Judge Harold R. Banke.
Robin T. Hartley and his wife, Teresa L. Hartley, sued Macon Bacon Time, Inc., d/b/a Precision Time (“Precision Tune”) for personal injuries and loss of consortium respectively after Robin Hartley allegedly sustained injuries from a slip and fall at Precision Tune. The Hartleys (collectively “Hartley”) appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
[816]*816Viewed in the light most favorable to Hartley, the evidence was as follows. On a rainy weekend, Charles Marsh picked up Hartley to go to a mall. While en route, Marsh experienced some mechanical difficulty with his vehicle and they proceeded to Precision Tune where Marsh sought out his son-in-law, Curtis Moss, a mechanic, to diagnose the trouble. Moss directed them and the car into a service bay. As Marsh and Moss investigated the problem with the hood upraised, Hartley attempted to join them. Hartley exited the vehicle and started walking toward Moss, who saw him reach the front corner of the car then suddenly slip and fall, landing on his back. Hartley stated that he slipped on some light colored liquid which appeared to be new oil. Moss testified, “[w]hen I picked him up off the floor and got him a chair, I did notice some fluid and water on the floor.”
Moss, Precision Tune’s shop manager, testified that the shop had no set hour or times for inspection and the general procedure was “to straighten up and make sure it was spotless” at the end of the day. He admitted that he had not instructed anyone to mop or sweep that particular day and that he had not inspected the floor before Hartley arrived. According to Moss, rainwater was on the floor because every time a car came in, water dripped off the car. Moss also testified that he routinely allowed customers to remain in the service bay area to watch him work on their cars.
Precision Tune offered the testimony of Jimmy Davidson, a salesman who arrived after Hartley fell. Davidson, who regularly transacted sales with the owner, claimed that the floor was obviously wet from rainwater. Although Davidson testified that he overheard Moss tell Hartley, “I told you, you were too drunk to be walking around this wet floor with those flip-flops on,” he admitted that he could not honestly say that Hartley appeared to have been drinking.
Precision Tune moved for summary judgment on several grounds. It contended that Hartley failed to show it wilfully or wantonly caused his injury, it exercised due care in keeping its premises safe to the general public, and Hartley failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. The trial court awarded summary judgment as a matter of law. Held:
We have carefully reconsidered this case in light of Robinson v. Kroger, 268 Ga. 735 (493 SE2d 403) (1997).1 Robinson is, of course, binding precedent. Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI; Coffey v. Wal-Mart Stores, 224 Ga. App. 824, 827 (2) (482 SE2d 720) (1997). Although this case may well result in a defense verdict, we believe [817]*817that material issues of disputed fact foreclosed summary judgment.
Hartley’s legal status under OCGA §§ 51-3-1; 51-3-2 is an issue remaining to be tried. Although Precision Tune contends that Hartley was a trespasser or a licensee, Hartley asserts that he was an invitee, lawfully on the business premises in connection with the repair of Marsh’s vehicle and “for the purpose of shopping for and assessing the business’ service and parts prices.”2 Pretermitting any decision about Hartley’s status, summary judgment was not appropriate even assuming without deciding that Hartley was a licensee.3 Bishop v. Mangal Bhai Enterprises, 194 Ga. App. 874, 876 (2) (392 SE2d 535) (1990).
An owner or occupier is subject to liability to a licensee for injury caused by a condition on the property, but only if the owner (a) knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to the licensee, and should expect the licensee will not discover or realize the danger; and (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe or to warn the licensee of the condition and risk involved. London Iron &c. Co. v. Abney, 245 Ga. 759, 761 (2) (267 SE2d 214) (1980); Bunch v. Stanton, 174 Ga. App. 233, 235 (1) (329 SE2d 538) (1985). See Patterson v. Thomas, 118 Ga. App. 326, 328 (163 SE2d 331) (1968) (jury question as to whether defendant created unreasonable risk for licensee who slipped on rug placed on slippery floor).
Where an injury is caused by a condition on the property, the act of the owner must be a wilful and wanton act in order for an injured licensee to recover. Brooks v. Logan, 134 Ga. App. 226, 228 (1) (213 SE2d 916) (1975). However, it is usually wilful or wanton not to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to a person who is known to be or may reasonably be expected to be within a hidden peril on one’s premises. Brooks, 134 Ga. App. 228 (1).
After the presence of a licensee is known, he must be treated with the same care as an invitee as to active negligence, and he must be warned by the exercise of ordinary care as to hidden dangers. Cooper v. Corp. Prop. Investors, 220 Ga. App. 889, 891 (470 SE2d 689) [818]*818(1996); Wade v. Mitchell, 206 Ga. App. 265, 267 (2) (c) (424 SE2d 810) (1992). Thus, after Precision Tune knew that Hartley was on its premises, it was required to use ordinary care and diligence to avoid injuring him. See Moon v. Homeowners’ Assn. &c., 202 Ga. App. 821, 823 (2) (415 SE2d 654) (1992); Adams & Adams, Ga. Law of Torts (1996 ed.), § 4-4, p. 108. Inasmuch as the evidence is disputed as to whether the water and oil came to be on the floor while Hartley was on the premises, we cannot say that the active negligence cases do not apply. Trammell v. Baird, 262 Ga. 124, 126 (413 SE2d 445) (1992).
Notwithstanding Precision Tune’s claim, no admissible evidence showed that Moss instructed Hartley to remain inside the car or warned him to watch his step. Davidson’s testimony as to what he purportedly overheard was inadmissible hearsay. Matthews v. Wilson, 119 Ga. App. 708, 711 (168 SE2d 864) (1969).
Even if Precision Tune lacked actual knowledge of the hazard, constructive knowledge may be inferred when there is evidence that an employee of the owner was in the immediate vicinity of the dangerous condition and could have noticed and removed the hazard or the owner lacked a reasonable inspection procedure. Food Giant v. Cooke, 186 Ga. App. 253, 254 (1) (366 SE2d 781) (1988). Here, it is undisputed that Moss was in the immediate area of Hartley’s fall, and was watching Hartley as he suddenly slipped. Precision Tune offered no evidence that it had inspected the floor prior to Hartley’s arrival or that anyone had been instructed to mop or sweep it. According to Moss, Precision Tune had no regular inspection policy other than to tidy up before the employees left for the day. Whether the concurrent acts or omissions of failing to remove the rainwater that allegedly dripped from Marsh’s car or other vehicles or failing to discover and remove the other fluid from the garage floor constituted such negligence as would give rise to liability must be resolved by a jury. See Wade, 206 Ga. App.
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Judge Harold R. Banke.
Robin T. Hartley and his wife, Teresa L. Hartley, sued Macon Bacon Time, Inc., d/b/a Precision Time (“Precision Tune”) for personal injuries and loss of consortium respectively after Robin Hartley allegedly sustained injuries from a slip and fall at Precision Tune. The Hartleys (collectively “Hartley”) appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
[816]*816Viewed in the light most favorable to Hartley, the evidence was as follows. On a rainy weekend, Charles Marsh picked up Hartley to go to a mall. While en route, Marsh experienced some mechanical difficulty with his vehicle and they proceeded to Precision Tune where Marsh sought out his son-in-law, Curtis Moss, a mechanic, to diagnose the trouble. Moss directed them and the car into a service bay. As Marsh and Moss investigated the problem with the hood upraised, Hartley attempted to join them. Hartley exited the vehicle and started walking toward Moss, who saw him reach the front corner of the car then suddenly slip and fall, landing on his back. Hartley stated that he slipped on some light colored liquid which appeared to be new oil. Moss testified, “[w]hen I picked him up off the floor and got him a chair, I did notice some fluid and water on the floor.”
Moss, Precision Tune’s shop manager, testified that the shop had no set hour or times for inspection and the general procedure was “to straighten up and make sure it was spotless” at the end of the day. He admitted that he had not instructed anyone to mop or sweep that particular day and that he had not inspected the floor before Hartley arrived. According to Moss, rainwater was on the floor because every time a car came in, water dripped off the car. Moss also testified that he routinely allowed customers to remain in the service bay area to watch him work on their cars.
Precision Tune offered the testimony of Jimmy Davidson, a salesman who arrived after Hartley fell. Davidson, who regularly transacted sales with the owner, claimed that the floor was obviously wet from rainwater. Although Davidson testified that he overheard Moss tell Hartley, “I told you, you were too drunk to be walking around this wet floor with those flip-flops on,” he admitted that he could not honestly say that Hartley appeared to have been drinking.
Precision Tune moved for summary judgment on several grounds. It contended that Hartley failed to show it wilfully or wantonly caused his injury, it exercised due care in keeping its premises safe to the general public, and Hartley failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. The trial court awarded summary judgment as a matter of law. Held:
We have carefully reconsidered this case in light of Robinson v. Kroger, 268 Ga. 735 (493 SE2d 403) (1997).1 Robinson is, of course, binding precedent. Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI; Coffey v. Wal-Mart Stores, 224 Ga. App. 824, 827 (2) (482 SE2d 720) (1997). Although this case may well result in a defense verdict, we believe [817]*817that material issues of disputed fact foreclosed summary judgment.
Hartley’s legal status under OCGA §§ 51-3-1; 51-3-2 is an issue remaining to be tried. Although Precision Tune contends that Hartley was a trespasser or a licensee, Hartley asserts that he was an invitee, lawfully on the business premises in connection with the repair of Marsh’s vehicle and “for the purpose of shopping for and assessing the business’ service and parts prices.”2 Pretermitting any decision about Hartley’s status, summary judgment was not appropriate even assuming without deciding that Hartley was a licensee.3 Bishop v. Mangal Bhai Enterprises, 194 Ga. App. 874, 876 (2) (392 SE2d 535) (1990).
An owner or occupier is subject to liability to a licensee for injury caused by a condition on the property, but only if the owner (a) knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to the licensee, and should expect the licensee will not discover or realize the danger; and (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe or to warn the licensee of the condition and risk involved. London Iron &c. Co. v. Abney, 245 Ga. 759, 761 (2) (267 SE2d 214) (1980); Bunch v. Stanton, 174 Ga. App. 233, 235 (1) (329 SE2d 538) (1985). See Patterson v. Thomas, 118 Ga. App. 326, 328 (163 SE2d 331) (1968) (jury question as to whether defendant created unreasonable risk for licensee who slipped on rug placed on slippery floor).
Where an injury is caused by a condition on the property, the act of the owner must be a wilful and wanton act in order for an injured licensee to recover. Brooks v. Logan, 134 Ga. App. 226, 228 (1) (213 SE2d 916) (1975). However, it is usually wilful or wanton not to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to a person who is known to be or may reasonably be expected to be within a hidden peril on one’s premises. Brooks, 134 Ga. App. 228 (1).
After the presence of a licensee is known, he must be treated with the same care as an invitee as to active negligence, and he must be warned by the exercise of ordinary care as to hidden dangers. Cooper v. Corp. Prop. Investors, 220 Ga. App. 889, 891 (470 SE2d 689) [818]*818(1996); Wade v. Mitchell, 206 Ga. App. 265, 267 (2) (c) (424 SE2d 810) (1992). Thus, after Precision Tune knew that Hartley was on its premises, it was required to use ordinary care and diligence to avoid injuring him. See Moon v. Homeowners’ Assn. &c., 202 Ga. App. 821, 823 (2) (415 SE2d 654) (1992); Adams & Adams, Ga. Law of Torts (1996 ed.), § 4-4, p. 108. Inasmuch as the evidence is disputed as to whether the water and oil came to be on the floor while Hartley was on the premises, we cannot say that the active negligence cases do not apply. Trammell v. Baird, 262 Ga. 124, 126 (413 SE2d 445) (1992).
Notwithstanding Precision Tune’s claim, no admissible evidence showed that Moss instructed Hartley to remain inside the car or warned him to watch his step. Davidson’s testimony as to what he purportedly overheard was inadmissible hearsay. Matthews v. Wilson, 119 Ga. App. 708, 711 (168 SE2d 864) (1969).
Even if Precision Tune lacked actual knowledge of the hazard, constructive knowledge may be inferred when there is evidence that an employee of the owner was in the immediate vicinity of the dangerous condition and could have noticed and removed the hazard or the owner lacked a reasonable inspection procedure. Food Giant v. Cooke, 186 Ga. App. 253, 254 (1) (366 SE2d 781) (1988). Here, it is undisputed that Moss was in the immediate area of Hartley’s fall, and was watching Hartley as he suddenly slipped. Precision Tune offered no evidence that it had inspected the floor prior to Hartley’s arrival or that anyone had been instructed to mop or sweep it. According to Moss, Precision Tune had no regular inspection policy other than to tidy up before the employees left for the day. Whether the concurrent acts or omissions of failing to remove the rainwater that allegedly dripped from Marsh’s car or other vehicles or failing to discover and remove the other fluid from the garage floor constituted such negligence as would give rise to liability must be resolved by a jury. See Wade, 206 Ga. App. at 270 (4) (b) (distinguishing between pre-existing hazards and those arising after plaintiff’s arrival).
If it is determined that Hartley was a licensee, then evidence of Precision Tune’s imputed superior constructive knowledge will not save Hartley’s case, if the risk was not an unreasonable one. But a jury must decide whether Precision Tune should have realized the existence of an unreasonable risk to Hartley, if, in fact, this purported hazard constituted such a risk, and whether Precision Tune failed to exercise ordinary care to make the condition safe or to warn Hartley. Abney, 245 Ga. at 761 (2). Even assuming solely for the sake of argument that Precision Tune had a customary goal of “tidiness,” that fact, without more, is not sufficient to negate the possibility that on this specific occasion a deviation from that procedure occurred. Burke v. Bi-Lo, 212 Ga. App. 115, 117 (441 SE2d 429) (1994).
[819]*819Precision Tune contends that Hartley was negligent for wearing flip flops, consuming alcohol, and failing to observe the substance on its floor. It claims that Hartley’s failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, entitled it to summary judgment. But questions of negligence, contributory negligence, diligence, and the exercise of ordinary care are solely for the jury except in plain and indisputable cases. Pique v. Lee, 218 Ga. App. 357, 358 (461 SE2d 302) (1995); Begin v. Ga. Championship Wrestling, 172 Ga. App. 293, 295 (322 SE2d 737) (1984). This is not such a case. Robinson, 268 Ga. at 743 (1).
Judgment reversed.
Pope, P. J., Johnson, P. J., Blackburn, Ruffin and Eldridge, JJ, concur. Andrews, C. J., dissents.