Hauser v. Reilly

536 N.W.2d 865, 212 Mich. App. 184

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 18, 1995
• Docket: Docket 159444
• Status: Published

Opinions

Doctoroff, C.J.

In this paternity suit, plaintiff Jamie Hauser appeals as of right from a November 20, 1992, order granting "summary judgment” in favor of defendant Lorrie Reilly. We affirm.

The case concerns plaintiffs standing under the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq.; MSA 25.491 et seq., to claim that he is the father of Lynnae Rae, born August 5, 1991. Plaintiffs complaint, which was filed on July 16, 1992, alleged in relevant part:

5. That the aforementioned minor child is the product of the union between the parties hereto during a time in which Defendant had filed for Divorce from her husband John Reilly, Sr.

6. That Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant never followed through with said Divorce and in fact may still be married to John Reilly, Sr.

7. That while the minor child was not technically born out of wedlock, both of the parties hereto believed the child to be the natural child of Jamie Hauser and in fact submitted to blood tests.

8. That the test results came back with a probability of paternity for Jamie Hauser of 99.99%.

9. That the aforementioned blood test, in addition to the parties consent to same is a determination that the minor child is not an issue of the marriage between the Defendant and her present husband.

As relief, plaintiff sought an order of filiation and visitation rights, plus an award to defendant for child support.

On October 5, 1992, defendant filed a motion for "summary judgment” and costs under MCE 2.114(E) on the ground that Girard v Wagenmaker, 437 Mich 231; 470 NW2d 372 (1991), was directly on point in this case and stands for the proposition that plaintiff lacks standing to bring this lawsuit because defendant was married when the child was conceived and born. The motion was supported by defendant’s affidavit. The trial court held that it was bound to follow Girard, supra, awarded costs but not attorney fees, and dismissed the suit.¹

In Girard, supra, our Supreme Court concluded that the putative father did not have standing to bring a claim under the Paternity Act. The Supreme Court denied the putative father standing under an interpretation of the statute that required "a prior determination that the child is not the issue of a marriage.” Id. at 246. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Girard focused upon rules of statutory interpretation, and expressly declined to review "any constitutional questions.” Id. at 234-235, n 3. Dissenting, Justice Cavanagh (joined by Justice Levin) concluded that the majority’s interpretation of the Paternity Act violated the putative father’s right to due process under the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 17. Girard, supra at 276-278 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).

First, plaintiff claims that our Supreme Court’s holding in Girard was contrary to the intent of the Legislature. A decision of the Supreme Court is binding upon this Court until the Supreme Court overrules itself. People v Mitchell, 428 Mich 364, 369-370; 408 NW2d 798 (1987). Therefore, we may not revisit the issue of the Legislature’s intent with regard to the Paternity Act. See Spielmaker v Lee, 205 Mich App 51; 517 NW2d 558 (1994).

Second, plaintiff argues that our Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Paternity Act deprives him of his right to due process under the Michigan Constitution. We disagree.

Three different theories exist on the right of putative fathers to due process because of protected liberty interests in their relationships with their children. In Michael H v Gerald D, 491 US 110; 109 S Ct 2333; 105 L Ed 2d 91 (1989), Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, determined that a putative father had no protected liberty interest in establishing and maintaining a relationship with his child when the child’s mother gave birth to the child while married to another man. Justice Scalia reasoned that the United States Constitution did not grant the unwed father parental interests comparable to that of the married father. Id. at 130.

1 The trial court entered an order granting "summary judgment” in favor of defendant. We will review this case as an appeal from an order of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C).