Harvey v. Bogalusa Concrete, Inc.

719 So. 2d 1130, 97 La.App. 1 Cir. 2945, 1998 La. App. LEXIS 2835, 1998 WL 682952
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedSeptember 25, 1998
Docket97 CA 2945
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 719 So. 2d 1130 (Harvey v. Bogalusa Concrete, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harvey v. Bogalusa Concrete, Inc., 719 So. 2d 1130, 97 La.App. 1 Cir. 2945, 1998 La. App. LEXIS 2835, 1998 WL 682952 (La. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

719 So.2d 1130 (1998)

Raymond HARVEY
v.
BOGALUSA CONCRETE, INC.

No. 97 CA 2945.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

September 25, 1998.

*1131 Gregory D. Guth, New Orleans, LA, for plaintiff/appellant Raymond Harvey.

Robert J. May, Metairie, LA, for defendant/appellee Bogalusa Concrete, Inc.

Before SHORTESS, C.J., and CARTER and WHIPPLE, JJ.

CARTER, Judge.

A workers' compensation claimant appeals the dismissal of his claim by the workers' compensation judge.

FACTS

Raymond Harvey filed a disputed claim for workers' compensation benefits alleging he sustained injuries from nitrogen textroxide[1] exposure at the Gaylord Chemical plant on October 23, 1995. Harvey claims he has been unable to work since December 1995, due to his symptoms of burning eyes, upset stomach, diarrhea, and headaches, which he alleges were caused by exposure to leaking chemicals from a tank car several hours before an explosion. Harvey was employed as a truck driver by Bogalusa Concrete, Inc. in Bogalusa, Louisiana. On October 23, 1995, Harvey worked from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., and left the Gaylord premises soon after his shift ended. About an hour after Harvey left the Gaylord premises, a tank car filled with nitrogen tetroxide exploded and released its contents into the air.

After a trial on the merits, the workers' compensation judge dismissed Harvey's claim with prejudice. In written reasons for judgment, the workers' compensation judge indicated:

Since there is only speculation that the tank was leaking before the explosion and that claimant didn't complain at the time and had left work some time before the explosion, claimant was not in the course and scope of his employment when the alleged incident happened.

Harvey appealed the judgment of the workers' compensation judge with the following assignments of error:

1. The office of workers' compensation erred in holding that Raymond Harvey was not injured in the course and scope of his employment.
2. The office of workers' compensation erred in its piecemeal acceptance of the testimony of the defendant's litigation consulting physician which was not supported by a reading of his whole testimony.
3. The office of workers' compensation erred in rejecting the testimony of the claimant's treating physician without a valid basis for so doing.

DISCUSSION

An employee is entitled to receive benefits for a personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. LSA-R.S. 23:1031. Accident is defined by the Workers' Compensation Act as an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration. LSA-R.S. 23:1021(1).

A claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an employment accident occurred and that it had a causal relationship to the disability. If the testimony leaves the probabilities evenly balanced, the plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of persuasion. Likewise, plaintiff's case must fail if the evidence shows only a *1132 possibility of a causative accident or leaves it to speculation or conjecture. See Prim v. City of Shreveport, 297 So.2d 421, 422 (La. 1974).

The workers' compensation judge's determinations as to whether the worker's testimony is credible and whether the worker has discharged his or her burden of proof are factual determinations not to be disturbed on review unless clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Gonzales v. Babco Farm, Inc., 535 So.2d 822, 824 (La.App. 2nd Cir.), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1200 (La.1988). For an appellate court to reverse a workers' compensation judge's factual finding, it must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the workers' compensation judge or that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. See Stobart v. State, through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993); Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987). Thus, the reviewing court must do more than simply review the record for some evidence which supports or controverts the workers' compensation judge's finding. The reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the workers' compensation judge's finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. See Stobart v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d at 882.

The issue to be resolved by the reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart v. State, through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d at 882. Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the factfinder's, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Stobart v. State, through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d at 882. Where two permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart v. State, through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d at 883.

After reviewing the record, we find the workers' compensation judge did not err in dismissing Harvey's claim. The record does not support a finding that Harvey sustained an accident during the course and scope of his employment with Bogalusa Concrete for two reasons. First, there is insufficient proof that the tank car was actually leaking prior to the explosion. Second, the medical testimony establishes Harvey's mild physical abnormality is more likely related to his tobacco use than toxic exposure.

Harvey points to a newspaper article written after the explosion describing unofficial information that the tank car was probably leaking while Gaylord workers were attempting to unload it some time before the explosion occurred. However, there was no evidence from any source indicating when the alleged leak was noticed and when Gaylord began to act. In our opinion, the newspaper article relied upon by Harvey is mere speculation. Although Harvey testified he was in close proximity to the tank car when he delivered the concrete, he did not describe any activity whatsoever involving the tank car that would indicate an awareness of a leak as insinuated by the newspaper article. No other Bogalusa Concrete employees, who delivered concrete to Gaylord Chemical prior to the explosion, reported any ill effects related to the alleged pre-explosion leak.

Harvey testified he began to experience burning eyes, upset stomach and a headache at work prior to the explosion. But according to Claudine Hughes, the office manager for Bogalusa Concrete, there is no record of Harvey complaining of any problems on the day of the explosion. The record does not establish when Harvey actually informed his employer he was having any type of health complaints. According to Hughes, Bogalusa Concrete sent all of its employees to Dr. Lemaire shortly after the explosion as a precaution, whether they were complaining of any symptoms or not. Dr. Lemaire's medical records were not introduced into the record. Harvey testified Dr. Lemaire referred him to Dr. Jackson for further tests, *1133

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Bluebook (online)
719 So. 2d 1130, 97 La.App. 1 Cir. 2945, 1998 La. App. LEXIS 2835, 1998 WL 682952, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harvey-v-bogalusa-concrete-inc-lactapp-1998.