Harvey v. Symons

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-0900
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WILLIAM F. HARVEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-900-RJL-MJS

AMY E. SYMONS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ “Joint Motion to Seal Case.” (ECF No. 59.)

After nearly a year of contentious—and public—litigation, the parties negotiated a global

resolution through a court-facilitated settlement conference in December 2025. They now jointly

ask to seal the case in its entirety. In support, the parties argue that the filings on the docket include

sensitive details about Plaintiff’s “alleged mental capacity” and “financial affairs” and that the

“public availability of the record may adversely affect” Ms. Symons’ law practice. On review of

the parties’ skeletal arguments and the governing law, the Court DENIES the motion.

The Court begins from the premise that “public access to judicial records is a fundamental

element of the rule of law, important to maintaining the integrity and legitimacy of an independent

Judicial Branch.” In re Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance Applications & Ords., 964

F.3d 1121, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation omitted). Thus, “[t]he starting point in

considering a motion to seal court records is a strong presumption in favor of public access to

judicial proceedings.” Hardaway v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 843 F.3d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The “strong presumption” can be overcome, though, by weighing it against the following

six factors:

(1) [T]he need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previous public access to the documents; (3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents were introduced during the proceedings.

Id. (quoting EEOC v. National Children’s Center, Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see

also United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 317–22 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In weighing these factors,

district courts have “wide discretion” but must provide a “full explanation” that is “detailed

enough” to allow review. Abdelhady v. George Washington Univ., 89 F.4th 955, 958 (D.C. Cir.

2024) (citation and quotation omitted). Exercising its discretion here, the Court concludes that the

parties come up considerably short in establishing any justification for sealing.

Beginning with the first factor—the need for public access to the documents at issue—the

parties essentially ignore it. Although there may not be a specific public interest in the specific

filings relevant to this specific dispute, the Court cannot ignore the general public interest in open

access to judicial records, which “serves the important function[] of ensuring the integrity of

judicial proceedings.” Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 315. Turning to the second factor, which focuses on

prior public access to the documents, the parties ignore it, too. But the reality is that this case has

been publicly accessible since it was filed, and the same holds true for virtually all the filings that

both sides have made on the docket throughout the litigation. This reality cuts decidedly against

sealing. See Kartte v. Davis, 2022 WL 2904173, at *4 (D.D.C. July 22, 2022). Put another way,

the parties’ own consistent approach to this public litigation is at odds with their present arguments

surrounding the need to suddenly seal the proceedings in their entirety.

The parties do address the third and fourth factors, albeit in relatively perfunctory terms.

On the third factor, the fact that the parties object to ongoing public disclosure does favor sealing. 2 And on the fourth factor, the Court acknowledges that certain facets of the case do implicate

important privacy considerations, including personal health and financial information, which

likewise tilts toward sealing, at least in part. But the parties fail to grapple with the fact that lesser

measures beyond wholesale sealing could suffice to mitigate those concerns, such as a request to

seal certain docket entries on a filing-by-filing basis, targeted redactions of sensitive submissions,

and so on. After all, the Court itself directed that certain financial information should be filed under

seal at one point (see Min. Order, Apr. 22, 2025; ECF No. 17), and the parties might have made

similar requests to seal other potentially sensitive filings throughout the proceedings. For whatever

reason, they neglected to do so. In sum, while factors three and four point somewhat toward

sealing, the parties’ own litigation conduct, once again, undercuts that proposition.

The fifth factor—the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure—is minimally

relevant here. Although the parties all oppose disclosure and suggest they will suffer prejudice

absent sealing, this is largely a problem of their own making for the reasons just explained. The

Court might be more sympathetic if the parties were asking to seal or redact specific filings based

on specific assertions of prejudice. But their joint motion makes no effort to engage in that sort of

particularized analysis. And any potential prejudice to the parties from the public accessibility of

this case as a general matter does not favor categorical sealing. Finally, the parties do not address

the sixth factor at all, but the Court fails to see how it could cut in favor of sealing here.

For these reasons, the parties’ request to seal this case is unjustified. The D.C. Circuit has

repeatedly emphasized the strong presumption of public access to judicial records, and the parties

fail to demonstrate why that presumption is overcome here, especially given that their request

comes only after months of public litigation without any real effort to maintain the case—or even

3 any individual filings—under seal. Kartte, 2022 WL 2904173, at *4 (similarly rejecting motion to

seal case following settlement for many of these same reasons).

The Court DENIES the motion to seal.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 4, 2026

MATTHEW J. SHARBAUGH United States Magistrate Judge