Harpe v. Lawler

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedMarch 1, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-00047
StatusUnknown

This text of Harpe v. Lawler (Harpe v. Lawler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harpe v. Lawler, (N.D. Ga. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

NATHANIEL A. HARPE,

Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-CV-00047-JPB TOM LAWLER and RICHARD T. ALEXANDER,

Defendants.

ORDER This matter is before the Court on Tom Lawler and Richard T. Alexander’s (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 8] and Nathaniel A. Harpe’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Include or Allege Basis for Jurisdiction [Doc. 13]. The Court finds as follows: BACKGROUND Plaintiff is an individual who was previously incarcerated in Gwinnett County. [Doc. 7, p. 2]. Defendants were the clerks at the Superior Court of Gwinnett County who Plaintiff alleges handled his sentencing records. Id. at 4, 6. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit against Defendants on April 5, 2022,1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Doc. 4]. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants failed to accurately communicate Plaintiff’s sentence and credit for time served which resulted in

Plaintiff’s over-detention of eighteen months and nine days. [Doc. 4]. On June 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint wherein he appears to set forth additional claims against Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

[Doc. 7]. Specifically, in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to bring claims for violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, breach of ministerial duties under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-50(a) and negligent failure to comply with contractual obligations to the State of Georgia. Id.

On August 5, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity, failure to state a claim as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment § 1983 claim, insufficient service,

improper reliance on the theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability as to the individual capacity § 1983 claims, improper claims against a deceased defendant and statute of limitations. [Doc. 8-1]. Thereafter, on August 18, 2022,

1 Plaintiff’s initial Complaint was also brought against Wendy Mann, see [Doc. 4]; however, the First Amended Complaint dismisses Ms. Mann as a defendant, [Doc. 7, p.1]. Plaintiff filed a pleading titled “Second Amended Complaint” wherein Plaintiff appears to dismiss his “claim of due process violations,” adds supplemental exhibits and seeks to “clarify” some of his claims. [Doc. 11]. Plaintiff subsequently filed a “Motion to Include or Allege Basis for Jurisdiction” on

August 22, 2022. [Doc. 13]. LEGAL STANDARD “At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true,

and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). In determining whether an action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a pleading must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although detailed factual allegations are not necessarily required, the pleading must contain more than “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Importantly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, the Court has an obligation to “liberally construe” his pleadings. Sarhan v. Mia. Dade Coll., 800 F. App’x 769, 771 (11th Cir. 2020). “This leniency, however, does not require or allow courts to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an

action.” Thomas v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 393 F. App’x 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2010). “[P]ro se litigants still must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Rodriguez v. Scott, 775 F. App’x 599, 602 (11th Cir. 2019). As such,

a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must comply with Rule 8 by making a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. ANALYSIS Construing Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally and looking at the substance of the

pleadings, the Court considers the First Amended Complaint to be the currently operative complaint and construes the “Second Amended Complaint” to be a supplement to the First Amended Complaint, rather than an independent,

superseding amendment. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1252 n.11 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that pleadings are judged by their substance rather than form or label). Regardless of whether the Court construes the “Second Amended

Complaint” to be a supplement to the First Amended Complaint or a superseding complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint (together, the “Supplemented First Amended Complaint”) are due to be dismissed as impermissible shotgun pleadings. As such, the Court will not address the merits of Defendants’ motion to dismiss at this time. See Magluta

v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (“We are unwilling to address and decide serious constitutional issues on the basis of this [shotgun] complaint. We could perhaps decide whether some of [the] claims were subject to dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . . Piecemeal adjudication of that kind, however, does not promote judicial efficiency.”). “Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings,” which violate Rule 8’s requirement that a complaint contain a short and plain

statement of the claim. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that shotgun pleadings “waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of

discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the courts.” Arrington v. Green, 757 F. App’x 796, 797 (11th Cir. 2018). Furthermore, [s]hotgun pleadings, whether filed by plaintiffs or defendants, exact an intolerable toll on the trial court's docket, lead to unnecessary and unchannelled discovery, and impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court's parajudicial personnel and resources. Moreover, justice is delayed for the litigants who are “standing in line,” waiting for their cases to be heard. The courts of appeals and the litigants appearing before them suffer as well.

Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356–57 (11th Cir. 2018).

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Related

Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.
187 F.3d 1271 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Anthony L. Thomas v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union
393 F. App'x 635 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Joseph Frank Lee v. Alachua County, FL
461 F. App'x 859 (Eleventh Circuit, 2012)
Eric Watkins v. Associate Warden D. Hudson
560 F. App'x 908 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)
Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Igor Shabanets
878 F.3d 1291 (Eleventh Circuit, 2018)
Karun N. Jackson v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC
898 F.3d 1348 (Eleventh Circuit, 2018)
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.
416 F.3d 1242 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)

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