IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION
CHANDIA HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE 1:23-cv-05180-SDG JUSTICE, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Chandia Harris was a Juvenile Correctional Lieutenant employed by Defendant Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) at the Macon Youth Development Center. She alleges she was subjected to illegal discrimination and retaliation because she is openly gay.1 She brings claims for discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII.2 The matter is now before the Court for consideration of the final report and recommendation (R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge Regina D. Cannon [ECF 38], which recommends that DJJ’s motion for summary judgment be granted. Harris objected,3 and DJJ responded.4 While the Court declines to adopt the R&R, it agrees with Judge Cannon’s conclusion that DJJ is entitled to judgment in its favor.
1 ECF 1, ¶ 2. 2 See generally ECF 1. 3 ECF 40. 4 ECF 41. I. Scope of the Court’s Review A party challenging a report and recommendation issued by a United States
Magistrate Judge must file written objections that specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations to which an objection is made and must assert a specific basis for the objection. United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2009). The district court must “make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Jeffrey S. ex rel. Ernest S. v. State Bd. of Educ. of Ga., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990). The district court has broad
discretion in reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290–92 (11th Cir. 2009). A. Harris’s Failure to Comply with LR 56.1 The R&R concluded that Harris’s response to the motion for summary
judgment did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Court’s Local Rules.5 Harris responded to DJJ’s statement of material facts by repeating the fact and then including a response below that fact that cites to the record when the fact is in dispute.6 While the response paragraphs do not have their own
individual numbering, they are directly below DJJ’s numbered paragraphs. That
5 ECF 38, at 2–4. 6 See generally ECF 31-1. approach is not necessarily problematic. But Harris did not provide her own statement of additional facts that conforms to the requirements of the Local Rules.
LR 56.1(B)(2)(b), NDGa. She instead included an unnumbered statement of facts in her response brief with record citations.7 When a party does not comply with the Court’s Local Rules concerning
statements of material fact for summary judgment briefing, “[t]he proper course . . . is for a district court to disregard or ignore evidence relied on by the respondent—but not cited in its response to the movant’s statement of undisputed facts—that yields facts contrary to those listed in the movant’s statement. That is,
because the non-moving party has failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1.” Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008). However, the R&R did not disregard Harris’s contrary facts. Instead, to the extent Harris presented “facts that are
material, supported by the record, and disputed,” the R&R considered them and construed them in the light most favorable to Harris.8 Whatever the benefits of that approach, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear
that a district court cannot follow it when a party fails to comply with LR 56.1. “[I]f the district court does not ‘hew to the evidentiary line drawn by Local Rule 56.1,’ and considers the evidence submitted by the noncompliant party, it cannot pick
7 ECF 31-2, at 1–5. 8 ECF 38, at 4. and choose and instead must ‘base its decision on all of the evidentiary materials in the record on summary judgment.’” Connell v. Golden Corral Corp., No. 23-11472,
2024 WL 2943999, at *2 (11th Cir. June 11, 2024) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (quoting Reese, 27 F.3d at 1270). B. Title VII Claims at Summary Judgment Given the R&R’s approach to assessing the material facts in dispute, the
Court cannot readily determine if the R&R relied on facts it should not have. Since those facts necessarily affect the legal analysis, the Court cannot be certain that the R&R’s conclusions were not informed by improper consideration of the facts.
In addition, the R&R only analyzes Harris’s claims under the McDonnell- Douglas rubric9—likely because that is the only basis on which DJJ sought judgment.10 Under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination. The employer must then rebut
the presumption of intentional discrimination triggered by that prima facie case. Finally, the plaintiff must show that the adverse employment action was the result of intentional discrimination. Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 944
(11th Cir. 2023). But this is an evidentiary framework, not “a stand-in for the ultimate question of liability in Title VII discrimination cases.” Id. at 941.
9 Id. at 10–24. 10 ECF 30-1, at 5–20. McDonnell Douglas does not supply “a set of elements that the employee must prove—either to survive summary judgment or prevail at trial.” Id. A plaintiff
could, for instance, prove her case by presenting a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer intentional discrimination. Id. at 946. Because the R&R focused on Harris’s purported failure to satisfy
McDonnell Douglas, it did not consider whether there was sufficient evidence that Harris was terminated because of her sexual orientation. The Court must therefore decline to adopt the R&R. Instead, it has conducted a de novo review of the record and rules directly on DJJ’s motion for
summary judgment based on those evidentiary materials. That said, the parties mostly rely on the same evidence in support of their respective positions. And the Court reaches the same conclusion that Judge Cannon did—that DJJ is entitled to
summary judgment. II. Factual Background11 A. DJJ and the Center DJJ is a state agency that provides rehabilitative treatment services and supervision to minors.12 The Macon Youth Development Center (the Center) is one
11 The Court views these facts in the light most favorable to Harris. Pizarro v. Home Depot, Inc., 111 F.4th 1165, 1172–73 (11th Cir. 2024). 12 ECF 30-7, ¶ 3; ECF 31-1, ¶ 2. of DJJ’s facilities; its residents must be supervised at all times because DJJ is responsible for them.13 All posts need to be covered for each shift, and someone
has to be available to respond to any incidents.14 As a result, an officer on duty is not supposed to leave her shift until another officer has arrived to relieve her.15 It is a job requirement for every employee who “holds post” (that is, someone who
supervises the residents) to be able to work any day and shift.16 There should never be a time when a post is vacant because of staffing issues or shortages.17 Lieutenants, in particular, are in leadership roles and need to set an example.18 Harris was re-hired on April 1, 2021 to work at the Center.19 She had worked
for DJJ from June 2006 through March 2014.20 She was aware of DJJ’s policy that all shifts and all posts must be staffed.21 Cynthia Dupree was the Center’s Facility
13 ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. 14 ECF 30-6, ¶ 8; see generally ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 32:22–34:3). 15 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 39:17–21); ECF 30-5, ¶ 3. 16 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 53:16–54:3, 62:21–23); ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. 17 ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. 14:9–11). 18 ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. 19 ECF 30-9, at 4; ECF 31-6. 20 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 18:4–10). 21 Id. (Harris Tr. at 45:13–20). Director and Harris’s indirect supervisor.22 Demarcus Holloway was a lieutenant when Harris was hired.23 He was promoted to Captain several months later,
becoming Harris’s direct supervisor.24 Holloway indirectly reported to Dupree.25 B. Early Problems 1. April 2021 On April 6, 2021, Harris filed a complaint with human resources (HR).26 She
reported that she had overheard a conversation between Margarette Johnson and Denise Shinholster that took place in Dupree’s office during which the women expressed negative opinions about gay people.27 The HR complaint does not state that Dupree was present,28 but much later, Harris asserted that Dupree was there
and had stated that gay people were going to hell.29
22 ECF 30-4, ¶ 1 n.1, ¶ 2. Cynthia Dupree is the name by which she was known for at least a portion of the relevant time. She is now known as Cynthia Dudley. Id. ¶ 1, 1 n.1. For consistency, this Order refers to her as “Dupree.” 23 ECF 30-5, ¶ 2. 24 Id. (indicating that Holloway was promoted on October 16, 2021). 25 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 8:20–25, 9:10–23). 26 ECF 30-9, at 5–6; ECF 31-7. 27 Johnson was the Assistant Director of Security at the Center; Shinholster was the administrative office manager. ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 14:23–25, 15:19–22). Johnson was a superior officer to Harris and reported directly to Dupree. Id. (Dupree Tr. 8:20–25, 9:10–12). 28 ECF 30-9, at 5–6; ECF 31-7. 29 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 39:14–20). Harris was troubled by the conversation to the point that she had difficulty continuing her work that day.30 Harris spoke with Benita Ferguson from HR on
April 7. Harris withdrew her complaint and stated that she would talk to the women directly instead.31 Ferguson told Dupree about her conversation with Harris and Harris’s withdrawal of the complaint.32
After filing this complaint, Harris believed she was “nitpick[ed]” by Dupree,33 with the latter always making Harris change the post assignments she had prepared.34 But the changes related primarily to one staff member whom Harris supervised who had a history of “calling in.”35 Harris believes Dupree was
concerned about that other staff member’s conduct, not Harris’s.36 Harris also felt that Dupree’s interactions with the other lieutenants were more friendly. As a result, Harris believes she was treated differently from all the other supervisors.37
Harris attributed Dupree’s cold behavior toward her to the HR complaint. Before
30 ECF 30-9, at 5–6; ECF 31-7. 31 ECF 30-9, at 7; ECF 31-8; ECF 31-11, at 1. 32 ECF 30-9, at 7; ECF 31-8. 33 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 31:6–7, 68:23–68:6). See generally id. (Harris Tr. at 31:2– 33:10). 34 Id. (Harris Tr. at 31:17–33:8). 35 Id. (Harris Tr. at 33:17–25). 36 Id. (Harris Tr. at 35:4–8). 37 Id. (Harris Tr. at 72:25–73:11, 73:25–74:2). that, Dupree seemed more friendly.38 Harris could not identify any other way in which Dupree singled her out.39
Nearly a year after making the April 2021 complaint—in a March 2022 HR complaint about an entirely separate issue—Harris alleged that Dupree was involved in the April 2021 conversation with Johnson, with no mention of
Shinholster.40 2. July 2021 The record contains a written reprimand dated July 27, 2021, by LaKecia James to Harris.41 The document was not signed by either woman,42 and Harris
denies having received it.43 The reprimand addressed Harris’s July 19 refusal to assume post and insubordinate behavior.44 Harris refused to follow the directives of the Assistant Director of Security (Johnson) and the Director (Dupree), and left
38 Id. (Harris Tr. at 73:12–74:2). 39 Id. (Harris Tr. at 33:3–11, 34:25–35:3). 40 ECF 31-11, at 1. See infra Section II.C.1. 41 ECF 30-9, at 57–58; ECF 31-9. James was the Captain at the Center when Harris was hired. ECF 31-6. 42 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 28: 1–14); ECF 30-9, at 57–58; ECF 31-9. A September 9, 2022 email from the DJJ’s Assistant Deputy Commissioner indicates that there was only one fully executed reprimand in Harris’s file. ECF 31-17. 43 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 121:21–25). 44 ECF 30-9, at 57; ECF 31-9, at 1. the Center without approval.45 The reprimand warned that further instances of such conduct would be met with disciplinary action, including possible
dismissal.46 3. September 2021 On September 20, 2021, Johnson wrote to Kimberly Smith (the Regional Administrator for DJJ and Dupree’s supervisor47) describing concerns about
Harris.48 It addressed the July 19 incident.49 When Dupree spoke with Harris about her conduct that day, Harris was rude and disrespectful.50 Johnson also spoke with Harris, who was upset about taking post.51 Harris did not go to work as scheduled
five times in the ten days following the incident.52 Harris was also given leave
45 ECF 30-9, at 57; ECF 31-9, at 1. 46 ECF 30-9, at 57; ECF 31-9, at 1. 47 ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. 7:16–18); ECF 30-7, ¶ 2. 48 ECF 30-9, at 56; ECF 31-10. For purposes of this Order, the Court presumes that these hearsay statements could be reduced to admissible form. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999)) (“[A] district court may consider a hearsay statement in passing on a motion for summary judgment if the statement could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial or reduced to admissible form.”). 49 ECF 30-9, at 56; ECF 31-10. 50 ECF 30-9, at 56; ECF 31-10. 51 ECF 30-9, at 56; ECF 31-10. 52 ECF 30-9, at 56; ECF 31-10. without pay for August 2, when she failed to report for duty as scheduled.53 Between August 31 and September 19, Harris was absent nine times, though three
of those days were bereavement leave.54 Smith and Johnson spoke with Harris about her attendance; Harris indicated that she understood how important it was for her to be present when scheduled for duty.55
C. Escalation of the Issues 1. March 2022 Holloway (now the Captain and Harris’s direct supervisor) issued Harris a written reprimand related to a March 8, 2022 incident.56 According to the reprimand, Harris reported to work but became insubordinate and repeatedly
refused to assume post as directed.57 She wanted to leave before her relief had arrived.58 She then bypassed the chain of command by reporting the incident to HR and asking to speak with the Assistant Deputy Commissioner rather than
discussing the issue with Dupree.59 When Dupree did speak with Harris, Harris
53 ECF 30-9, at 56; ECF 31-10. 54 ECF 30-9, at 56; ECF 31-10. 55 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 143:11–144:4); ECF 30-9, at 56; ECF 31-10. 56 ECF 30-5, ¶ 4; ECF 30-9, at 54–55; ECF 31-12. Holloway’s reprimand is dated March 30, 2022. 57 ECF 30-9, at 54; ECF 31-12, at 1. 58 ECF 30-5, ¶ 4. 59 Id.; ECF 30-9, at 54; ECF 31-12, at 1. refused Dupree’s directives and left work because her blood pressure was high.60 The reprimand emphasized that Harris’s “actions/behavior directed toward [her]
supervisors while on duty is a discredit to the department and will not be tolerated.”61 It further warned that additional instances of such conduct by Harris would be met with disciplinary action—including possible dismissal.62 Harris
signed the reprimand.63 According to Harris, the incident arose because the person who was supposed to relieve her failed to do so; she feels that someone should have relieved her sooner.64 Harris also contends that Dupree authorized her leaving because her
blood pressure was high.65 As a result, Harris believes the reprimand should have been voided.66 She reported the reprimand to Smith and filed an HR complaint the day after the incident.67
60 ECF 30-5, ¶ 4; ECF 30-9, at 54; ECF 31-12, at 1. 61 ECF 30-9, at 54; ECF 31-12, at 1. 62 ECF 30-9, at 55; ECF 31-12, at 2. 63 ECF 30-9, at 55; ECF 31-12, at 2. 64 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 42:23–43:24). 65 Id. (Harris Tr. at 45:6–12). 66 Id. (Harris Tr. at 122:2–14, 123:3–5). 67 Id. (Harris Tr. at 44:3–6). Harris’s HR complaint named both Holloway and Dupree.68 Harris alleged that Holloway had threatened her job after she made him aware that she had been
relieved from her post late.69 However, Harris testified that Holloway’s conduct was not related to her sexual orientation.70 As for Dupree, the HR complaint stated that Harris felt like she was being targeted by Dupree because of her sexuality.71
It also asserted for the first time that Dupree had been involved in the April 2021 “gay bashing” conversation.72 Dupree denied involvement in the discussion or having made any inappropriate comments about same sex relationships.73 The complaint was investigated and HR concluded that there was no evidence of a
hostile work environment or retaliation, or that Dupree “has a gender bias.”74 2. Harris’s August 3, 2022 HR Complaint On August 3, 2022, Harris emailed a complaint to Smith (among others), reporting the following. A resident of the Center told Harris that she (the resident)
overheard a conversation on August 2 between Lieutenant Carlissa Burnett and
68 ECF 31-11. 69 Id. at 1. 70 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 54:1–5). 71 ECF 31-11, at 1. 72 Id. at 1. 73 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 14:9–18); ECF 30-6, ¶ 6. 74 ECF 30-9, at 8. Officer Shawn Williams. They were discussing Harris and coverage for her shifts. Burnett reportedly stated that Harris wanted other people to do her job for her.
When the resident interrupted the conversation, Officer Williams referred to Harris as a “dyke ass.”75 Harris completed an incident report about the event, as did the resident.76 Burnett completed an incident report denying that Williams
made the statement.77 Williams’s incident report does not outright deny that he made the statement but commented that he had better “things to do than to sit and talk about” Harris.78 Holloway spoke with both Harris and Burnette about the incident, and informed Smith.79 Harris does not think Burnett was biased against
gay people but that Burnett should have addressed Williams’s comment.80 3. Harris’s August 26–28 Leave In July or early August 2022, Holloway approved Harris for leave for August 26 to 28, 2022, for her wedding and honeymoon.81 Dupree was on
75 ECF 30-9, at 9. 76 Id. at 10–12. 77 Id. at 13. 78 Id. at 14. 79 Id. at 16. 80 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 62:5–12). 81 ECF 26-5 (stating leave was approved on July 15, 2022); ECF 26-8 (indicating leave was approved on August 3); ECF 31-15 (stating leave was approved in July); see also ECF 30-4, ¶ 8. The exact date is immaterial. There is no dispute bereavement leave at that point.82 Holloway left his position at the Center on August 11, after Dupree returned from leave.83 Upon Dupree’s return, the Center
was very short-staffed because Holloway (who was the Captain) and the Assistant Director had left their jobs and one of the four lieutenants was on medical leave.84 On August 23, Dupree cancelled Harris’s leave for August 28, but
eventually left the entire leave period intact and instead scheduled Harris to cover a different shift.85 In contrast, Harris claims that Dupree never rescinded the cancelation of her August 28 leave; Harris just did not report to work that day.86 Time records indicate that Harris’s August 28 leave day was authorized.87 Harris
did not understand why her leave was being canceled when two other officers (junior to her) had leave approved for that day.88
that Holloway approved the leave, and that Dupree was unaware of it until she returned to the office. 82 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 79:7–11); ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 46:22–47:16). 83 ECF 30-5, ¶ 2. 84 ECF 30-4, ¶ 6. 85 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 61:2–10, 69:20–70:2); ECF 26-8 (reflecting denial of leave for August 28 due to staff shortage); ECF 30-7, ¶ 6. 86 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 83:5–13). 87 Id.; ECF 24-10, at 9. 88 Id. (Harris Tr. at 81:8–18). 4. The Weekend Assignment (September 2–4) i. August 25 On August 25, 2022, Dupree informed Center staff about coverage for the
next two weekends. Because of staff shortages, Harris was directed not to work on Wednesday, August 31, and Thursday, September 1 (her regularly scheduled days), but to work the night shift the weekend of September 2 through 4.89 Had
she not been scheduled for the September 2–4 shift, Harris would have had three weekends off in a row. She usually worked every other weekend.90 Dupree later explained that the lieutenants need to divide up the schedule.91 Harris responded to Dupree’s directive by saying that she could not work
the night shift because of childcare issues. She objected to having her shifts changed.92 Dupree replied that no person had a permanent shift and that, as a lieutenant, Harris was subject to work any shift based on the Center’s needs.93
89 ECF 30-11, at 5; ECF 31-14. See also ECF 31-15. 90 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 86:3–14, 93:6–22, 116:10–25). Lieutenant Burnett had covered the days Harris was on leave for her honeymoon as well as the next two weekdays (i.e., August 26–30). Burnett declined to work the September 2– 4 shift to which Harris had been assigned. ECF 30-4, ¶ 8. 91 ECF 30-4, ¶ 8. 92 ECF 30-11, at 5. 93 Id. at 4. Harris accused Dupree of engaging in retaliatory behavior because Holloway had approved Harris’s August 26–28 leave, but did not state that the
retaliation had anything to do with her sexual orientation.94 During her deposition, however, Harris claimed that Dupree was retaliating because of sexual orientation since no other employee had to put in leave time for a weekend that
they were scheduled to be off.95 Harris forwarded her email exchange with Dupree to, and had a discussion with, Regional Administrator Smith.96 ii. August 29 After she returned from her honeymoon, on August 29, Harris sent a
complaint to Martha Dalesio, Assistant Deputy Commissioner of DJJ.97 Harris asserted that Dupree was retaliating against her because of the leave that Holloway had approved and that Dupree was “always targeting” her.98 Harris emphasized that she could not work night shifts because she had no one to take
94 ECF 30-11, at 4; ECF 31-15, at 1. 95 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 93:23–94:12). 96 ECF 24-11; ECF 30-11, at 4. 97 ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. at 6:9–10); ECF 31-15. Dalesio was Smith’s direct supervisor and oversaw a division of 25 facilities, including the Center. ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. at 6:21–25, 7:12–15). 98 ECF 31-15, at 1. care of her two special-needs children.99 The complaint did not assert that Dupree was targeting Harris because of her sexual orientation.100
iii. August 31 Harris then reported to work on one of her regularly scheduled days (August 31), even though Dupree had instructed her not to report that day.101 The two women had a confrontation with Dupree about why Harris was at work when
she had been instructed to work September 2–4 instead. According to Dupree, Harris became aggressive and Dupree instructed her to leave. Harris refused.102 Harris testified that Dupree was the one yelling.103 Harris later called Dalesio to
report the incident.104 Dupree called Smith.105 iv. The “Town Hall” Allyson Richardson was the Deputy Commissioner for the Division of Administrative Services for DJJ, and was responsible for overseeing human
resources functions.106 She was called to the Center to mediate the conflict between
99 Id. at 1. 100 See generally ECF 31-15. 101 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 89:11–17); ECF 30-7, ¶ 7; ECF 30-11, at 5. 102 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 73:8–74:20); see generally id. (Dupree Tr. at 73:8–75:20). 103 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 103:5–23, 104:6–18). 104 Id. (Harris Tr. at 103:24–104:5). 105 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 76:2–6); ECF 30-7, ¶ 7. 106 ECF 30-6, ¶ 2. Harris and Dupree.107 Smith and Dalesio were also at this “town hall.”108 Dupree was not.109 Smith and Richardson made sure that Harris understood she was
required to work any shift, at any time, and that she needed to be flexible.110 Harris indicated she understood that, if she was on the schedule, she had to work.111 Richardson, Smith, and Dalesio discussed with Harris her insubordinate and
“reportedly aggressive” behavior.112 Harris agreed to work the weekend shift to which she had been assigned.113 Harris does not believe that anyone in the town hall was discriminating against her for her sexual orientation.114 According to Harris, Richardson told her to come to work the following day
(September 1), which she did.115 Harris believed everything was fine at that point.116 In contrast, Richardson described Harris as irate and disrespectful during
107 ECF 30-6, ¶ 3. The exact date of the mediation is not clear from the record but it was before the September 2–4 weekend shift Harris had been assigned to work. Compare ECF 24-11, with ECF 30-7, ¶¶ 6–9. 108 ECF 30-7, ¶ 8; ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. 19:7–15). 109 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 105:14–21). 110 ECF 30-6, ¶ 5; ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. 111 ECF 30-6, ¶ 5. See also ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. 112 ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. 19:18–22). 113 ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. 114 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 110:12–19). 115 Id. (Harris Tr. at 106:7–19). 116 Id. (Harris Tr. at 106:21–107:8). the town hall. Smith described her as very upset.117 Richardson attested that Harris could have been terminated on the spot because of her behavior.118
Despite her agreement to do so, Harris did not report to work on September 2–4 as scheduled.119 D. Termination Harris was dismissed from her position on September 9, 2022. According to
the termination letter, her dismissal was based on her refusal to work her scheduled shift and insubordinate behavior when told to leave the facility, as well as her prior disciplinary history.120 Dupree signed the termination letter.121
DJJ has a progressive discipline policy, but its details are not reflected in the record.122 Smith described the decision to terminate Harris’s employment as a “group” one.123 Smith heard about issues related to Harris’s conduct “[e]very week.”124 Dupree was part of the discussions, and can recommend terminations
117 ECF 30-7, ¶ 6. 118 ECF 30-6, ¶ 11. 119 ECF 24-10, at 33–34; ECF 30-6, ¶ 6; ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. 120 ECF 30-9, at 59; ECF 31-16, at 1. See also ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 67:5–10); ECF 30- 7, ¶ 9. 121 ECF 30-9, at 59; ECF 31-16. 122 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 35:16–18); ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. 23:5–56). 123 ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. 124 Id. ¶ 5. but cannot approve them.125 Richardson was involved in the termination decision,126 as were Dalesio and HR at the central office.127 Richardson agreed that
Harris should be terminated because she did not come to work as scheduled from September 2 to 4 and she had already had several instances of not coming to work.128 Either the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of DJJ advised that
Harris be terminated.129 HR and DJJ leadership made the decision based on Harris’s conduct.130 In contrast, an unsent email from Dalesio dated the same day as Harris’s termination letter states that “[t]here appear[ ] to be several migrating [sic] factors
that leads to a different course of action” for Harris other than termination.131 Dalesio’s email indicated, among other things, that there was only one fully executed reprimand in Harris’s file; and she had outstanding complaints about
125 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 36:3–13, 67:5–10); ECF 30-4, ¶ 9. 126 ECF 30-4, ¶ 9. 127 ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. at 23:7–12). 128 ECF 30-6, ¶ 6. 129 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 76:12–18). 130 ECF 30-4, ¶ 9. 131 ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. at 28:20–29:9); ECF 31-17. harassment and retaliation because of her sexual orientation.132 The email reflected Dalesio’s notes to herself and points of discussion about Harris’s termination.133
E. General Employer Concerns According to Dupree, the Center “struggled” with Harris “as far as scheduling shifts that she was willing and able to work, getting her to take her post, and her aggressive behavior.”134 Harris had problems taking direction from
Dupree and Holloway.135 She was “aggressive” and caused “a lot of stress and hostility.”136 Despite these problems, Dupree attests that she tried to work with Harris to be flexible with her schedule.137 However, lieutenants are expected to do
more than the lower-ranked officers because lieutenants have more authority and get paid more.138 Holloway described Harris as unreliable: She was frequently absent and rarely on time.139 She would also leave early without asking permission.140 When
132 ECF 31-17. 133 ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. at 29:13–22). 134 ECF 30-4, ¶ 5. 135 Id. 136 Id. ¶ 10. 137 Id. ¶ 7. 138 Id. 139 ECF 30-5, ¶ 3. 140 Id. Harris did ask to leave early, Holloway “always said yes” because he knew she would leave anyway.141 As her supervisor, Holloway often had to cover Harris’s
shifts when she did not arrive on time or left early.142 Harris denied that other people had to hold over on their shifts because she was tardy, but acknowledged that “there were a couple of mornings” where she ran late.143 Holloway said Harris
was “not easy to work with” and would refuse to take her post.144 Other employees complained about Harris’s attitude and behavior.145 III. Discussion Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); a fact is “material” if it could change the outcome of the case, and a dispute is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could resolve it in the non-movant’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The purpose of summary judgment is to test “the need for a trial”—to look for
“factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. Thus, “[t]he
141 Id. 142 Id. 143 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 52:24–53:10). 144 ECF 30-5, ¶¶ 5–6. 145 Id. ¶ 6. evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor.” Id. at 255.
A. Harris’s Discrimination Cause of Action A plaintiff asserting discrimination under Title VII must show that she suffered an adverse employment action. Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Harris’s termination qualifies as such.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). “[T]he ultimate question in a discrimination case is whether there is enough evidence to show that the reason for an adverse employment action was illegal discrimination.” Tynes, 88
F.4th at 941. That is, did Harris put forward enough evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude she was fired because of her sexual orientation? See id. at 942. Although it focuses on the McDonnell-Douglas framework in presenting its arguments, DJJ argues that Harris did not.146 The Court agrees.
Harris attributes everything that happened to her while employed at the Center to her sexual orientation because of her April 2021 HR complaint.147 There is evidence that those who made the decision to terminate Harris’s employment
were aware of her sexual orientation. But “discrimination is about actual knowledge, and real intent, not constructive knowledge and assumed intent.
146 ECF 30-1, at 5–12. 147 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 195:5–12). When evaluating a charge of employment discrimination, then, we must focus on the actual knowledge and actions of the decision-maker.” Walker v. Prudential Prop.
& Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). Richardson, Smith, and Dalesio were all decision-makers.148 Harris, however, has pointed to no evidence suggesting that any of them concluded she should be terminated because
of her sexual orientation. The evidence instead shows that the decision to end Harris’s employment was made after her hostile interaction with Dupree and after she agreed to work the September 2–4 weekend shift and then failed to show up.149 The evidence about Dupree is different but she was not a decision-maker.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Harris, Dupree may have harbored bias toward gay people, and “nitpicked” Harris and was less friendly to her as a result.150 Dupree was involved in discussions about Harris’s termination but did
not have the authority to make the ultimate determination.151 In fact, Dupree
148 ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. at 23:7–12); ECF 30-4, ¶ 9; ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. 149 ECF 28 (Dalesio Tr. 19:7–15); ECF 30-6, ¶¶ 3, 5; ECF 30-7, ¶¶ 8–9. 150 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 31:2–33:10, 39:14–20, 68:23–68:6, 72:25–73:11, 73:25–74:2); ECF 31-11. 151 Although Harris raised a mixed-motive argument in her objections to the R&R, ECF 40, at 4–5, she made no such argument in response to the motion for summary judgment. See generally ECF 31. Accordingly, the Court declines to consider it now. Williams, 557 F.3d at 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a district court does not abuse its discretion by declining to consider a party’s argument that was not first presented to the magistrate judge). testified that the termination decision was a joint one between HR and DJJ leadership.152 Harris has not pointed to any evidence putting that fact in dispute.
Harris’s comparator testimony about other employees who called out from work or were granted leave but not fired and other gay employees who were purportedly mistreated is entirely speculative. She presented no evidence that any
of them—particularly anyone of her relatively high rank—had disciplinary histories of refusing to assume post, insubordination, and absenteeism.153 She presented no details about how other gay employees were supposedly targeted.154 B. Harris’s Retaliation Cause of Action
For her retaliation claim, Harris must show that she engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action, and that but for her protected activity she would not have suffered the adverse action. Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1135–36 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). As with Harris’s
discrimination claim, termination qualifies as an adverse employment action. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 761. DJJ argues that Harris cannot show its reasons
152 ECF 30-4, ¶ 9. 153 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 74:25–75:12, 96:24–99:20, 112:21–113:15, 118:10–24, 120:6– 17, 158:1–22). 154 Id. (Harris Tr. at 35:15–36:5, 158:1–22). for terminating her employment were pretextual.155 Harris disagrees.156 This argument goes to whether Harris’s protected activity was the but-for cause of her
termination: Would she have been fired if she hadn’t filed multiple complaints with HR? Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Univ. of Tx. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013)) (“To establish the necessary causation, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that ‘her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.’”). Assuming without deciding that Harris’s complaints to HR were protected activity, there is no evidence in the record connecting those complaints to the
decision to terminate Harris’s employment. Harris points to the knowledge of the people involved in her termination of her numerous HR complaints and the positive feedback she received during the
town hall as suggesting that the decision-makers were influenced by her protected activities. She also argues that the scrutiny and nitpicking she suffered indicate a retaliatory motive.157 But these arguments avoid the crucial question of whether
she would have been fired if she had never filed any HR complaints. Harris has failed to demonstrate a dispute of material fact on that point.
155 ECF 30-1, at 20. 156 ECF 31-2, at 17–21. 157 ECF 31-2, at 15–20. The evidence shows that Harris would have been fired because of her history of problematic behavior—any protected activity notwithstanding. She
received at least one written reprimand about her refusal to assume post and insubordinate behavior.158 The reprimand warned that recurrence of this type of behavior would result in disciplinary action up to termination.159 Harris was
aware of the importance of all shifts and all posts being staffed.160 Regional Administrator Smith was alerted to concerns about another instance of Harris refusing to take post and leaving the Center without authorization.161 Harris was rude and disrespectful toward Dupree, and had numerous unscheduled absences
from work.162 She failed to report for duty as scheduled more than once.163 There were frequent problems with Harris’s willingness to work, to assume post, aggressive behavior, and absenteeism.164
When Harris was scheduled to work the September 2–4 night shift, she refused to do so.165 She and Dupree had a “heated” conversation in which Dupree
158 ECF 30-9, at 54–55. 159 Id. at 55. 160 ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 45:13–20). 161 ECF 31-10. 162 Id. 163 Id. 164 ECF 30-4, ¶¶ 5, 7, 10; ECF 30-5, ¶¶ 3, 5–7. 165 ECF 30-11, at 4–5. instructed Harris to leave.166 Harris then had the “town hall” with Richardson, Smith, and Dalesio during which Harris expressed her understanding that she
could be required to work any shift at any time.167 She agreed to work as scheduled and then failed to report.168 This final failure to report to work after agreeing to do so was more than enough misconduct to break any causal connection between
Harris’s termination and her protected activities. Henderson v. FedEx Express, 442 F. App’x 502, 506 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Intervening acts of misconduct can break any causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action.”).
IV. Conclusion Having conducted a de novo review of the record, the Court declines to adopt the R&R [ECF 38] and denies the objections [ECF 40] as moot. The Court, however, agrees that Defendant Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice is entitled to
summary judgment. Its motion [ECF 30] is therefore GRANTED.
166 ECF 24 (Harris Tr. at 103:5–104:18); ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 73:8–74:20); see generally ECF 26 (Dupree Tr. at 73:8–75:20). 167 ECF 30-6, ¶ 5. See also ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. 168 ECF 24-10, at 33–34; ECF 30-6, ¶ 6; ECF 30-7, ¶ 9. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and to close this case. SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2025.
Steven D. Grimberg United States District Judge