J-A10013-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.0.P. 65.37
DANA HARLEY AND PAUL P. BUTLER) : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
V.
RIDERS’ CLUB COOPERATIVE AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPEAL OF: PAUL P. BUTLER : No. 3651 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2016-01325
DANA HARLEY AND PAUL P. BUTLER) : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
Vv. RIDERS’ CLUB COOPERATIVE AND
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPEAL OF: RIDERS’ CLUB : COOPERATIVE : No. 3680 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2016-01325
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MCLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM*, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JUNE 21, 2018 Appellants, Paul P. Butler and Riders’ Club Cooperative (“RCC”), appeal from the order entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, in this declaratory judgment action. We
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A10013-18
affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history. Therefore, we have no need to restate them. We add that on November 2, 2017, Appellant Butler and Appellant RCC timely filed separate notices of appeal. The trial court ordered Appellant RCC on November 8, 2017, and Appellant Butler on November 9, 2017, to file respective concise statements of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); both Appellants timely complied on November 29, 2017. This Court consolidated the appeals on February 16, 2018.
Appellant Butler raises one issue for our review:
WHEN A MEMBER PARTICIPANT OF A RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENT IS OPERATING A VEHICLE AS PART OF THE ARRANGEMENT AS DEFINED IN THE [RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS] ACT, 55 P.S. § 695.1 ET SEQ....AND IS INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT MAY THE MEMBER’S INSURANCE COMPANY ENFORCE A HIRED CAR EXCLUSION TO DENY COVERAGE TO THE MEMBER AND THOSE WHO CLAIM INJURY ARISING OUT OF THE ACCIDENT, WHEN THE AFORESAID [RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS] ACT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT SUCH EXCLUSIONS SHALL NOT APPLY TO A VEHICLE USED IN A RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENT[?]
(Appellant Butler’s Brief at 5). Appellant RCC raises two issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED/ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [APPELLANT RCC]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND HOLDING THAT THE VEHICLE IN WHICH THE ACCIDENT AT ISSUE OCCURRED COULD NOT BE DEEMED TO BE “OPERATED BY” [APPELLANT RCC], SO AS TO BRING IT WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS ACT, 55 [P.S.] § 695.1 ET
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SEQ., BECAUSE THE MEMBER-DRIVER OPERATING THE VEHICLE WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, AND NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF [APPELLANT RCC], IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY STATUTORY LANGUAGE OR CASE AUTHORITY DICTATING SUCH A CONCLUSION?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED/ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [APPELLANT RCC]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND HOLDING THAT THE EXCLUSION FOR “CAR FOR HIRE” SITUATIONS IN [APPELLANT BUTLER’S] STATE FARM INSURANCE POLICY IS ENFORCEABLE, NOTWITHSTANDING CLEAR LANGUAGE IN THE RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS ACT, 55 [P.S.] § 695.5, THAT “PROVISIONS IN AN INSURANCE POLICY WHICH DENY COVERAGE FOR ANY MOTOR VEHICLE USED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES OR AS A PUBLIC OR LIVERY CONVEYANCE SHALL NOT APPLY TO A VEHICLE USED INA RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENT“?
(Appellant RCC’s Brief at 4).
Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 908 A.2d 344, 347 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on
facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing
and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its
discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies
the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking
reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it
does not follow legal procedure. Miller v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 753 A.2d 829, 832 (Pa.Super. 2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Our scope of review is
plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa. 407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001),
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct. 2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002). In
-3- J-A10013-18
reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment,
[W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of action. Summary judgment is proper if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense, which could be established by additional discovery or expert report and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.
Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.
Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Steven C.
Tolliver, Sr., we conclude Appellants’ issues merit no relief. The trial court
-4- J-A10013-18
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented.
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J-A10013-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.0.P. 65.37
DANA HARLEY AND PAUL P. BUTLER) : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
V.
RIDERS’ CLUB COOPERATIVE AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPEAL OF: PAUL P. BUTLER : No. 3651 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2016-01325
DANA HARLEY AND PAUL P. BUTLER) : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
Vv. RIDERS’ CLUB COOPERATIVE AND
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPEAL OF: RIDERS’ CLUB : COOPERATIVE : No. 3680 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2016-01325
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MCLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM*, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JUNE 21, 2018 Appellants, Paul P. Butler and Riders’ Club Cooperative (“RCC”), appeal from the order entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, in this declaratory judgment action. We
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A10013-18
affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history. Therefore, we have no need to restate them. We add that on November 2, 2017, Appellant Butler and Appellant RCC timely filed separate notices of appeal. The trial court ordered Appellant RCC on November 8, 2017, and Appellant Butler on November 9, 2017, to file respective concise statements of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); both Appellants timely complied on November 29, 2017. This Court consolidated the appeals on February 16, 2018.
Appellant Butler raises one issue for our review:
WHEN A MEMBER PARTICIPANT OF A RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENT IS OPERATING A VEHICLE AS PART OF THE ARRANGEMENT AS DEFINED IN THE [RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS] ACT, 55 P.S. § 695.1 ET SEQ....AND IS INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT MAY THE MEMBER’S INSURANCE COMPANY ENFORCE A HIRED CAR EXCLUSION TO DENY COVERAGE TO THE MEMBER AND THOSE WHO CLAIM INJURY ARISING OUT OF THE ACCIDENT, WHEN THE AFORESAID [RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS] ACT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT SUCH EXCLUSIONS SHALL NOT APPLY TO A VEHICLE USED IN A RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENT[?]
(Appellant Butler’s Brief at 5). Appellant RCC raises two issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED/ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [APPELLANT RCC]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND HOLDING THAT THE VEHICLE IN WHICH THE ACCIDENT AT ISSUE OCCURRED COULD NOT BE DEEMED TO BE “OPERATED BY” [APPELLANT RCC], SO AS TO BRING IT WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS ACT, 55 [P.S.] § 695.1 ET
-2- J-A10013-18
SEQ., BECAUSE THE MEMBER-DRIVER OPERATING THE VEHICLE WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, AND NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF [APPELLANT RCC], IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY STATUTORY LANGUAGE OR CASE AUTHORITY DICTATING SUCH A CONCLUSION?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED/ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [APPELLANT RCC]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND HOLDING THAT THE EXCLUSION FOR “CAR FOR HIRE” SITUATIONS IN [APPELLANT BUTLER’S] STATE FARM INSURANCE POLICY IS ENFORCEABLE, NOTWITHSTANDING CLEAR LANGUAGE IN THE RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS ACT, 55 [P.S.] § 695.5, THAT “PROVISIONS IN AN INSURANCE POLICY WHICH DENY COVERAGE FOR ANY MOTOR VEHICLE USED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES OR AS A PUBLIC OR LIVERY CONVEYANCE SHALL NOT APPLY TO A VEHICLE USED INA RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENT“?
(Appellant RCC’s Brief at 4).
Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 908 A.2d 344, 347 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on
facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing
and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its
discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies
the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking
reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it
does not follow legal procedure. Miller v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 753 A.2d 829, 832 (Pa.Super. 2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Our scope of review is
plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa. 407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001),
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct. 2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002). In
-3- J-A10013-18
reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment,
[W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of action. Summary judgment is proper if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense, which could be established by additional discovery or expert report and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.
Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.
Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Steven C.
Tolliver, Sr., we conclude Appellants’ issues merit no relief. The trial court
-4- J-A10013-18
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed October 4, 2017, at 8-15) (finding: sole consideration is whether Appellant Butler was acting as independent contractor at time of accident; Appellant Butler was not officer or employee of Appellant RCC; Appellant Butler’s membership in Appellant RCC is irrelevant to whether Appellant Butler acted as agent or independent contractor of Appellant RCC; Appellant Butler’s actions as independent contractor cannot be imputed to Appellant RCC; Appellant RCC did not operate Appellant Butler’s vehicle via directives to or communications with Appellant Butler; Appellant RCC’s only role was to ask Appellant Butler if he was available to drive Mses. McDonald and Harley to specific location on specific date at specific time for fee; Appellant RCC did not dictate routes and/or speed or any other aspect of incident; Appellant RCC had no other role except to collect and distribute fees paid for ride; Appellant RCC’s Member Agreement, Additional Memorandum of Understanding, payment structure, and lack of control over activities of member drivers all indicate drivers are independent contractors; drivers’ independent contractor status shields Appellant RCC from liability in event of accident; Appellant RCC designed its service to avoid potential legal liabilities, including respondeat superior tort liability, obligation to pay payroll taxes, and other responsibilities flowing from master-servant relationship; because Appellant RCC’s arrangement with Appellant Butler did not constitute
ridesharing agreement within meaning of Ridesharing Arrangements Act, “car
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for hire” unambiguous exclusion in Appellee’s automobile insurance policy applies in these circumstances to deny coverage and is enforceable; Appellee is legally permitted to disclaim coverage for accident and is entitled to summary judgment). The record supports the trial court’s rationale, and we see no reason to disturb it. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Es Prothonotary
Date: 6/21/18