Harper v. Amur Equipment Finance, Inc

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-2413
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN HARPER, No. 24-2413 D.C. No. 3:22-cv-01723-YY Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* AMUR EQUIPMENT FINANCE, INC; WATSON & CHALIN MANUFACTURING, INC.; ARTISAN AND TRUCKERS CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Karin J. Immergut, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 12, 2025**

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

John Harper appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his

diversity action alleging various claims arising from an incident in which a trailer

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Harper was pulling caught fire in Wyoming. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ayla,

LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Harper’s claims against Watson &

Chalin Manufacturing, Inc (“W&C”) for lack of personal jurisdiction because

Harper failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that W&C had such continuous

and systematic contacts with Oregon as to establish general personal jurisdiction,

or sufficient claim-related contacts with Oregon to provide the court with specific

personal jurisdiction over W&C. See Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d

1015, 1020-25 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing requirements for general and specific

personal jurisdiction).

We do not consider the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Amur

Equipment Finance, Inc. and Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company, because

Harper did not address the district court’s summary judgment order in his opening

brief. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir.

2003) (explaining that “we will not consider any claims that were not actually

argued in appellant’s opening brief”); Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144

(9th Cir. 1992) (issues not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening

brief are deemed abandoned).

We reject as meritless Harper’s contention that his due process rights were

2 24-2413 violated.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-2413