Hauser v. Kraeuter Co.

129 A. 473, 97 N.J. Eq. 413, 12 Stock. 413, 1925 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 115
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedMay 29, 1925
StatusPublished

This text of 129 A. 473 (Hauser v. Kraeuter Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hauser v. Kraeuter Co., 129 A. 473, 97 N.J. Eq. 413, 12 Stock. 413, 1925 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 115 (N.J. Ct. App. 1925).

Opinion

Kraeuter Company are tool manufacturers in Irvington. Their forge shop contains twenty-eight drop hammers, varying in size from four hundred to two thousand pounds, falling weight. The noise from the hammers is claimed to be a nuisance to habitation. Vibration is also charged, but it is established that, sensibly and materially, there is none. The noise is of the intensity to be expected from a dozen and more heavy drop hammers, all in action. That the complainants, and complaining witnesses called by them, are annoyed and distressed in their homes there can be no doubt. Nor can there be any question that their non-complaining neighbors, some living in as close and others in closer proximity to the source, are not bothered, and suffer no inconvenience. The difference, in effect, is apparently due to difference in temperament, physical and nervous condition, and the circumstances under which the noise is experienced. The factory, with present methods, has been in operation since 1917. It is in a locality which for many years has been devoted to foundries, smelters, forges, saw mills, railroad yards, mills and elevator factories, stove and range factories and the like, and which long has been known as "Enterprise Hill." The industries are contiguous. This mill center was recently zoned by the municipality for heavy industries, and while the municipal action is not influential, it is indicative of the character of the neighborhood. The locality was promoted industrially before the coming of the houses now surrounding the mill section, which, mostly, are of the type usually found in factory districts, and, as a rule, are occupied by the families of workers. The case is not one of factory invasion of a residential neighborhood, but, one where the defendants were invited by the industrial character of the place, dedicated to heavy industries, to locate their plant, and where the prospect held out, as it were, assurances of immunity from complaint of discomfort customary from mill and factory annoyance.

Where great industrial works are segregated, as they are here, in an appropriate locality, and are circumspectly carried *Page 415 on, during working hours, noise, characteristic of the enterprises, must be endured by those who by choice or of necessity live in the vicinity. It is unfortunate that such dwellers are denied the comforts afforded in communities more remote from factory districts, but their misfortune in this respect is purely social, not legal, and not cognizable in equity. The maxim "So use your own as not to injure another" is not infringed in such neighborhoods, if the business is not a nuisance per se, or the noise is not greater than ordinarily comes from carefully carrying on a lawful trade. That the noise from the defendant's factory is greater and more constant than that which comes from other noisy plants in the group, and possibly is the major contributor to the concert of noises coming from the mill section, is not a distinction that makes for the extinction of their works, as a nuisance, if the noise is no more than necessarily made in cautiously conducting the business. It is conceded that the noise is not inconsistent with the nature of the works, and it may be added that the works are perfectly consistent with the surroundings. Equity is always reluctant to interfere on the ground of nuisance with a lawful trade lawfully carried on, and it would have to be an annoyance of exceptional aggravation to move the court to enjoin an industry in a factory district at the instance of householders adjacent to the district. It would seem that in such surroundings the maxim is more nearly apposite as between factory owners than as between them and neighboring dwellers. Wallace Tiernan v. UnitedStates Cutlery Co., 97 N.J. Eq. 408; 3 N.J. Adv. R. 1904. This is borne out by the present-day policy of governmental segregation of manufactures in our larger municipalities, and it must be regarded as the accepted rule, in the spirit of the age of business activity and in the interest of public welfare, that the householder in and near industrial centers subordinates himself and submits to the discomforts incident to industrial life.

An injunction restraining the defendants would inflict upon them an irreparable loss; it would result in the closing of their factory and the destruction of their business, involving *Page 416 an investment of $300,000 and the withdrawal from commerce of an annual turnover of a million and a half of dollars. The judgment, however, is not rested on the weight of inconveniences (Hennessy v. Carmony, 50 N.J. Eq. 616), but upon the pure equities of the case, which find support in the wealth of literature on the subject, of which some is to be found inWolcott v. Melick, 11 N.J. Eq. 204; Cleveland v. CitizensGas Light Co., 20 N.J. Eq. 201; Duncan v. Hays Greenwood,22 N.J. Eq. 25; Gilbough v. West Side Amusement Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 27; Seligman v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 71 N.J. Eq. 697;affirmed, 72 N.J. Eq. 946; Reilley v. Curley, 75 N.J. Eq. 57;Kroecker v. Camden Coke Co., 82 N.J. Eq. 373; Chambers v.Walker, 33 N.J.L.J. 23; Straus v. Barnett, 140 Pa. 111; Eller v. Koehler, 68 Ohio St. 51; 67 N.E. Rep. 89; Hafer v. Guynan,7 Pa. Dist. R. 21; Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448;Lindblom v. Purity Ice and Refrigerating Co. (1920),217 Ill. App. Rep. 306; Lohmuller v. Samuel Kirk Son Co.,133 Md. 78; Huckenstein's App., 70 Pa. 102; Rushmere v. Polsue Alfieri, 1 Ch. L.R. (1906) 234.

The complainant has not made out a case of nuisance which calls for the drastic remedy by injunction, and the bill will be dismissed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lohmuller v. Samuel Kirk & Son Co.
104 A. 270 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1918)
Wallace Tiernan Co. v. U.S. Cutlery Co.
128 A. 872 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1925)
Huckenstine's Appeal
70 Pa. 102 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1872)
Straus v. Barnett
21 A. 253 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1891)
Gilbert v. Showerman
23 Mich. 448 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1871)
Cleveland v. Citizens Gas Light Co.
20 N.J. Eq. 201 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1869)
Duncan v. Hayes & Greenwood
22 N.J. Eq. 25 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1871)
Hennessy v. Carmony
50 N.J. Eq. 616 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1892)
Gilbough v. West Side Amusement Co.
53 A. 289 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1902)
Seligman v. Victor Talking Machine Co.
63 A. 1093 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1906)
Reilley v. Curley
71 A. 700 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1908)
Kroecker v. Camden Coke Co.
88 A. 955 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1913)
Eller v. Koehler
1 Ohio Law Rep. 79 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1903)
Seligman v. Victor Talking Machine Co.
73 A. 1118 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1907)
Lindblom v. Purity Ice & Refrigerating Co.
217 Ill. App. 306 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1920)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
129 A. 473, 97 N.J. Eq. 413, 12 Stock. 413, 1925 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 115, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hauser-v-kraeuter-co-njch-1925.