Harris v. Administration for Children Services

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided October 7, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-06832·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LATOYA HARRIS, Plaintiff, 20-CV-6832 (LLS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN SERVICES, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action allegingthat the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) wrongfully accused her of neglecting her son and allowed him to be abused while under the agency’s care. By order dated September 30, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is,in forma pauperis (IFP).For the following reasons, the complaint is dismissedwith leave to replead within thirty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss anIFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude”in pro se cases,id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim,pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible –not merely possible –that the pleader is

entitled to relief.Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against ACS,alleging that the agency took her son away and then allowed him to be abused. Sheasserts that the events giving rise to her claims occurred from 2005 to 2009. Plaintiff provides the following statement as the facts of her case: Within 2005 ACS was said to take my child away, and I was said to have neglect my child. During this time this was not what was happening, and I can prove this case of what happened to me by a person name Raheem Thomas 292 Ralph Ave #5A Bklyn NY 11233. He is a person Im asking the courts to speak to in reference to my case. He known of me for many years, and I would like the courts to speak with him because of the neglect charge that’s not true. I was not abusing my child. Also during beingin the care of ACS my son has said in 2017 to me and the Board of Education that he was abused while in care, and I would like to bring a case against ACS for the abuse my child sustained while in/under ACS care. I have medical reports from my doctor and can explain my case with Raheem Thomas. Please assist me with this case. (ECF No. 2, at 5-6.) Plaintiff further asserts that she suffered distress from the neglect proceedings and what she characterizes as the rape of her son. She seeks “continuing payments to [her] for wrongly accusing [her] of neglect of [her] child and abused from [sic] him while in care.” (Id. at 6.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s assertions against ACSarise out of child neglect proceedings,the removal of her son from her care, and the abuses he suffered while under the agency’s care.Because she claims thatACSviolated her federal constitutional and statutory rights, the Court construes her claims as being brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. To state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must

allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Plaintiff’s claims are untimely. The statute of limitations for claims under §1983 is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions,” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). In New York, that period is three years.See Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2002). Claims under §1983generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). Plaintiff brings the complaint asserting claims arising from conduct that occurred from

2005 to2009.But she filed this action on August 21, 2020, more than eleven years after the alleged violations occurred. Because the failure to file an action within the limitations period is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not required to plead that the case is timely filed. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the existence of an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, is plain from the face of the pleading. See Waltersv. Indus. and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 293 (2d Cir. 2011); see

alsoPino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §1915(d) on statute of limitations grounds). A district court should grant notice and opportunity to be heard, however, before dismissing a complaint sua sponteon statute of limitations grounds.

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Related

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Pearl v. City of Long Beach
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