Harvinder-Singh Gill v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 HARVINDER-SINGH GILL, Case No. 1:26-cv-00521-JLT-EPG-HC

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECT RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., PETITIONER WITH A BOND HEARING BEFORE AN IMMIGRATION JUDGE 15 Respondents.

16 17 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition 18 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated herein, the 19 undersigned recommends granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordering 20 Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration 21 judge at which the government must justify Petitioner’s continued detention by clear and 22 convincing evidence. 23 I. 24 BACKGROUND 25 Petitioner is a citizen of India who was briefly arrested and then released on his own 26 recognizance after entering the United States on May 5, 2022 without inspection. (ECF No. 1 at 27 5, 13.1) No credible fear or other interview as to admissibility occurred during the initial arrest. 1 Petitioner thereafter filed an application for asylum. (ECF No. 1 at 13.) The petition alleges that 2 Petitioner never missed any immigration court hearings or appointment calls scheduled with U.S. 3 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).2 4 Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol on July 7, 2023, and 5 charged with driving under the influence and driving without a license. (ECF No. 10-3 at 2, 4–5.) 6 On September 10, 2024, Petitioner was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and 7 driving with a blood alcohol content over .15%. (Id. at 7.) On September 29, 2025, Petitioner 8 was scheduled for an ICE visit in San Francisco and was detained. (ECF No. 1 at 14.) 9 Respondents assert that “ICE arrested Petitioner on an administrative warrant based on his 10 failure to follow the conditions of his release.” (ECF No. 10 at 2 (citing ECF No. 10-1 at 2; ECF 11 No. 10-4).) 12 On January 21, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his 13 detention on substantive due process, procedural due process, and statutory grounds. (ECF No. 1 14 at 15–17.) On February 19, 2026, Respondents filed an answer. (ECF No. 10.) On February 24, 15 2026, Petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 11.) 16 II. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Procedural Due Process 19 “We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there 20 exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second 21 examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally 22 sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (internal citations 23 omitted). 24 1. Liberty Interest 25 Respondents contend that “Petitioner’s prior release in the discretion of DHS does not 26 have the effect of having converted petitioner’s presence in the United States into an 27 2 Respondents assert that Petitioner missed a September 3, 2024 appointment and was late for a 1 ‘admission.’” (ECF No. 10 at 2.) Respondents argue that “Petitioner does not possess the right to 2 freedom from immigration detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress.” (Id. 3 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); Dep’t of 4 Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020)).) However, Mezei and 5 Thuraissigiam addressed due process rights with respect to admission, and here, Petitioner is not 6 raising claims regarding the admission process. See Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 7 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1171 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“Defendants ask the Court to extract from 8 Thuraissigiam a broad rule that any inadmissible noncitizen possesses only those due process 9 rights afforded to them by statute, regardless of the nature of their status or the relief they seek. 10 But such a conclusion is untethered to the claim in Thuraissigiam and the Court’s reasoning. 11 Thuraissigiam’s discussion of due process is necessarily constrained to challenges to 12 admissibility to the United States.”), appeal filed, No. 24-2801 (9th Cir. argued May 21, 2025). 13 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 14 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. 15 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 16 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause 17 protects.” Zadvydas at 690. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court 18 addressed whether due process requires a parolee be afforded some opportunity to be heard prior 19 to revocation of parole. 408 U.S. at 472. In examining “the nature of the interest of the parolee in 20 his continued liberty,” the Supreme Court stated: 21 The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime. The 22 parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and 23 function as a responsible, self-reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free 24 to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him 25 to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison. . . . The 26 parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions. 27 1 indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts 2 a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others” and held that “the liberty is valuable and 3 must be seen as within the protection of” due process. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 4 Relying on Morrissey, courts in this district have consistently held that noncitizens who 5 have been released from immigration custody pending civil removal proceedings have a 6 protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 7 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025); J.A.E.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01380-KES-HBK 8 (HC), 2025 WL 3013377, at *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); J.C.L.A. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv- 9 01310-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 WL 2959250, at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); Qazi v. Albarran, 10 No. 2:25-cv-02791-TLN-CSK, 2025 WL 3033713, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); Martinez 11 Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 12 Aug. 28, 2025); Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 WL 2791778, at *8 13 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025); Maklad v. Murray, No. 1:25-cv-00946 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2299376, 14 at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025). 15 “Even assuming Respondents are correct that § 1225(b) is the applicable detention 16 authority for all ‘applicants for admission,’ Respondents fail to contend with the liberty interest 17 created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case was released on recognizance[.]” Garcia v. 18 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01907-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL 3771348, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025). 19 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest 20 in remaining out of immigration custody. 21 2. Mathews Test 22 In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due 23 process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: 24 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 25 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 26 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 27 requirements would entail. 1 With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that the private interest at issue is 2 fundamental. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that it “is beyond dispute” an immigration 3 detainee’s “private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom from imprisonment is at the 4 ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 5 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 6 With respect to the second factor, “‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is 7 high’ where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination 8 hearing.’” J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (alterations in original) (quoting A.E. v. Andrews, 9 No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 871334, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025)). “Civil 10 immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a 11 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.” Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25- 12 cv-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (alteration in 13 original) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). Petitioner’s release on recognizance necessarily 14 required a determination that he posed neither a flight risk nor a danger. Rocha Chavarria v. 15 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01755-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3533606, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) 16 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); Noori v. Larose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at 17 *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025)); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 18 (“The federal government sometimes releases noncitizens on bond or parole while their removal 19 proceedings are pending. Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen 20 is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 21 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). “[A]s there have been no procedural safeguards to determine if 22 petitioner’s re-detention is justified, ‘the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, i.e., 23 a bond hearing, is high.’” Sharan S. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01427-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 24 3167826, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (quoting A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5). 25 With respect to the third and final factor, “although the government has a strong interest 26 in enforcing the immigration laws, the government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a 27 hearing is ‘low.’” J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (citing Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1 cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2022) (“Although the Government 2 has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued 3 removal orders are promptly executed, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without 4 providing an individualized bond hearing is low.”). Courts generally have found that the cost of 5 providing a custody hearing is relatively minimal, and there is nothing in the record before this 6 Court demonstrating that providing Petitioner with a pre-deprivation hearing would be fiscally or 7 administratively burdensome. See J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (“In immigration court, 8 custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost.” (citing Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 9 1094)). 10 On balance, the Mathews factors show that Petitioner is entitled to notice and a bond 11 hearing and “[t]hat hearing should have occurred before petitioner was re-detained.” Carmen 12 G.C. v. Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-01648-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3521304, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13 8, 2025). 14 “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is 15 deprived of any significant protected interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. 16 Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127 (“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court usually has held that 17 the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty ....”). Courts typically require evidence 18 of urgent concerns or an especially strong government interest to justify a post-deprivation hearing. See Guillermo M. R., 2025 WL 19 1983677, at *9; United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53, 59–61 (1993) (“We tolerate some exceptions to 20 the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing, but only in extraordinary situations where some valid governmental 21 interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event[,]” such as “executive urgency.” (internal quotations 22 omitted)). 23 Carmen G.C., 2025 WL 3521304, at *7. 24 At such a pre-deprivation hearing, the government bears the burden of proving by clear 25 and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk such that re- 26 detention is warranted. See Carmen G.C., 2025 WL 3521304, at *7 (“On balance, the Mathews 27 factors show that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing where the government must prove that 1 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01673-JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) 2 (“[T]he immigrant’s initial release reflected a determination by the government that the 3 noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. Since it is the government that 4 initiated re-detention, it follows that the government should be required to bear the burden of 5 providing a justification for the re-detention.”). 6 Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has demonstrated that he has a strong liberty interest in 7 remaining out of custody, that the risk of erroneous deprivation will be meaningfully reduced by 8 requiring notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and that the 9 governmental burden in providing such procedure is quite minimal. Accordingly, the 10 undersigned recommends granting the petition on the second claim for relief.3 11 B. Appropriate Relief 12 Courts in this district have taken differing approaches to the relief granted to petitioners 13 who have been released, subsequently re-detained, and denied bond hearings in violation of due 14 process. In some cases, the immediate release of the petitioner has been ordered. See, e.g., 15 Yurani Hortua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 16 2025) (ordering immediate release of petitioner who had been released from immigration 17 detention on parole, was arrested for theft but the case was resolved with community service and 18 did not result in a conviction, and was re-detained at a routine six-month check-in); Carmen 19 G.C., 2025 WL 3521304 (ordering immediate release of petitioner who allegedly violated 20 reporting requirements four times); Rocha Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606 (ordering immediate 21 release of petitioner who allegedly “incurred compliance violations” that were not identified and 22 where respondents did not suggest the alleged violations were the reason for petitioner’s re- 23 detention). 24 In other cases, bond hearings have been ordered rather than immediate release. See, e.g., 25 J.E.H.G., 2025 WL 3523108 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated 26 reporting requirements numerous times and was re-detained based on said violations); Paz 27 3 In light of this conclusion, the Court declines to address Petitioner’s substantive due process and 1 Aguilera v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-01619 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 3485016 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2025) 2 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated reporting requirements one time and 3 was re-detained based on said violation); Sharan S., 2025 WL 3167826 (ordering bond hearing 4 for petitioner who allegedly violated reporting requirements eight times). 5 Here, after Petitioner was released on his own recognizance, he was convicted of driving 6 under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol content over .15%. (ECF No. 10- 7 3 at 7.) Respondents assert that “ICE arrested Petitioner on an administrative warrant based on 8 his failure to follow the conditions of his release.” (ECF No. 10 at 2 (citing No. 10-1 at 2; ECF 9 No. 10-4).) Accordingly, the Court finds that a post-deprivation hearing is the appropriate 10 remedy. See C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549 (E.D. Cal. 11 Nov. 3, 2025) (granting preliminary injunction and ordering substantive bond hearing for 12 petitioner who pleaded guilty to DUI and possession of open container while driving). 13 III. 14 RECOMMENDATION 15 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 16 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED on the second claim 17 for relief. 18 2. Respondents be directed to provide Petitioner with an individualized hearing before an 19 immigration judge where the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence 20 that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify her detention. 21 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 22 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 23 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 24 FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 25 written objections, no longer than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits, with the Court and 26 serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 27 Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed 1 | Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 2 | The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 3 | right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 4 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7) Dated: _ March 5, 2026 [Jee ey — 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28