WEICK, Circuit Judge.
The grand jury returned an indictment, against appellant Chereton containing five counts. The first count charged him with a conspiracy with one Raymond Kaufman to use the mails to defraud in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The-remaining four counts of the indictment charged Chereton with knowingly and fraudulently making false oaths in relation to the bankruptcy proceeding, In the-Matter of Consolidated Radio and Appliance Company, in violation of Title 18-U.S.C. § 152.
The case was tried before a jury in the District Court and at the conclusion-of the Government’s case, the Court dismissed count one of the indictment which charged the conspiracy to use the mails to defraud. The case was submitted to-the jury on the remaining four counts-charging the false oaths in the bankruptcy proceeding resulting in Chereton’s conviction on all of said counts. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment on each of the four counts to be served concurrently.
In the District Court, Chereton had moved to dismiss the remaining four counts of the indictment on the ground that they did not specifically charge that the alleged false oaths were material to-the inquiry in the bankruptcy proceeding. The District Judge denied the motion to dismiss and Chereton claims that this was prejudicial error.
Count two of the indictment is con-contained in footnote 2.
Counts three,
four and five in the same manner quoted the questions propounded and the answers alleged to be false.
The questions propounded to Chereton, set forth in the several counts of the indictment, in substance elicited information relative to the sale of accounts receivable made by Mid-States Equipment Company, a corporation, to the bankrupt, Consolidated Radio and Appliance Company, to sales of merchandise by Consolidated to Mid-States and to the checks issued by Consolidated purportedly in payment for the merchandise, but which were endorsed by Consolidated and returned to Mid-States.
Chereton controlled Mid-States and his cousin Raymond Kaufman was in control of Consolidated.
At the trial, Kaufman testified that he was advised by Chereton to incorporate his business as part of a scheme engineered by Chereton to defraud creditors. Pursuant to this plan Mid-States sold $63,469.09 of accounts receivable, claimed to be worthless, to Consolidated for $47,601.82 for which Consolidated gave Mid-States an unsecured promissory note payable on demand. A written agreement was entered into providing for the sale of the accounts receivable. A financial statement of Consolidated was prepared and included the accounts receivable as an asset in the full amount. The agreement, note and financial statement all bear the same date, namely, May 15, 1952. Kaufman testified that Chereton told him that the accounts receivable were worthless. A portion of Kaufman’s testimony is in footnote 3.
Kaufman testified that of the merchandise thus obtained from creditors $56,-
754.22 in value was shipped to Mid-States and that Chereton paid him personally only $1,000.
Checks of Mid-States payable to Consolidated in the amounts of $18,534.28, $14,479.15 and $9,388.48 in payment for part of the merchandise were endorsed by consolidated and returned to Mid-States and deposited in the bank account of Mid-States on which the checks had been drawn. Not all of the checks had been signed when they were endorsed. There were not sufficient funds in this bank account to pay any of the checks. The cheeks were credited as payments on this demand promissory note given in connection with the sale of the alleged worthless accounts receivable.
Kaufman further testified that Mid-States shipped Consolidated about $15,-000 or $16,000 of merchandise, which had not been ordered and was practically worthless, in order to build up the amount that was owing from Consolidated to Mid-States.
Chereton cites Rudin v. United States, 6 Cir., 1958, 254 F.2d 45, 48 which holds that an indictment must allege all of the elements necessary to constitute a violation of the statute. In that case we held it was not necessary that the indictment follow the exact wording of the statute. Judge Miller, who wrote the opinion of this Court said that “the test of the sufficiency of an indictment is that it must sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, that the record show with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.” To the same effect is Anderson et al. v. United States, 6 Cir., 1954, 215 F.2d 84, 86.
Chereton relies on Meer v. United States, 10 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 65 and United States v. Margolis, 3 Cir., 1943, 138 F.2d 1002.
In Meer, the Court held that materiality was an essential element of an offense charged under Title 18 U.S.C. § 152 although not made so by the statute. The reasoning adopted by the Court was that Congress did not intend to make a false statement in a bankruptcy proceeding an offense where not material to the inquiry or issue presented. In a perjury case, the statute expressly requires that the statement relate to a material matter. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1621. The Court further held that it was necessary for the-indictment to either expressly allege that the false statement was material or to set forth sufficient facts to show the materiality.
We would hesitate to hold that an indictment in the exact words of a valid' criminal statute was insufficient because-it did not contain an element of the offense engrafted thereon by judicial decision. In such a case as the present one,, it should be sufficient if the evidence dis
closed that the question propounded related to a material matter. To us the point seems highly technical because even though materiality was not expressly alleged in the indictment, it clearly appeared from the questions and answers set forth therein that they were material to the inquiry in the bankruptcy proceeding. This is all that the decision in Meer required.
Margolis is authority for the proposition that the false oath must relate to a material matter. It did not involve any question concerning the sufficiency of the indictment.
Chereton states in his brief (p. 17) “No proofs were offered as to the nature of the inquiry then being conducted.
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WEICK, Circuit Judge.
The grand jury returned an indictment, against appellant Chereton containing five counts. The first count charged him with a conspiracy with one Raymond Kaufman to use the mails to defraud in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The-remaining four counts of the indictment charged Chereton with knowingly and fraudulently making false oaths in relation to the bankruptcy proceeding, In the-Matter of Consolidated Radio and Appliance Company, in violation of Title 18-U.S.C. § 152.
The case was tried before a jury in the District Court and at the conclusion-of the Government’s case, the Court dismissed count one of the indictment which charged the conspiracy to use the mails to defraud. The case was submitted to-the jury on the remaining four counts-charging the false oaths in the bankruptcy proceeding resulting in Chereton’s conviction on all of said counts. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment on each of the four counts to be served concurrently.
In the District Court, Chereton had moved to dismiss the remaining four counts of the indictment on the ground that they did not specifically charge that the alleged false oaths were material to-the inquiry in the bankruptcy proceeding. The District Judge denied the motion to dismiss and Chereton claims that this was prejudicial error.
Count two of the indictment is con-contained in footnote 2.
Counts three,
four and five in the same manner quoted the questions propounded and the answers alleged to be false.
The questions propounded to Chereton, set forth in the several counts of the indictment, in substance elicited information relative to the sale of accounts receivable made by Mid-States Equipment Company, a corporation, to the bankrupt, Consolidated Radio and Appliance Company, to sales of merchandise by Consolidated to Mid-States and to the checks issued by Consolidated purportedly in payment for the merchandise, but which were endorsed by Consolidated and returned to Mid-States.
Chereton controlled Mid-States and his cousin Raymond Kaufman was in control of Consolidated.
At the trial, Kaufman testified that he was advised by Chereton to incorporate his business as part of a scheme engineered by Chereton to defraud creditors. Pursuant to this plan Mid-States sold $63,469.09 of accounts receivable, claimed to be worthless, to Consolidated for $47,601.82 for which Consolidated gave Mid-States an unsecured promissory note payable on demand. A written agreement was entered into providing for the sale of the accounts receivable. A financial statement of Consolidated was prepared and included the accounts receivable as an asset in the full amount. The agreement, note and financial statement all bear the same date, namely, May 15, 1952. Kaufman testified that Chereton told him that the accounts receivable were worthless. A portion of Kaufman’s testimony is in footnote 3.
Kaufman testified that of the merchandise thus obtained from creditors $56,-
754.22 in value was shipped to Mid-States and that Chereton paid him personally only $1,000.
Checks of Mid-States payable to Consolidated in the amounts of $18,534.28, $14,479.15 and $9,388.48 in payment for part of the merchandise were endorsed by consolidated and returned to Mid-States and deposited in the bank account of Mid-States on which the checks had been drawn. Not all of the checks had been signed when they were endorsed. There were not sufficient funds in this bank account to pay any of the checks. The cheeks were credited as payments on this demand promissory note given in connection with the sale of the alleged worthless accounts receivable.
Kaufman further testified that Mid-States shipped Consolidated about $15,-000 or $16,000 of merchandise, which had not been ordered and was practically worthless, in order to build up the amount that was owing from Consolidated to Mid-States.
Chereton cites Rudin v. United States, 6 Cir., 1958, 254 F.2d 45, 48 which holds that an indictment must allege all of the elements necessary to constitute a violation of the statute. In that case we held it was not necessary that the indictment follow the exact wording of the statute. Judge Miller, who wrote the opinion of this Court said that “the test of the sufficiency of an indictment is that it must sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, that the record show with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.” To the same effect is Anderson et al. v. United States, 6 Cir., 1954, 215 F.2d 84, 86.
Chereton relies on Meer v. United States, 10 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 65 and United States v. Margolis, 3 Cir., 1943, 138 F.2d 1002.
In Meer, the Court held that materiality was an essential element of an offense charged under Title 18 U.S.C. § 152 although not made so by the statute. The reasoning adopted by the Court was that Congress did not intend to make a false statement in a bankruptcy proceeding an offense where not material to the inquiry or issue presented. In a perjury case, the statute expressly requires that the statement relate to a material matter. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1621. The Court further held that it was necessary for the-indictment to either expressly allege that the false statement was material or to set forth sufficient facts to show the materiality.
We would hesitate to hold that an indictment in the exact words of a valid' criminal statute was insufficient because-it did not contain an element of the offense engrafted thereon by judicial decision. In such a case as the present one,, it should be sufficient if the evidence dis
closed that the question propounded related to a material matter. To us the point seems highly technical because even though materiality was not expressly alleged in the indictment, it clearly appeared from the questions and answers set forth therein that they were material to the inquiry in the bankruptcy proceeding. This is all that the decision in Meer required.
Margolis is authority for the proposition that the false oath must relate to a material matter. It did not involve any question concerning the sufficiency of the indictment.
Chereton states in his brief (p. 17) “No proofs were offered as to the nature of the inquiry then being conducted. Thus, there was nothing before the lower court upon which his ruling could be predicated, that the questions and answers were legally pertinent to the inquiry being conducted.” In this, Chereton is in error. The record (Government’s Exhibit No. 25) clearly shows that he was being examined in the bankruptcy court in a proceeding under Section 21, sub. a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 44, sub. a. This section authorized the bankruptcy court to require any designated person to appear before the court “to be examined concerning the acts, conduct, or property of the bankrupt.”
Examination of a designated person under this section may be as broad in scope as that permitted of the bankrupt himself. Ulmer v. United States, 6 Cir., 1915, 219 F. 641. The examination is in the nature of a discovery proceeding. It provides the means for a thorough investigation into the affairs of the bankrupt calculated to lead to the discovery and recovery of his assets and a determination of the amount of his indebtedness. The relevancy of questions propounded is not to be determined by standards applied to the trial of issues, but by the broader test of relevancy applied under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. Matter of Autocue Sales & Distributing Corp., D.C.N.Y.1957, 151 F.Supp. 798. The “** * trustee may inquire at large and without limit except in cases of plain abuse, to be determined in the Court’s discretion.” Marx v. Chase National Bank, 2 Cir., 1941, 117 F.2d 800, 801. The inquiry may even be a fishing expedition. In re Foerst, 93 F. 190 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1899). It is no objection that it leads to the prosecution of an action against the witness. Marx v. Chase National Bank, supra. In proceedings for the reorganization of a corporation under the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq.) the examination before a master appointed by the Court may be “exploratory and groping; and it may be as searching as to him appears proper.” Sachs v. Hadden, 2 Cir., 1949, 173 F.2d 929, 931.
These questions set forth in the several counts of the indictment sought to examine Chereton “concerning the acts, conduct, or property of the bankrupt.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 44, sub. a. Sufficient facts appear in the questions and answers to establish that they were clearly material to the inquiry. The Trial Judge was right in determining their materiality as a matter of law at the trial. Ulmer v. United States, supra; United States v. Parker, 7 Cir., 1957, 244 F.2d 943, certiorari denied 355 U.S. 836, 78 S.Ct. 61, 2 L.Ed.2d 48. In our judgment, the indictment sufficiently apprised Chereton of what he must be prepared to meet. He could not be brought to tidal again for having given the false answers to the questions set forth at length in the indictment. The indictment was, therefore, sufficient. Rudin v. United States, supra.
The remaining point to be considered is Chereton’s claim that the District Judge assumed the examination of a principal witness and after a question had been answered inquired “What more needs to be said?” Chereton claims that this was prejudicial error.
The witness Davis was a Government witness. He was the receiver and trustee in bankruptcy of Consolidated. He testified on direct examination as to the
efforts made to collect the accounts receivable purchased by Consolidated from Mid-States and the fact that nothing was collected on any of these accounts. Davis had personally sampled about 50 of the accounts and could not find any of the debtors. Some of the addresses were fictitious. Three members of Davis’ own staff and two outside individuals attempted to make collections on the accounts without success. He then referred the accounts to a Collection Agency on a 50% contingent basis and no collections were made by the agency. The bankrupt had not made any collections on these accounts subsequent to their purchase.
The District Judge did ask questions of the witness Davis, but, in so doing, we do not believe that he assumed to take over the examination of the witness. The District Judge had a right to ask the questions. His role was more important than that of a mere umpire. Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 82, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; United States v. Curcio, 2 Cir., 1960, 279 F.2d 681.
The comment made by the Court must be considered in its context with respect to the other questions propounded at the time. The witness was being examined by Government counsel when the Court asked the questions. The Government claims that the comment was directed to it.
We find no error in the questions asked by the Court or in his comment affecting the substantial rights of Chereton. Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.
Furthermore, the Court’s instructions to the jury cured any claimed erroneous impression that the comment might otherwise have been made on the jury.
There is no claim that the Court’s instructions to the jury were erroneous in any respect. A number of the propositions of law covered in the instructions were given by the Court as requested by counsel for Chereton. The verdict is supported by substantial evidence.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.