Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City

2000 UT App 031, 997 P.2d 321, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 2000 Utah App. LEXIS 12, 2000 WL 146794

• Court: Court of Appeals of Utah
• Decided: February 10, 2000
• Docket: 981628-CA
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

BILLINGS, Judge:

¶ 1 Harmon City, Inc. (Harmon) challenges the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for Draper City (Draper). We affirm.

¶ 2 Harmon bought 10.277 acres (the property) within the Draper city limits. Harmon purchased the property to build a twenty-four hour, 71,700-square-foot grocery store, a 13,300-square-foot drug store, and a 16,-500-square-foot “in-line tenant space.” When Harmon bought the property, it was zoned RR-43 for residential/agricultural use. Although the property fell within an area designated for mixed use in Draper’s General Plan, Harmon’s project was not compatible with the RR-43 zoning classification.

¶ 3 Therefore, in November, 1997, Harmon applied to Draper asking that the property be rezoned to C-2,¹ under which the property would fall within a “neighborhood commercial district.”² Harmon supplemented its application with documentation by experts in land development. Harmon submitted its application to the Draper Planning Commission, which considered Harmon’s request and ultimately recommended that the city council approve it.

¶ 4 On February 3, 1998, the city council considered Harmon’s application. The council heard comments from a Harmon representative, the planning commission, and interested citizens. Many of the comments were positive, however, some citizens expressed concern about having a large, twenty-four-hour grocery store in the primarily residential neighborhood because of the increased traffic and other safety concerns. After considering the planning commission’s recommendation, as well as comments from the public, the city council voted to deny Harmon’s requested zoning reclassification from RR-43 to C-2.

¶ 5 On March 4, 1998, Harmon filed an appeal in the district court. Both sides moved for summary judgment based on the record created before the city council. In its decision- granting summary judgment for Draper, the trial court, with our emphasis, stated, “So long as it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare, this Court will uphold the city’s zoning decision.” The court noted that it was “satisfied that there is sufficient basis in the record to support Draper City Council’s denial of plaintiffs application for rezoning. Accordingly, the court cannot find that the city council’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.”

¶ 6 Harmon appeals, arguing that the trial court incorrectly relied on the “reasonably debatable” standard of review. Harmon ar-' gues that the trial court should have applied the “substantial evidence” standard, and that, under that standard, the court should have concluded that there was not substantial evidence to support the council’s denial of the rezoning application. Harmon thus asks that we reverse the trial court’s decision.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 When reviewing a city council’s decision not to change the zoning classification of property, we presume that the decision is valid and “determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.” Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1999).³ At issue is the meaning of arbitrary and capricious in the context of Draper’s decision not to change the zoning classification of the property. This is a legal issue which we review for correctness. See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 22, 979 P.2d 332.

I. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard

¶ 8 Judicial review of land use decisions by municipalities and counties has always been limited in this state to some formulation of the arbitrary, capricious, or illegal standard.⁴ However, the deference that we have historically granted to land use decisions under this standard has varied depending on whether the decision-making body is acting in a legislative capacity or an administrative/adjudicative capacity.⁵

¶ 9 In addressing the issues presented here, it is important to recognize that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act.⁶ Review of a municipality’s legislative action has always been highly deferential in Utah. In Marshall v. Salt Lake City, for example, plaintiffs challenged a city’s legislative enactment of a zoning ordinance dividing the city into districts and specifying permitted uses within districts. See 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 705-06 (1943). The trial court granted judgment against the city, but the supreme court reversed, stating that it would uphold the zoning ordinance “if it could promote the general welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare.” Id. at 709 (emphasis added).

¶ 10 The court enunciated a similarly deferential meaning of “arbitrary” in Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (1953). In Dowse, a case factually similar to the present case, Salt Lake City had denied a landowner’s petition to rezone his property from residential to commercial. See id. at 723. The landowner sued to have the city’s decision reversed, but the district court dismissed the landowner’s complaint. See id. at 723-24. The supreme court affirmed, noting that the city’s denial of the rezone application was not arbitrary even if, as the landowner alleged, other blocks in the neighborhood were zoned commercial and the property was located in an area unsuitable for residential use. See id. at 724. “‘This is essentially a legislative problem, and the determination may be attacked only if there is no reasonable basis therefor.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177, 181 (1949) (quoting Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 175 P.2d 542, 549 (1946))).⁷

¶ 11 In another ease strikingly similar to the present one, a corporation sought to develop a shopping center on undeveloped land in Salt Lake County. See Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 634 (1961). To develop the shopping center, the corporation needed to have the property’s zoning classification changed from residential to commercial. See id. Although the county’s planning commission recommended that the county commission (the county’s legislative body) adopt the proposed zoning classification amendment, the county commission voted to deny the corporation’s application after a public hearing. See id. at 634-35. The corporation sued the county in district court seeking to have the court compel the county to adopt the corporation’s application for the zoning reclassification. See id. The trial court entered judgment for the corporation and ordered the county to adopt the zoning amendment. See id. at 634.

¶ 12 The supreme court reversed, reviewing¹ the county’s decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard. On the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Gayland court said:

In zoning, as in any legislative action, the functioning authority has wide discretion. Its action is endowed with a presumption of validity; and it is the court’s duty to resolve all doubts in favor thereof and not to interfere with the Commission’s action unless it clearly appeal's to be beyond its power; or is unconstitutional for some such reason as it deprives one of property without due process of law, or capriciously and arbitrarily infringes upon his rights therein, or is unjustly discriminatory.

Id. at 636 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

¶ 13 The Gayland court applied a standard of review essentially identical to that currently provided by statute: “The courts shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1999).

¶ 14 We conclude that the 1991 enactment of section 10-9-1001(3), which largely codifies the case law cited above, did not alter the deferential review of a municipality’s legislative zoning classification decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g., Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 252 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (“[I]f an ordinance ‘could promote the general welfare[,j or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare’ we will uphold it.” (citations omitted)).

¶ 15 We conclude that the Utah Legislature did not adopt a one-size-fits-all standard of review for legislative and administrative/adjudicative functions when it codified the “arbitrary, capricious, or illegal” language of section 10-9-1001. The Legislature uses “arbitrary and capricious” to define both review of adjudicative actions by a board of adjustments, see Utah Code Ann. § 10 — 9— 708(2) (1999) (“[T]he plaintiff may only allege that the board of adjustment’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.”), and review of legislative actions of a municipality, see id. § 10-9-1001(3). However, the Legislature has provided for judicial review under the substantial evidence standard only for adjudicative functions. See id. § 10-9-708(6) (“The court shall affirm the decision of the board of adjustment if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.”). These different standards of review, both described generally as arbitrary and capricious, exactly mirror the case law prior to the 1991 statutory enactment.⁸

¶ 16 Harmon cites a number of cases to support its argument that we should review the Draper City Council’s legislative zoning decision under the substantial evidence standard. However, those cases are inapposite in that each involves a municipality acting in an administrative quasi-judicial capacity. Moreover, the bulk of those cases address decisions of a board of adjustment.⁹ The distinction between quasi-judicial decisions of a board of adjustment as opposed to legislative municipal zoning decisions is significant: boards of adjustment have no legislative powers and are not permitted to have those powers. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 220 (Utah 1992); Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. Sandy City, 879 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Utah Ct.App.1994).

¶ 17 In light of the case law prior to the 1991 enactment of the current zoning statute, we read sections 10-9-1001 and 10-9-708 as embracing the historical distinction between administrative and legislative functions for the purpose of judicial review. We therefore conclude that the district court properly applied the “reasonably debatable” standard of review in this case.

¶ 18 We also reach this conclusion because the distinction between a municipality’s legislative and administrative functions rests on an important principle: It is a legislative body’s prerogative to determine public policy, a judicial body’s job to interpret the policy, and an administrative body’s job to enforce the policy. Establishing zoning classifications reflects a legislative policy decision with which courts will not interfere except in the most extreme cases. Indeed, we have found no Utah case, nor a case from any other jurisdiction, in which a zoning classification was reversed on grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious.

¶ 19 The dissent suggests that, for purposes of judicial review, our supreme court abandoned the distinction between the legislative and administrative acts of a municipality in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332. In Springville Citizens, the court stated: “A municipality’s land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at ¶ 24 (citation omitted). We conclude that the supreme court did not intend, with that broad statement, to abandon the case law cited above. We are not convinced, from reviewing the facts relied on by the court in its opinion, that the supreme court was reviewing in Springville Citizens what it viewed as a legislative act.¹⁰

¶ 20 First, the plaintiffs in Springville Citizens sought judicial review of the city’s decision to approve a planned unit development (PUD) rather than reclassification of the zoning district. See id. at ¶¶2-10.¹¹ Second, the plaintiffs in Springville Citizens argued that the PUD approval was arbitrary and capricious because the city failed to follow its own mandatory ordinances. See id. at ¶ 19. Those ordinances limited the discretion of the city council and planning commission by requiring them to consider evidence in particular documents when they made their respective decisions. See id. We can discern no claim in Springville Citizens that the city’s actions were arbitrary and capricious with respect to statutory requirements as opposed to those imposed by ordinance.

¶21 We therefore do not believe that Springville Citizens controls our decision as to whether Draper’s decision not to rezone property was arbitrary and capricious under Utah’s zoning statute. That statute places no requirement on a municipality to justify its zoning classifications by substantial evidence.

¶22 We recognize that the city council’s approval of the PUD in Springville Citizens culminated in “adoption of an ordinance amending the City’s zoning map.” 1999 UT 25, ¶ 2, 979 P.2d 332. Furthermore, we recognize that some authorities, including those cited in the dissent, conclude that PUD approval is a legislative act. We note, however, that those authorities concluding that PUD approval was legislative went on to apply the highly deferential fairly debatable review appropriate to legislative acts.¹²

¶ 23 Moreover, in cases deciding whether PUD approval is legislative or administrative, the distinction is based upon the extent to which a municipality’s PUD enabling ordinance limits the municipality’s discretion over PUD approval.¹³ As noted above, the plaintiffs’ claims in Springville Citizens were based on the city’s ordinances limiting the discretion of the city council and planning commission by requiring them to consider certain information. See Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 19, 979 P.2d 332. Because the supreme court reviewed Spring-ville’s actions under the substantial evidence standard, we conclude that the supreme court found the city’s discretion limited by its PUD enabling ordinance and therefore viewed the city’s actions as administrative. Thus, although the city council of Springville chose to approve the PUD by an ordinance amending its zoning map, see id. at ¶ 2, we conclude that this procedure did not change an administrative act into a legislative one.¹⁴

¶ 24 Finally, we note that the supreme court cited Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App.1995), for the proposition that approval of the PUD had to be supported by substantial evidence. See Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 24, 979 P.2d 332. Patterson involved judicial review of a county board of adjustment’s decision, an administrative decision that, by statute, is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708(6) (1999). We do not think that the supreme court intended to sweep aside the long-standing distinction between a municipality’s legislative and administrative acts by citing to a case controlled by a statute inapposite to review of legislative zoning decisions.

¶ 25 We conclude that our supreme court did not intend to abandon the deferential “reasonably debatable” standard of review for a municipality’s legislative action such as a zoning decision. Absent a clearer command from our supreme court, we decline to require Draper to justify by substantial evidence its purely legislative act of denying a requested change in zoning classification. In sum, we conclude that the district court was correct in using the “reasonably debatable” standard in reviewing the city council’s refusal to rezone Harmon’s property.

II. Public Clamor Doctrine

¶ 26 Next, Harmon argues that its application to rezone the property was denied because the Draper City Council improperly relied on “public clamor.” See Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 711-12 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (city’s decision to deny a conditional use permit arbitrary and capricious where the city relied solely on “public clamor”). In relying on Davis County, however, Harmon incorrectly equates review of the administrative decision to deny a conditional use permit with review of a legislative act. Although both actions are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a city may rely on the concerns of interested citizens when performing-legislative functions. See Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 634 (1961).

¶ 27 In Gayland, the court discussed the information that a legislative body may consider when exercising its legislative authority to classify zoning districts:

In support of its contention that the refusal to approve its application was an arbitrary deprivation of its property rights, plaintiff argues that the Commission [i.e., the legislative body] improperly heard, considered and based its determination on protests and representations voiced by people representing jealous business interests in the general area. We do not see any impropriety in the Commission receiving and taking into account any information they had to offer bearing on the problem under consideration.

It is important to keep in mind that such a hearing is not of the same character as a trial, nor even of an administrative hearing or other legal proceeding, and is not limited by formal rules of procedure or evidence as they are. In pursuing its authority to zone the county the Commission is performing a legislative function. It has the responsibility of advising itself of all pertinent facts as a basis for determining what is in the public interest in that regard. For this reason it is entirely appropriate to hold public hearings and to allow any interested parties it desires to give information and to present their ideas on the matter. But this is by no means the only source from which the commissioners may obtain such information. From the fact that they hold such public offices it is to be assumed that they have wide knowledge of the various conditions and activities in the county bearing on the question of proper zoning, such as the location of businesses, schools, roads and traffic conditions, growth in population and housing, the capacity of utilities, the existing classification of surrounding property, and the effect that the proposed reclassification may have on these things and upon the general orderly development of the county. In performing their duty it is both their privilege and obligation to take into consideration their own knoivledge of such matters and also to gather available pertinent information from all possible sources and give consideration to it in making their determination.

Id. at 635-36 (emphasis added). As Gayland points out, the public clamor doctrine has no application when a legislative body acts in a legislative capacity.¹⁵ We thus conclude that the Draper City Council was not required to disregard the concerns of its electorate — or its own concerns — when performing in a legislative capacity.

III. Plaintiffs Burden

¶ 28 As the dissent explains, Harmon presented ample information to the city council that would have justified Harmon’s requested change in zoning classification. However, in attacking the city’s action, Harmon’s burden was not to show that the city council had no reason to deny Harmon’s application to rezone the property to commercial. Rather, the burden was on Harmon to show that the city’s decision to preserve the status quo, i.e., its decision not to change the zoning classification of the property, was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. That is, plaintiff had to show that the use of the property for residential purposes could not promote the general welfare. See Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 252 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (noting that court will uphold zoning classification if it “could promote the general welfare”). Although Harmon presented evidence to support the position that the proposed rezone was reasonable, the city council, upon the record before it, could have reasonably concluded that use of the property for residential purposes consistent with the current zoning status was entirely appropriate.¹⁶ We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision to uphold this legislative act of the Draper City Council,

CONCLUSION

¶29 The trial court correctly applied the reasonably debatable standard of review to Draper’s legislative decision not to change the zoning classification of Harmon’s property. We do not doubt that the city would have been justified in relying on the extensive documentation that Harmon presented had it decided to rezone the property. However, Harmon has failed to show that the present zoning of the property for residential use could not promote the general welfare. We therefore affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Draper.

¶30 I CONCUR: GREGORY K ORME, Judge.

1 . The stated purpose of the proposed C-2 Neighborhood Commercial District is:

To provide areas, in appropriate locations where convenience buying outlets may be established to serve surrounding residential neighborhoods. The regulations of this district are designed to promote a combination of retail and service facilities, which in character and scale, are necessary to meet day-to-day needs of area residents.

Staff Report to Draper Planning Commission, Draper Gateway Zone Change and Conditional Use Permit, at 2 (Jan. 2, 1998).

2 . Concurrent with its rezoning application, Harmon also applied for a conditional use permit. At the time the planning commission voted to recommend that the city council approve ■ the rezoning request, the commission also voted to approve the conditional use permit. During the meeting at which the city council considered the rezoning, an appeal of the planning commission's approval of the conditional use permit was also on the ágenda. However, when the city council rejected the rezoning request, the council declined to consider the appeal of the conditional use permit because the permit depended on the rezoning.

3 ."Although [section 10-9-1001] expressly applies only to the district court, 'the standard for our review ... is the same standard established in the Utah Code for the district court’s review.' ” Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207, 210 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998) (quoting Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah Ct.App. 1995)); see also Spring-ville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 22, 979 P.2d 332.

4 . See, e.g., Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1984) (reviewing decision by board of adjustment under arbitrary and capricious standard); Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 636 (1961) ("[I]t is the court's duty ... not to interfere with the Commission's action unless it ... capriciously and arbitrarily infringes upon [property] rights.”); Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 709 (1943) ("Unless the action of such body is arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, or clearly offends some provision of the constitution or statute, the court must uphold it.”).

5 . Compare Marshall, 141 P.2d at 709 (stating, in reviewing a legislative zoning action: “If a [zoning] classification is reasonably doubtful, the judgment of the court will not be substituted for the judgment of the city.” (emphasis added)), with Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1035 (stating that, in reviewing a board of adjustment’s adjudicative action: "[The trial court's] role was limited to determining whether there was evidence in the record to support the Board of Adjustment’s action.” (emphasis added)).

6 . See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992); see also Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988) ("the passage of general zoning ordinances and the determination of zoning policy [are] properly vested in the legislative branch.”); Gayland, 358 P.2d at 635-36 ("In pursuing its authority to zone, ... the Commission is performing a legislative function.”). Additionally, the legislative process is inherently political in nature and requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interests of all concerned in furtherance of the general welfare. See, e.g., Marshall, 141 P.2d at 709-10 (noting varied interests considered in creating zoning plan).

7 .In Walker v. Brigham City, 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993), the supreme court said that a municipality's legislative decision would be upheld under the arbitrary and capricious standard unless "wholly discordant to reason and justice.” Id. at 349. In Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976), the supreme court, reviewing a challenge to a rezoning by the Salt Lake County Commission, observed that "[i]n the review of zoning cases the function of the court is narrow and its scope is limited to a determination of whether or not the action of the Board of County Commissioners as a legislative body is illegal, arbitrary, or capricious.” Id. at 1151-52. The court deferred to the legislative body and upheld the rezoning as enacted "pursuant to a planning scheme developed for that portion of the county.” Id. at 1152. The supreme court likewise upheld a rezoning, this one passed by a municipality’s legislative body, in Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966). In Naylor, the court stated that the city’s action was not arbitrary and capricious unless "there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it.” Id. at 766.

8 . See, e.g., Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1035 (court's role under arbitrary and capricious standard is "determining whether there was evidence in the record to support the Board of Adjustment’s action”); Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 708 n. 5, 711 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (where city council sits as a board of adjustment, decision to deny conditional use permit is arbitrary where reasons for denial lack sufficient factual basis).

9 . For example, Brown v. Sandy City Board’ of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct.App.1998), reviews a municipal board of adjustment’s administrative interpretation of the municipality's zoning ordinance. See id. at 208. Likewise, Wells v. Board, of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp., 936 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct.App.1997), reviews a board of adjustment’s decision denying a zoning variance. See id. at 1103; see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Utah 1990) (reviewing administrative evaluation for property tax purposes); Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133, 1134 (Utah 1986) (reviewing administrative procedures for processing zoning variance requests); Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1033 (reviewing board of adjustments' denial of zoning variance); Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603 (reviewing county board of adjustment’s approval of special exception to zoning ordinance); Davis County, 756 P.2d at 705 (reviewing city council’s denial of conditional use permit).

10 . f the Springville Citizens decision represented the clear departure from prior precedent that is claimed in the dissent, even if that departure were necessitated by legislative enactment, it would be extraordinary, indeed, for the court not to say so and to explain in some detail why such an unprecedented result was in order. We find it instructive that there is no such discussion in the opinion.

11 .The dissent suggests that Springville Citizens involved a zoning reclassification because part of the land at issue in that case was zoned RA-1-20,000, a classification permitting only residential and agricultural uses. The remainder of the land was classified H-l. In its slip opinion, the district court surmised that the developers chose to develop the land as a PUD rather than a subdivision because, under its present classification, land zoned H-l could be developed as a PUD but not as a subdivision. See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, No. 960400547, slip op., at 3-4 & n. 6 (Dist.Ct.Utah Sept. 5, 1997). Thus the H-l zoning classification was more restrictive than the RA-1-20,000 classification; the latter could have been developed as either a PUD or a subdivision, but the former could be developed only as a PUD. The developer therefore did not require a new zoning classification but rather required approval for the proposed PUD under the existing zoning classification.

In any event, in interpreting Springville Citizens, we do not think it proper to look beyond the facts relied upon by the supreme court in its published opinion, which makes no reference to either zoning classification.

12 . See, e.g., State ex rel. Helujon, Ltd. v. Jefferson County, 964 S.W.2d 531, 536 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (reviewing PUD approval under arbitrary and capricious standard, "meaning ... fairly debatable"); see also Native Sun/Lyon Communities v. City of Escondido, 15 Cal.App.4th 892, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 344, 354 (1993) (“It is the settled law of this state 'that zoning ordinances, whatever the size of the parcel affected, are legislative acts.’ Legislative acts, of course, do not require findings.” (emphasis added; citations omitted)).

13 . Compare Todd Mart, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Webster, 49 A.D.2d 12, 370 N.Y.S.2d 683, 689-90 (N.Y.App.Div.1975) (holding PUD approval Iegis-lative because municipality's discretion under PUD enabling ordinance was no less broad than its discretion under statute), with McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633, 639 (Tenn.1990) (holding PUD approval administrative because PUD enabling ordinance limited city council’s discretion over PUD approval).

14 .We do admit that Springville Citizens can reasonably be read otherwise. However, we conclude that, because the nature of the claim in Springville Citizens is less than clear, we should read Springville Citizens ' application of the standard of review as consistent with longstanding Utah common law and as supported by good public policy, rather than as a dramatic break from prior precedent where no such intention is expressed in the opinion.

15 . Nor should "public clamor” be equated with public comment. "Clamor” is a more subjective term, connoting a degree of irrationality or emotion. See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 414 (1993) (defining "clamor” as “the loud and continued uproar of many human voicesf;] a loud continued and usu[ally] confused noise”). Its synonyms include hubbub, rumpus, tumult, and din. See id.

16 . Harmon’s argument fails for the additional reason that, through this suit, it seeks to enforce Draper’s master plan. By statute, a city’s master plan is advisory unless made mandatory by the ciiy. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-303(6) (1999). Harmon has not argued that the Draper master plan is mandatory and not advisory. We might reach a different conclusion had Draper legislatively limited its discretion in zoning matters by making its master plan mandatory. Cf. Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, ¶¶ 28-30, 979 P.2d 332 (holding municipality bound to follow its own mandatory ordinances).

1 . The General Plan describes Mixed Use (Planned Development) zoning as follows:

The mixture of uses within this category should include master planned developments consisting of office, light manufacturing, retail, residential, and recreation and open space components. These areas are envisioned as providing for a compatible mix of residential and non-residential uses in well-planned activity centers, that promote day and evening use. The mix of land uses may vary from location to location. The size of individual projects may vary, however, each development must respect surrounding parcels....

Land Use Element, Draper, Utah, General Plan § 6(a) (1996). The General Plan further states: "Generally, the types of uses encouraged in [Mixed Use] areas include auto dealerships, corporate and speculative offices, lodging facilities, regional commercial centers, clean manufacturing facilities, a variety of residential densities, convention facilities, service retail, movie and live theaters, and other similar activities.” Id. § 6(c).

The General Plan specifically notes that the area around 700 East and 11400 South "would be appropriate for smaller-scale mix-use development which respects the neighborhood character within the area.” Id. § 6(b).