Hathorn v. Dr. Strong's Saratoga Springs Sanitarium

55 Misc. 445, 106 N.Y.S. 553
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 15, 1907
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 55 Misc. 445 (Hathorn v. Dr. Strong's Saratoga Springs Sanitarium) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hathorn v. Dr. Strong's Saratoga Springs Sanitarium, 55 Misc. 445, 106 N.Y.S. 553 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1907).

Opinion

Spencer, J.

The plaintiffs are owners of the Hathorn Mineral Spring at Saratoga and the defendants of the Dr. Strong’s Sanitarium in the same village. Plaintiffs’ spring, discovered in 1868, has discharged large quantities of mineral [446]*446water, which have been used for medicinal purposes upon the premises or conserved in bottles and sold for use elsewhere. Its owners have thus enjoyed a large and profitable business. In recent years the quality of gas has gradually depreciated and the flow of water decreased, so that, at the time of the commencement of this action, it had practically ceased to flow. The defendants, whose premises are about 1,200 feet distant, in 1902 drilled a well about six inches in diameter and about 400 feet deep, at which depth Saratoga mineral water was discovered. It did not come to the surface but stood about 30 feet below. The defendants, thereupon, installed therein a steam rotary pump, with the plunger about 150 feet below the surface, and commenced its operation and continued until this action and the service of an injunction order. Such order was subsequently modified and continued as modified. Issue has been joined and a trial had. The testimony is voluminous. Counsel have submitted briefs remarkable for clearness and the orderly manner in which the evidence is collated. They have also discussed numerous decisions by courts of this and other countries. In the midst of such a wealth of citation and discussion, one is likely to be lost, unless elementary principles are kept in mind. These principles as to waters are simple. Therefore, it will be well to briefly set them forth in order to lead up to the particular questions involved.

In the absence of statutory regulations or private agreements, all waters are, in contemplation of law, regarded as either flowing or percolating. The former consists of those bodies, such as lakes, ponds and streams, which are upon or beneath the surface of the earth and whose boundaries and courses are well defined and reasonably ascertainable and whose existence is not of a temporary or ephemeral character. As to these, the owner of land has no title. His right to use or divert is measured by its reasonableness and limited to the premises along, through or over which the waters flow. The reason for this rule is found in the fact that all such riparian owners have rights therein, and one may not unreasonably interfere with another.

[447]*447Without discussion, it may be premised that none of the waters of Saratoga belong to this class. All waters, not within the above description of flowing waters, are deemed percolating. They are so regarded because, practically, they constitute themselves parts of the substances in which they exist or through which they pass. When found in land, they may not be distinguished in law from the land. They are a part of the same, and the owner of the land is the absolute owner. He may use them where and in such manner as he chooses or dispose of them to others for like use. He is subject only to the general limitation, which has application to all ownership of property, that in its acquisition and enjoyment he may not unreasonably injure or interfere with the rights of others.

As all springs and streams, classed as running waters, draw their supplies from percolating waters, it follows of necessity that they are subject to diminution or exhaustion by use or diversion by the owner of the land from which they come. Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520, 527; Bloodgood v. Ayers, 10S id. 400. Since the decision of Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, cited and followed by courts in our own country, it has been regarded also as settled law that the same rule applies to percolating waters in the lands of adjoining proprietors, and that one owner may dig and take all the percolating water he finds and use it to his own free will and pleasure; and if, by the exercise of such right, he intercepts or draws off the percolating waters of his neighbors’ land, such injury is damnum absque injuria.

These decisions were made to rest upon the difficulties of determining with reasonable certainty the movements of percolating waters, and because adjudications in respect thereto would be against public policy as interfering with drainage, mining and other public improvements. But the researches of science have made plain and certain many things that were then beyond our knowledge, and it is difficult to perceive any relation which this subject has to public policy. The rights of an owner in property below the surface should be regarded as inviolable as those in property upon the surface.

[448]*448In the light of more recent decisions, we must regard the foregoing cases as having application only to such percolating waters as pass from the lands of one owner to those of another by reason of natural laws, and not as applying to artificial appliances, employed to accelerate the operation of such laws or to divert, contrary thereto. Thus, in Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 App. Div. 340; affd., 160 N. Y. 357, pumping percolating water from an excavation, by which surface ponds and streams on lands of a neighbor were depleted, was condemned as in violation of the rights of.such neighbor. In Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N. Y. 522, affg. 47 App. Div. 371, the same doctrine was confirmed and the pumping of percolating waters was restrained, because it drew percolating water from a neighbor’s land and (bus depleted its moisture and rendered more difficult the cultivation of celery and watercress. These cases must be regarded as making important advances in reíegard to this subject. For example, in the latter it is said that the proof concerning underground percolating waters may be about as satisfactory and convincing as in the case of surface waters; and, in the former, the question of public policy is mentioned and disregarded. They must also be regarded as decisive that the doctrine of reasonable use has no application to the- rights of landowners in the percolating waters in their respective lands. In the Forbell case, the water was employed by the defendant for the relief of suffering humanity in a great city and by the plaintiff to nourish celery and water-cresses, yet the court prohibited the former for the sake of the latter. Although not therein definitely stated, both of these decisions must be regarded as resting upon the proposition that the use of artificial means to attract or divert percolating waters is an unreasonable interference therewith, when shown to deplete such waters in the lands of another to his loss. We thus come to the precise question in this case. Does the pumping at the defendants’ well decrease the force of the gas and the flow of water at plaintiffs’ spring ? If so, I find no escape from the conclusion that it is unjustifiable and should be restrained.

[449]*449The question of fact, which now confronts us, has been sharply contested and, from the very nature of the case, does not admit of ocular demonstration. The testimony discloses an instance between two other wells, where the effect was so direct and immediate as to be seen by complementary pulsations in pump and well; but no such direct relation could be expected between the spring of the plaintiffs and the well of the defendants, because of the distance between them and their different surface elevations.

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Bluebook (online)
55 Misc. 445, 106 N.Y.S. 553, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hathorn-v-dr-strongs-saratoga-springs-sanitarium-nysupct-1907.