Hattie v. Potter

102 P. 1023, 54 Wash. 170, 1909 Wash. LEXIS 965
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 14, 1909
DocketNo. 8030
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 102 P. 1023 (Hattie v. Potter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hattie v. Potter, 102 P. 1023, 54 Wash. 170, 1909 Wash. LEXIS 965 (Wash. 1909).

Opinion

Morris, J.

Orson Tucker died intestate in Lincoln county, Washington, on the 8th day of August, 1908, leaving sur[171]*171viving him his father, John J. Tucker, his sole heir, then an inmate of the Yuba county hospital, at Marysville, California. The property of Orson Tucker consisted of lands and personal property situate within Lincoln county, of the value of $20,000, now in the possession of John E. Frazer, his administrator. On August 15, 1906, John J. Tucker gave a power of attorney to Frank W. Potter, husband of his daughter Minnie Potter, being a general power of attorney as to all lands and property of the estate of Orson Tucker. Under this power of attorney Potter went to Lincoln county and procured the appointment of Frazer as administrator. On November 12, 1906, John J. Tucker gave a deed to his daughter Minnie Potter of all the Lincoln county lands descending to him as sole heir of his son Orson, and on the same day made an assignment to her of all his rights, title, and interests in and to the estate of his son Orson.

John J. Tucker died March 25, 1907, leaving surviving him his daughter Minnie Potter, and the minor appellants, children of two other daughters, now deceased; and thereafter this action was commenced on behalf of said minors to set aside said deed and assignment, upon the grounds of fraud, undue influenpe, and insufficient mental capacity. Upon issue being joined, trial was had, resulting in a decree sustaining the validity,of these instruments, and this appeal.

As is usual in cases of this character, the evidence is somewhat conflicting, but we think it is established that John J. Tucker lost his wife about thirty-five years ago. He made no effort to maintain his family together but, leaving them in custody of others, he spent his time working upon ranches near. Marysville. His only home, in so far as it can be said he had one, seems to have been with a bachelor friend named Shay, with whom he lived more or less for thirty-five years. He seems to have been a good worker, and to have commanded good wages until he began to fail physically; but nobody seems to know what became of the money he earned, unless he spent it in an occasional spree, which seems to have [172]*172been more or less of a habit with him when he visited Marysville. In addition to his wages, he received money from his mother’s estate, but nobody seems to know how much, or what became of it. He continued to work as long as he was able, until, as Shay says, he “couldn’t hold a saw any more,” when Shay obtained a permit for him and he entered the county hospital as a charity inmate, on June 27, 1904, being at that time seventy-four years of age.

The details of his life at the hospital are naturally very meager, but he seems to have been what would ordinarily be expected of a man of his age and physical condition, until the death of his son, when, according to the testimony of the hospital steward, he had a “break-down,” mentally and physically, and his entire condition and habit seem to have greatly changed. A few instances of this change are given: Before that time he used to peel potatoes each day in preparation for dinner; afterwards he either would or could not; at least he did not. Before the death of his son he was somewhat careful about his appearance; would be the first one to ask for clean clothes from the steward Sunday morning; after-wards he paid no attention to his clothes, and they would be taken to his bed. He did not seem to realize it was Sunday. He was in the habit of crying; would hold the hands of the steward and cling to him in a helpless manner. At bed time he would go to the operating room and other rooms, wandering around, and complain of being lost; would forget where he put his tobacco; complain of losing his money. He was somewhat deaf, and had lost the power of speech to some extent, so that it was difficult to understand him. Before his so-called breakdown, he is described as being quite talkative; afterwards he did not seem to want to talk. Before he went to the hospital he was very exact about his money matters; as his old friend Shay says: “He was very exact, that old man was; he wanted the last cent.” After the son’s death he seemed, the steward testified, to have no idea of money matters. ' A physician, to whom a [173]*173hypothetical question was propounded based upon his physical and mental condition as testified to by some of the witnesses, says the facts would indicate senile dementia.

This was.the man from whom this power of attorney was obtained by his son-in-law shortly after the son’s death, and by whom later on the deed and assignment were executed, transferring all his property without consideration to his daughter. Concerning the execution of these several papers there is no competent evidence that gives much history of them. We know little about them, except that they were executed. Hence we must depend largely upon all the facts and circumstances surrounding and in any wise reflecting upon the acts, to determine their character. In cases of this character it is not necessary to establish an absolute loss of mentality. Complainants do not have to prove the insanity of the grantor. It is sufficient to show that the mind was in such a weakened condition, from either mental or physical infirmities, that it could be found there was not sufficient intelligence to understand fully the nature and effect of the transaction complained of; or, if so, that the conveyance was executed under such circumstances that it ought not to be upheld, or as would justify the interference of equity for its cancellation; especially where, as in this case, we find allegations of fraud and undue influence imposed upon an old man seventy-seven years of age, conveying all his property to one heir to the exclusion of others, and leaving himself stripped of property of the value of $20,000, and continuing to be an inmate of a county poor house until his death. Such a transaction is upon its face of doubtful propriety, and justifies a careful scrutiny into its fairness. Such a man as the evidence shows John J. Tucker to have been at the time of the execution of these instruments could easily have been imposed upon; and the inference may well be drawn, and courts of equity will not be slow to draw it, that they were obtained by fraud or circumvention. A party in such a mental condition is easily exposed to fraudulent designs, so pow[174]*174erless to escape them and too dull to suspect, that courts deem it their duty to interpose, and that upon the ground of fraud. Van Horn v. Keenan, 28 Ill. 445.

We can find in this record no natural reason for this old man’s act. This daughter and her husband, who became the sole beneficiaries of these conveyances, had lived for two years in the same city. The husband was a merchant. They do not seem to have taken much interest in him until he became possessed of this property. The steward says he never saw the daughter at the hospital. The daughter says she was there once prior to the time she moved to Reno. Her husband admits on his direct examination that, prior to the time this property came to the old gentleman, he never went to see him; says he was too busy. On cross-examination, this fact being called to his attention, he says he did go to see him; thinks he might have dropped in when he was riding by; but he can give no time nor details of such visit. It is safe to assume they were never made. As soon as the brother dies, they become very much interested in the welfare of the father and the disposition of the property.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
102 P. 1023, 54 Wash. 170, 1909 Wash. LEXIS 965, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hattie-v-potter-wash-1909.