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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CONNER ANTHONY HATHAWAY, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00567-JHC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 11 Defendant. 12 13
14 I. 15 INTRODUCTION 16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Conner Anthony Hathaway’s complaint 17 against the United States of America. Dkt. # 5. Mr. Hathaway is proceeding pro se and in forma 18 pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. # 4. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), district courts have authority to review 19 IFP complaints and must dismiss them “at any time” if it is determined that a complaint is 20 malicious or frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks relief from 21 a defendant who is immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(b)(1); 22 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (clarifying that § 1915(e) applies to all IFP 23 proceedings, not only those filed by prisoners). The Court has reviewed Mr. Hathaway’s 24 1 complaint and has determined that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 2 granted and seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Accordingly, the 3 Court DISMISSES Mr. Hathaway’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court
4 GRANTS Mr. Hathaway leave to amend his complaint. 5 II. 6 BACKGROUND 7 Mr. Hathaway filed a motion to proceed IFP and a proposed complaint on April 27, 2022. 8 Dkt. # 1. Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughan granted the IFP motion on May 12, 2022, Dkt. # 4, 9 and Mr. Hathaway then filed his complaint, Dkt. # 5. 10 Mr. Hathaway alleges that he received inadequate medical care at the Federal Detention 11 Center in SeaTac, Washington after he was arrested for a probation violation on November 10, 12 2020. See generally Dkt. # 5. Mr. Hathaway alleges that medical providers at the facility
13 subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, committed medical malpractice and medical 14 negligence, and acted with deliberate indifference1 in refusing to treat him properly for severe 15 alcohol withdrawal. Id. He brings his claims against the “United States of America.” Id. at 1. 16 III. 17 ANALYSIS 18 A. Standard of Review
19 Title 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) authorizes a district court to dismiss a claim filed IFP “at 20 any time” if it determines: (1) the action is frivolous or malicious; (2) the action fails to state a 21 claim; or (3) the action seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 22
23 1 Mr. Hathaway refers to “discriminatory indifference” throughout his complaint. Because the standard for suing state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal officials in a 24 Bivens actions is “deliberate indifference,” this order refers to it as such. 1 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Mr. Hathaway is a pro se plaintiff, the Court must construe his 2 pleadings liberally. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, 3 his complaint must still contain factual allegations “enough to raise a right to relief above the
4 speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court need not 5 accept as true a legal conclusion presented as a factual allegation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 6 662, 678 (2009). Although the pleading standard announced by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it demands more than “an unadorned, the- 8 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (requiring 9 the plaintiff to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 10 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 11 B. Mr. Hathaway’s Complaint
12 Mr. Hathaway relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis for his lawsuit, and names the 13 “United States of America” as the defendant. Dkt. # 5. To state a claim for relief under 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) they suffered a violation of rights protected by the 15 Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a 16 person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 17 1991). The United States of America is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action because it does 18 not act under color of state law, nor can it be considered a “person” under the act. Accardi v. 19 United States, 435 F.2d 1239, 1241 (3rd Cir. 1970); International Islamic Cmty. of Masjid 20 Baytulkhaliq, Inc. v. U.S., 981 F. Supp. 352, 366 (D. V. I. 1997), aff’d, 17 F.3d 472; United 21 States v. Vital Health Products, Ltd., 786 F. Supp. 761, 778 (E. D. Wis. 1992), aff’d, 985 F.2d 22 562. Moreover, the United States may not be sued without its consent. United States v. Mitchell,
23 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); Hutchinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1982). 24 1 A more appropriate cause of action for Mr. Hathaway’s claims would be “an action under 2 the authority of Bivens [v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 3 388 (1971)].” Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). A Bivens action is
4 the “federal analog to an action against state or local officials under § 1983,” and is the proper 5 vehicle for “seek[ing] to hold federal officers individually liable for constitutional violations.” 6 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011). However, even if the Court liberally 7 construes Mr. Hathaway’s claim as a Bivens action, his complaint fails because it names the 8 United States of America as the sole defendant, rather than the medical providers or facilities 9 staff allegedly responsible for the constitutional violations. See Thomas-Lazear v. F.B.I., 851 10 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he United States has not waived its sovereign immunity in 11 actions seeking damages for constitutional violations”); Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CONNER ANTHONY HATHAWAY, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00567-JHC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 11 Defendant. 12 13
14 I. 15 INTRODUCTION 16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Conner Anthony Hathaway’s complaint 17 against the United States of America. Dkt. # 5. Mr. Hathaway is proceeding pro se and in forma 18 pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. # 4. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), district courts have authority to review 19 IFP complaints and must dismiss them “at any time” if it is determined that a complaint is 20 malicious or frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks relief from 21 a defendant who is immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(b)(1); 22 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (clarifying that § 1915(e) applies to all IFP 23 proceedings, not only those filed by prisoners). The Court has reviewed Mr. Hathaway’s 24 1 complaint and has determined that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 2 granted and seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Accordingly, the 3 Court DISMISSES Mr. Hathaway’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court
4 GRANTS Mr. Hathaway leave to amend his complaint. 5 II. 6 BACKGROUND 7 Mr. Hathaway filed a motion to proceed IFP and a proposed complaint on April 27, 2022. 8 Dkt. # 1. Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughan granted the IFP motion on May 12, 2022, Dkt. # 4, 9 and Mr. Hathaway then filed his complaint, Dkt. # 5. 10 Mr. Hathaway alleges that he received inadequate medical care at the Federal Detention 11 Center in SeaTac, Washington after he was arrested for a probation violation on November 10, 12 2020. See generally Dkt. # 5. Mr. Hathaway alleges that medical providers at the facility
13 subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, committed medical malpractice and medical 14 negligence, and acted with deliberate indifference1 in refusing to treat him properly for severe 15 alcohol withdrawal. Id. He brings his claims against the “United States of America.” Id. at 1. 16 III. 17 ANALYSIS 18 A. Standard of Review
19 Title 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) authorizes a district court to dismiss a claim filed IFP “at 20 any time” if it determines: (1) the action is frivolous or malicious; (2) the action fails to state a 21 claim; or (3) the action seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 22
23 1 Mr. Hathaway refers to “discriminatory indifference” throughout his complaint. Because the standard for suing state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal officials in a 24 Bivens actions is “deliberate indifference,” this order refers to it as such. 1 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Mr. Hathaway is a pro se plaintiff, the Court must construe his 2 pleadings liberally. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, 3 his complaint must still contain factual allegations “enough to raise a right to relief above the
4 speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court need not 5 accept as true a legal conclusion presented as a factual allegation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 6 662, 678 (2009). Although the pleading standard announced by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it demands more than “an unadorned, the- 8 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (requiring 9 the plaintiff to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 10 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 11 B. Mr. Hathaway’s Complaint
12 Mr. Hathaway relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis for his lawsuit, and names the 13 “United States of America” as the defendant. Dkt. # 5. To state a claim for relief under 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) they suffered a violation of rights protected by the 15 Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a 16 person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 17 1991). The United States of America is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action because it does 18 not act under color of state law, nor can it be considered a “person” under the act. Accardi v. 19 United States, 435 F.2d 1239, 1241 (3rd Cir. 1970); International Islamic Cmty. of Masjid 20 Baytulkhaliq, Inc. v. U.S., 981 F. Supp. 352, 366 (D. V. I. 1997), aff’d, 17 F.3d 472; United 21 States v. Vital Health Products, Ltd., 786 F. Supp. 761, 778 (E. D. Wis. 1992), aff’d, 985 F.2d 22 562. Moreover, the United States may not be sued without its consent. United States v. Mitchell,
23 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); Hutchinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1982). 24 1 A more appropriate cause of action for Mr. Hathaway’s claims would be “an action under 2 the authority of Bivens [v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 3 388 (1971)].” Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). A Bivens action is
4 the “federal analog to an action against state or local officials under § 1983,” and is the proper 5 vehicle for “seek[ing] to hold federal officers individually liable for constitutional violations.” 6 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011). However, even if the Court liberally 7 construes Mr. Hathaway’s claim as a Bivens action, his complaint fails because it names the 8 United States of America as the sole defendant, rather than the medical providers or facilities 9 staff allegedly responsible for the constitutional violations. See Thomas-Lazear v. F.B.I., 851 10 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he United States has not waived its sovereign immunity in 11 actions seeking damages for constitutional violations”); Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971 12 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Bivens does not provide a means of cutting through the sovereign immunity of
13 the United States itself” (citing Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d 1399, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1983)). 14 Because Mr. Hathaway has named a defendant that is immune from suit, and because no 15 statutory waiver of sovereign immunity exists in this case, his complaint must be dismissed even 16 if construed liberally as a Bivens action. 17 C. Leave to Amend 18 When dismissing a complaint, “leave to amend should be granted unless the court 19 determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not 20 possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 21 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); see also DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 22 1992) (“A district court does not err in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be
23 futile.”); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that a district court should 24 not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless “it is absolutely clear that the l deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment” (quoting Schucker v. 2 || Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203 (9th Cir. 1988))). 3 Mr. Hathaway does allege facts that may sufficiently plead a Bivens action, see, e.g., 4 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), and therefore his complaint should not be dismissed with 5 ||prejudice. However, if he wishes to sustain his claims as such, he must replace the defendant, 6 “United States of America,” with the federal officials who allegedly violated the constitutional 7 in question and specify that he is seeking to hold them liable in their individual capacities. g || Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.3d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987) (“a Bivens action can be maintained 9 against a defendant in his or her individual capacity only, and not in his or her official 10 capacity.”). Thus, the Court GRANTS Mr. Hathaway leave to amend his complaint. If Mr. 11 Hathaway chooses to file an amended complaint as to these claims, he shall do so within 12 fourteen (14) days of this order. If Mr. Hathaway fails to timely file an amended complaint that 13 remedies the above deficiencies, the Court will dismiss his claims with prejudice. 14 IV. 15 CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Mr. Hathaway’s complaint pursuant to 17. || 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) without prejudice. The Court GRANTS Mr. Hathaway leave to 18 amend his complaint within fourteen (14) days of this order. 19 Dated this 1st day of June, 2022. 20 21 Cok 4. Chur John H. Chun United States District Judge 23 24