Hawaii Masons & Plasterers Trust Funds v. 808 Maintenance & Flooring, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Hawaii
DecidedOctober 4, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-00280
StatusUnknown

This text of Hawaii Masons & Plasterers Trust Funds v. 808 Maintenance & Flooring, Inc. (Hawaii Masons & Plasterers Trust Funds v. 808 Maintenance & Flooring, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Hawaii primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hawaii Masons & Plasterers Trust Funds v. 808 Maintenance & Flooring, Inc., (D. Haw. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII TRUSTEES OF THE HAWAII ) CIVIL NO. 24-00280 MWJS-WRP MASONS’ AND PLASTERERS’ ) TRUST FUNDS, ) FINDINGS AND ) RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT Plaintiffs, ) PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ) ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT vs. ) ) 808 MAINTENANCE & FLOORING, ) INC., ET AL., ) ) Defendants. ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant 808 Maintenance & Flooring Inc., filed on August 28, 2024 (Motion), ECF No. 17. The Court finds the Motion suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule 7.1(c) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii. Based on the record in this action and the relevant legal authority, the Court FINDS AND RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ Motion be GRANTED.1 1 Within fourteen days after a party is served with the Findings and Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a party may file written objections in the United States District Court. A party must file any objections BACKGROUND According to the Complaint, Defendant agreed comply with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement entitled the Master Agreement Covering

Ceramic Tile, Marble and Terrazzo Trades in the State of Hawaii (Agreement), which required Defendant to pay to Plaintiffs certain amounts for employee benefits for work performed by Defendant’s covered employees, to submit certain

reports to Plaintiffs, to permit Plaintiffs to audit its payroll records, and to furnish Plaintiffs with a surety bond or cash-in-escrow in the amount equal to Defendant’s last three months of contributions or $5,000, whichever is greater, if required by Plaintiffs. See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 11-17; Ex. 2 to Mot., ECF No. 17-5.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant failed to make the required contributions and submit the required reports. See id. ¶¶ 21-22. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs sought an order directing Defendant to provide timely reports and contributions, to permit

Plaintiffs to audit its payroll books and records, and to furnish Plaintiffs with surety bonds or cash-in-escrow in the amount equal to Defendant’s last three months of contributions or $5,000, whichever is greater, as required under the Agreement. See id. at 13-14. Additionally, Plaintiffs sought an award for unpaid

contributions, liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. See id.

within the fourteen-day period to preserve appellate review of the Findings and Recommendation. The Clerk entered default against Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) on August 1, 2024. See Entry of Default, ECF No. 12. This Motion followed.

DISCUSSION Default judgment may be entered if the defendant has defaulted by failing to appear and the plaintiff’s claim is for a “sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1), (2). The granting

or denial of a motion for default judgment is within the discretion of the court. See Haw. Carpenters’ Trust Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily disfavored, and cases should be decided on their

merits if reasonably possible. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). A. Jurisdiction Before considering the merits of default judgment, the Court has an

affirmative obligation to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“To avoid entering a default judgment that can later be

successfully attacked as void, a court should determine whether it has the power, i.e., the jurisdiction, to enter the judgment in the first place.”). Here, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(a), 1132, 1145. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is a Hawaii corporation doing business in Hawaii and that the claims arise out of that business, see Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 9, and indicate that Defendant was served through its registered agent, Jack T. Shizuru Jr., see Proof of

Service, ECF No. 9, at 4. Because the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court will address the merits of the Motion.

B. Default Judgment Factors Following a determination that jurisdiction is proper, the Court must consider whether default judgment is appropriate. The court should consider the following factors in deciding whether to grant a motion for default judgment:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (the Eitel factors). On default, “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). The allegations as to liability are deemed true, but the plaintiff must establish the relief to which it is entitled. See Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). Also, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267

(9th Cir. 1992). 1. The Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiffs The first factor considers whether Plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if

default judgment is not entered. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, absent entry of default judgment, Plaintiffs would be without any other recourse for recovery. Accordingly, the first Eitel factor favors default judgment.

2. Merits of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Claims For purposes of liability, the factual allegations in the Complaint are taken as true on default. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18; Fair Hous.

of Marin, 285 F.3d at 906. Here, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, taken as true, establish that Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment against Defendant.

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Hawaii Masons & Plasterers Trust Funds v. 808 Maintenance & Flooring, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawaii-masons-plasterers-trust-funds-v-808-maintenance-flooring-inc-hid-2024.