Harris v. William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc.

489 P.2d 1320, 94 Idaho 440, 1971 Ida. LEXIS 354

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: October 20, 1971
• Docket: 10707
• Status: Published

Opinions

SHEPARD, Justice.

This appeal arises from an order of the Industrial Accident Board denying benefits to the claimant on the grounds that he had not suffered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

Employer William Burns Detective Agency (hereinafter Burns) maintained security force guards in connection with certain dam construction being then undertaken by Morrison-Knudsen Company. A security guard station was maintained by Burns on a road approximately ten miles from the actual dam construction in an area owned by Morrison-Knudsen Company. At that station all vehicles seeking-to enter the area were stopped and examined to assure that only authorized personnel and vehicles entered the construction, area. Claimant was an employee of Burns. and worked at the aforesaid guard station but lived in a nearby trailer camp. There is no showing that there was any employer-employee, or indeed any other, relationship between claimant and Morrison-Knudsen Company.

In traveling to and from work, the security guards who lived in the trailer camp had two alternatives: they could walk the relatively short distance on a road or they could take a shorter route which involved a short board stairway down an embankment from the guard station and a path which ultimately led to the trailer camp. Both routes were generally used by the security guards.

On the night of July 27, 1967, claimant terminated work at the guard station at midnight and returned to the trailer camp. He descended the short board stairway and started along the path. During the course of his walk down the path, he stepped on a small round stone and fell, suffering certain injuries to his back, hip and groin. There is no showing that the board stairway or indeed the path presented any particular or peculiar danger or hazard.

It is a general rule that an accident does not arise out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of the Workman’s Compensation law when it occurs while the employee is on his way to work and before he reaches the premises of his employer or when he is on his way home and has left the premises of his employer. Jaynes v. Potlatch Forests, 75 Idaho 297, 271 P.2d 1016, 50 A.L.R.2d 356 (1954); Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 235 P.2d 736 (1951).

Appellant contends that the board stairway was constructed by Morrison-Knudsen Company at the request of Burns. There is, however, no showing that the staircase, even if it be assumed to have been under the control of Burns, contributed any particular or peculiar hazard or indeed contributed to the accident. There is a complete lack of any showing that Burns had any connection with or control over the path being traversed by appellant at the time of the accident.

Appellant contends that the holding of Jaynes is not applicable in the case at bar since in Jaynes the court also adopted the “peculiar risk” doctrine and it is upon that doctrine that claimant relies. Jaynes states:

“It will be noted in most jurisdictions an exception to the general rule has extended the principle to embrace an accident as arising out of and in the course of employment when it occurs at a point where the employee is within range of dangers peculiarly associated with the employment. In this respect it is reasoned that such injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident to the work and as the result of peculiar exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment because the causative danger is peculiar to the employment and not common to the neighborhood. Under this rule it is not intended to nor does it protect an employee against all the hazards, perils and dangers on his journey from home to work and from work back to his home.

“A vast majority of the state courts, as well as the United States Supreme Court, have consistently declared and adhered to the doctrine that where an employee has been subjected to a peculiar risk, such as crossing railroad tracks * * * there is such an obvious causal relation between the work and the hazard that the course of employment concept must be expanded to cover such employees, otherwise an injustice in the denial of compensation for an injury caused by the employment would result; it is a recognition of the causal connection between the conditions under which an employee must approach and leave the premises of the employer and the occurrence of the injury; it recognizes that the employment involves peculiar and abnormal exposure to a common peril which annexes itself as a risk incident to and inseparable from the employment; it is not necessarily based upon nearness to the plant nor upon reasonable distance therefrom or even identifying the surrounding area as an integral part of the premises for all practical purposes but upon a causal relationship between the work and the hazard.” 75 Idaho 297, 301-302, 271 P.2d 1016, 1018. (Emphasis added)

Viewing the facts of the case at bar in light of the standards set forth by Jaynes it is apparent that there was no showing herein that the risk which occasioned the accident to the claimant herein was peculiar to his employment. Claimant has the burden of showing that the risk was indeed peculiar to the employment and as herein stated that burden has not been sustained.

As also stated in Jaynes and reiterated in Spanbauer v. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Company, 93 Idaho 509, 465 P.2d 633 (1970):

“ * * * this Court was also careful to state that the exception propounded in that case [Jaynes] was not intended to cover all possible accidents, but only instances where there was a very real and special danger, and that it did not protect an employee against all hazards on his journeys from home to work and from work back to his home.”

The order of the Industrial Accident Board is affirmed. Costs to respondents.

McQUADE, C. J., and DONALDSON, J., concur.