Harvey v. World Market, LLC

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: May 9, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01242
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 VALERIE HARVEY, Case No. 25-cv-01242-CRB

9 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 10 v. DISMISS

11 WORLD MARKET, LLC, et al., 12 Defendants.

13 Valerie Harvey sues World Market, LLC and Cost Plus World Market, LLC, 14 alleging that World Market engaged in a deceptive advertising practice commonly referred 15 to as “drip pricing” by not including certain fees in its listing prices. Harvey brings claims 16 on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated California consumers under three 17 California consumer protection statutes: (1) the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, (2) the 18 Unfair Competition Law, and (3) the False Advertising Law. World Market moves to 19 dismiss Harvey’s claims. The Court DENIES World Market’s motion to dismiss. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 A. Factual Allegations 22 Harvey alleges that she purchased a set of armchairs from World Market in 23 September 2024. SAC (dkt. 1-25) ¶ 6. She alleges that World Market advertised the 24 chairs on its website as costing $429.99 but that, after she placed the chairs in her digital 25 shopping cart, World Market added two charges that increased the product’s total price: an 26 “Oversized Item Surcharge” for $49.95 and a “Shipping and Handling” charge for $50.00. 27 Id. Harvey alleges that World Market did not include the charges—which, she alleges, do 1 price. Id. ¶¶ 2, 7. Harvey alleges that, by adding these initially undisclosed fees, World 2 Market engaged in “drip pricing,” an unlawful advertising practice. Id. ¶ 2. 3 Ultimately, Harvey purchased the chairs even after the additional charges were 4 displayed in her digital shopping cart. Id. ¶ 19. Yet she alleges that, had she known of the 5 chairs’ actual cost from the outset, she would not have purchased them or would have 6 purchased them from a different website. Id. ¶ 43. 7 B. The “Honest Pricing Law” 8 California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act provides consumers with legal 9 remedies if they are subject to various forms of deceptive advertising. In July 2024, after 10 national attention came to Ticketmaster’s practice of charging exorbitant “service fees” for 11 in-demand live events, the California Legislature passed the “Honest Pricing Law,” which 12 amended the CLRA to ban a practice known as “drip pricing.”1 Cal. Civ. Code 13 § 1770(a)(29); SB 478 FAQ (dkt. 23-1) at 1. Businesses engage in drip pricing by 14 advertising products at “artificially low headline price[s]” and then disclosing “additional 15 charges later in the buying process.” SB 478 Assembly Committee Comments (dkt. 23-4) 16 at 2. In passing the Honest Pricing Law, the California Legislature explained that drip 17 pricing “impose[s] substantial economic harms on consumers and impede[s] the 18 dissemination of important market information.” SB 478 Pricing Transparency Comments 19 (dkt. 23-3) at 6. The newest CLRA provision thus prohibits “[a]dvertising, displaying, or 20 offering a price for a good or service that does not include all mandatory fees or charges” 21 other than taxes or actually incurred shipping costs.2 Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(29). 22 C. Procedural History 23 On October 3, 2024, Harvey filed her initial class action complaint in Alameda 24

25 1 The Court takes judicial notice of publicly available documents related to Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(29)’s legislative history. See Aramark Facility Servs. v. Service Employees 26 International Union, Local 1877, 530 F.3d 817, 826 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008). 2 Section 1770(a)(29)’s legislative history explicitly states that the bill is designed to 27 prohibit drip pricing in all industries, rather than solely in the context of ticket pricing. SB 1 County Superior Court, bringing a claim under the newly added provision of the CLRA, 2 section 1770(a)(29), as well as claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law and 3 False Advertising Law. Compl. (dkt. 1-3). Harvey’s claims are essentially fraudulent 4 omission claims; they are based on World Market’s allegedly misleading price displays, 5 which she says omit certain fees. See SAC ¶¶ 52, 54 (alleging that World Market 6 “intended to … mislead and deceive” consumers by omitting certain fees in its listing 7 prices). As far as the Court is aware, both from the parties’ briefs and the Court’s own 8 research, this is one of the first section 1770(a)(29) cases to reach a merits-stage inquiry. 9 World Market removed the case to federal court and now moves to dismiss under 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 11 be granted. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either “the lack of a cognizable 14 legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 15 Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). A 16 complaint must plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 17 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A 18 claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 19 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 20 When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court “must presume all factual allegations of the 21 complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” 22 Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). “Courts must consider 23 the complaint in its entirety” and may also consider “documents incorporated into the 24 complaint by reference[] and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, 25 Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). 26 Because Harvey’s claims “are premised on misleading advertising or labeling,” 27 Watkins v. MGA Ent. Inc., 550 F. Supp. 3d 815, 833 (N.D. Cal. 2021), they “sound in 1 of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see SAC ¶¶ 45, 52 (alleging that World Market 2 engaged in a “course of conduct” that was “intended to … mislead and deceive” 3 consumers). Under Rule 9(b), the party alleging fraud “must state with particularity the 4 circumstances constituting fraud or mistake,” though “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and 5 other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 6 9(b) demands that supporting allegations “be ‘specific enough to give defendants notice of 7 the particular misconduct … so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny 8 that they have done anything wrong.’” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th 9 Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Thus, “averments of fraud must be accompanied by ‘the 10 who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 11 USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 World Market makes two arguments in favor of dismissing Harvey’s complaint. 14 First, World Market argues that Harvey lacks statutory standing for all three of her claims. 15 Mot. (dkt. 10) at 11, 19. Second, World Market contends that Harvey fails to state a claim 16 under Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(29). Id. at 10. The Court concludes that Harvey has 17 standing to bring her claims and that she has stated a claim under section 1770(a)(29). 18 A. Lack of Standing 19 World Market contends that Harvey fails to sufficiently allege two elements that are 20 necessary to establish standing under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL: reliance and harm. Mot. 21 at 11. 22 1. Reliance 23 To proceed on a “fraudulent omission” claim under the three statutes, a plaintiff 24 must allege that she relied on the defendant’s alleged omission. Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 25 806 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2015) (CLRA); Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 26 1007, 1020 (9th Cir. 2020) (UCL and FAL). In particular, a plaintiff must allege that, “had 27 the omitted information been disclosed, [she] would have been aware of it and behaved 1 “material,” meaning that “a reasonable consumer ‘would attach importance to its existence 2 or nonexistence in determining [her] choice of action in the transaction in question.’” Id. 3 Whether an omitted fact is material is “generally a question of fact” unsuitable for 4 resolution on the pleadings. Id. at 1226. 5 World Market argues that Harvey lacks standing to bring her three state law claims 6 because she does not plausibly allege that she relied on any misleading advertising practice 7 in completing her transaction. Mot. at 11. World Market asserts that Harvey’s 8 “conclusory allegation” that she would not have purchased the product in question had 9 World Market initially displayed the product’s total price is insufficient to establish actual 10 reliance. Id. at 14. 11 Given the lack of cases interpreting section 1770(a)(29), World Market analogizes 12 to a slew of cases interpreting other provisions of the CLRA. See Charbonnet v. Omni 13 Hotels & Resorts, No. 20-cv-01777-CAB-DEB, 2020 WL 7385828 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 14 2020) (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770(a)(5), 1770(a)(7), and 1770(a)(9)); Hall v. Marriott Int’l, 15 Inc., 344 F.R.D. 247 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (a previous version of the CLRA); Imber-Gluck v. 16 Google, Inc., No. 5-14-cv-01070-RMW, 2014 WL 3600506 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) 17 (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770(a)(5), 1770(a)(7), and 1770(a)(14)).3 For example, in 18 Charbonnet, World Market’s most factually analogous citation, a plaintiff alleged that “she 19 was ‘lured into Omni’s artificially lowered rate’ for a hotel room, and ‘the property fee 20 was not revealed until after the false price was first represented.’” 2020 WL 7385828, at 21 *3 (citations omitted) (cleaned up). In that case, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims 22 and concluded that “[t]he fact that Plaintiff completed her reservation and paid the higher 23

24 3 Section 1770(a)(5) prohibits “representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or 25 that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that the person does not have.” Section 1770(a)(7) prohibits “representing that goods or services are of a 26 particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another.” Section 1770(a)(9) prohibits “advertising goods or services with 27 intent not to sell them as advertised.” Section 1770(a)(14) prohibits “representing that a 1 total price, knowing it was more than the advertised daily rate, shows that the addition of 2 taxes and fees ultimately had no effect on her decision to book a room there.” Id. at *5. 3 And in Hall—another case involving hotel fees—the court rejected the plaintiffs’ “bait- 4 and-switch” theory, explaining that “[a]ny consumer’s perception that the price reflected 5 on the first page of Marriott’s booking process constituted the total price is quickly and 6 explicitly dispelled at every other page in the booking process.” 344 F.R.D. at 266. World 7 Market contends that Harvey’s decision to proceed with her purchase after learning of the 8 product’s total cost likewise precludes her from plausibly alleging that she relied on the 9 initially advertised price. Mot. at 15. 10 Though the facts in Charbonnet and Hall are facially similar to the facts in this case, 11 the reasoning of those courts regarding reliance is inapplicable in light of the Honest 12 Pricing Law, which added the CLRA provision at issue in this case—section 1770(a)(29). 13 Indeed, applying the Charbonnet and Hall courts’ reasoning to section 1770(a)(29) would 14 undermine the very purpose of that provision. The provision’s drafters explained that the 15 statute was designed to “combat … bait-and-switch advertising” (the theory of liability 16 rejected in Hall) by prohibiting scenarios akin to what happened here. SB 478 Comments 17 (dkt. 23-6) at 1, 4. For instance, the drafters envisioned a scenario where “[y]ou carefully 18 select tickets to a concert or a sporting event, ones that allow you and your friends to sit 19 together; then a ‘service charge’ is displayed on the payment page, blowing the group’s 20 budget.” Id. at 1. But the reasoning of Charbonnet and Hall would undermine these ticket 21 buyers’ case too: if they were to proceed with their purchase to avoid losing out on the 22 tickets and then later sue under section 1770(a)(29), the ticket provider could argue (like 23 World Market does here) that the buyers’ decision to move forward with their purchase 24 “shows that the addition of [the] ... fees ultimately had no effect on [their] decision.” See 25 2020 WL 7385828, at *5. At this early stage of litigation, it would be inappropriate for the 26 Court to hypothesize about the availability of alternatives or other factual circumstances 27 surrounding the transaction, and so Harvey’s purchase of armchairs from World Market 1 So the Court declines to adopt the reasoning of Charbonnet and Hall in this case, as doing 2 so would be irreconcilable with the Legislature’s intent in passing the Honest Pricing Law. 3 World Market’s proposed interpretation of section 1770(a)(29) would also create a 4 catch-22 for consumers seeking to enforce the CLRA’s newest provision. When a 5 business engages in drip pricing, consumers are left with two choices: they can proceed 6 with their purchase after discovering the initially undisclosed fees or decide not to buy the 7 product they wanted. In either scenario, as World Market’s own briefs illustrate, the 8 business could argue that those consumers do not have statutory standing to recover under 9 section 1770(a)(29). In the former situation the consumers would arguably lack reliance 10 (having purchased the product after learning of added fees), while in the latter they would 11 arguably lack damages (having incurred no expense at all).4 Surely the Legislature did not 12 pass a law with no practical effect—especially given the overarching purpose of the 13 CLRA. See Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeno Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025, 14 1036 (9th Cir. 2013) (“courts should avoid interpreting a statute in a way that renders a 15 provision meaningless”) (citation omitted). 16 Thus, the Court concludes that reliance is presumed in section 1770(a)(29) claims— 17 at least at the pleading stage for purposes of assessing a plaintiff’s statutory standing—in 18 circumstances where a product is advertised at a price that does not include all mandatory 19 charges (other than taxes and shipping fees) “that will be reasonably and actually 20

21 4 At oral argument, World Market cited Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC as an example of a scenario where a class of plaintiffs did allege a cognizable claim under section 22 1770(a)(29). In Veera, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant falsely advertised products as being on sale, which led them to enter the defendant’s store, select certain items, and 23 stand in a check-out line, only to learn that the sale did not apply to those items. 6 Cal. App. 5th 907, 920 (2016). Like Harvey, the plaintiffs purchased the items after learning of 24 their actual prices. Id. The court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that “there [was] a triable issue whether plaintiffs’ reliance on the allegedly 25 misleading advertising was a cause … of their economic harm.” Id. World Market asserts that the time the Veera plaintiffs spent standing in line is a key distinction with this case 26 and argues that to plausibly allege reliance, Harvey must allege that she was similarly “invested in the decision to buy and swept up” in her transaction. See id. at 921. But that 27 language from Veera does not appear to be a new test for establishing reliance under the 1 incurred.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(29). Ninth Circuit precedent supports this approach. 2 In Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp. the court explained that “the legislature’s decision to prohibit a 3 particular misleading advertising practice is evidence that the legislature has deemed that 4 the practice constitutes a ‘material’ misrepresentation, and courts must defer to that 5 determination.” 718 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1225 6 (holding that reliance “can be presumed, or at least inferred” where the omission in 7 question is material); Moore, 966 F.3d at 1021 (“at the motion to dismiss stage, ‘actual 8 reliance ... is inferred from the misrepresentation of a material fact’”) (citation omitted)). 9 Presuming reliance is also consistent with the CLRA’s purpose: “to protect consumers 10 against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical 11 procedures to secure such protection.” Lytle v. Nutramax Labs., Inc., 114 F.4th 1011, 12 1038 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). 13 World Market acknowledges that reliance can be presumed where an allegedly 14 fraudulent omission is material but contends that reliance cannot be presumed in this case 15 because “Harvey’s decision to complete the transaction with full knowledge of [the 16 initially undisclosed] charges conclusively establishes that those charges were immaterial 17 to her purchasing decision.” Reply (dkt. 24) at 6. In making this argument, World Market 18 misses the forest for the trees. Whether a fraudulent omission is material is an objective 19 question assessed from the standpoint of a reasonable consumer. Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1225. 20 By contrast, whether an individual consumer subjectively relied on that omission in a 21 particular instance is a factual question unsuitable for resolution on the pleadings—though 22 it may become relevant at a later stage of litigation. See Moore, 966 F.3d at 1021. That 23 Harvey decided to complete the transaction after discovering the initially undisclosed fees 24 is therefore irrelevant to determining whether a reasonable consumer would find those fees 25 to be material. 26 The Court therefore presumes Harvey’s reliance on World Market’s allegedly 27 misleading advertising for purposes of this motion, satisfying that requirement of her 1 alleged section 1770(a)(29) violation, Harvey has also sufficiently alleged reliance under 2 those statutes. See Moore, 966 F.3d at 1020. 3 That all said, World Market’s argument as to Harvey’s reliance specifically is not 4 lost on the Court. If Harvey did not in fact rely on the initial display price of the chairs, 5 that would defeat the presumption of reliance, thereby dooming her claim (and, for 6 purposes of this case, making her an inadequate class representative). See Lytle, 114 F.4th 7 at 1019, 1035 (recognizing that “the presumption of reliance is rebuttable” and that class 8 certification may not be appropriate if the allegedly deceptive marketing practice was “not 9 material as to all class members”) (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Court will instruct 10 the parties to begin discovery with a limited inquiry into Harvey’s reliance and will permit 11 an early motion for summary judgment on those grounds if appropriate. 12 2. Damage 13 World Market also argues that Harvey lacks standing under the CLRA, UCL, and 14 FAL because she fails to allege damages. Mot. at 8. To establish standing under the UCL 15 and FAL, a plaintiff must allege that she “lost money or property ... as a result of [her] 16 transactions with the defendant.” Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1104. Under the CLRA, a plaintiff 17 can satisfy the damages requirement by alleging that she suffered “any damage as a result 18 of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be 19 unlawful by [s]ection 1770.” Id. at 1107. The CLRA’s “‘any damage’ requirement is a 20 capacious one that includes any pecuniary damage as well as opportunity costs and 21 transaction costs,” so “any plaintiff who has standing under the UCL’s and FAL’s ‘lost 22 money or property’ requirement will ... have suffered ‘any damage’ for purposes of 23 establishing CLRA standing.” Id. at 1108. 24 World Market contends that Harvey cannot plausibly allege that she was harmed 25 “by knowingly paying for a product ... that she, in fact, receive[d].” Mot. at 12. To be 26 sure, a plaintiff does not suffer a cognizable injury where she spends money but “receives 27 the benefit of the bargain” in exchange. See Warner v. Tinder Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1 have purchased is not loss of money or property within the meaning of the [UCL or FAL] 2 as long as one still receives the benefit of the bargain”); Hall v. Time Inc., 158 Cal. App. 3 4th 847, 855 (2008) (holding that a plaintiff had not alleged an injury in fact under the 4 UCL where he “expended money ... but he received a book in exchange” and “did not 5 allege he did not want the book, the book was unsatisfactory, or the book was worth less 6 than what he paid for it”). World Market correctly points out that Harvey “does not claim 7 to have been dissatisfied with her purchase” and thus it argues that she did not suffer any 8 harm under the meaning of the CLRA, the UCL, or the FAL. Mot. at 12. 9 But World Market’s argument does not fit this case, where the asserted economic 10 injury comes in the form of fees above and beyond the cost of the product itself. Indeed, 11 faced with a plaintiff’s allegations that a defendant falsely advertised goods as being 12 substantially discounted when they had never been sold at the purported original price, the 13 Ninth Circuit rejected a similar “benefit of the bargain” defense. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 14 1102, 1107. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an economic 15 injury by alleging that the defendant “made material misrepresentations that induced him 16 to buy products he would not otherwise have purchased.” Id. at 1107. The court explained 17 that the “material misrepresentations” in question related solely to the defendant’s 18 allegedly deceptive pricing scheme, rather than the condition or nature of the defendant’s 19 products. Id. The court therefore did not need to consider whether the plaintiff was 20 satisfied with the products in reaching its conclusion. 21 World Market’s “benefit of the bargain” argument is also inconsistent with section 22 1770(a)(29)’s legislative history. The Legislature’s comments clarify that “junk fees 23 impose substantial economic harms on consumers and impede the dissemination of 24 important market information.” SB 478 Pricing Transparency Comments at 6. This 25 statement highlights the Legislature’s belief that consumers are economically harmed (and 26 thus have standing even under the more stringent UCL and FAL standard) whenever they 27 pay fees that are not included in a product’s initially advertised price, regardless of the 1 were, in fact, “junk fees” within the meaning of section 1770(a)(29)—that is, whether they 2 were fees in excess of the costs that World Market actually incurred—is a question of fact 3 not suitable for resolution on the pleadings. See City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 4 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The purpose of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the 5 formal sufficiency of a claim for relief; the motion is not a procedure for resolving a 6 contest between the parties about the facts or the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s 7 case.”) (cleaned up). 8 Because Harvey has plausibly alleged that she lost “money or property” under the 9 UCL and FAL’s test, she has also satisfied the CLRA’s “any damage” standard. 10 B. Failure to State a Claim Under Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(29) 11 World Market also argues that Harvey fails to state a claim under the CLRA. Mot. 12 at 10–11. World Market contends that Harvey’s CLRA claim should be dismissed because 13 she does not allege with particularity any facts indicating that World Market violated 14 section 1770(a)(29). Id. World Market emphasizes that section 1770(a)(29) does not 15 require companies to include “[p]ostage or carriage charges that will be reasonably and 16 actually incurred to ship the physical goods to the consumer” in a product’s initially 17 advertised price. Id. at 11 (citing Cal. Civ. Code. § 1770(a)(29)(A)(ii)). World Market 18 contends that Harvey provides no factual support for her “conclusory allegation” that 19 World Market did not actually incur the fees it charged her. Id. 20 But Harvey has adequately alleged that World Market does not actually incur the 21 shipping fees it charges. She alleges that those fees are “based upon the sale price” of 22 World Market’s products and that under World Market’s policy “a 3-pound item that sells 23 for $50 would incur a shipping cost far less than a 3-pound item that sells for $500.”5 24 Opp. (dkt. 22) at 11 (citing SAC ¶ 53). Taken as true, Harvey’s allegations are sufficient 25 to state a claim—even under Rule 9(b)—because the Court can infer that World Market’s 26

27 5 World Market argues that a shipping policy “based upon the sale price of a product” may 1 || purported shipping costs are not “actually incurred.” See Cal. Civ. Code § 2 1770(a)(29)(A)Gi). “The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to ensure that the defendant has enough 3 || information (the who, what, when, where, and how of the claimed fraud) so that ‘a 4 || defendant can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations.’” Caldwell v. Nordic 5 || Naturals, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 3d 889, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (citation omitted). Harvey 6 || alleges that World Market (the “who’’) advertises products at artificially low prices before 7 || adding fees that exceed the products’ true value (the “what”’). SAC □□ 3, 12, 13. She 8 || alleges that she encountered this deceptive advertising practice in September 2024 (the 9 || “when’”) in California (the “where’”’). Id. J] 19, 28. And she alleges that World Market 10 || charges shipping fees “based upon the sale price of the product[s]” in question instead of 11 || the costs World Market actually incurs (the “how’’). Id. J] 25, 28. Harvey thus satisfied 12 |} Rule 9(b)’s standard in that she “provide[d] notice ... of the specific fraudulent conduct” 13 |} that World Market must defend against. Bly-Magee, 236 F.3d at 1018. She has therefore 14 || stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. 15 | Iv. CONCLUSION Z 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES World Market’s motion to dismiss. 5 17 || The Court instructs the parties to conduct limited factual discovery, within 60 days, 5 18 || confined to the following question: Did Harvey actually rely on the initial display price of 19 || the chairs that she purchased from World Market when she purchased them? All other 20 || discovery is stayed while discovery on this issue is ongoing. And if based on this initial 21 || discovery World Market believes that there is no genuine dispute of fact as to Harvey’s 22 || reliance, World Market may file an early summary judgment motion with respect to that 23 || issue (which would of course be without prejudice as to any subsequent summary 24 || judgment motion after full discovery). 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. cK 26 Dated: May 9, 2025 xo CHARLES R. BREYER 27 United States District Judge 28