Harold C. Lee v. Maranda

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedNovember 22, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-07097
StatusUnknown

This text of Harold C. Lee v. Maranda (Harold C. Lee v. Maranda) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harold C. Lee v. Maranda, (C.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

Case 2:22-cv-07097-FWS-MAR Document 12 Filed 11/22/22 Page 1 of 27 Page ID #:41

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5

6 7 HAROLD C. LEE, Case No. 2:22-cv-07097-FWS (MAR) 8 Plaintiff, 9 v. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 10 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND MARANDA, ET AL., 11 Defendant. 12 I. 13 INTRODUCTION 14 On November 10, 2022, Harold C. Lee (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed 15 the instant Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 11. For 16 the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses the SAC with leave to amend. 17 If Plaintiff desires to pursue this action, he is ORDERED to respond by 18 no later than December 23, 2022, by choosing one of the three (3) options 19 discussed in Part V, below. Further, Plaintiff is admonished that, if he fails to 20 timely respond, the Court will recommend that this action be dismissed without 21 further leave to amend and with prejudice for failure to state a claim and follow the 22 Court’s orders. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// Case 2:22-cv-07097-FWS-MAR Document 12 Filed 11/22/22 Page 2 of 27 Page ID #:42

1 II. 2 BACKGROUND 3 A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 4 On March 10, 2022, Plaintiff constructively filed1 a Complaint in the Southern 5 District of California, bringing claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) 6 against Defendants located in both the Central and Southern Districts of California. 7 Dkt. 1 at 3–5; 11. On May 31, 2022, the Southern District dismissed the Complaint 8 with leave to amend. Dkt. 5. On July 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed the First Amended 9 Complaint (“FAC”), which omitted the claims brought against the Defendant located 10 in the Southern District. Dkt. 6. Accordingly, on September 29, 2022, the Southern 11 District ordered that the action be transferred to the Central District. Dkt. 7. The 12 Central District received the case file on October 4, 2022. Dkt. 8. 13 On October 18, 2022, the Court dismissed the FAC with leave to amend. Dkt. 14 10. On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant SAC. Dkt. 11. 15 B. SUMMARY OF THE SAC 16 Plaintiff brings three (3) claims against a single Defendant, Correctional Officer 17 Maranda, stemming from events at Lancaster State Prison in May 2021. Dkt. 11 at 2– 18 56. Plaintiff’s allegations are similar to those in his FAC, with a few key additions and 19 omissions: 20 On May 17, 2021, Plaintiff informed Defendant Maranda that he was going to 21 “file an appeal against him for allowing inmates to deliver his Trust Account 22 Statement, and other U.S. mail.” Id. at 3. Maranda became hostile and threatened to 23 have Plaintiff removed from the housing unit for complaining. Id. 24 On May 26, 2021, Defendant Maranda was assigned to the floor unit, and 25 Correctional Officer Tapia was assigned to the control gun tower. Id. at 3–4 . 26 27 1 Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se inmate gives prison authorities a pleading to mail to court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on the date it is signed. Roberts v. 28 Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating the “mailbox rule applies to § 1983 suits filed by pro se prisoners”). 2 Case 2:22-cv-07097-FWS-MAR Document 12 Filed 11/22/22 Page 3 of 27 Page ID #:43

1 Protocol mandated that two officers remain on the floor at all times, or the building 2 could not be released for daily activity. Id. Tapia had left to use the restroom just 3 before the p.m. yard was due to be released. Id. Pursuant to protocol, Maranda 4 should have waited until Tapia returned to his post before releasing the p.m. yard. 5 Id. Instead, Maranda violated protocol by going up to the control gun tower to 6 release the p.m. yard himself, leaving just one officer on the floor. Id. 7 When the p.m. yard was released, a couple of inmates began fighting 15 feet 8 away from Plaintiff. Id. at 4. Presumably in a failed attempt to quell the fight, 9 Maranda shot Plaintiff in the chest. Id. Plaintiff had nothing to do with the fight the 10 other inmates were having. Id. 11 Plaintiff appears to allege Maranda: 12 (1) used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment rights by 13 shooting Plaintiff in the chest; 14 (2) retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment by 15 threatening to remove him from the housing unit using excessive force 16 against Plaintiff; and 17 (3) violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and/or due 18 process rights. 19 Id. at 4–6. Plaintiff seeks damages totaling $2,500,000. Id. at 6. 20 III. 21 STANDARD OF REVIEW 22 Where a plaintiff is incarcerated, a court must screen the complaint under 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915A and is required to dismiss the case at any time if it concludes the 24 action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, 25 or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 26 U.S.C. § 1915A; see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 27 A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim “where there is no 28 cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a 3 Case 2:22-cv-07097-FWS-MAR Document 12 Filed 11/22/22 Page 4 of 27 Page ID #:44

1 cognizable legal theory.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2007). In 2 considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all of the 3 material factual allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892–93 (9th Cir. 4 2011). However, a court need not accept as true “allegations that are merely 5 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 6 Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint 7 need not include detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, 8 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cook v. 9 Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 10 A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 11 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint “must 12 contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 13 opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th 14 Cir. 2011). 15 “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and a ‘pro se complaint, 16 however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 17 pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Woods, 525 F.3d at 889–90. However, liberal 18 construction should only be afforded to “a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” Neitzke v. 19 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), and a court need not accept as true 20 “unreasonable inferences or assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 21 factual allegations,” Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 22 If a court finds the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, a 23 court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 24 F.3d 1122, 1126–30 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Harold C. Lee v. Maranda, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harold-c-lee-v-maranda-cacd-2022.