Hassan Jagne v. Warden, Alligator Alcatraz, U.S. Attorney General

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

HASSAN JAGNE,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:26-cv-734-KCD-NPM

v.

WARDEN, ALLIGATOR ALCATRAZ, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendants. /

ORDER Petitioner Hassan Jagne is a noncitizen without legal status who is subject to a final order of removal. (Doc. 1 at 3.) He was recently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment as interpreted by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and violates the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). (Doc. 1.)1 The Government opposes the petition. (Doc. 14.) For the reasons below, the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. I. Background Jagne, a citizen of Gambia, first entered the United States in July 1993 as a B-2 visitor. (Doc. 14-1 at 15.) He was eventually placed in removal

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. proceedings, applied for various forms of relief, all of which were denied, and ultimately requested voluntary departure in lieu of deportation in August

1998. (Id. at 1, 15.) He failed to depart, which converted the immigration judge’s decision into a final order of removal. (Id. at 15.) In 2008, Jagne was arrested to enforce the removal order to Gambia, but because he could not be deported at that time, he was released on an

order of supervision. (Doc 1-1.) Jagne complied with his supervision requirements for several years and was issued another supervision order on September 24, 2024. (Id.) On March 7, 2026, Jagne was detained upon reporting for a supervision

check-in. (Doc. 14-1 at 15.) He was served with a warrant for his arrest, a notice of revocation of release, a notice of intent to remove him to Gambia, and was offered an interview. (Id. at 17-31.) Jagne then filed this habeas petition, arguing that his removal to Gambia is not reasonably foreseeable

and seeks immediate release. (Doc. 1 at 3.) II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of

the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration

detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025). III. Discussion Jagne’s various claims are addressed in turn below.

A. Zadvydas The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period,

detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas, the authority to

detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. at 659. And to make that rule workable, the Court

established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v.

Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Applied here, Jagne cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement. ICE took him into custody on March 7, 2026. (Doc. 14-1 at 15.) Because his confinement remains well short of the six-month mark, he sits squarely

within the presumptively reasonable window. See Guerra-Castro v. Parra, No. 1:25-CV-22487, 2025 WL 1984300, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”); see also Jiang v. Mukasey, No. 208-CV-773-FTM-

29DNF, 2009 WL 260378, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2009); Noel v. Glades Cnty. Sheriff, No. 2:11-CV-698-FTM-29, 2011 WL 6412425, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2011). Seemingly recognizing this problem, his petition jumps to the burden-

shifting framework, claiming that his removal to Gambia is not likely. (Doc. 1 at 8.) This argument puts the cart before the horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any due process claim is not ripe. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV- 22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of

Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026). Jagne attempts another workaround. He points to an earlier, “post- final-order civil confinement,” arguing that the Court should aggregate his

past and present stints in ICE custody. (Doc. 1 at 3.) By combining these distinct periods of confinement, Jagne contends that his total time in civil immigration detention exceeds the six-month threshold, which is sufficient to rebut the presumption of reasonableness and trigger Zadvydas review.

District courts are split on whether prior time in ICE custody should be aggregated to satisfy the six-month Zadvydas clock. Some have firmly rejected this cumulative approach. They reason that if “detentions [are counted] in the aggregate, any subsequent period of detention, even one day,

would raise constitutional concerns.” Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-CV-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025). Because the executive branch is tasked with great deference in effectuating removals, these courts warn that constantly adjudicating the constitutionality of every brief re-

detention would improperly obstruct that statutory discretion. Meskini v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., No. 4:14-CV-42 (CDL), 2018 WL 1321576, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018). Under this view, Zadvydas does not function as a “Get Out of Jail Free Card that may be redeemed at any time just because an alien was detained too long in the past.” Id.; see also Flores-Reyes v. Assistant Field Off.

Dir., No. 26-CV-20226, 2026 WL 406708, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2026). Conversely, other courts have treated the Zadvydas period as cumulative. Chen v. Holder, No. CV 6:14-2530, 2015 WL 13236635, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2015). This approach is driven by the constitutional

imperative to prevent the government from indefinitely detaining noncitizens through a loophole of release and re-detention. Krechmar v. Parra, No. 2:25- CV-01095-SPC-DNF, 2025 WL 3620802, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2025). To consider only the current, isolated period of confinement—ignoring all prior

custody—would allow the government to bypass Zadvydas through successive detentions. For these courts, aggregation is the only way to safeguard against the precise danger of indefinite detention that the Supreme Court sought to prevent. See Rodriguez Romero v. Ladwig, No. CV 25-1106-JWD-EWD, 2026

WL 321437, at *12 (M.D. La. Feb. 6, 2026). This Court declines to endorse a blanket rule that all prior periods of confinement automatically aggregate to satisfy the Zadvydas six-month clock. Such a categorical approach is practically unworkable and effectively

penalizes the government for its past lawful actions. If every prior day spent in immigration custody simply rolled over into the present calculus, the government’s statutory authority to briefly re-detain a noncitizen to finalize a removal would be severely restricted, if not eliminated entirely. The six- month period established in Zadvydas was designed to provide the

government a functional window to negotiate with foreign nations, secure travel documents, and coordinate the complex logistics of deportation. A strict aggregation rule ignores the reality that diplomatic circumstances evolve. If a foreign government that previously refused repatriation suddenly agrees to

issue travel documents, the United States needs a practical opportunity to effectuate that newly viable removal. Mandating an automatic rollover of all past detention would force the immediate release of a noncitizen even when their current custody is driven by an imminent, foreseeable deportation,

ultimately frustrating the core purpose of the removal statute. Instead, the better approach is to afford the government a new six- month presumptively reasonable period for each discrete detention, unless there are facts suggesting the government is acting with an improper motive.

If the record reveals a calculated pattern of catch-and-release designed merely to reset the Zadvydas clock or evade judicial review, aggregation may be entirely appropriate. But absent evidence of such bad faith or a deliberate strategy of looping confinement, courts should presume that a subsequent

detention is a genuine, independent effort to effectuate removal. This standard strikes the appropriate balance. It alleviates constitutional concerns regarding indefinite, cyclical detention by providing a safeguard against abuse, while simultaneously protecting the government’s legitimate, statutory interest in finalizing deportations when logistical or diplomatic

circumstances finally permit. This approach finds support in both Zadvydas’s reasoning and the historical foundations of the vehicle Jagne employs (habeas corpus). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court eschewed a rigid, mechanical formula, focusing

instead on whether the length of detention remains “reasonably necessary to secure removal.” 533 U.S. at 699. The Court explicitly instructed lower courts to measure reasonableness in light of the specific circumstances of the case and the actual likelihood of a future deportation. Id. (“It should measure

reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.”). That directive undermines the logic of a blind, automatic aggregation of prior custody days here. See also Meskini, 2018 WL 1321576, at *3.

A flexible standard also aligns with the fundamental principle that habeas corpus is “at its core, an equitable remedy.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). Because habeas relief is governed by equitable principles, courts are empowered to look beyond a mere mathematical tally to examine

the totality of the circumstances. Id.; see also Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 213 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has long recognized that habeas corpus [is] . . . governed by equitable principles[.]”). By inquiring into whether the government has engaged in a deliberate cycle of release and re-detention, the court exercises its equitable discretion to prevent

gamesmanship, all while preserving the executive branch’s necessary flexibility to enforce the immigration laws. Applying this standard here, Jagne’s argument for aggregation falls short. While he points to his prior period of ICE custody, the record is devoid

of evidence that immigration officials manipulated his release and rearrest to bypass the six-month presumption or avoid judicial oversight. Without proof of such tactical maneuvering, this Court treats his present custody as an independent, good-faith endeavor to secure his deportation.

As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “detention during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 523. So the executive branch gets a presumptively reasonable six-month runway to do its job, negotiate with

foreign governments, and execute a final removal order. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Because Jagne remains inside that window, his current custody does not cross the line into the kind of indefinite, arbitrary lockup the Fifth Amendment forbids. Until that clock actually runs out, the Government

retains the constitutional authority to hold him. Jagne also seemingly argues that his clean supervision record precludes ICE from revoking his supervision. (Doc. 1 at 4.) This argument fails. He is subject to a final removal order that stands uncontested. The INA explicitly authorizes a return to detention to effectuate such orders. 8 C.F.R.

§ 241.13(i)(2). And the government no doubt has a legitimate interest in doing exactly that—enforcing its laws, ensuring individuals do not flee, and protecting the public. See Malam v. Adducci, 469 F. Supp. 3d 767, 790 (E.D. Mich. 2020). Here, the Government revoked Jagne’s release specifically to

enforce his outstanding removal order, gave him notice that they were doing so, and afforded him an informal interview. (Docs. 14-1 at 17-31.) Returning him to custody thus serves a recognized, legitimate government objective and was done in compliance with the INA’s regulations.

B. Warrant Jagne further claims he was unlawfully detained in violation of 8 CFR 241.13(g), (i)(2)-(3) because there was no warrant or finding of probable cause, exigent circumstances, or changed circumstances before his re-

detention. (Doc. 1 ¶ 9.) But such a claim is not cognizable under § 2241. A writ of habeas corpus is the remedy for someone seeking release from unlawful confinement. It challenges the fact or duration of detention. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006). It is not a catch-

all bucket for complaints about police misconduct, past mistreatment, or the conditions of confinement. See Houston v. Pearce, No. 1:21-CV-0582-LMM- CMS, 2021 WL 11718540, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 2021). In any event, this Court lacks jurisdiction to address Jagne’s arguments about the Government’s decision to arrest and hold him. See Gupta v. McGahey, 709

F.3d 1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding no jurisdiction to address detainee’s claims that police “illegally procured an arrest warrant, that the agents illegally arrested him, and that the agents illegally detained him”); see also Alvarez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir.

2016). C. Procedural Due Process Jagne also presses a procedural due process claim, though labeled as a violation of the INA. (Doc. 1 at 28.) He argues that ICE violated its

regulations and internal instructions when it revoked his release. Specifically, he claims his re-detention has not been reviewed or authorized by any member of the HQPDU or ERO HQ. (Doc. 1 at 9.) For starters, it’s not entirely clear that Jagne is entitled to a

freestanding due process analysis at this time. When the Supreme Court confronted the constitutional perils of indefinite immigration detention in Zadvydas, it did not instruct lower courts to start weighing the process afforded to the detainee. It set a timer. For the first six months, detention is

presumptively reasonable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. So until that timer goes off, Zadvydas itself seemingly supplies the constitutional metric. Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 566 (6th Cir. 2020). “In other words, the Zadvydas standard is due process: a § 1231 detainee who fails the Zadvydas test fails to prove a due process violation.” Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750,

760 (4th Cir. 2024). Because Jagne’s detention is barely out of the starting gate, he is presumably not yet entitled to anything more. But even if we assume the due process clause applies with full force, Jagne still comes up empty. Jagne insists that his revocation is invalid

because his re-detention was neither reviewed nor authorized by the proper official. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Because the Government previously released Jagne after determining there was no significant likelihood of his removal, his return to custody travels under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. See Choy v. Woosley, No.

4:25-CV-197-DJH, 2026 WL 324601, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 6, 2026). And unlike its counterpart § 241.4, § 241.13 contains no rigid signature mandate limiting revocation authority to specific executives. Because the agency operated under the correct regulatory framework, Jagne’s complaint about

the authority to re-detain him falls flat. Jagne also claims that he did not receive a written decision stating the reasons for his redetention, nor a post-detention interview. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Not so. At its core, the Due Process Clause demands that before the government

strips a person of a protected liberty interest, it must provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” United Student Aid

Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010). In the context of revoking a noncitizen’s supervised release, ICE’s regulations strike that constitutional balance by guaranteeing written notice and an informal interview that allows the individual to respond. See 8 C.F.R.

§§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i). According to the unrebutted record, Jagne received both. (See Doc. 14-1 at 17-31.) He got exactly what the Fifth Amendment requires—notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). The Constitution guarantees a fair

process, not a favorable result. Because ICE afforded Jagne the requisite notice and an opportunity to be heard, his procedural due process claim fails. D. APA Jagne also tries to repackage his statutory challenge as a violation of

the Administrative Procedure Act. He contends that the Government’s decision to detain him is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. (Doc. 1 at 31.) The difficulty here is twofold. First, Jagne has brought this claim in a

habeas petition, which is the wrong vehicle for the job. The writ of habeas corpus exists to challenge the fact or duration of physical confinement. It is not a catch-all funnel for standard administrative grievances. Trying to shoehorn a freestanding APA challenge into a habeas petition simply does not work. See Fleurimond v. Noem, No. CV-26-00037-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL

507542, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2026). A habeas petition comes with a streamlined procedure, fast-tracked rules, and a nominal filing fee. An APA challenge, by contrast, is a standard civil action with a heftier filing fee and following the ordinary, more deliberate pace of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Litigants cannot sidestep those standard requirements by simply slapping a habeas label on an administrative complaint. See Alvarez v. Noem, No. 5:26-CV-0013-JKP, 2026 WL 93972, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2026); Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing legal

distinction between habeas cases and civil actions brought under APA, which have different filing fees and exhaustion provisions). Second, the APA itself leaves no room for this claim. The APA operates as a fallback option, providing a right of judicial review only when “there is

no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. But Jagne has an adequate remedy—the very habeas petition he filed to get through the courthouse doors. See Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 674 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Because the writ of habeas corpus provides a fully adequate

avenue to test the legality of his custody—which is the only thing Jagne is challenging here—the APA simply leaves no room for this redundant claim. See Fleurimond, 2026 WL 507542, at *8; Rivera v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-01289 KWR-KBM, 2026 WL 3813809, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026). IV. Conclusion Jagne’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition should his current detention exceed the six-month mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. All other claims and relief are DENIED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 28, 2026.

KyleC.Dudek =—>

United States District Judge