Harris v. Daniels

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided July 14, 2022·No. 2:22-cv-00293·Unknown

Opinion

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

4 AMMAR HARRIS, Case No. 2:22-cv-00293-CDS-NJK

5 Plaintiff, ORDER

v. 6

7 CHARLES DANIELS, et al.,

8 Defendants.

9 10 I. DISCUSSION 11 On June 2, 2022, the Court issued a screening order permitting one claim to proceed and 12 dismissing some claims with leave to amend and some claims with prejudice. ECF No. 14. The 13 Court granted Plaintiff 30 days from the date of that order to file an amended complaint curing 14 the deficiencies of the complaint. Id. at 12. The Court specifically stated that if Plaintiff chose not 15 to file an amended complaint, the action would proceed on the Eighth Amendment claim for 16 deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendants William F., Cabrera, and 17 Doe nurses when Plaintiff learns their identities and against Defendants Daniels, Williams, 18 Minev, and Johnson for injunctive relief only. Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff did not file an amended 19 complaint. Pursuant to the screening order, this action will proceed on the Eighth Amendment 20 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendants William F., 21 Cabrera, and Doe nurses when Plaintiff learns their identities and against Defendants Daniels, 22 Williams, Minev, and Johnson for injunctive relief only. 23 Plaintiff also filed a motion to supplement pleadings (ECF No. 16), an objection to the 24 screening order (ECF No. 17), a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) (ECF No. 18), 25 and a motion to compel (ECF No. 19). The Court now addresses these motions. 26 A. Objection to Screening Order (ECF No. 17) 27 In the screening order, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for a class action lawsuit on 28 the grounds that a pro se litigant cannot bring a class action lawsuit because a pro se litigant does 2 argues that the Court needs to appoint class action counsel under Federal Rule of Civil 3 Procedure 23(c)(1)(B). ECF No. 17 at 2. 4 The Court denies Plaintiff’s objection. There is no right to appointed counsel in civil 5 cases. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009); Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 6 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). Additionally, as discussed in the screening order, Plaintiff cannot bring a 7 class action lawsuit pro se. Although FRCP 23(c)(1)(B) and 23(g) discuss the appointment of 8 class counsel, Plaintiff misunderstands the rule. The rule “provides that once the Court has 9 determined that a case may proceed as a class action, it also orders that one of the attorneys 10 already appearing in the case as a representative of a named plaintiff is appointed to represent 11 the entire class.” Lyons v. United States, No. 2:17-CV-2262-JAD-NJK, 2018 WL 1939329, at *2 (D. 12 Nev. Apr. 3, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-CV-2262-JAD-NJK, 2018 WL 13 1932878 (D. Nev. Apr. 24, 2018). FRCP 23 does not mandate appointment of counsel for pro se 14 litigants to bring class actions. Id.; see also Olmos v. Ryan, No. 10-CV-2564-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 15 1580555, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2012). 16 B. Motion to Supplement (ECF No. 16) 17 Plaintiff files a motion to supplement pleadings under FRCP 15(d). ECF No. 16. 18 Pursuant to FRCP 15(d), “[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just 19 terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, 20 or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” The Supreme Court 21 has held that FRCP 15(d) “plainly permits supplemental amendments to cover events happening 22 after suit, and it follows, of course, that persons participating in these new events may be added 23 if necessary. Such amendments are well within the basic aim of the rules to make pleadings a 24 means to achieve an orderly and fair administration of justice.” Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince 25 Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 227 (1964). “While leave to permit supplemental pleading is ‘favored,’. . 26 . it cannot be used to introduce a ‘separate, distinct and new cause of action.’” Planned Parenthood 27 of S. Arizona v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997). 28 2 proposed document is not a supplemental pleading. Plaintiff submitted his original complaint 3 on February 16, 2022. ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff’s proposed supplemental pleading attempts to make 4 more allegations against Defendant William F. for events that took place in October 2021. See 5 ECF No. 16 at 2. This is not a supplemental pleading. Additionally, the proposed pleading tries 6 to state a claim against the NDOC. See id. However, Plaintiff cannot sue the NDOC because the 7 NDOC is an arm of the State of Nevada and is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 8 Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); Black v. Nevada Dep’t of Corr., 9 2:09-cv-2343-PMP-LRL, 2010 WL 2545760, *2 (D. Nev. June 21, 2010). 10 To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to submit exhibits (see ECF No. 16 at 3-46), his 11 attempt is premature because this case is still in the pre-service screening stage. Plaintiff should 12 wait to submit exhibits until it is procedurally applicable in this case. 13 C. Motion for TRO (ECF No. 18) 14 Plaintiff also filed a motion for TRO because he is “currently suffering pain and atrophy 15 on his right side, physical therapy is needed to prevent permanent injury.” ECF No. 18 at 1. 16 Injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, is an “extraordinary remedy, never 17 awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A plaintiff 18 seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he 19 is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 20 equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. 21 City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 20). Furthermore, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), preliminary injunctive 23 relief must be “narrowly drawn,” must “extend no further than necessary to correct the harm,” 24 and must be “the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 25 The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for TRO. Plaintiff’s one line about his medical needs 26 is insufficient to demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 27 relief. 28 /// 2 Plaintiff files a motion to compel the prison’s law clerk to e-file his documents. ECF No. 3 19. The Court denies the motion because all the documents that Plaintiff is concerned with have 4 been filed this Court including the motion to supplement pleading and objection to screening 5 order. 6 II.

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