Hawkins v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 22, 2022
• Docket: 2:21-cv-00711
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Loraanne M Hawkins, No. CV-21-00711-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Loranne M Hawkins’s appeal from the 16 Commission of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) denial of social security 17 disability benefits. The appeal is fully briefed, (Doc. 15, Doc. 18, Doc. 21), and the Court 18 now rules. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 A. Factual Overview 21 Plaintiff was 42 years old as of the hearing and has a high school education. (AR 22 28, 29). Plaintiff has a history of work as an administrative clerk, procurement clerk, and 23 mortgage closing clerk. (AR 17–18). Plaintiff filed her social security disability claim in 24 October 2018. (AR 10). 25 B. The SSA’s Five-Step Evaluation Process 26 To qualify for social security benefits, a claimant must show she “is under a 27 disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (E). A claimant is disabled if she suffers from a medically 28 determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents her from engaging “in any 1 substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 423(d)(1)–(2). The SSA has created a five-step process 2 for an ALJ to determine whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). 3 Each step is potentially dispositive. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4). 4 At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial 5 gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. Substantial 6 gainful activity is work activity that is both “substantial,” involving “significant physical 7 or mental activities,” and “gainful,” done “for pay or profit.” Id. § 404.1572(a)–(b). 8 At the second step, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the claimant’s 9 impairments. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have “a severe medically 10 determinable physical or mental impairment,” the claimant is not disabled. Id. A “severe 11 impairment” is one which “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability 12 to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). Basic work activities are “the abilities and 13 aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” Id. § 404.1522(b). 14 At the third step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment or 15 combination of impairments “meets or equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 16 Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is disabled. 17 Id. If not, before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s “residual 18 functional capacity” (RFC). Id. § 404.1520(a)(4). The RFC represents the most a claimant 19 “can still do despite [her] limitations.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing the claimant’s 20 RFC, the ALJ will consider the claimant’s “impairment(s), and any related symptoms, such 21 as pain, [that] may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what [the claimant] 22 can do in a work setting.” Id. 23 At the fourth step, the ALJ uses the RFC to determine whether the claimant can still 24 perform her “past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The ALJ compares the 25 claimant’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work. 26 Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform her past relevant work, the ALJ will find 27 that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 28 1 At the fifth and final step, the ALJ determines whether—considering the claimant’s 2 RFC, age, education, and work experience—she “can make an adjustment to other work.” 3 Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the ALJ finds that the claimant can make an adjustment to other 4 work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. If the ALJ finds that the claimant cannot make 5 an adjustment to other work, then the claimant is disabled. Id. 6 C. The ALJ’s Application of the Factors 7 At the first step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 8 activity since October 30, 2018, the alleged onset date. (AR 13). At the second step, the 9 ALJ concluded Plaintiff had severe impairments of right and left carpal tunnel syndrome 10 status post repair, neuropathy status post breast cancer treatment, and obesity. (AR 13). 11 At the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s her impairments did not meet 12 or equal the criteria in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. (AR 13 14–15). After evaluating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform 14 light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). (AR 15). At the fourth step, the ALJ 15 determined that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as an administrative clerk. 16 (AR 17–18). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 This Court may not overturn the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits absent legal error 19 or a lack of substantial evidence. Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). 20 “Substantial evidence means ... such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 21 as adequate to support a conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) 22 (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). 23 On review, the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the 24 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion, and may 25 not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. (quoting 26 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014)). The ALJ, not this Court, draws 27 inferences, resolves conflicts in medical testimony, and determines credibility. See 28 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, the Court must affirm even when “the evidence admits of more 2 than one rational interpretation.” Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). The 3 Court “review[s] only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and 4 may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 5 1010. 6 III. DISCUSSION 7 Plaintiff raises two potential errors in the ALJ’s analysis: 1) the ALJ committed 8 materially harmful error by finding Plaintiff’s gastrointestinal impairments were not 9 severe, and 2) the ALJ committed materially harmful by rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective 10 symptom testimony. (Doc. 15 at 1–2). The Court address each in turn. 11 A. Gastrointestinal Impairments 12 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff’s gastrointestinal 13 impairments were not severe. (Doc. 15 at 11). Plaintiff contends that the record shows that 14 her gastrointestinal impairments would interfere with her ability to work. (Doc. 15 at 11). 15 The ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), concluding 16 that: The record showed that the claimant was also assessed with GERD, a hiatal 17 hernia, and migraines. However, the undersigned found that, upon review of 18 available evidence of record, these impairments did not result in complications at a frequency and severity consistent with severe 19 impairments; they did not result in more than minimal limitations with the 20 claimant’s ability to perform work related activities for the requisite durational period. Accordingly, the claimant’s GERD and hiatal hernia are 21 nonsevere. 22 (AR 13). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff “has had a lot of treatment for her GI issues, but 23 her testing and exams have again been normal.” (AR 17). 24 To prove a severe impairment, a claimant must simply demonstrate that “there is 25 more than a minimal effect on [her] ability to do basic work activities.” Jimenez v. Astrue, 26 641 F. Supp. 2d 954, 960 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). Basic work 27 activities include: 28 Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; [c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and 1 speaking; [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; [u]se of judgment; [r]esponding appropriately to supervision, 2 co-workers and usual work situations; and [d]ealing with changes in a routine 3 work setting. 4 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b); see also Jimenez, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 960. The bar for establishing 5 a severe impairment is low and is “meant to screen out weak claims.” Buck v. Berryhill, 6 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017). 7 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to address Plaintiff’s “extensive course of 8 treatment” and suffering she experienced. (Doc. 15 at 12). Plaintiff claims that if the ALJ 9 found that her gastrointestinal impairments were severe, it could have impacted the residual 10 functional capacity determination and the ultimate nondisability determination. (Doc. 15 11 at 13). Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored the abdominal surgery performed 12 during the relevant period. (Doc. 15 at 16). 13 Here, the ALJ determined that the impairment was not severe for several reasons. 14 First, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had “a lot of treatment” for her gastrointestinal issues 15 and subsequent tests revealed normal findings. (AR 17). Second, the ALJ considered 16 Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily tasks which indicated non-severe impairments. (AR 15). 17 Third, the ALJ found that symptoms experienced were infrequent to constitute a severe 18 impairment. (AR 13). And although the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s gastrointestinal 19 impairments were not severe, he still considered the impairment when assessing Plaintiff’s 20 RFC. (AR 13). 21 The Court concludes that the ALJ gave legally sufficient reasons to conclude that 22 Plaintiff’s gastrointestinal impairments were not severe. Though the evidence could have 23 led to the opposite conclusion, this Court cannot upset the ALJ’s decision where “evidence 24 exists to support more than one rational interpretation.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 25 Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 26 B. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 27 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom 28 testimony. (Doc. 15 at 13). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to show “anything specific 1 in the medical record that was inconsistent” with her testimony. (Doc. 15 at 15). 2 At her hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had carpal tunnel surgery but that she 3 continued to experience pain and numbness in her hands. (AR 33). She also testified that 4 she had been having migraines since 2014 and had memory issues. (AR 33–34). She further 5 testified that she had issues with her bowels and had nausea. (AR 43). Additionally, 6 Plaintiff testified that she performs limited housework. (AR 39). 7 The Ninth Circuit has established a two-step analysis for an ALJ to determine 8 whether to credit a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony. “First, the ALJ must 9 determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 10 impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 11 alleged.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Garrison, 759 12 F.3d at 1014–15). If the claimant presents such evidence, the ALJ then evaluates the 13 claimant’s subjective complaints. See id. “In evaluating the credibility of pain testimony 14 after a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ 15 may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical 16 evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 17 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). Instead, an ALJ must provide “specific, clear, and convincing 18 reasons” for doing so. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014). 19 At the first step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably 20 be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms.” (AR 16). At the second step, 21 however, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, 22 persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not consistent with the medical 23 evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 16). 24 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring 25 Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony be “entirely consistent” with medical evidence. 26 (Doc. 15 at 14). The Court does not read the ALJ’s “not entirely consistent” language as 27 requiring Plaintiff to fully corroborate her symptom testimony with objective medical 28 evidence. Rather, the ALJ was merely stating that the record contained conflicting evidence 1 as to the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms. An ALJ may properly consider objective medical 2 evidence to assess Plaintiff’s credibility regarding the intensity and persistence of her 3 symptoms. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 4 The ALJ also did not solely rely on the objective medical evidence. The ALJ 5 considered Plaintiff’s ability to engage in activities of daily living. (AR 15). Moreover, the 6 ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s treatment history did not reflect her symptoms: She had carpal tunnel release surgery and her follow up records after the 7 surgeries showed she was doing well, had no restrictions in using her hand, 8 and full strength. There was no further treatment specifically for her hands or wrists and it was indicated that her numbness went away, contrary to her 9 testimony. 10 (AR 17). 11 Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to specifically discuss what symptoms 12 were inconsistent with the objective evidence. (Doc. 15 at 15). Plaintiff argues that this 13 failure does not satisfy the specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting her 14 symptom testimony. (Doc. 15 at 15). Here, however, the ALJ did more than state that 15 Plaintiff’s “alleged symptoms” were inconsistent with the objective evidence. (Doc. 15 at 16 15). The ALJ noted that the examination notes showed “normal findings, normal gait, and 17 full active range of motion of her extremities including her hands.” (AR 16). The ALJ also 18 stated that the “follow up records after the surgeries showed she was doing well, had no 19 restrictions in using her hand, and full strength.” (AR 17). 20 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that treatment records for 21 her GI issues were “normal.” (Doc. 15 at 16). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she required 22 an abdominal surgery during this period because of a test. (Doc. 15 at 16). But the ALJ 23 considered the treatment Plaintiff had for her GI issues which would include surgery. (AR 24 17). The Court does not read the ALJ to be saying that Plaintiff had no issues with her GI. 25 Rather, she treated her issues and subsequent tests came back normal. 26 The reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony were sufficiently specific, 27 clear, and convincing. The ALJ’s decision was reasonable and supported by substantial 28 evidence. IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated above, 3 IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of the Commissioner 4|| of Social Security is AFFIRMED, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment || accordingly. 6 Dated this 22nd day of June, 2022. 7 8 '

James A. CO 10 Senior United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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