Harris v. Clark County School District

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 5, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00259
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 LEROY HARRIS, Case No. 2:23-cv-00259-MMD-MDC

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 9 Defendant. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Leroy Harris sued his former employer, Defendant Clark County 13 School District (“CCSD”), under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) for 14 allegedly failing to rehire him because he has a disability. (ECF No. 50 (“SAC”1).) Before 15 the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgement.2 (ECF No. 56 (“Motion”).) As 16 further explained below, the Court will grant the Motion because Plaintiff fails to establish 17 a prime facie case of discrimination. 18 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3 19 In the fall of 2017, Plaintiff became a probationary4 physical education teacher at 20 Bunker Elementary School. (ECF No. 56-6 at 30.) His duties included but were not limited 21 to teaching physical education, classroom management, posting weekly lesson plans, 22

23 1In his SAC, Plaintiff incorrectly states that his first amended complaint is the operative complaint in this case. (ECF No. 50 at 1.) Upon filing, the SAC became the 24 operative complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A]fter amendment the original pleading no longer performs any function and is treated thereafter 25 as non-existent . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The SAC will therefore be treated as the operative complaint. 26 2Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 58) and Defendant replied (ECF No. 59). 27 3The facts that follow are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 28 4As a probationary employee, Plaintiff was not entitled to reemployment following 2 supervised Plaintiff. (Id. at 7.) 3 A. Wheelchair Ramp Removal and Replacement 4 During the summer of 2018, the wheelchair ramp to Plaintiff’s portable classroom 5 was removed. (ECF No. 56-3 at 3.) Principal Mills requested it be replaced throughout 6 the summer and fall of 2018. (Id.) In November 2018, Plaintiff wrote on a punch list that 7 the wheelchair ramp was still missing and students needed it for classroom access. (Id. 8 at 32.) He did not indicate that he personally needed the wheelchair ramp because of his 9 disability. (Id.) Plaintiff approached Principal Mills the following month about filing a 10 reasonable accommodation request with the Office of Diversity and Affirmative Action 11 Programs (“ODAA”) for the wheelchair ramp’s return, and Principal Mills encouraged him 12 to do so. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff requested the wheelchair ramp to be reinstalled as an 13 accommodation with ODAA on December 26, 2018. (ECF No. 56-6 at 21.) The wheelchair 14 ramp was reinstalled over the weekend of January 19 and 20, 2019. (Id.) 15 B. Plaintiff’s Job Performance and Denial of Rehiring 16 On March 23, 2018, Principal Mills issued Plaintiff an oral warning that his job 17 performance was below standard because he was “failing to adequately supervise 18 students during extracurricular activities, [] soliciting donations without administrative 19 approval,5 [] not following lesson plans, and [] not obtaining authorization prior to showing 20 a cartoon video during class.” (ECF No. 56-3 at 2, 10.) Plaintiff was instructed to submit 21 a written supervision plan for his after school program, cease sending any school-related 22 communications to the community without approval, follow his lesson plan, implement 23 lessons based on grade level standards, maximize physical activity, get approval before 24 showing an educational video, do not show unrelated videos or give free time, review the 25 staff handbook, and “be honest and forthright in all [] interactions within the workplace.” 26 5Plaintiff asserts in the SAC that this allegation is false. (ECF No. 50 at 5-6.) 27 However, Plaintiff himself attaches evidence of him soliciting a donation from Robco Electric Company to pay for students’ soccer league entry fee. (ECF No. 50 at 19.) While 28 Principal Mills is CC’ed on the letter, Plaintiff does not proffer evidence that he garnered 2 same day, Principal Mills issued Plaintiff’s 2017-2018 evaluation, which rated his 3 performance as “developing.” (ECF No. 56-3 at 15.). 4 On December 11, 2018, Principal Mills held an investigatory conference with 5 Plaintiff to discuss his substandard job performance. (Id. at 35-36.) Plaintiff received a 6 written warning a few days later that stated that his performance was “below standard 7 and must improve,” and directed him to “[b]e respectful and professional at all times in 8 [the] workplace,” plan, prepare, and execute age-appropriate lessons, create a classroom 9 management plan, and comply with all previously issued directives. (Id. at 38-39.) 10 Plaintiff’s 2018-2019 evaluation was issued on March 21, 2019, and again rated 11 his performance as “developing.” (Id. at 65.) His directives included completing his lesson 12 plans prior to the start of the work week, ensuring lessons were developmentally 13 appropriate, maximizing instructional time, and improving classroom management. 14 (Id. at 64.) 15 On April 26, 2019, Plaintiff received Notice of Non-Reemployment for “[f]ailure to 16 satisfy performance standards of the Clark County School District.” (Id. at 67.) On May 2, 17 2019, Plaintiff emailed ODAA because he believed that his non-reemployment was 18 retaliation for seeking the return of the wheelchair ramp. (ECF No. 56-6 at 18.) On May 19 22, 2019, ODAA responded that it completed their investigation and were “unable to 20 substantiate [Plaintiff’s] allegations of ‘retaliation’.” (Id. at 20.) 21 Plaintiff applied for reemployment with the District in June 2020. (ECF No. 56-8 at 22 2.) He applied for eight different positions. (ECF No. 50 at 13.) CCSD’s Human Relation’s 23 Department (“HR”) sent a request for information from the Employee-Management 24 Relations Department (“EMR”) regarding “any pertinent information, such as, [sic] 25 discipline, grievance, early resolution, sick leaves review, fingerprints and status logs” 26 related to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 56-7 at 5-6.) EMR recommended HR not to rehire Plaintiff. 27 (Id. at 5.) EMR was not aware that Plaintiff had a disability. (Id. at 2.) HR decided not to 28 rehire Plaintiff based on the Notice of Non-Reemployment, his oral warning, his written 2 (ECF No. 56-8 at 2.) During the process of reviewing job applications from former 3 employees, HR does not request documents or information from ODAA. (Id. at 3.) 4 Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission 5 (“NERC”) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on January 26, 2021. 6 (ECF No. 56-6 at 26.) In the Charge, Plaintiff alleged that his termination and denial of 7 reemployment were in retaliation to his reasonable accommodation request and/or filing 8 an internal discrimination complaint. (Id. at 26-27.) ODAA responded by informing NERC 9 that Plaintiff was not rehired because he “was a poor performing probationary employee.” 10 (Id. at 29.) 11 Plaintiff then initiated this action. In his SAC, Plaintiff brings one claim under Title 12 I of the ADA for failure to hire. (ECF No. 50 at 12-13.) He alleges that Defendant refused 13 to rehire him “because of his disabilities.” (Id. at 13.) 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a prima facie case of 16 discrimination under Title I of the ADA because he has produced no evidence that he was 17 not rehired because of his disability. (ECF No. 56 at 11.) Plaintiff responds that Defendant 18 rejected him because of his disability and is flawed in its allegation that “Plaintiff was not 19 qualified to work in CCSD.”6 (ECF No. 58 at 1, 10.) The Court agrees with Defendant. 20 The ADA provides in part that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a 21 qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard 22 to . . . the hiring [of employees] . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To prove a prima facie case 23 of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) they are disabled 24 under the ADA, (2) they are a qualified individual with a disability, and (3) they were 25 discriminated against because of their disability. See Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 26

27 6Plaintiff responds using a Title VII employment discrimination standard, which differs from the standard under the ADA. (ECF No. 58 at 7.) This standard is inapplicable 28 here as Plaintiff sues only under the ADA. (ECF No. 50 at 2.) The Court considers 2 1246 (9th Cir. 1999)). Regarding the third prong, a plaintiff must show that the adverse 3 employment action would not have occurred but for the disability. See Murray v. Mayo 4 Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019) (“ADA discrimination claims under Title I must 5 be evaluated under a but-for causation standard.”). 6 If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to 7 Defendant to establish a non-discriminatory, legitimate reason for the adverse 8 employment action. See Brown v. City of Tuscon, 336 F.3d 1181, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2003) 9 (citations omitted). The plaintiff must then show defendant’s proffered reasons are pretext 10 for discrimination. See Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 11 272 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by either 12 persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely influenced the employer’s 13 decision or by showing the employer’s explanation is “unworthy of credence.” Villiarimo 14 v. Aloha Island, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 15 Plaintiff fails to establish prima facie discrimination because he does not proffer 16 evidence that Defendant did not rehire him because of his disability.7 EMR was unaware 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 7The Court will address only the third prong of the prima facie discrimination 27 standard because failing to meet any of the prongs ends a claim. See Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (establishing that a plaintiff must show 28 all three elements). 2 request any information related to a possible disability when evaluating Plaintiff’s 3 applications. (ECF Nos. 56-7 at 2; 56-8 at 2.) Accordingly, HR could not have reasonably 4 known about Plaintiff’s disability, and by extension, could not have been influenced by it. 5 Cf. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995) (“The employer 6 could not have been motivated by knowledge it did not have . . . .”) Rather, HR explicitly 7 stated that it did not rehire Plaintiff because of his poor work performance. (ECF No. 56- 8 8 at 2.) Plaintiff proffers no evidence to the contrary. 9 Even if but-for causation existed to support prima facie case, Plaintiff cannot show 10 HR’s reason was a pretext for discrimination. Defendant proffered that it had a legitimate 11 reason not to rehire Plaintiff: Plaintiff’s long-documented poor job performance working 12 for Defendant. This documentation began well before he requested an accommodation 13 with ODAA, and Plaintiff has not proffered evidence beyond conclusory statements that 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 8In his SAC, Plaintiff argues that evidence he proffers of emails between EMR and 21 Principal Mills prove that they conspired to discredit him and prevent future employment with Defendant. (ECF No. 50 at 8.) However, the emails do not indicate any information 22 of a possible conspiracy and do not mention Plaintiff’s disability. Rather, they concern Principal Mill’s seeking guidance on Plaintiff’s unprofessional conduct and poor work 23 performance. (Id. at 23-35.)

24 Plaintiff also argues that Mollie Hall, the Director of EMR, “deliberately misled the court” because she “knew Plaintiff had participated in protected activities.” (Id. at 9.) He 25 argues that EMR knew because it gave testimony to NERC regarding his Charge of Discrimination. (Id.) However, as Defendant notes, this claim is not supported by the 26 chronology of evidence. (ECF No. 56 at 14.) ODAA did not receive Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination until September 24, 2021, over a year after Plaintiff applied for 27 reemployment. (ECF No. 56-6 at 26.) Accordingly, any communication between ODAA and EMR regarding the Charge would have occurred months after Plaintiff applied for 28 reemployment. Plaintiff does not proffer other evidence that EMR knew about Plaintiff’s 2 himself did not grieve an oral warning he received. (ECF No. 56-2 at 25.) Ultimately, 3 Plaintiff’s own performance record supports Defendant’s legitimate reason not to rehire 4 him that is independent from and unrelated to his disability. Thus, Defendant had a 5 legitimate business reason for not rehiring Plaintiff, and Plaintiff cannot show that the 6 reason was a pretext for discrimination. 7 The Court will therefore grant Defendant’s Motion because Plaintiff does not proffer 8 evidence that he was not rehired because of his disability nor that Defendant’s proffer 9 reason was pretextual. 10 IV. CONCLUSION 11 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 12 cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 13 determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 14 Motion before the Court. 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 9Plaintiff appears to argue that pretext existed because several of his teacher 22 observations were not in compliance with state law. (ECF No. 50 at 6.) His assessment is incorrect. Plaintiff explains that NRS § 391.680 requires a pre- and post-conference 23 meeting for each teacher observation, which he did not consistently receive. (Id.) 24 However, NRS § 391.685(1) and § 391.680(3) require that probationary teachers must receive three scheduled observations throughout the year, and those scheduled 25 observations must have a pre- and post-conference meeting. Plaintiff did receive required pre- and post-conference meetings for his three scheduled observations during the 2017- 26 2018 and 2018-2019, even if he did not receive these conferences for every observation. 27 (ECF No. 56-3 at 4.) Accordingly, his scheduled observations complied with state law. But if these observations had violated state law, Plaintiff does not explain or proffer 28 evidence explaining why doing so arises to pretext. 1 It is therefore ordered that Defendant Clark County School’s motion for summary 2 || judgment (ECF No. 56) is granted. 3 The Clerk of Court is accordingly directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant 4 || and close this case. 5 DATED THIS 5" Day of March 2025.

7 MIRANDA M. DU 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28