Wennerstrum, J.
Plaintiff, a minor, in an action brought in his behalf by his father, sought recovery under the guest statute for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. It occurred at night at a T intersection of a gravel country road and a blacktop, numbered highway. Defendants’ motions for a directed verdict were overruled and upon submission of the cause to the jury a verdict was returned against them. Later defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial were overruled. They have appealed.
Ronald H. Hartman, the plaintiff, was 17 years of age at the time of the accident which occurred on April 2, 1956. He and defendant Wendell Kruse lived with their respective parents on near-by farms in Plymouth County, Iowa. They are related by marriage.
The plaintiff had attended a national guard drill at Le Mars on the evening of the accident. Later the young men went to the plaintiff’s home. Defendant Wendell Kruse was driving his father’s car. Shortly after ten o’clock p.m. they left the Hartman home in the Kruse fear to attend a dance at Akron, approximately 12 miles away. They drove west over a gravel hilly road to where the accident occurred some ten miles from the Hartman home. The Kruse boy when he observed the nature [1323]*1323of the intersection he was approaching endeavored to turn and guide the car so as to avoid striking a railroad embankment and a telephone pole across the road to the west. The ear rolled over once as it skidded into the ditch and landed on its wheels. Both boys were thrown out on the right-hand side.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff: contends the Kruse boy was driving the car in a reckless manner at the time of the accident and over the road they had traveled we deem it advisable to relate the testimony concerning the manner in which the ear was driven from the time it left the Hartman farm until it entered the T intersection. Two of several intervening north-and-south roads between the Hartman home and Highway No. 12 where the accident occurred were marked with stop signs. The first intervening road which had a stop sign was about one and one-half miles west of the Hartman home, and is known as Highway No. 29. The second road which had a stop sign was about one and six-tenths miles east of the place of the accident. There is testimony by the plaintiff the Kruse boy stopped his car at the first stop sign. He also testified defendant Wendell Kruse increased his speed after crossing the highway last referred to and he observed the speedometer indicated a speed of 85 miles per hour when they reached a bridge about five and one-half miles from the Hartman home and about four and one-half miles from the place of the accident. This rate of speed is denied by the defendant but under our established holdings we are to consider the testimony of the plaintiff in the light most favorable to him in considering a motion for a directed verdict. There is testimony on the part of the plaintiff he asked the defendant to slow down, that the defendant laughed and said: “ ‘I know how to drive this car.’ ” He also testified Wendell said he was going to overhaul the car in two weeks and he did not care if he did “ ‘drive the heck out of it.’ ” These statements were made approximately four and one-half miles east of where the accident took place.
There is a hill about a quarter of a mile from the T intersection on Highway No. 12 where the accident occurred. There is a stop sign at this road. The defendant driver testified he first observed the stop sign after the car had leveled off at the bottom of the hill and the lights of his car illuminated it. He [1324]*1324was then about 100 feet away from the sign and he then put on his brakes. The plaintiff twice gave testimony the defendant “slammed on his brakes.” The ear skidded on into the intersection and continued another 62 feet to the west shoulder of Highway No. 12. It then rolled over. When the ear came to rest, Wendell, the driver, was lying on the ground about three feet from the car and the plaintiff was about ten feet from it.
The plaintiff, in his amended and substituted petition, based his claim on recklessness, in the main upon the claimed dangerous rate of speed the car was driven by defendant Wendell Kruse at and prior to the time of the accident, and alleged the automobile was driven at a speed of between 80 and 85 miles an hour to a point where the road on which the defendant was driving ended. It is further alleged that the driver of the car failed to have the automobile under control when he drove into the T intersection previously mentioned.
In connection with these allegations of the petition it should be noted the plaintiff did not testify as to any particular rate of speed after the occupants of the car had passed the bridge some four and a half miles east of Highway No. 12. The only testimony given by the plaintiff relative to the movement of the car after it passed the bridge is as follows:
“* * # Then we came to this next stop sign. Wendell just slammed on his brakes. He didn’t stop. He just slammed it in second and went right on across. * * * After Wendell Kruse passed this second stop sign I said ‘Wendell, we should have stopped at this stop sign.’ He just said, ‘Yeah, I guess so’, and just took right off and kept right on going. After that point the road was still hilly.
“Q. What happened after that, if anything? A. Well, I was scared. I didn’t know what to do. And he came over this last hill and as the ear started to go down I shut my eyes because I didn’t know what to do. The next thing I knew he hit his brakes. Q. Did you have your eyes closed at the time that he hit his brakes? A. No. I opened them up and there was the black-top right ahead of us. Q. Well, what if anything did you see at that point. A. As soon as I seen the blacktop I blacked right out.”
[1325]*1325I. The initial question for our determination is whether the facts heretofore set forth generate a jury question relative to the claimed recklessness of the defendant driver. We have set out such parts of the plaintiff’s testimony which, interpreted in the light most favorable to him, must be considered in determining whether it discloses “* * * a situation from which reasonable men might draw an inference of ‘no care, coupled with disregard for consequences’.” Anderson v. Elliott, 244 Iowa 670, 677, 57 N.W.2d 792, 795. We have said, “The evidence must disclose something from which recklessness could be legitimately inferred, * * Wilde v. Griffel, 214 Iowa 1177, 1180, 243 N.W. 159, 160; Goetsch v. Matheson, 246 Iowa 800, 806, 68 N.W.2d 77.
However, in order that the action and conduct of the driver of a car can be classified as reckless “* * * it must be such as to manifest a heedless disregard or indifference to the rights of others; * * Wilde v. Griffel, supra. We have also held in order to show recklessness there must be evidence of (1) “no care, coupled with disregard for consequences,” (2) there must be evidence a driver “* * * had actual knowledge of an existing danger, or there was a danger so obvious that he should be cognizant of it, and proceeded without any heed of or concern for the consequences”, and (3) “* * * the consequences of the actions of the driver are such that the occurrence of the catastrophe is a probability rather than a possibility.” Fritz v.
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Wennerstrum, J.
Plaintiff, a minor, in an action brought in his behalf by his father, sought recovery under the guest statute for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. It occurred at night at a T intersection of a gravel country road and a blacktop, numbered highway. Defendants’ motions for a directed verdict were overruled and upon submission of the cause to the jury a verdict was returned against them. Later defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial were overruled. They have appealed.
Ronald H. Hartman, the plaintiff, was 17 years of age at the time of the accident which occurred on April 2, 1956. He and defendant Wendell Kruse lived with their respective parents on near-by farms in Plymouth County, Iowa. They are related by marriage.
The plaintiff had attended a national guard drill at Le Mars on the evening of the accident. Later the young men went to the plaintiff’s home. Defendant Wendell Kruse was driving his father’s car. Shortly after ten o’clock p.m. they left the Hartman home in the Kruse fear to attend a dance at Akron, approximately 12 miles away. They drove west over a gravel hilly road to where the accident occurred some ten miles from the Hartman home. The Kruse boy when he observed the nature [1323]*1323of the intersection he was approaching endeavored to turn and guide the car so as to avoid striking a railroad embankment and a telephone pole across the road to the west. The ear rolled over once as it skidded into the ditch and landed on its wheels. Both boys were thrown out on the right-hand side.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff: contends the Kruse boy was driving the car in a reckless manner at the time of the accident and over the road they had traveled we deem it advisable to relate the testimony concerning the manner in which the ear was driven from the time it left the Hartman farm until it entered the T intersection. Two of several intervening north-and-south roads between the Hartman home and Highway No. 12 where the accident occurred were marked with stop signs. The first intervening road which had a stop sign was about one and one-half miles west of the Hartman home, and is known as Highway No. 29. The second road which had a stop sign was about one and six-tenths miles east of the place of the accident. There is testimony by the plaintiff the Kruse boy stopped his car at the first stop sign. He also testified defendant Wendell Kruse increased his speed after crossing the highway last referred to and he observed the speedometer indicated a speed of 85 miles per hour when they reached a bridge about five and one-half miles from the Hartman home and about four and one-half miles from the place of the accident. This rate of speed is denied by the defendant but under our established holdings we are to consider the testimony of the plaintiff in the light most favorable to him in considering a motion for a directed verdict. There is testimony on the part of the plaintiff he asked the defendant to slow down, that the defendant laughed and said: “ ‘I know how to drive this car.’ ” He also testified Wendell said he was going to overhaul the car in two weeks and he did not care if he did “ ‘drive the heck out of it.’ ” These statements were made approximately four and one-half miles east of where the accident took place.
There is a hill about a quarter of a mile from the T intersection on Highway No. 12 where the accident occurred. There is a stop sign at this road. The defendant driver testified he first observed the stop sign after the car had leveled off at the bottom of the hill and the lights of his car illuminated it. He [1324]*1324was then about 100 feet away from the sign and he then put on his brakes. The plaintiff twice gave testimony the defendant “slammed on his brakes.” The ear skidded on into the intersection and continued another 62 feet to the west shoulder of Highway No. 12. It then rolled over. When the ear came to rest, Wendell, the driver, was lying on the ground about three feet from the car and the plaintiff was about ten feet from it.
The plaintiff, in his amended and substituted petition, based his claim on recklessness, in the main upon the claimed dangerous rate of speed the car was driven by defendant Wendell Kruse at and prior to the time of the accident, and alleged the automobile was driven at a speed of between 80 and 85 miles an hour to a point where the road on which the defendant was driving ended. It is further alleged that the driver of the car failed to have the automobile under control when he drove into the T intersection previously mentioned.
In connection with these allegations of the petition it should be noted the plaintiff did not testify as to any particular rate of speed after the occupants of the car had passed the bridge some four and a half miles east of Highway No. 12. The only testimony given by the plaintiff relative to the movement of the car after it passed the bridge is as follows:
“* * # Then we came to this next stop sign. Wendell just slammed on his brakes. He didn’t stop. He just slammed it in second and went right on across. * * * After Wendell Kruse passed this second stop sign I said ‘Wendell, we should have stopped at this stop sign.’ He just said, ‘Yeah, I guess so’, and just took right off and kept right on going. After that point the road was still hilly.
“Q. What happened after that, if anything? A. Well, I was scared. I didn’t know what to do. And he came over this last hill and as the ear started to go down I shut my eyes because I didn’t know what to do. The next thing I knew he hit his brakes. Q. Did you have your eyes closed at the time that he hit his brakes? A. No. I opened them up and there was the black-top right ahead of us. Q. Well, what if anything did you see at that point. A. As soon as I seen the blacktop I blacked right out.”
[1325]*1325I. The initial question for our determination is whether the facts heretofore set forth generate a jury question relative to the claimed recklessness of the defendant driver. We have set out such parts of the plaintiff’s testimony which, interpreted in the light most favorable to him, must be considered in determining whether it discloses “* * * a situation from which reasonable men might draw an inference of ‘no care, coupled with disregard for consequences’.” Anderson v. Elliott, 244 Iowa 670, 677, 57 N.W.2d 792, 795. We have said, “The evidence must disclose something from which recklessness could be legitimately inferred, * * Wilde v. Griffel, 214 Iowa 1177, 1180, 243 N.W. 159, 160; Goetsch v. Matheson, 246 Iowa 800, 806, 68 N.W.2d 77.
However, in order that the action and conduct of the driver of a car can be classified as reckless “* * * it must be such as to manifest a heedless disregard or indifference to the rights of others; * * Wilde v. Griffel, supra. We have also held in order to show recklessness there must be evidence of (1) “no care, coupled with disregard for consequences,” (2) there must be evidence a driver “* * * had actual knowledge of an existing danger, or there was a danger so obvious that he should be cognizant of it, and proceeded without any heed of or concern for the consequences”, and (3) “* * * the consequences of the actions of the driver are such that the occurrence of the catastrophe is a probability rather than a possibility.” Fritz v. Wohler, 247 Iowa 1039, 1041, 78 N.W.2d 27, 28, and cases cited.
II. As heretofore shown the defendant driver failed to stop at the intersecting road and stop sign approximately one and six-tenths miles from the road where the accident occurred. It was after the car had passed this stop sign the plaintiff made the remark previously quoted and the defendant replied as heretofore set out. We do not believe the statement of the plaintiff can be interpreted as amounting to a protest or a complaint relative to an excessive rate of speed. Neither can we interpret the reply of the defendant driver as indicating a mental attitude of indifference to and a complete disregard for consequences.
In Goodman v. Gonse, 247 Iowa 1091, 1096, 76 N.W.2d 873, 876, the plaintiff introduced testimony that shortly before the accident there considered, one of the occupants of the car said [1326]*1326to tbe driver be was “driving too fast” and in reply tbe driver said: “ ‘Shut your mouth, I don’t like back seat drivers, you ean get up here and drive.’ ” We made no extensive comment about these remarks in tbe opinion but upon all tbe evidence in tbe plaintiff’s ease we beld there was not sufficient showing from Avbicb an inference of recklessness might be drawn.
III. We should also consider whether there is evidence of “no care, coupled with disregard for consequences.” In the present case there is undenied evidence the defendant driver, as soon as he observed the stop sign at the Highway No. 12 T intersection put on the brakes of his car. It was then 100 feet from the stop sign. From this point it skidded into the intersection and then proceeded another 62 feet to the west shoulder of Highway No. 12 and rolled over. As the car skidded into the highway the defendant driver, according to his testimony, “* * * thought I had better straighten it out and it kept going. Then I thought, well, there is a telephone pole straight ahead and a big embankment — a low embankment, but I didn’t want to hit that so I tried to turn to the left.”
• We are unable to conclude the driver’s actions showed * * acts utterly inconsistent with prudence or proper regard for the safety of the guest in his car, from which the inference could be drawn that the operation of the vehicle was reckless.” Goodman v. Gonse, supra, 247 Iowa 1091, 1099, 76 N.W.2d 873, 877, 878; Wilde v. Griffel, supra, 214 Iowa 1177, 1179, 243 N.W. 159. In the instant case, as in the Wilde case, there is no evidence the driver did not do everything in his power to avoid the accident.
IV. We should determine whether the defendant driver “* * * had actual knowledge of an existing danger * # *” and then proceeded “without any heed of or concern for the consequences.”
It is true there is testimony by the plaintiff that Wendell had been over the road traveled. The defendant testified he had not driven over the road but had ridden over it a couple of nights before. Kelative to knowledge of the nature of the intersection at Highway No. 12 the defendant driver testified:
«# * * Then after this second stop sign I slowed down to [1327]*1327about 45 because I kind of thought there was a dead end — I thought there was a dead end ahead and I was looking for a sign of some kind to tell me that there was a dead end. I didn’t know exactly how far it was from the second stop sign to the dead end of the road. I thought it was at least two miles or more. I expected there would be some sign when I got there to tell it was a dead end. There is a stop sign at the north-and-south highway that is about a mile and a half or a mile and six tenths east of Highway No. 12 where the accident took place. That intersecting road was a gravel road. After I reached that road that is approximately a mile and a half east of Highway No. 12, I drove the car westward toward Highway No. 12 at about 45 miles an hour.”
There is no other evidence of Wendell’s knowledge relative to the “dead-end” intersection. We have held where the driver does not have conscious knowledge that a road ends at a T intersection one is not guilty of recklessness in not observing the character of the intersection in time. Tucker v. Heaverlo, 249 Iowa 197, 202, 86 N.W.2d 353, 356; Wilde v. Griffel, supra; Tomasek v. Lynch, 233 Iowa 662, 10 N.W.2d 3.
As shown by the quoted testimony the defendant driver had knowledge he was approaching a T intersection but he did not know just where it was. When he did observe the stop sign and road he put on the brakes and sought to turn the car and avoid hitting the embankment across the road. It is our considered conclusion the defendant driver did everything he could to avoid the accident and that he did not proceed “without any heed of or concern for the consequences.”
In Tucker v. Heaverlo, supra, we held where the driver put on the brakes approximately twenty-five feet from a ditch “* * * it does indicate an effort to stop the automobile as soon as the driver became aware of the apparent danger.” In Tomasek v. Lynch, supra, there is evidence the car skidded for 20 feet before it went over an embankment. In each of the last two cited cases this court held there was not sufficient evidence of recklessness to justify submitting that question to the jury. In the present case the brakes were put on approximately 162 feet from the ditch. It may be true the driver then tried to straighten up the [1328]*1328car when it began to skid but he was endeavoring to control and stop it. He also endeavored to turn it to the left. All these acts, it is our conclusion, do not indicate a lack of or unconcern for consequences.
Other cases where this court has held there was not sufficient evidence of recklessness to justify submitting that question to a jury, where the driver of a car sought to stop and control it, are: Brown v. Martin, 216 Iowa 1272, 1285, 248 N.W. 368; Scott v. Hansen, 228 Iowa 37, 44, 46, 289 N.W. 710; Schmitt v. Cutkomp, 248 Iowa 575, 581, 81 N.W.2d 662, 665.
It is when a driver has conscious knowledge of a dangerous situation and then does not exercise the slightest care to avoid injury to his guest that recklessness is shown. Roberts v. Koons, 230 Iowa 92, 296 N.W. 811; Peter v. Thomas, 231 Iowa 985, 2 N.W.2d 643; Long v. Pearce, 233 Iowa 1025, 10 N.W.2d 50. Such is not the situation in the present case.
V. Upon a review of the evidence heretofore set out, as well as all the evidence disclosed by the record, we are unable to conclude “* * * the consequences of the actions of the driver are such that the occurrence of the catastrophe is a probability rather than a possibility.” There is nothing to indicate the action of the driver, in the light of what he endeavored to do, showed there was a probability of a catastrophe rather than a possibility.
'VT. The plaintiff’s testimony concerning the speed of 85 miles per hour was when the car was at or near the bridge approximately four and a half miles from Highway No. 12, the intersecting road. In the light of the comment in the dissenting opinion relative to speed it can again be stated there is no reference to the probable speed of the car just before the accident except as previously stated. It is true the plaintiff made a statement regarding the speed of the car during the last quarter of a mile before reaching the intersecting. road when he testified: “I knew the ear was going at a fast rate of speed.” This, however, is a comparative term. It does not indicate a particular mileage per hour. And it was then, or shortly thereafter when, according to the plaintiff’s own statement, “The next thing I knew he hit his brakes.” Speed in itself does not amount to recklessness. Thornbury v. Maley, 242 Iowa 70, 74, [1329]*132945 N.W.2d 576, and cases cited. And as stated in the Maley case the question whether a particular speed is dangerous depends upon the surroundings and the attendant circumstances. A fact to be considered is the effort of the defendant to stop his car, which is substantiated by the plaintiff’s statement previously quoted. And as heretofore set out in another division of this opinion we have held even when a driver has conscious knowledge of a dangerous situation recklessness is shown only when the driver does not exercise the slightest care to avoid injury to his guest. Upon the plaintiff’s own version of the situation immediately prior to the accident there is no evidence the defendant did not exercise the slightest care.
VII. In Shenkle v. Mains, 216 Iowa 1324, 1328, 247 N.W. 635, 637, we commented on the exceptional grounds upon which a plaintiff might recover in a recklessness case as follows: “* * * The general rule is that a guest cannot recover. The exceptional grounds are: (1) ‘intoxication’ of the driver, (2) ‘reckless operation’ by the driver. The exceptional character of these grounds implies an infrequency of application thereof. To use and apply the exceptions as the general rule, and in effect to supplant the general rule with the constant use of the exceptions, is to drive against a red light. If the application of the exceptions becomes more frequent than that of the general rule, it may well be deemed a warning sign that we are misapplying the exceptions.” The foregoing statement has application in the instant case.
We have concluded the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence should have been sustained. Inasmuch as the motion heretofore mentioned was overruled, the subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been approved. It is very apparent the plaintiff presented all the evidence obtainable and it is hardly possible additional witnesses or testimony could be secured if the case is retried. Under rule 349, R. C. P., we may enter or direct the trial court to enter a final judgment. It is our conclusion the trial court should do so. Schneider v. Parish, 242 Iowa 1147, 1155, 49 N.W.2d 535, 540.
The judgment entered against the defendants by reason of the verdict returned is reversed and remanded and it is directed [1330]*1330a judgment should be entered in favor of the defendants and against the .plaintiff for costs. — Reversed and remanded with directions.
Bliss, Hays, Thompson, Larson, and Peterson, JJ., concur.
Oliver, J., and Garfield, C. J., dissent.