hawkins-El also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. [DE 9]. However, “[a]n appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see also Thomas v. Zatecky, 712 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing “bad faith” as objective frivolousness). In many cases, “good faith” does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff has subjectively good intentions. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000). Rather, “to sue in bad faith means merely to sue on the basis of a frivolous claim, which is to say a claim that no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Id. Appealing in forma pauperis is also prohibited when a plaintiff sues in “actual bad faith”—for instance when a plaintiff displays dishonesty in court filings. See e.g., Bastani v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 960 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 2020). Hawkins-El’s complaint was dismissed because it failed to state any claims. See generally (ECF No. 4). As set forth in the court’s dismissal order, Hawkins-El alleged the following: [H]e and Sergeant Donny Betzner got into an argument he describes as a “heated altercation,” so Hawkins-El struck Sergeant Betzner. (ECF 1 at 2). Correctional Officer Tonya Conley then put Hawkins-El into a chokehold and tried to “bulk” him to the ground. Id. Hawkins-El admits he was “struggling” to get out of the chokehold, so Sergeant Betzner took out his mace and began to spray him in the face. Id. Hawkins-El and Officer Conley fell backwards onto the bottom bunk, still struggling, and Hawkins-El buried his face into Officer Conley’s body to avoid the mace. Hawkins-El then “got up to go decontaminate myself” and was met with a second burst of chemical agent by Sergeant Betzner. As Hawkins-El was still moving toward the “mop closet” to decontaminate himself, Sergeant Betzner punched him in the forehead. Hawkins-El claims he now suffers from back pain, neck stiffness, and headaches due to the incident. Id. at 1-2. In assessing whether Hawkins-El had stated viable Eighth Amendment claims against the officers, the Court noted Hawkins-El admitted he was the initial physical aggressor and that, despite the claim that he was “no threat” after the second burst of chemical spray was issued, “his own allegations contradict that assertion because he admits he was still ‘try[ing] to get to the mop closet’ when Sergeant Betzner punched him in the forehead to end the encounter.” Id. at 3. Based on Hawkins-El’s own assertions, “the allegations in the complaint do not support an inference of excessive force because there was a clear need for the officers to use the force to subdue Hawkins- El after he struck an officer and continued to actively resist their efforts to control him.” Id.1 In his motion, Hawkins-El states he should be “granted the opportunity to amend [his] complaint” because the use of force was “grossly disproportionate to the non-threat posed by Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 9-1 at 1). He doesn’t provide any additional facts that would support such a conclusion, nor does he dispute the facts set forth by the Court in its dismissal order. As noted above, the allegations do not support a claim of excessive force. See Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d

1 The court also dismissed the claims against the officers for failing to follow IDOC policy when effectuating the use of force because “departmental policy violations do not amount to constitutional violations.” (ECF 4 at 4). The claims against the Executive Regional Director were dismissed because supervisor liability is insufficient to state a claim and because failing to conduct an “in depth” investigation of the matter doesn’t state a constitutional violation. Id. 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2007); McCready v. Ebay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that a plaintiff can plead himself out of court if he pleads facts that preclude relief). Moreover, allowing Hawkins-El leave to file an amended complaint would be futile. Although he checked the box indicating he has never “sued anyone for this exact same event,”

(ECF No. 1 at 4), this statement, declared by Hawkins-El under penalty of perjury, is false. Following the entry of judgment, the Court discovered Hawkins-El had previously filed two petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the Southern District of Indiana based on the events at issue here.2 See Hawkins-El v. Vanihel, cause no. 2:22-CV-550-JRS-MKK (S.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 2022) (“Hawkins-El Habeas #1”) and Hawkins-El v. Vanihel, cause no. 1:22-CV-2331-SEB-CSW (S.D. Ind. Dec. 2, 2022) (“Hawkins-El Habeas #2”).3 Both petitions stem from prison disciplinary convictions of A-117 battery against staff that occurred on the morning of April 22, 2022—one for battering Sergeant Donny Betzner and one for battering Correctional Officer Tonya Conley. Relevant portions of the conduct reports forming the basis of the disciplinary convictions include the following:

On 4/22/2022 at approximately 8:50AM, I Sgt. D. Betzner was performing curtain detail in JHU. After removing the curtain that was hanging in JHU 103-104 an offender later identified as Hawkins, John 986724 began to walk towards myself and Officer T. Conley asking why we took his curtain. . . . He continued to make his plea about his curtain then suddenly struck me in the left side of my face hitting me in the eye causing blood to obscure vision in that eye at that point I attempted to perform blocking techniques to prevent further injury but

2 Although the habeas petitions would not have been counted as strikes in determining whether Hawkins-El initially qualified for in forma pauperis status, they are clearly relevant to the current litigation. It is evident Hawkins-El was and is aware of those lawsuits and knows they are based on the same events described here, as he continues to actively litigate them. Hawkins-El’s failure to disclose them is evidence of actual bad faith. However, because the Court will deny the motion to appeal in forma pauperis for an additional reason, the issue of actual bad faith will not be considered as solely dispositive. 3 The Court is permitted to take judicial notice of public documents in its orders connected with the screening of a complaint. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2018); Daniel v. Cook Cty., 833 F.3d 728, 742 (7th Cir.

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