24CA1543 Harris v Stallings 07-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1543 Larimer County District Court No. 22CV30740 Honorable C. Michelle Brinegar, Judge
David Harris,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Dustin Stallings; Premier Medical Corporation, a Colorado Corporation; Lincare, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; Lincare Holdings, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; and RCS Management Holdings Company, a Delaware Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE TOW Yun and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 24, 2025
The Law Office of Sam Cannon, LLC, Sam Cannon, Megan McDonald, Fort Collins, Colorado; Metier Law Firm, LLC, R. Todd Ingram, Michael W. Chaloupka, Rebecca J. Fisher, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Montgomery Amatuzio Chase Bell Jones, LLP, Lori K. Bell, Taylor G. Ostrowski, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Plaintiff, David Harris, appeals the judgment entered against
defendants, Dustin Stallings, Premier Medical Corporation
(Premier), and Lincare Holdings, Inc (Lincare).1 We will refer to
Premier and Lincare collectively as “the employers.” We affirm the
judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand the case with
instructions for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 Harris was injured when Stallings, driving his employer’s
truck, turned left in front of Harris against the light and their
vehicles collided. Harris sued Stallings and various corporate
entities he alleged were Stallings’s employers. His claims against
the corporate entities were based on both vicarious liability as
1 Harris originally sued two other corporate entities — Lincare, Inc.,
and RCS Management Holdings Company (RCS). No judgment was entered against either of these entities. The claims against Lincare, Inc., were dismissed without prejudice by stipulation, and Harris’s later effort to reinstate those claims was rejected by the court, thus making the dismissal with prejudice. As to RCS, no evidence was presented at trial about that entity, and the jury was not asked to render any verdict on the claims against it. Those claims have therefore been abandoned. See Scott Wetzel Servs., Inc. v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 804, 807-08 (Colo. 1991) (noting that the trial court’s having instructed on only one of several claims implicitly meant that the remaining claims had been abandoned).
1 Stallings’s employers and direct liability for negligent hiring,
training, and supervision.
¶3 On April 19, 2024, after a five-day trial, a jury found in favor
of Harris and awarded Harris $1.2 million in noneconomic damages
and $75,000 in physical impairment damages. The jury found
Stallings to be 5% at fault and found the employers, identified in
the verdict form as “Premier Medical Corporation/Lincare Holdings,
Inc.,” to be 95% at fault for their negligent training and supervision
of Stallings.
¶4 Several days later, Harris filed a motion for entry of judgment
along with a proposed order of judgment that did not reduce the
noneconomic damage award according to the statutory cap on such
damages. See § 13-21-102.5(3), C.R.S. 2024. Specifically, Harris
argued that the cap should be applied on a per defendant basis and
that because Premier and Lincare were separate entities, the total
award did not exceed the statutory cap. The employers objected,
arguing that, because the parties had treated the employers as a
single entity, the cap must apply to the single award as it relates to
those companies.
2 ¶5 On June 27, 2024, the trial court entered a signed, written
order titled “Order Regarding Motion for Entry of Judgment” (the
June order). In this order, the trial court agreed with employers
and apportioned the judgment consistent with the jury’s findings
and applied the statutory cap to reduce the award against the
employers. The June order stated that “[j]udgment shall enter”
against defendants in a sum certain ($539,260 against the
employers and $63,750 against Stallings) plus statutory interest.
Further, the order stated that Harris was entitled to “interest on the
aforesaid amounts of the verdict at the rate of 9% per annum from
the date of the subject incident, December 23, 2019, until the
judgment is paid.” The court then instructed Harris to submit a
new proposed order of judgment “consistent with the Court’s
findings and parameters.”
¶6 Harris complied with that instruction on July 11, 2024,
submitting a proposed order of judgment consistent with the June
order. In this proposed order, Harris calculated the prejudgment
interest through July 11, 2024. As drafted by Harris, the proposed
order ended with “Judgment Enters on July 11, 2024.” On July 16,
3 the trial court signed this proposed order without changes (the July
order).
¶7 On August 29, 2024, Harris filed a notice of appeal identifying
several orders he wished to appeal, including the June order and
the July order, as well as a pretrial ruling denying his request to
seek exemplary damages. He asserted that judgment entered on
July 11, 2024, but was filed and served on the parties on July 16,
2024.
II. Jurisdiction
¶8 We must first address our jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
¶9 After briefing was complete, this court issued an order
directing Harris to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed with prejudice for failure to file a timely notice of appeal.2
The show cause order suggested that the June order was a final,
appealable judgment because it met all the criteria of a judgment
under C.R.C.P. 54(a) and 58(a): It was signed, written, and dated,
2 As Harris notes in his response to the show cause order,
defendants did not raise the timeliness of the appeal either in their briefs or through a motion to dismiss. However, “[w]e must determine independently our jurisdiction over an appeal, nostra sponte if necessary.” Allison v. Engel, 2017 COA 43, ¶ 22, overruled on other grounds by Wolf v. Brenneman, 2024 CO 31.
4 and it resolved all issues of liability and damages. Thus, because
Harris filed his notice of appeal more than forty-nine days after the
entry of the June order, it appeared that the appeal was not timely
filed.
¶ 10 In his response, Harris argues that the June order was not a
final and appealable judgment under C.R.C.P. 58. First, Harris
contends that the order did not reference C.R.C.P. 58 or say that
judgment entered on that date. Second, the trial court’s direction
to prepare a proposed order of judgment would have been
unnecessary if the June order were the judgment. And third, the
clerk of the court did not enter the June order as a judgment in the
register of actions. Alternatively, Harris argues that the court’s
actions and statements misled him as to the date of the entry of
judgment and, thus, the deadline for his appeal. Accordingly, we
should determine that his untimely filing was the result of
excusable neglect and accept the filing under C.A.R. 4(a)(4).
5 ¶ 11 After reviewing Harris’s response, a motions division of this
court deferred the determination of this court’s jurisdiction to the
division considering the merits of the appeal.3
¶ 12 Reviewing our jurisdiction de novo, Stone Grp. Holdings LLC v.
Ellison, 2024 COA 10, ¶ 15, we conclude that the June order was a
final and appealable judgment, which Harris did not timely appeal;
nevertheless, we further conclude that he has demonstrated
excusable neglect for not doing so. Consequently, we accept the
appeal.
¶ 13 We begin by considering whether the June order was a
judgment. We conclude that it was.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 14 C.R.C.P. 54(a) defines “judgment” as “a decree and order to or
from which an appeal lies.” C.R.C.P. 58(a) provides that “[t]he term
‘judgment’ includes an appealable decree or order as set forth in
C.R.C.P. 54(a).” Rule 58(a) also provides that
[s]ubject to the provisions of C.R.C.P. 54(b), upon a general or special verdict of a jury . . . the court shall promptly prepare, date, and sign a written judgment and the clerk shall
3 Though given the opportunity to file a response to the show cause
order, no defendant did so.
6 enter it on the register of actions as provided in C.R.C.P. 79(a). . . . The effective date of entry of judgment shall be the actual date of the signing of the written judgment. The notation in the register of actions shall show the effective date of the judgment.
C.R.C.P. 79(a)(4) provides, “The notation of an order, or of the entry
of judgment, shall show the date the order or judgment was ordered
in open court, in chambers, or under the provisions of Rule 55
regarding default.” C.R.C.P. 79(d) requires that the district court
clerk “keep a judgment record in which a notation shall be made of
every money judgment.”
¶ 15 The court of appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from final
judgments of the district courts. § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2024. “[A]
final judgment is ‘one that ends the particular action in which it is
entered, leaving nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do
in order to completely determine the rights of the parties involved in
the proceedings.’” Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 24 (quoting
People v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, ¶ 37). In other words, a final judgment
is one that fully resolves liability and reduces damages (including
prejudgment interest) to a sum certain. Stone Grp. Holdings, ¶ 18.
7 Prejudgment interest is reduced to a sum certain if it is easily
calculable from the face of the judgment. Id. at ¶ 25.
¶ 16 The notice of appeal must be filed with the appellate court
within forty-nine days after entry of the judgment or order being
appealed. C.A.R. 4(a)(1). Rule 4 also provides that “[a] judgment or
order is entered within the meaning of section (a)(1) and (a)(4) when
it is entered pursuant to C.R.C.P. 58,” and the time for the filing of
the notice of appeal runs from the date of the mailing or electronic
service of the notice of the entry of the judgment or order. C.A.R.
4(a)(5).
B. Analysis
¶ 17 The core issue is whether the June order was a final and
appealable judgment. The order fully resolved liability. It reduced
the jury’s damage award to a sum certain. And it stated that
prejudgment interest would run from the date of the incident and
be calculated at 9% per annum. In other words, the prejudgment
interest could be calculated from the face of the order. Thus, the
June order met all the criteria of a final and appealable judgment.
¶ 18 Harris contends otherwise. As noted, Harris points out that
the order did not state that judgment entered on that date; did not
8 reference C.R.C.P. 58; said “so ordered” as opposed to “judgment
enters”; and used the future tense, “judgment shall enter,” without
specifying a date. Further, the court ordered him to prepare a
“proposed order of judgment consistent with the court’s findings”
within fourteen days. Finally, Harris relies on the fact that the
court clerk did not enter the June order in the register of actions as
a judgment on that date.
¶ 19 Though true, none of these facts negates the finality of the
June order. C.R.C.P. 58 does not require a judgment to explicitly
invoke the rule itself, nor does it require any other particular
language — and Harris points us to no authority that does. To the
contrary, “[i]n determining whether an order is final, we look to the
legal effect of the order rather than its form.” Luster v. Brinkman,
250 P.3d 664, 666 (Colo. App. 2010). Nor is “judgment shall enter”
necessarily a use of future tense. Indeed, while that language could
be described as stilted legalese and a bit arcane, such language is
commonly used at the time judgment is entered by trial courts
throughout the state without precluding finality. See, e.g., In re
Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.B-M., 252 P.3d 506, 508-09
(Colo. App. 2011) (holding that the magistrate’s signed minute order
9 saying, “[J]udgment shall enter” . . . in the amount of $1,500,” was
a final order that the magistrate lacked authority to alter with later
ruling). Reading the court’s language in this light, we disagree with
Harris’s contention that the order did not state that judgment
entered.4
¶ 20 We acknowledge that the trial court created some confusion by
asking Harris to prepare an unnecessary “proposed order of
judgment consistent with the court’s findings.” But a superfluous
order, even it titled “final judgment,” does not abrogate the finality
or appealability of a proper final judgment already entered. See
Stone Grp. Holdings, ¶ 37 (concluding that order that reduced
sanctions amount to a sum certain was the final order and
subsequent order entering “final judgment” was superfluous).
¶ 21 Finally, Rule 58(a) provides that the effective date is
determined by the date the written judgment is signed, and then
that date shall be entered in the register of actions. It does not
4 In light of our conclusion that the language of the June order
satisfied all the elements of a judgment, we necessarily reject Harris’s claim that E-Service of the June order on the parties (which the judicial department’s case management system reflects occurred the day the order was entered) was not sufficient to trigger C.A.R. 4(a)(5)’s forty-nine-day clock for filing the notice of appeal.
10 work in the other direction. In other words, the date of the
judgment entered in the register of actions does not determine the
date of finality. Indeed, if an administrative failure to enter the
judgment in the register of actions defeated finality, a party could
be deprived of the opportunity to appeal merely because this purely
ministerial task was not completed.
¶ 22 In sum, the June order was a final and appealable judgment.
But that does not end our inquiry. Upon a showing of excusable
neglect, we may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal by up to
thirty-five days. C.A.R. 4(a)(4). “Excusable neglect involves a
situation where the failure to act results from circumstances which
would cause a reasonably careful person to neglect a duty.”
Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Dist. Ct., 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo. 1973).
¶ 23 Here, we conclude the trial court’s actions created sufficient
confusion about the effect of the June order and the timing for filing
an appeal such that a reasonably careful lawyer may nevertheless
have been misled. Specifically, though there was no reason to do
so, the court instructed counsel to prepare and submit a revised
proposed order that would contain nothing more than what the
court had just announced. Thus, it was reasonable for counsel to
11 believe that the order left something more to do, notwithstanding
the fact that the June order met all the requirements of a final and
appealable judgment. That confusion was then exacerbated by the
court’s purporting to enter judgment on a later date and by the
court clerk’s incorrectly indicating the date of judgment in the
register of actions.
¶ 24 Thus, while in general “counsel has the obligation to
determine in the first instance whether there is a final, appealable
order, and should make that determination in a diligent and
informed manner,” Chavez, ¶ 36, the fact that counsel did not do so
here is understandable. We therefore conclude that counsel’s
neglect in failing to file a timely appeal was excusable. And because
the appeal was filed within the additional thirty-five days permitted
under C.A.R. 4(a)(4), we exercise our discretion to extend the
deadline for filing to the date the appeal was filed. Accordingly, we
have jurisdiction over the appeal.
III. The Merits
¶ 25 Turning to the merits of the appeal, Harris asserts two claims.
First, he argues that the trial court erred by treating the employers
as a single entity when applying the statutory cap on damages.
12 Second, he contends that the trial court erroneously denied his
request to amend the complaint to assert claims for exemplary
damages against defendants. We address each issue in turn.
A. Treating the Employers as a Single Entity
¶ 26 We conclude that Harris waived any challenge to treating
Premier and Lincare as a single entity in this case.
1. Additional Background
¶ 27 Before trial, Harris moved for partial summary judgment,
arguing that it was undisputed that, in addition to Premier, Lincare
was also Stallings’s employer. In response to the motion, the
employers denied that Lincare was Stallings’s employer. But the
employers also recognized that the business relationship between
Lincare and Premier may be confusing to the jury and stated that
they were willing to stipulate that Premier and Lincare could be
considered “one in the same.”
¶ 28 Harris replied, opposing this language and proposing his own:
“On July 23, 2018, Premier Medical Corporation and RCS
Management Holding Company were acquired by Lincare Holdings,
Inc. After the acquisition, each entity had the right to control Mr.
Stallings’s work. The parties agree that the entities are each
13 considered Mr. Stallings’s employers for purposes of this case.” In
addition to other reasons, Harris contended that this language
would reduce jury confusion and allow the parties to “separately
address” issues regarding the apportionment of liability and
application of Colorado’s noneconomic damages cap under sections
13-21-111.6, C.R.S. 2024, and 13-21-102.5. The court concluded
that there was a genuine dispute of material fact about who
Stallings’s employers were but nevertheless adopted the employers’
proposed language.5
¶ 29 Harris filed proposed jury instructions, with special verdict
forms, treating Lincare and Premier as two distinct defendants and
asking the jury to apportion damages amongst (1) Stallings;
(2) Premier; and (3) Lincare.
¶ 30 At trial, the court stated that it was redoing the jury
instructions and verdict form. The court said, “I don’t know how
you want to list the companies. They shouldn’t be listed separately.
They should be, like Lincare/Premier Medical. I want to make it
5 Notwithstanding the fact that the employers’ language was a
unilateral suggestion to which Harris objected and offered opposing language, the trial court characterized its ruling as “adopt[ing] that stipulation.”
14 like, something like that.” Harris’s counsel responded, “You read
our minds, your Honor, because we just agreed on that.”
¶ 31 The next day, the court provided the parties with proposed
instructions. The instructions repeatedly referred to “Defendant
Premier Medical Corporation/Lincare Holdings, Inc.,” and stated
“both of the defendants Dustin Stallings and Premier Medical
Corporation/Lincare Holdings, Inc.” The instructions also asked
the jury to determine the total amount of damages and what
percent of damages were caused by the negligence or fault of
“Defendant Dustin Stallings for his driving” and of “Defendant
Premier Medical Corporation/Lincare Holdings, Inc. for its training
and/or supervision of Dustin Stallings.”
¶ 32 The court asked Harris’s counsel if he wanted to make a
record regarding the proposed instructions. Harris’s counsel
stated, “[W]e reviewed the instructions you e-mailed, and we do not
object to any of the instructions you proposed giving.”
2. Analysis
¶ 33 Defendants argue that Harris invited the error and thus
cannot raise it on appeal. We disagree that Harris invited any error.
He never asked for the two companies to be treated as a single
15 entity and objected to the language the trial court adopted as a
mischaracterized “stipulation.” Thus, it simply cannot be said that
Harris “injected into the case” any error in this regard. See
Blakeland Drive Invs., LLP IV v. Taghavi, 2023 COA 30M, ¶ 52.
¶ 34 However, Harris waived his right to complain about the error.6
¶ 35 When “the trial court requests input from the parties on the
proposed instructions, and a party affirms that it has no objections
to any of them, the party waives any claim of error based on the
instructions.” Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transp., Inc., 2012 COA
88, ¶ 31.
¶ 36 Harris’s counsel agreed to the instruction and the verdict form
proposed by the court treating Premier and Lincare as one entity.
This instruction and verdict form explicitly asked the jury to
allocate damages between only Stallings and the employers; the
jury was never asked to allocate the percentage of responsibility
between Premier and Lincare. By not objecting to the instruction or
6 Although the employers do not argue waiver, we have an
affirmative, independent obligation to determine whether a claim of error was preserved. See Gomez v. Walker, 2023 COA 79, ¶ 25 n.6.
16 the verdict form, Harris waived any appellate challenge to the issue
of treating the employers as a single entity. See id. at ¶ 32.
¶ 37 “[W]aiver extinguishes error, and therefore appellate
review . . . .” People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 40. Because he
waived this issue, Harris cannot now argue that the trial court
erred by not treating Premier and Lincare as two distinct entities
when applying the damages cap in section 13-21-102.5(3)(a). See
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Niemet, 866 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Colo. 1994) (holding
that the cap in section 13-21-102.5 applies to the liability share of
each defendant in a case). We thus decline to address this
argument further.
B. Request to Add Exemplary Damages Claims
¶ 38 Harris next contends that the trial court erred by denying his
motion for leave to amend his complaint to add exemplary damages
claims. We agree.
¶ 39 Harris filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add
claims for exemplary damages under section 13-21-102, C.R.S.
2024. He alleged that his injury was attended by circumstances of
fraud because Stallings testified that he did not receive any training
17 from the employers after his initial onboarding; however, the
training logs showed that Stallings had completed additional
training, and Premier testified that those logs were accurate and
that Stallings had completed numerous training courses during his
employment. He argued that based on this contradictory evidence,
either Stallings lied to his employers about his level of training, or
the employers committed fraud by falsifying a record of Stallings’s
training history.
¶ 40 Harris further alleged that Stallings acted willfully and
wantonly by failing to take an alcohol or controlled substance
screening test within the time required by the employers’ policies
and federal regulations. Harris argued that this would support an
inference that Stallings must have been intoxicated at the time of
the incident.
¶ 41 Harris also alleged that the employers’ conduct was willful and
wanton because they knew Stallings was an unsafe driver.
Specifically, Harris claimed that Premier knew of a prior accident in
which Stallings was following the car in front of him too closely and
was distracted by his cell phone, yet the company took no action in
response to this accident. He alleges that Premier obtained
18 Stallings’s driving record twice and that both times it stated, “MVR
NOT CLEAR,” but the company took no action. And he alleges that
Premier did not report the earlier accident (because it did not
appear on Stallings’s driving records) and that this failure to report
prevented Lincare from learning about the accident.
¶ 42 Finally, he alleged the employers required Stallings to work an
illegal schedule leading up to this incident in violation of federal
law.
¶ 43 Harris later supplemented his motion with an internal email
between Lincare’s Safety Administrator for Vehicle Accidents and
Stallings’s supervisor, in which the supervisor was told, “We can’t
con[ti]nue to put the Public or Lincare in Harm’s way by our
driver[’]s reckless behavior and driving habits.” Harris also
included a monthly report, which provided insight into Stallings’s
driving habits during the month of the incident, including that he
harshly cornered 119 times.
¶ 44 Defendants objected to Harris’s request to add exemplary
damages claims. As to Stallings’s training records, they pointed to
contrary evidence, including deposition testimony that Stallings did
not recall if he took certain trainings, documents that showed
19 Stallings did take those trainings, documents showing Stallings
filled out an accident report after the prior incident and was
assigned and completed additional training, logs showing the
number of hours Stallings worked leading up to the incident, and
documents showing how much vacation Stallings took leading up to
the incident. Defendants also contended that Harris miscited the
employers’ policies and federal regulations.
¶ 45 The trial court denied the motion, finding that
Plaintiff has shown no prima facie evidence to support adding a claim for exemplary damages. Plaintiff has not established facts in which “the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.” C.R.S. § 13-21-102(1)(a). Plaintiff solely offers argument and speculation to support its position. That is insufficient. Therefore, the Court denies the motion on those grounds alone.
2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 46 “The question of whether the plaintiff has established
sufficient proof to add a claim for exemplary damages lies within
the sound discretion of the trial court.” Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172
P.3d 437, 449 (Colo. 2007). The trial court’s ruling will not be
disturbed unless we determine that the trial court abused its
20 discretion. Id. “A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or is based on a
misapprehension or misapplication of the law.” In re Estate of
Chavez, 2022 COA 89M, ¶ 19. “A trial court necessarily abuses its
discretion if its ruling is based on an incorrect legal standard.
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard is a
question of law we review de novo.” Sunahara v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 CO 30M, ¶ 12.
¶ 47 “Prima facie proof of a triable issue of exemplary damages is
established by ‘a showing of a reasonable likelihood that the issue
will ultimately be submitted to the jury for resolution.’” Stamp, 172
P.3d at 449 (quoting Leidholt v. Dist. Ct., 619 P.2d 768, 771 n.3
(Colo. 1980)). “Such proof may be established through discovery,
by evidentiary means, or by an offer of proof.” Id. “Prima facie
evidence is evidence that, unless rebutted, is sufficient to establish
a fact.” Id. The “prima facie proof” requirement is a “lenient
standard.” Id. at 450. In assessing whether the requisite prima
facie showing has been made, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the moving party to determine whether a reasonable
fact finder could find for the moving party. Cf. Boryla v. Pash, 960
21 P.2d 123, 126-27 (Colo. 1998) (in assessing whether a party has
made out a prima facie case sufficient to withstand a motion for
directed verdict, the court considers all of the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a
reasonable jury could have found in its favor).
¶ 48 When actual damages are assessed by a jury, the jury may
also award reasonable exemplary damages “for a wrong done to the
person or to personal or real property” if the injury is “attended by
circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.”
§ 13-21-102(1)(a). “[W]illful and wanton conduct” is conduct that is
“purposefully committed which the actor must have realized as
dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to
consequences, or of the rights and safety of others, particularly the
plaintiff.” § 13-21-102(1)(b).
¶ 49 “The injured party need prove only ‘circumstances of fraud’
surrounding a tortious act resulting in damages.” Amber Props.,
Ltd. v. Howard Elec. & Mech. Co., 775 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo. App. 1988).
“The elements of ‘circumstances of fraud’ are identical with the
necessary elements of fraud.” Id. (citing Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co.,
684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984)). “Fraud generally consists of a false
22 representation of a material existing fact, made with knowledge or
utter disregard of its falsity, with the intent to induce another to
rely upon the representation and to take detrimental action
thereon.” Palmer, 684 P.2d at 214-15.
3. Analysis
¶ 50 When requesting permission to add exemplary damages
claims, Harris submitted deposition testimony and documents,
including emails and driving data reports. He alleged specific facts
that, if true, could support inferences of fraudulent acts and willful
and wanton behavior.
¶ 51 The trial court recognized that prima facie proof of a triable
issue of exemplary damages can be established through discovery,
by evidentiary means, or by an offer of proof showing a reasonable
likelihood that the issue will ultimately be submitted to the jury for
resolution. The court also stated that the evidence must be viewed
in the light most favorable to Harris and that the standard for
establishing a prima facie case is lenient.
¶ 52 Yet, notwithstanding its correct recitation of the analytical
rubric, the trial court concluded that Harris solely offered argument
and speculation to support his position. The court denied the
23 motion “on those grounds alone.”7 In doing so, the court did not
apply the lenient standard it had just recited. Moreover, in order to
reach that conclusion, the trial court necessarily conducted some
level of factfinding and resolved conflicts in the evidence to conclude
that Harris’s position was speculative. Cf. Boryla, 960 P.2d at
126-27. This is a misapplication of the legal standard.
¶ 53 Contrary to the trial court’s analysis, Harris presented
sufficient evidence to establish “a reasonable likelihood that the
issue w[ould] ultimately be submitted to the jury for resolution.”
Stamp, 172 P.3d at 449 (quoting Leidholt, 619 P.2d at 771 n.3).8
Thus, the trial court should have granted Harris’s motion to amend
the complaint to add exemplary damages claims against Stallings
and the employers and to allow the jury to resolve the competing
evidence and inferences therefrom. We thus remand for a trial
7 Defendants argued that Harris’s motion for leave to amend the
complaint was filed after the deadline for such motions established in the case management order. Harris had acknowledged that fact in his motion but asserted that the tardiness was created by defendants’ numerous delays in complying with discovery. The court did not consider the motion untimely, noting that the trial had been reset, and thus, “untimeliness [wa]s no longer a factor.” 8 We, of course, express no opinion on whether Harris’s claim for
exemplary damages will ultimately be successful.
24 solely on the exemplary damages claims. See Amber Props., Ltd.,
775 P.2d at 47.
IV. Disposition
¶ 54 The judgment for actual damages is affirmed. The order
denying Harris’s motion to amend the complaint to add exemplary
damages claims is reversed. The matter is remanded with
instructions (1) to amend the register of actions to reflect entry of
the actual damages judgment on June 27, 2024; and (2) to conduct
a trial on Harris’s claims for exemplary damages only. At trial, the
court shall advise the jury about the nature of Harris’s claims; that
the liability of Stallings and the employers pursuant to those
claims, including the pro rata allocation of fault, has been
determined; and that actual damages have been awarded on each of
the claims, including the amount of each award, and it shall
instruct the jurors only on the law relating to the issues concerning
exemplary damages.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.