Harris County, Texas v. Jasmine Jader Gariet

Opinions

Opinion issued August 31, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00175-CV ——————————— HARRIS COUNTY, Appellant V. JASMINE JADE GARIET, Appellee

On Appeal from the 133rd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-79704

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After being injured in car accident with a Harris County Sheriff Office’s

deputy, Jasmine Jade Gariet sued the County under the Texas Tort Claims Act

(“TTCA”).1 The County responded with a combined plea to the jurisdiction and

1 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.001-101.109. motion for summary judgment, asserting that it was entitled to official immunity and

the emergency exception to TTCA’s limited waiver of immunity applied.2 The trial

court denied the plea and motion.

In two issues on appeal, the County contends that the trial court erred in

denying its plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment.

We reverse and render judgment dismissing Gariet’s suit for lack of

jurisdiction.

Background

After dark on May 22, 2022, Gariet was driving in the far-right lane of the

three southbound lanes on West Sam Houston Parkway North, into the West Road

intersection. Responding to a priority one emergency call about a residential

burglary in progress, Harris County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”) Deputy Jeffrey

Saunders was traveling westbound on West Road toward West Sam Houston

Parkway North in his patrol car, with lights and siren activated. When Saunders

entered the intersection, he struck Gariet’s car. According to Gariet, Saunders caused

the collision by failing to keep a proper lookout for Gariet and other drivers, maintain

control of his vehicle, control his speed, yield the right of way, take prudent evasive

action, and safely apply his brakes. Gariet brought negligence and gross negligence

claims against the County, asserting that Deputy Saunders’s actions did not comply

2 Id. § 101.055(2).

2 with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency operation of a patrol car and

Saunders acted with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of

others, including Gariet.

The investigating officer who prepared the crash report stated that Gariet had

the green light when she began traveling south through the intersection. Deputy

Saunders had the red light but entered the intersection with lights and siren activated.

The officer found that Saunders failed to clear the intersection properly. Saunders

was not charged with violating any traffic laws.

In its internal administrative review, the HCSO summarized the collision as

follows:

Deputy Saunders slowed as he entered the intersection but did not stop completely when attempting to clear the intersection (confirmed by in- car video and vehicle download). The driver of a vehicle traveling southbound in the outside lane of the service road did not see the police car in the intersection. Deputy Saunders’[s] actions of disregarding the red light caused a major crash.

Saunders received a reprimand based on HCSO’s determination that he violated two

provisions of the Texas Transportation Code: section 646.151, which requires a

vehicle operator approaching an intersection to obey any traffic-control device; and

section 546.005, which cautions that the operator of an authorized emergency

vehicle retains responsibility for (1) operating “the vehicle with appropriate regard

for the safety of all persons”; and “(2) the consequences of reckless disregard for the

3 safety of others.” Saunders served a one-day suspension and attended a one-day

driver safety course.

In its plea to the jurisdiction, the County argued that it was entitled to

immunity because the emergency exception to immunity did not apply and he did

not act with reckless disregard for the safety of others. In the summary judgment

motion, the County alternatively asserted that it was entitled to common-law

immunity from liability for Saunders’s actions because he was engaged in a

discretionary act when the collision occurred and did what a reasonably prudent

patrol deputy, under the same or similar circumstances, would have done.

In her response, Gariet alleged Deputy Saunders negligently operated the

patrol car and violated Transportation Code section 546.005 by acting with

“conscious indifference and/or reckless disregard” for the safety of the public when

he proceeded through the red light without first clearing the intersection for

oncoming traffic. She attached an excerpt from Saunders’s deposition, which

included the following testimony:

Q: Your actions on that day were reckless, correct? Saunders: My actions caused the accident. Q: And they were — it was reckless actions that caused it, correct? Saunders: Yes, sir.

4 According to Gariet, this testimony constituted an admission of recklessness by

Saunders that made the emergency exception to the statutory waiver of immunity

inapplicable.

In reply, the County maintained that Gariet failed to show that Deputy

Saunders violated any applicable law. According to the County, Gariet misplaced

her reliance on the HCSO’s internal findings, which did not establish a violation of

law. Texas Transportation Code section 546.001 permits an officer to proceed

through a red light in an emergency, which was what Deputy Saunders did.

The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction and summary-judgment

motion.

Plea to the Jurisdiction

In its first issue, the County argues that trial court erred in denying its plea to

the jurisdiction because Deputy Saunders did not violate a law or act with reckless

disregard for the safety of others and property.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. City of

San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 528 (Tex. 2022). The plaintiff suing the

governmental unit bears the burden of affirmatively showing waiver of immunity.

Id. The plaintiff “survives the plea to the jurisdiction only by showing that the statute

clearly and affirmatively waives immunity and by also negating any provisions that

5 create exceptions to, and thus withdraw, that waiver.” City of Austin v. Powell, 704

S.W.3d 437, 447 (Tex. 2024) (cleaned up). In determining whether the plaintiff has

met this burden, we consider the facts alleged by the plaintiff and the evidence before

the trial court. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 528.

“When a plea challenges jurisdictional facts, our review mirrors that of a

traditional summary judgment motion.” Id. “[W]e take as true all evidence favorable

to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in

the nonmovant’s favor.” Id. at 528–29.

B. Governmental Immunity

The County, “[a]s a political subdivision of the state . . . is ‘immune from suit

unless [its] immunity is waived by state law.’” Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 448 (quoting

Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 528). TTCA section 101.021(1) waives governmental

immunity for:

(1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if: (A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle . . .; and (B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law[.]

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1). The TTCA also identifies several

circumstances for which it withdraws that waiver. Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 448–49

(quoting Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. 2023)).

6 Pertinent here, the emergency exception provides that the waiver of

governmental immunity does not apply

to a claim arising . . . from the action of an employee while responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such a law or ordinance, if the action is not taken with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others[.]

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2).

The emergency exception “contemplates two distinct inquiries to be

undertaken in a particular order.” Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 449. The court must first

determine whether any laws or ordinances apply to the officer’s emergency action.

This inquiry does not include consideration of generally applicable rules of the road,

only ones that specifically address emergencies. Id. at 451. If a law or ordinance has

some application to the emergency action, then “the jurisdictional inquiry turns on

whether the officer’s action complied with the relevant law or ordinance.” Id.

If no law or ordinance applies to any part of the emergency action, the court

must consider whether the officer acted with conscious indifference or reckless

disregard for the safety of others. Id. at 449. Under the Transportation Code, a

motorist commits the offense of “reckless driving” when he “drives a vehicle in

wil[l]ful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” TEX. TRANSP.

CODE § 545.401(a); City of Houston v. Gomez, 716 S.W.3d 161, 165 (Tex. 2025).

7 “[R]ecklessness for purposes of the emergency exception likewise involves a

‘willful or wanton disregard’ for the safety of others.” Gomez, 716 S.W.3d at 165

(quoting Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 531). “[T]his recklessness standard requires

‘conscious indifference’ or ‘subjective awareness of an extreme risk.’” Id. (quoting

Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 531).

C. Analysis

Gariet identified Transportation Code section 546.005 as the statute that

Saunders allegedly violated.3 Section 546.005 follows certain permissive rules that

apply to the operation of an emergency vehicle and provides that those rules “do not

relieve the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle from: (1) the duty to operate

the vehicle with appropriate regard for the safety of all persons; or (2) the

consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE

§ 546.005; see also Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 452 (observing that Chapter 546 “sets a

3 The only statutory violation the appellant pled was section 546.005. The dissent would reverse because it believes there are disputed facts over whether Deputy Saunders violated section 546.001. That issue is not properly before us because the appellant’s pleadings did not allege a violation of section 546.001. A party trying to defeat governmental immunity has the burden to prove immunity is waived, and this includes the burden to negate any exceptions in its pleadings. See City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Tex. 2024). Because of the particular burdens of pleading in a TTCA case we cannot affirm here on a basis that was not pled. In its 546.001 analysis the dissent discusses both City of Houston v. Moran, No. 01-24-00224-CV, 2025 WL 3545572 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 11, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) and City of Houston v. Johnson, No. 01-23-00356-CV, 2025 WL 1521763 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 29, 2025, no pet.). However, in those cases the plaintiffs pled a section 546.001 violation as a basis for negating the emergency exception.

8 baseline standard for all emergency responses”). This provision “largely

corresponds” to the recklessness prong of the TTCA’s emergency exception. See

Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 455; see also Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 529 (noting that

distinction between whether officer violated section 546.005 and whether he was

reckless “largely collapsed” under facts of case). The parties do not argue that

application of section 546.005, as opposed to the recklessness prong, would lead to

a different result here. As a result, we consider only if the evidence before the trial

court raises a fact issue about whether Saunders, in operating the patrol car, acted

with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others. See Powell,

704 S.W.3d at 449.

The undisputed evidence shows that Deputy Saunders was responding to a

priority one emergency call after dark. He had his siren and lights activated and

slowed as he entered the intersection but did not stop completely. In his deposition,

Saunders testified he approached the intersection after emerging from underneath an

overpass and saw that “the first two [southbound] lanes of traffic were stopped for

me . . . . And so that’s why I thought that traffic was stopped for me, and I did not

see . . . the vehicle in the last lane, and that’s why I proceeded through—and we

didn’t see each other . . . .” The dash cam video is consistent with Saunders’s

description of the circumstances that led to the collision.

9 This evidence shows no more than “mere inattentiveness” or a “momentary

judgment lapse,” neither of which establish recklessness. See City of Houston v.

Gomez, 716 S.W.3d 161, 165–66 (Tex. 2025). It shows that Saunders assessed the

risks based on his perception at the time but failed to notice Gariet’s moving car on

the far side of two stopped lanes of traffic. See Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 457. It does

not show that Saunders “knew the relevant facts but did not care about the result,”

as required for a finding of conscious indifference or reckless disregard. See id. at

456.

In asserting that the evidence raises a fact issue about whether Saunders acted

with reckless disregard, Gariet relies first on the conclusion in HCSO’s internal

investigation that Saunders violated Transportation Code section 546.005. We note

that this Court has previously concluded that an internal finding that the officer

violated a provision of Transportation Code Chapter 546 raised a fact issue on

whether the emergency exception applied. See City of Houston v. Moran, No.

01-24-00224-CV, 2025 WL 3545572, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.

11, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (determining that crash report and department letter

suspending officer after collision raised fact issues about whether officer violated

sections 546.001 and 546.005); City of Houston v. Johnson, No. 01-23-00356-CV,

2025 WL 1521763, at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 29, 2025, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (concluding that crash report and investigator’s testimony raised fact

10 issues about whether officer violated section 546.001(2) by driving through red light

at intersection where crash occurred without slowing as necessary for safe

operation). Unlike this case, though, Moran and Johnson both involved

administrative conclusions that the officer violated a provision of Chapter 546

involving specific conduct, not merely the statutory duty of care set forth in section

546.005.

Because whether Deputy Saunders violated section 546.005 collapses into the

question of whether he acted with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for

the safety of others such that the emergency exception to the waiver of immunity

does not apply, the underlying facts—and not an official’s conclusion—control our

inquiry. The investigation did not identify any facts disputed or undisputed, beyond

those we have already considered. For this reason, the administrative conclusion that

Saunders violated section 546.005 is not material to a determination of whether the

emergency exception applies. See Windrum v. Kareh, 581 S.W.3d 761, 769 (Tex.

2019) (“[A]n expert’s statement or opinion is conclusory when he . . . offers no basis

for his opinion or the bases offered do not actually support the opinion . . . .”);

Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.

2004) (“Opinion testimony that is conclusory or speculative is not relevant evidence,

because it does not tend to make the existence of a material fact ‘more probable or

less probable.’” (citing Texas Rule of Evidence 401)).

11 Gariet also relies on an excerpt from Deputy Saunders’s deposition testimony

in which Saunders acknowledged that he failed to properly clear the intersection and

that his conduct was reckless. But Saunders’s subjective, post hoc opinion about his

conduct is likewise not relevant to whether the emergency exception applies.

For these reasons, we conclude that Gariet has not raised a fact issue regarding

the application of the TTCA’s emergency exception to the immunity waiver. Thus,

we hold that the trial court erred in denying the County’s plea to the jurisdiction.

We sustain the County’s first issue.4

Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s denial of the County’s plea to the jurisdiction and

render judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Clint Morgan Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney, and Morgan.

Justice Rivas-Molloy, dissenting.

4 Because of our disposition, we need not address the County’s remaining issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 12