UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OSEI HARPER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03345 (UNA) ) DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, et al., ) ) ) Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is currently before the Court on consideration of, inter alia, Plaintiff’s pro se
Complaint, ECF No. 1, and his Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF
No. 2. Upon review, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and dismisses this matter without
prejudice.
Plaintiff, a resident of Florida, sues the Department of the Navy, the Board for Correction
of Naval Records, the Department of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy (in his official capacity),
three naval officers (in their individual capacities), and “John Does 1–5,” see Compl. at 4–6. But
Plaintiff may not sue these Doe Defendants, as it contravenes D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(c)(1). The
Complaint itself chronicles “Plaintiff’s journey” and his attempt to “challenge[] a continuum of
harm spanning more than three decades, compounded by administrative obstruction and
falsification of records. This continuum originated in the U.S. Navy and metastasized through
three decades of discriminatory exclusion, marginalization, and systemic betrayal.” See id. at 7–
8.
Where the Complaint is most cognizable, Plaintiff broadly challenges the Navy’s responses
to his FOIA requests, see id. at 10–12, but Plaintiff then attempts to expand and connect these FOIA responses to a sprawling nefarious scheme orchestrated against him that “began as
command-level misconduct [and then] evolved into a pattern of administrative sabotage, legal
manipulation, and systemic obstruction,” id. at 8; see generally Compl. Plaintiff invokes the
FOIA, the Privacy Act, the Little Tucker Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Rehabilitation
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Bivens and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Federal
Mandamus Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act. See id. at 6, 20–26.
In essence, Plaintiff attempts to address every wrong that he ever allegedly endured arising
from his military service and thereafter, from Defendants’ alleged “pyramid of misconduct,” see
id. at 11, 16, that has purportedly manifested in myriad ways, including alleged federal crimes, see
id. at 11, 25; “suppression of earned promotions,” see id. at 20; “targeted retaliation [and]
discriminatory exclusion,” see id. at 24; cruel and unusual punishment, see id. at 10, 24;
mistreatment based on disability leading up to his wrongful discharge in 1992, see id. at 4–10, 13,
10, 15–17, 20, 22, 24–25; post-discharge discrimination based on disability, 7, 17–21; denial of
benefits and medical treatment, see id. at 8, 10, 16–18, 20–21, 24, 27; failure to correct his military
record and falsification of records, see id. at 4, 6–8, 11–12, 18–20, 24–27; denial of “fair access to
administrative review,” and refusal “to engage in good faith consideration of his petitions,” see id.
at 6–7, 11, 14, 17, 20–21, 24, 26. He demands assorted equitable relief and damages. See id. at
27–28.
The Court also notes that, since this case was initiated less than two months ago, Plaintiff
has proliferated this case with numerous additional submissions, including supplementing the
Complaint with 171 pages of additional Exhibits and Memoranda, ECF Nos. 6 through 6-30, ECF
Nos. 7 through 7-2, but these proposed additions fail to comply with Federal Rule 15(a) or D.C.
Local Civil Rule 5.1(e), (g), 7(i), or 15(i), and to that same end, “Plaintiff’s [C]omplaint is not the legal equivalent of a LEGO set, something to be recreated,” in such piecemeal fashion, see
Whitman v. Dep’t of Army, No. 21-03163, 2023 WL 3844603, at *2 (D.D.C. June 5, 2023). And
although a “a pro se litigant must of course be given fair and equal treatment, he cannot generally
be permitted to shift the burden of litigating his case to the courts.” Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702
F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (cleaned up); see Sun v. D.C. Gov’t, 133 F. Supp. 3d 155, 168
n.6 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[I]t is not the Court’s job to canvass the record for documents supporting a
pro se party’s position.”).
Here, the breadth of Plaintiff’s submissions does not assist him. Certainly, some of the
alleged wrongs may constitute plausible causes of action, if better pleaded, but instead of providing
the necessary supporting details of any these potential claims––e.g., how or when Defendants
negligently handled his administrative petitions––and which petitions were mishandled, or the
dates and administrative history of his FOIA requests, Plaintiff instead focuses largely on fleshing
out his theory of a “coordinated effort . . . of engineered neglect and deception,” Compl. at 7; see
generally Compl., but “‘a laundry list of wrongful acts and conclusory allegations to support h[is]
theory of a conspiracy,’” are patently “‘insufficient to allow the case to go forward.’” Curran v.
Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
as frivolous) (quoting Richards v. Duke Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2007)). Plaintiff
also focuses heavily on his attempts at settlement, see Compl. at 13–15, 19, 27–28, but those
discussions are irrelevant to the Court, see Jones v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2004).
Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Jarrell v. Tisch,
656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987), and here, the Complaint and its addendums fail to comply
with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a pleading to contain “(1)
a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir.
2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted
so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the
doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).
Here, the Complaint is neither short nor plain, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the allegations
cannot be described as simple, concise, and direct, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1), and the paragraphs
are not limited to a single set of circumstances, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OSEI HARPER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03345 (UNA) ) DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, et al., ) ) ) Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is currently before the Court on consideration of, inter alia, Plaintiff’s pro se
Complaint, ECF No. 1, and his Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF
No. 2. Upon review, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and dismisses this matter without
prejudice.
Plaintiff, a resident of Florida, sues the Department of the Navy, the Board for Correction
of Naval Records, the Department of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy (in his official capacity),
three naval officers (in their individual capacities), and “John Does 1–5,” see Compl. at 4–6. But
Plaintiff may not sue these Doe Defendants, as it contravenes D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(c)(1). The
Complaint itself chronicles “Plaintiff’s journey” and his attempt to “challenge[] a continuum of
harm spanning more than three decades, compounded by administrative obstruction and
falsification of records. This continuum originated in the U.S. Navy and metastasized through
three decades of discriminatory exclusion, marginalization, and systemic betrayal.” See id. at 7–
8.
Where the Complaint is most cognizable, Plaintiff broadly challenges the Navy’s responses
to his FOIA requests, see id. at 10–12, but Plaintiff then attempts to expand and connect these FOIA responses to a sprawling nefarious scheme orchestrated against him that “began as
command-level misconduct [and then] evolved into a pattern of administrative sabotage, legal
manipulation, and systemic obstruction,” id. at 8; see generally Compl. Plaintiff invokes the
FOIA, the Privacy Act, the Little Tucker Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Rehabilitation
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Bivens and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Federal
Mandamus Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act. See id. at 6, 20–26.
In essence, Plaintiff attempts to address every wrong that he ever allegedly endured arising
from his military service and thereafter, from Defendants’ alleged “pyramid of misconduct,” see
id. at 11, 16, that has purportedly manifested in myriad ways, including alleged federal crimes, see
id. at 11, 25; “suppression of earned promotions,” see id. at 20; “targeted retaliation [and]
discriminatory exclusion,” see id. at 24; cruel and unusual punishment, see id. at 10, 24;
mistreatment based on disability leading up to his wrongful discharge in 1992, see id. at 4–10, 13,
10, 15–17, 20, 22, 24–25; post-discharge discrimination based on disability, 7, 17–21; denial of
benefits and medical treatment, see id. at 8, 10, 16–18, 20–21, 24, 27; failure to correct his military
record and falsification of records, see id. at 4, 6–8, 11–12, 18–20, 24–27; denial of “fair access to
administrative review,” and refusal “to engage in good faith consideration of his petitions,” see id.
at 6–7, 11, 14, 17, 20–21, 24, 26. He demands assorted equitable relief and damages. See id. at
27–28.
The Court also notes that, since this case was initiated less than two months ago, Plaintiff
has proliferated this case with numerous additional submissions, including supplementing the
Complaint with 171 pages of additional Exhibits and Memoranda, ECF Nos. 6 through 6-30, ECF
Nos. 7 through 7-2, but these proposed additions fail to comply with Federal Rule 15(a) or D.C.
Local Civil Rule 5.1(e), (g), 7(i), or 15(i), and to that same end, “Plaintiff’s [C]omplaint is not the legal equivalent of a LEGO set, something to be recreated,” in such piecemeal fashion, see
Whitman v. Dep’t of Army, No. 21-03163, 2023 WL 3844603, at *2 (D.D.C. June 5, 2023). And
although a “a pro se litigant must of course be given fair and equal treatment, he cannot generally
be permitted to shift the burden of litigating his case to the courts.” Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702
F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (cleaned up); see Sun v. D.C. Gov’t, 133 F. Supp. 3d 155, 168
n.6 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[I]t is not the Court’s job to canvass the record for documents supporting a
pro se party’s position.”).
Here, the breadth of Plaintiff’s submissions does not assist him. Certainly, some of the
alleged wrongs may constitute plausible causes of action, if better pleaded, but instead of providing
the necessary supporting details of any these potential claims––e.g., how or when Defendants
negligently handled his administrative petitions––and which petitions were mishandled, or the
dates and administrative history of his FOIA requests, Plaintiff instead focuses largely on fleshing
out his theory of a “coordinated effort . . . of engineered neglect and deception,” Compl. at 7; see
generally Compl., but “‘a laundry list of wrongful acts and conclusory allegations to support h[is]
theory of a conspiracy,’” are patently “‘insufficient to allow the case to go forward.’” Curran v.
Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
as frivolous) (quoting Richards v. Duke Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2007)). Plaintiff
also focuses heavily on his attempts at settlement, see Compl. at 13–15, 19, 27–28, but those
discussions are irrelevant to the Court, see Jones v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2004).
Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Jarrell v. Tisch,
656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987), and here, the Complaint and its addendums fail to comply
with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a pleading to contain “(1)
a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir.
2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted
so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the
doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).
Here, the Complaint is neither short nor plain, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the allegations
cannot be described as simple, concise, and direct, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1), and the paragraphs
are not limited to a single set of circumstances, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Indeed, Plaintiff’s
intended claims are “too unwieldy to proceed.” See Spence v. U.S. Dep’t of Vet. Affairs, No. 19-
cv-1947, 2022 WL 3354726, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2022) (holding that, where allegations are
presented in a “disorganized and convoluted” manner, dismissal is appropriate for that reason
alone), aff’d, 109 F.4th 531 (D.C. Cir. 2024). “Courts have often dismissed complaints that contain
bloated and disorganized allegations such as this for violations of Rule 8.” Id. (collecting cases);
see Brown, 75 F.R.D. at 499 (finding that the complaint failed to comply with Rule 8(a) and
because it was “long-winded and redundant, and hides the substance of its claims within its
prolixity. Defendants should not be forced to spend time and energy in attempting to decipher
Hamrick’s utterly confusing and lengthy pleading.”)).
Put differently, Plaintiff’s ongoing distrust of Defendants is clear, but when it comes down
to pleading actual legal claims, he presents only “threadbare recitals” that are “supported by mere
conclusory statements” which are insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint “must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of
[defendant’s] misconduct.’” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672,
681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; see Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov.2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 16 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We have never accepted ‘legal
conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations’ because a complaint needs some information
about the circumstances giving rise to the claims.”) (quoting Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16
F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
For all of these reasons, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, will be dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 5, raising conspiratorial accusations
of a “perpetuation of injustice . . . sustained for over three decades,” substantially similar to those
raised in the Complaint, will be denied for the same reasons. Accord DeLorean 88 LLC v. District
of Columbia, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2851597, at *10 (D.D.C. 2025) (denying motion for
preliminary injunction as moot when complaint was dismissed). Plaintiff’s Motion for CM/ECF
Password, ECF No. 3, Motion to Expedite Ruling, ECF No. 8, and Motion for Judicial Action,
ECF No. 10, are all denied as moot. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
TREVOR N. McFADDEN Date: November 13, 2025 United States District Judge