Opinion by
Watkins, J.,
This appeal is from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, of Allegheny County, [277]*277which judgment was entered after a jury award in the amount of Three Hundred and Forty Thousand Dollars, ($340,000.00).
The facts in this case are as follows. Michael Harrison and E. M. Griswold, appellees, were partners in a consulting and finance business in the City of Pittsburgh. The appellants were the holders of an option on real estate in the State of Florida which they planned to develop. The appellants were in the business of developing real estate, having completed several very successful ventures in the Pittsburgh area. In order to accomplish their aims with the Florida property, they were in need of additional money. Harry Softer, one of the appellants, lived in the same apartment house as Michael Harrison, one of the appellees, and had informal discussions with him regarding the Florida project. In the fall of 1967, the appellees and appellants entered into an informal oral agreement whereby the appellees would attempt to find the required financing for the project. There was a disagreement between the parties at the trial as to whether any amount of compensation had been agreed to in this oral agreement. The appellees made many contacts in an attempt to secure the required financing, without success. However, through Mr. Harrison’s nephew, who lived in Texas, they were put in contact with a Bernard Kemp. Through this contact, the name of Joseph Boneparth of New York and Florida was given to the appellees as one with possible interest in such a project. The appellees then informed the appellants of his name, address and telephone number and asked them to contact him. The appellants did in fact contact Mr. Boneparth, who apparently brought in another gentleman by the name of Harry August who had contacts with the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. After many meetings and much negotiation, the appellants received from the [278]*278John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company a letter of commitment on the Florida project for the purchase and lease back of this property after listed improvements were accomplished. This letter of commitment was then taken by the appellants to secure the immediate financing necessary to satisfy the John Hancock conditions to the Chase-Manhattan Bank. The appellees, after making the referral of the appellants to Boneparth in March, 1968, sent to the appellants the following letter for signature by the appellants which formed the written contract by the parties.
“Michael Harrison — E. M. Griswold Consultants
Mergers — Acquisitions—Financing 401 Wood Street
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 471-0904
“March 8, 1968
Michael Harrison—
E. M. Griswold—
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Gentlemen:
“I and my associate or associates, do hereby agree to use the services of Michael Harrison and E. M. Gris-wold, to interest an investor, that will invest with me in my project on Miami Beach, the sum of $12,000,000 or $15,000,000, or such lesser amount as I agree to accept, for an interest in the project in the amount of 25% or 50%, or such percentage as may be mutually agreed upon between your investor and myself.
“This agreement is to cover just one potential investor, fully described below, whether the investment be made as an individual, a group, or a corporation.
“There are two men involved: Mr. Bernard Kemp, the 3rd, of Dallas, Texas, and Mr. Joseph Boneparth, of [279]*279122 East 42nd St., New York City, Phone No. MU-7-2888; also of Hillcrest Apartments, Hollywood, Florida, Phone No. 981-8215, where he will be for the week commencing March 7th. We understand that Mr. Boneparth is a partner in the Stock Exchange house of BearStearns, and has banking connections with Eufatik of Zurich, Switzerland.
“If said parties or their associates, either individually or collectively, under whatever name they may choose to operate, enter into an agreement with me along the lines specified in Paragraph One above, or under any other basis accepted by me, I herewith agree to pay you a commission or fee of 2-1/3% of whatever amount is put into the said Miami Beach project, whether in the form of loan or of capital investment, or both, or on whatever basis said monies are invested in the project.
“If at any time during these pending negotiations, I and my associate or associates decide to organize a corporation to handle the project, I agree to have said corporation execute an agreement embodying the aforesaid terms and conditions.
“This contract good for ninety (90) days.
/s/ Harry Soffer”
The letter of commitment and the financing from Chase-Manhattan were secured in August, 1968. On June 28, 1968, E. Lebowitz went to the offices of the appellees and after some discussions, the appellees signed an agreement and release of liability to the appellants for the gum of Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00). A tender of payment by appellants was refused by the appellees, who alleged the agreement and release were secured through fraud on the part of the appellants. The appellees then filed a complaint in assumpsit alleging the written agreement as set forth above and also the general oral agreement which they had with the [280]*280appellants since the fall of 1967 as the basis for their claim.
This matter was sent to the jury by the court below, giving to them the matter of deciding whether or not the appellees were entitled to recover and whether they had fulfilled their obligation under the written agreement and/or the oral agreement and also whether or not there was an oral agreement. This was error which would require a new trial.
The written agreement of March 8, 1968, was prepared by the appellees and executed by the appellants at the appellees’ insistence and it was without question the intent of the parties to form the basis of any future relation between the parties concerning this transaction.
The Restatement, Contracts, Section 240, reads as follows:
Ҥ240. In What Cases Integration Does Not Affect Prior or Contemporaneous Agreements.
“(1) An oral agreement is not superseded or invalidated by a subsequent or contemporaneous integration, nor a written agreement by a subsequent integration relating to the same subject-matter, if the agreement is not inconsistent with the integrated contract, and
“(a) is made for separate consideration, or
“(b) is such an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the written contract.
“(2) Where no consideration is stated in an integration, facts showing that there was consideration and the nature of it, even if it was a promise, or any other facts that are sufficient to make a promise enforceable, are admissible in evidence and are operative.”
The question of whether or not there was an inte-, gration of the oral contract and the written one is one
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Opinion by
Watkins, J.,
This appeal is from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, of Allegheny County, [277]*277which judgment was entered after a jury award in the amount of Three Hundred and Forty Thousand Dollars, ($340,000.00).
The facts in this case are as follows. Michael Harrison and E. M. Griswold, appellees, were partners in a consulting and finance business in the City of Pittsburgh. The appellants were the holders of an option on real estate in the State of Florida which they planned to develop. The appellants were in the business of developing real estate, having completed several very successful ventures in the Pittsburgh area. In order to accomplish their aims with the Florida property, they were in need of additional money. Harry Softer, one of the appellants, lived in the same apartment house as Michael Harrison, one of the appellees, and had informal discussions with him regarding the Florida project. In the fall of 1967, the appellees and appellants entered into an informal oral agreement whereby the appellees would attempt to find the required financing for the project. There was a disagreement between the parties at the trial as to whether any amount of compensation had been agreed to in this oral agreement. The appellees made many contacts in an attempt to secure the required financing, without success. However, through Mr. Harrison’s nephew, who lived in Texas, they were put in contact with a Bernard Kemp. Through this contact, the name of Joseph Boneparth of New York and Florida was given to the appellees as one with possible interest in such a project. The appellees then informed the appellants of his name, address and telephone number and asked them to contact him. The appellants did in fact contact Mr. Boneparth, who apparently brought in another gentleman by the name of Harry August who had contacts with the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. After many meetings and much negotiation, the appellants received from the [278]*278John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company a letter of commitment on the Florida project for the purchase and lease back of this property after listed improvements were accomplished. This letter of commitment was then taken by the appellants to secure the immediate financing necessary to satisfy the John Hancock conditions to the Chase-Manhattan Bank. The appellees, after making the referral of the appellants to Boneparth in March, 1968, sent to the appellants the following letter for signature by the appellants which formed the written contract by the parties.
“Michael Harrison — E. M. Griswold Consultants
Mergers — Acquisitions—Financing 401 Wood Street
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 471-0904
“March 8, 1968
Michael Harrison—
E. M. Griswold—
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Gentlemen:
“I and my associate or associates, do hereby agree to use the services of Michael Harrison and E. M. Gris-wold, to interest an investor, that will invest with me in my project on Miami Beach, the sum of $12,000,000 or $15,000,000, or such lesser amount as I agree to accept, for an interest in the project in the amount of 25% or 50%, or such percentage as may be mutually agreed upon between your investor and myself.
“This agreement is to cover just one potential investor, fully described below, whether the investment be made as an individual, a group, or a corporation.
“There are two men involved: Mr. Bernard Kemp, the 3rd, of Dallas, Texas, and Mr. Joseph Boneparth, of [279]*279122 East 42nd St., New York City, Phone No. MU-7-2888; also of Hillcrest Apartments, Hollywood, Florida, Phone No. 981-8215, where he will be for the week commencing March 7th. We understand that Mr. Boneparth is a partner in the Stock Exchange house of BearStearns, and has banking connections with Eufatik of Zurich, Switzerland.
“If said parties or their associates, either individually or collectively, under whatever name they may choose to operate, enter into an agreement with me along the lines specified in Paragraph One above, or under any other basis accepted by me, I herewith agree to pay you a commission or fee of 2-1/3% of whatever amount is put into the said Miami Beach project, whether in the form of loan or of capital investment, or both, or on whatever basis said monies are invested in the project.
“If at any time during these pending negotiations, I and my associate or associates decide to organize a corporation to handle the project, I agree to have said corporation execute an agreement embodying the aforesaid terms and conditions.
“This contract good for ninety (90) days.
/s/ Harry Soffer”
The letter of commitment and the financing from Chase-Manhattan were secured in August, 1968. On June 28, 1968, E. Lebowitz went to the offices of the appellees and after some discussions, the appellees signed an agreement and release of liability to the appellants for the gum of Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00). A tender of payment by appellants was refused by the appellees, who alleged the agreement and release were secured through fraud on the part of the appellants. The appellees then filed a complaint in assumpsit alleging the written agreement as set forth above and also the general oral agreement which they had with the [280]*280appellants since the fall of 1967 as the basis for their claim.
This matter was sent to the jury by the court below, giving to them the matter of deciding whether or not the appellees were entitled to recover and whether they had fulfilled their obligation under the written agreement and/or the oral agreement and also whether or not there was an oral agreement. This was error which would require a new trial.
The written agreement of March 8, 1968, was prepared by the appellees and executed by the appellants at the appellees’ insistence and it was without question the intent of the parties to form the basis of any future relation between the parties concerning this transaction.
The Restatement, Contracts, Section 240, reads as follows:
Ҥ240. In What Cases Integration Does Not Affect Prior or Contemporaneous Agreements.
“(1) An oral agreement is not superseded or invalidated by a subsequent or contemporaneous integration, nor a written agreement by a subsequent integration relating to the same subject-matter, if the agreement is not inconsistent with the integrated contract, and
“(a) is made for separate consideration, or
“(b) is such an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the written contract.
“(2) Where no consideration is stated in an integration, facts showing that there was consideration and the nature of it, even if it was a promise, or any other facts that are sufficient to make a promise enforceable, are admissible in evidence and are operative.”
The question of whether or not there was an inte-, gration of the oral contract and the written one is one [281]*281of law for the court to decide. Gianni v. Russell & Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791 (1924).
The oral contract, as alleged by the appellees, would certainly be inconsistent with the written agreement prepared by the appellees and the consideration for the one was the same as for the other. As stated in Gianni v. Russell & Co., Inc., supra, at page 323, “ ‘Where parties, without any fraud or mistake, have deliberately put their engagements in writing, the law declares the writing to be not only the best, but the only, evidence of their agreement’ [citing cases]. ‘All preliminary negotiations, conversations and verbal agreements are merged in and superseded by the subsequent written contract . . . and unless fraud, accident or mistake be averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the parties, and its terms cannot be added to nor subtracted from by parol evidence’ [citing cases].”
However, the most serious question raised by this appeal is whether the appellees have any standing to collect no matter how the contractual problems are resolved.
Appellant urges that any recovery by appellees is barred by the Real Estate Brokers License Act of 1929, May 1, P. L. 1216, as amended, 63 P.S. §431. Appellees admit that they were not licensed real estate brokers but were “finders” and therefore do not come within the prohibition of the act.
The relevant portion of the act, supra, is as follows:
“The term ‘real estate broker’ shall include all persons, copartnerships, associations, . . . who, for another and for a fee, commission, or other valuable consideration, shall.. . negotiate the sale,. . . purchase or rental, or shall offer or attempt to negotiate the sale . . . purchase, or rental ... of any real estate, interest in real estate, the property of another, whether the same shall be located within the State of Pennsylvania, or else[282]*282where ... or shall negotiate or offer or attempt to negotiate a loan, secured or to be secured by . . . transfer of any such real estate. . . . One act in consideration of compensation, by fee, commission or otherwise, of buying, selling, renting . . . any such real estate of or for another or attempting or offering so to do, or negotiating a loan upon or leasing or renting or placing for rent any such real estate . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence that the person, copartnership, association ... so acting or attempting to act, is a real estate broker within the meaning of this act.”
The most recent appellate court decision does not give the statute as narrow an interpretation as contended for by the appellees, but on the contrary holds that the mere introduction of two willing parties comes within the purview of the statute. Alford v. Raschiatore, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 635, 63 A. 2d 366 (1949).
The only question before us is whether the contract as finally determined is enforceable under the Real Estate Brokers Act, supra. In Verona v. Schenley Farms Co., 312 Pa. 57, 167 Atl. 317 (1933), the plaintiff claimed he was not “engaged in the real estate business” but the court held that such an averment in the face of the agreement to use his best efforts in presenting to the prospective buyer the special, particular and peculiar advantages of the land in question as being the most “fitting, suitable and desirable location . . .” was a mere denial of what the statute defines as “acting in the capacity of a real estate broker;” and as the Court said at page 638 in Alford v. Raschiatore, supra, “a denial which, therefore, amounts to nothing.”
That is exactly the situation we have in the instant case and as the court further said in Alford, supra, at page 639:
“We cannot give to the word ‘negotiate,’ in the sense intended by the Legislature, the strict con[283]*283struction contended for by appellee. If we should so do, it would exclude from the regulatory purpose of the Act a great percentage of brokers and salesmen who normally do no more than acquaint prospective buyers and sellers with the location and price of available property, and who annually comply with the licensing feature of the Act in the belief that they are covered by it.”
Judgment reversed and judgment, n.o.v., entered for appellants.