United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 25-1404
SANDY HARRIS, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
NATIONAL GRID USA SERVICE COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Angel Kelley, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo, Kayatta, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
Alan H. Crede, with whom Robert S. Mantell was on brief, for appellant.
Lisa Stephanian Burton, with whom Laurielle M. Howe and Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. were on brief, for appellee.
March 24, 2026 KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Sandy Harris, Jr., appeals the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former
employer, National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. ("National
Grid"), on his claims of unlawful retaliation under Massachusetts
and federal law. The district court found Harris had failed to
show the causal nexus required to sustain his claims. We agree
that the clear chronology of events precludes any finding that
Harris's protected activity caused his termination. Our reasoning
follows.
I.
National Grid, a utility company, employed Harris as a
"Change Analyst," which required him to travel throughout his
service territory -- Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and part of New
York -- from his base in Massachusetts. In July 2020, during the
COVID-19 pandemic, Harris took time off work to travel to Ohio and
California to visit family. On July 28, the day after his vacation
ended, he informed his boss that, because he was not required to
be on-site "due to COVID-19 concerns," he had not returned to
Massachusetts and was looking to work from Ohio or California under
a company policy permitting employees who would not be appearing
on-site to work outside their service areas on a temporary basis.
The company did have a policy allowing employees to temporarily
work from outside their territories, but only if they had the
- 2 - approval of their supervisors.1 Harris had not received that
approval.
On July 30, National Grid's Director of Human Resources,
Judith Dunn, sent Harris an email with a letter stating that he
had "violated company policy by not seeking management approval to
work out of state at the completion of [his] vacation" and that he
would be deemed to have resigned unless he returned to his
territory immediately. Dunn also offered Harris the possibility
of a severance agreement.2 Harris replied to Dunn's email that
same day, stating that he did not intend to resign but was
"requesting to work out of state on a temporary basis." He vowed
to return to his service territory immediately if his request was
not approved.
Harris has conceded that it was not until his July 30
reply to Dunn -- sent after he received Dunn's letter telling him
he had to return to his territory or be deemed to have
resigned -- that he "stated, for the first time, that he had
preexisting conditions" placing him at a "higher risk for COVID"
and that he was requesting a "reasonable accommodation" allowing
1 The policy also required employees to continue to perform "storm duty assignments," which require employees to work during certain storms, and to consult with a tax advisor before working from out of state. 2 Harris initially expressed interest in a severance agreement but eventually rejected the offer.
- 3 - him to work off-site.3 Harris also does not contend that he in
any way suggested that he suffered any condition that prevented
him from returning to his territory and working off-site from
there. In response, Dunn reiterated that Harris had not sought or
received managerial approval prior to working from outside of his
service territory and again directed him to immediately return.
Harris did not return to his service territory. Instead,
he filed and then withdrew a request for leave under the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). He also provided National Grid with
a brief letter from his doctor stating merely: "It is my medical
opinion that Sandy Harris would benefit from an accommodation to
work remotely during the COVID pandemic." The letter did not
suggest that there was any medical reason why Harris could not
work remotely from his home in his territory instead of from Ohio
or California. On August 12, National Grid notified Harris that
this letter was insufficient and asked for more documentation by
August 18.
3 Harris nevertheless argues that, separate from this July 30 reply to Dunn, he also made a "general request for reasonable accommodation" on July 22. Appellant's Br. 36. But Harris does not elaborate on what accommodation he requested, and the record is bereft of evidence that any request he purportedly made that day meets the legal standard for protected conduct. See Moore v. Indus. Demolition LLC, 138 F.4th 17, 34 (1st Cir. 2025) (requiring a reasonable accommodation request to "[a]t the least . . . identify some desired accommodation and explain how the desired accommodation is linked to some handicap" to qualify as protected conduct under the Massachusetts law on which Harris relies).
- 4 - Harris did not supply the requested documentation. Nor
did Harris ever assert that there was any medical reason why he
could not return to his territory, whether or not he appeared
on-site at the workplace. National Grid then terminated his
employment on August 19.
II.
While Harris's complaint sought to advance several
claims, he challenges on appeal only the district court's grant of
summary judgment for National Grid on his retaliation claims, which
we review de novo. See Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113
F.4th 153, 161 (1st Cir. 2024) ("Summary judgment is appropriate
if the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact
exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
He does not press any claim that National Grid improperly failed
to accommodate any disability. Instead, he contends that he was
fired because he asserted his right to seek accommodation of a
disability under Massachusetts law and/or relief under the FMLA.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4)–(4A); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654.4
Harris's retaliation claims require him to prove a
causal connection between conduct protected by those laws and his
termination. See Moore v. Indus. Demolition LLC, 138 F.4th 17, 32
4 Harris acknowledges that these claims are "largely duplicative," and, accordingly, we address them together. Appellant's Br. 56.
- 5 - (1st Cir. 2025) (Massachusetts law); Stratton v. Bentley Univ.,
113 F.4th 25, 48 (1st Cir. 2024) (FMLA). The record is clear,
though, that before National Grid learned Harris was going to apply
for any accommodation or other relief, it had already decided to
fire him if he refused to return to his territory immediately.
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United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 25-1404
SANDY HARRIS, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
NATIONAL GRID USA SERVICE COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Angel Kelley, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo, Kayatta, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
Alan H. Crede, with whom Robert S. Mantell was on brief, for appellant.
Lisa Stephanian Burton, with whom Laurielle M. Howe and Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. were on brief, for appellee.
March 24, 2026 KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Sandy Harris, Jr., appeals the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former
employer, National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. ("National
Grid"), on his claims of unlawful retaliation under Massachusetts
and federal law. The district court found Harris had failed to
show the causal nexus required to sustain his claims. We agree
that the clear chronology of events precludes any finding that
Harris's protected activity caused his termination. Our reasoning
follows.
I.
National Grid, a utility company, employed Harris as a
"Change Analyst," which required him to travel throughout his
service territory -- Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and part of New
York -- from his base in Massachusetts. In July 2020, during the
COVID-19 pandemic, Harris took time off work to travel to Ohio and
California to visit family. On July 28, the day after his vacation
ended, he informed his boss that, because he was not required to
be on-site "due to COVID-19 concerns," he had not returned to
Massachusetts and was looking to work from Ohio or California under
a company policy permitting employees who would not be appearing
on-site to work outside their service areas on a temporary basis.
The company did have a policy allowing employees to temporarily
work from outside their territories, but only if they had the
- 2 - approval of their supervisors.1 Harris had not received that
approval.
On July 30, National Grid's Director of Human Resources,
Judith Dunn, sent Harris an email with a letter stating that he
had "violated company policy by not seeking management approval to
work out of state at the completion of [his] vacation" and that he
would be deemed to have resigned unless he returned to his
territory immediately. Dunn also offered Harris the possibility
of a severance agreement.2 Harris replied to Dunn's email that
same day, stating that he did not intend to resign but was
"requesting to work out of state on a temporary basis." He vowed
to return to his service territory immediately if his request was
not approved.
Harris has conceded that it was not until his July 30
reply to Dunn -- sent after he received Dunn's letter telling him
he had to return to his territory or be deemed to have
resigned -- that he "stated, for the first time, that he had
preexisting conditions" placing him at a "higher risk for COVID"
and that he was requesting a "reasonable accommodation" allowing
1 The policy also required employees to continue to perform "storm duty assignments," which require employees to work during certain storms, and to consult with a tax advisor before working from out of state. 2 Harris initially expressed interest in a severance agreement but eventually rejected the offer.
- 3 - him to work off-site.3 Harris also does not contend that he in
any way suggested that he suffered any condition that prevented
him from returning to his territory and working off-site from
there. In response, Dunn reiterated that Harris had not sought or
received managerial approval prior to working from outside of his
service territory and again directed him to immediately return.
Harris did not return to his service territory. Instead,
he filed and then withdrew a request for leave under the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). He also provided National Grid with
a brief letter from his doctor stating merely: "It is my medical
opinion that Sandy Harris would benefit from an accommodation to
work remotely during the COVID pandemic." The letter did not
suggest that there was any medical reason why Harris could not
work remotely from his home in his territory instead of from Ohio
or California. On August 12, National Grid notified Harris that
this letter was insufficient and asked for more documentation by
August 18.
3 Harris nevertheless argues that, separate from this July 30 reply to Dunn, he also made a "general request for reasonable accommodation" on July 22. Appellant's Br. 36. But Harris does not elaborate on what accommodation he requested, and the record is bereft of evidence that any request he purportedly made that day meets the legal standard for protected conduct. See Moore v. Indus. Demolition LLC, 138 F.4th 17, 34 (1st Cir. 2025) (requiring a reasonable accommodation request to "[a]t the least . . . identify some desired accommodation and explain how the desired accommodation is linked to some handicap" to qualify as protected conduct under the Massachusetts law on which Harris relies).
- 4 - Harris did not supply the requested documentation. Nor
did Harris ever assert that there was any medical reason why he
could not return to his territory, whether or not he appeared
on-site at the workplace. National Grid then terminated his
employment on August 19.
II.
While Harris's complaint sought to advance several
claims, he challenges on appeal only the district court's grant of
summary judgment for National Grid on his retaliation claims, which
we review de novo. See Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113
F.4th 153, 161 (1st Cir. 2024) ("Summary judgment is appropriate
if the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact
exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
He does not press any claim that National Grid improperly failed
to accommodate any disability. Instead, he contends that he was
fired because he asserted his right to seek accommodation of a
disability under Massachusetts law and/or relief under the FMLA.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4)–(4A); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654.4
Harris's retaliation claims require him to prove a
causal connection between conduct protected by those laws and his
termination. See Moore v. Indus. Demolition LLC, 138 F.4th 17, 32
4 Harris acknowledges that these claims are "largely duplicative," and, accordingly, we address them together. Appellant's Br. 56.
- 5 - (1st Cir. 2025) (Massachusetts law); Stratton v. Bentley Univ.,
113 F.4th 25, 48 (1st Cir. 2024) (FMLA). The record is clear,
though, that before National Grid learned Harris was going to apply
for any accommodation or other relief, it had already decided to
fire him if he refused to return to his territory immediately.
Indeed, it so informed him on July 30, and it was only in response
to that ultimatum that Harris first claimed to have a preexisting
condition requiring some accommodation.
Given this chronology, Harris's assertion to National
Grid that he had some medical condition requiring him to work
off-site cannot have caused National Grid to issue the ultimatum
that Harris return to his service territory or be let go.
"Causation moves forward, not backwards, and no protected conduct
after an adverse employment action can serve as the predicate for
a retaliation claim." Pearson v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 723
F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding there was "no causal link"
between an employee's protected conduct and his termination for
the "obvious" reason that his employer "recommended firing [him]
before" the protected conduct occurred); see also Jones v.
Nationwide Life Ins., 696 F.3d 78, 90 (1st Cir. 2012) ("When an
employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after
it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent,
such a request can be too little, too late." (cleaned up)); Mesnick
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining
- 6 - that, "[w]ere the rule otherwise, then a disgruntled employee, no
matter how poor his performance or how contemptuous his attitude
toward his supervisors, could effectively inhibit a well-deserved
discharge by merely" engaging in subsequent protected conduct).
Nor is there otherwise any indication that Harris would
have retained his job if he had not requested accommodation or
exercised his rights under the FMLA. See Pearson, 723 F.3d at 42
(holding plaintiff had not shown causation where, although only a
recommendation to terminate and not the final decision to do so
predated his protected conduct, he "point[ed] to no evidence that
this recommendation would have been rejected" if not for that
conduct). Instead, it appears Harris's request for an
accommodation actually postponed his termination while National
Grid considered that request. The company's medical department
provided Harris with detailed guidance regarding the medical
documentation necessary and the deadline to submit the same. It
was only when Harris failed to submit appropriate documentation to
support his claim that National Grid finally terminated his
employment, almost three weeks after the company told him his
failure to return immediately from outside his territory would be
considered job abandonment. This sequence of events manifests
bend-over-backwards respect for, rather than retaliation against,
Harris's assertion of his rights.
- 7 - Similarly, the fact that National Grid checked to ensure
Harris had not submitted a request for FMLA leave on the eve of
his termination does not suggest they were "dedicated to ending
his employment before he would file." Appellant's Br. 59.
Instead, Dunn's August 18 email to National Grid's medical
department, asking for an update regarding whether Harris had
submitted medical documentation or had requested FMLA leave,
explicitly stated that she "want[ed] to ensure [National Grid]
ha[d] given [Harris] the agreed time to respond." The fact that
National Grid was on alert for any medical documentation or leave
requests from Harris again suggests they were being sensitive to,
rather than antagonistic toward, his rights.
We therefore agree with the district court that Harris
has not produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that he was terminated for requesting reasonable
accommodation under Massachusetts law or for exercising his rights
under the FMLA.
III.
We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment
in full.
- 8 -