F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 21 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
JERALD WAYNE HARJO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-7041 (D.C. No. 97-CV-82-S) GARY GIBSON, Warden, Oklahoma (E.D. Okla.) State Penitentiary; DREW EDMONDSON, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, BRORBY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder. 1 The jury found two
aggravating circumstances–the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel and the
murder was committed to avoid arrest or prosecution–and fixed punishment at
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 1 He was also convicted of first degree burglary, burglary of an automobile, and larceny of an automobile. The jury, however, found petitioner not guilty of first degree rape. death. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. See Harjo v. State ,
882 P.2d 1067 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1131
(1995). That court also denied post-conviction relief. See Harjo v. State ,
No. 96-966 (Okla. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 1997) (unpublished). The federal district
court denied habeas corpus relief, and we affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of Saturday, January 16, 1988, petitioner, who had been
drinking, rode his nephew’s bicycle to the home of the victim, sixty-four year old
Ruth Porter. Petitioner abandoned the bicycle at the side of the road. A van and
a Ford Mustang were parked in Mrs. Porter’s driveway. Petitioner took a
screwdriver from the van. He piled two cinder blocks under a back bedroom
window and, using the screwdriver, removed the screen from the window and
entered the home.
Petitioner found a pillowcase, tore two eye holes in it, and placed it over
his head. Then, he entered Mrs. Porter’s bedroom, where she was asleep. When
she awakened, petitioner got scared and put a pillow over her face. He also
strangled her with his hands and burned her pubic hair with a cigarette lighter.
After killing Mrs. Porter, petitioner took the keys to the Mustang and drove
it to his brother’s home. On Sunday, Mrs. Porter’s son-in-law found her body
and reported the murder. That afternoon, Wewoka Police Officer Blankenship
-2- saw the Mustang, which the police had been looking for, parked at petitioner’s
brother’s home. Officer Blankenship questioned petitioner after giving him
Miranda 2 warnings. Petitioner denied taking the car and provided another officer
with the names of two others who allegedly took the car. A roadblock was set up
but these two were never located. Sheriff Sisco took petitioner to the sheriff’s
office for questioning. The sheriff read petitioner Miranda warnings, and
petitioner signed a waiver of rights. After over two hours of questioning, and
petitioner changing his story, he confessed to the crimes.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Because petitioner filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, it applies to this appeal.
See Williams v. Taylor , 120 S. Ct. 1479, 1486 (2000). Petitioner will not be
entitled to habeas relief unless he can establish that a habeas claim adjudicated by
the state courts “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established” Supreme Court precedent, or
“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), (2).
2 Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-3- Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.
Williams v. Taylor , 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). This court will presume the
correctness of state court findings of fact, unless petitioner is able to rebut that
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
“If[, however, a] claim was not heard on the merits by the state courts, and
the federal district court made its own determination in the first instance, we
review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact, if
any, for clear error.” LaFevers v. Gibson , 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
I. HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, OR CRUEL AGGRAVATOR
Petitioner argues the evidence was insufficient to support the heinous,
atrocious, or cruel aggravator because the evidence did not show Mrs. Porter
consciously suffered torture or serious physical abuse. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals determined sufficient evidence existed to support this
aggravator: “[petitioner] strangled and suffocated Mrs. Porter with his bare
hands. She sustained scratches and bruises on her face, chest, arms and vaginal
-4- area. Her lower denture was displaced; her windpipe crushed. Her pubic hair
was singed. Mrs. Porter struggled prior to her death.” Harjo , 882 P.2d at 1078.
“Under Oklahoma law, the torture or serious physical abuse required by the
properly narrowed [heinous, atrocious, or cruel] aggravator may include infliction
of great physical anguish or extreme mental cruelty.” Jones v. Gibson , 206 F.3d
946, 952 (10th Cir. 2000). “Conscious physical suffering of the victim must
occur before death and any extreme mental distress must result from the
petitioner’s intentional acts.” Id. at 952-53. Conscious physical suffering before
death may be proved by statements of the petitioner or any other evidence
showing the victim remained alive and conscious during the attack. See Powell v.
State , 906 P.2d 765, 782 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). Mental torture must produce
mental anguish in addition to what accompanies the underlying killing. See
Jones , 206 F.3d at 953. Analysis focuses on the petitioner’s acts and the level of
tension created by those acts. See id. Although Oklahoma law does not clearly
establish the length of time a victim must be terrorized before there is mental
torture, factors such as anticipation of harm and lack of provocation can establish
mental torture. See id. at 953-54.
Reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we
conclude a rational factfinder could have found the existence of this aggravator
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lewis v. Jeffers , 497 U.S. 764, 780-82 (1990).
-5- Although the record does not expressly establish when Mrs. Porter lost
consciousness, petitioner stated in his confession that she struggled. This shows
that she was conscious during the attack and anticipated harm and that death was
not instantaneous. See Jones , 206 F.3d at 954. We therefore conclude the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination was reasonable.
II. MITIGATING EVIDENCE OF REMORSE
Petitioner argues that he was denied his right to present mitigating
evidence of remorse. Petitioner had composed a letter to the jury expressing his
remorse for Mrs. Porter’s death and for the pain suffered by her family. Lacking
ability to verbalize his feelings, he had asked counsel to read the letter. The trial
court denied permission based upon the State’s hearsay objection. The Oklahoma
appellate court held the trial court did not deny petitioner his constitutional right
to be heard, but rather disallowed him to avoid cross-examination. See Harjo ,
882 P.2d at 1080 (distinguishing Green v. Georgia , 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per
curiam)).
The Oklahoma appellate court correctly distinguished Green . In Green , a
co-defendant had confided to a friend that he had killed the victim. The trial
court disallowed the friend’s testimony under state hearsay rules. The Supreme
Court held that, regardless of whether the proffered testimony was hearsay,
exclusion violated due process because the testimony was relevant to punishment,
-6- there was ample evidence to corroborate the confession, and the evidence was
reliable. See Green , 442 U.S. at 97; see also Paxton v. Ward , 199 F.3d 1197,
1214 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that, like in Green, excluded evidence was
highly relevant to punishment and State had considered it sufficiently reliable to
warrant dismissal of earlier charges).
Here, however, petitioner’s own statement, and not a co-defendant’s
confession, was at issue. In Green , the excluded confession tended to show the
defendant’s innocence. In this case, the statement tended to show remorse, which
petitioner had expressed in his confession, which was presented to the jury, when
he stated he did not expect the victim to die and he performed CPR in an attempt
to save her. Also, the statement here did not have the same reliability as the
confession in Green . It was not spontaneous and was not against petitioner’s
interest.
We agree with other courts that Green should not be extended to require a
state to admit a defendant’s own out-of-court words. See McGinnis v. Johnson,
181 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1999) , cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 955 (2000); Gacy v.
Welborn , 994 F.2d 305, 316 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Harvey v. Shillinger ,
76 F.3d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing right to allocution is not
constitutionally protected); United States v. Barnette , 211 F.3d 803, 820 (4th Cir.
2000) (deciding criminal defendant has no constitutional right to make unsworn
-7- statement of remorse to jury which is not subject to cross examination) .
Accordingly, we conclude the Oklahoma appellate court’s determination was not
unreasonable.
III. MURDER TO AVOID LAWFUL ARREST OR PROSECUTION
Petitioner argues the murder to avoid lawful arrest or prosecution
aggravator is unconstitutional because it applies to any person accused of
murdering a potential witness to a prior felony if there is any evidence of an
attempt by the accused to conceal his identity. Additionally, petitioner argues the
evidence was insufficient to support this aggravator, because Mrs. Porter did not
know about the other crimes at the time he killed her and she did not identify him.
The Oklahoma appellate court recognized it has consistently found this
aggravator does not create a risk of arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death penalty. See Harjo, 882 P.2d at 1080-81. It also determined the evidence
was sufficient to support this aggravator. See id. at 1078.
Instructing the jury according to the statutory language of the aggravator, as
the trial court did, meets constitutional standards. See Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d
904, 922-23 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1188 (2000); see also Davis
v. Executive Dir. of Dep’t of Corrections, 100 F.3d 750, 769-70 (10th Cir. 1996)
(determining similar Colorado aggravating circumstance was constitutional).
-8- Thus, further narrowing was not necessary, and the Oklahoma appellate court’s
determination was not unreasonable.
Oklahoma law requires that the predicate crime for this aggravator be
separate and distinct from, rather than significantly contributing to, the murder.
See Barnett v. State, 853 P.2d 226, 233-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). “To support
the finding of this aggravating circumstance, the focus is on the defendant’s
intent, whether proved by the defendant’s own statement or through
circumstantial evidence.” Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286 , 1301 (10th Cir. 2000).
Reviewing pursuant to the rational factfinder standard, see Lewis, 497 U.S.
at 780-82, we conclude the Oklahoma appellate court’s determination that there
was sufficient evidence to support this aggravator was not unreasonable.
Petitioner murdered Mrs. Porter after burglarizing her home and van. He wore a
pillow case over his head. He and Mrs. Porter knew each other. He confessed
that after she awakened and started struggling he got scared and kept smashing
the pillow into her face. Thus, as the Oklahoma appellate court determined, the
jury could have reasonably inferred petitioner feared Mrs. Porter would identify
him if he did not kill her. See Harjo , 882 P.2d at 1078.
IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
Petitioner alleges five instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel:
(1) counsel failed to adequately investigate and present additional mitigating
-9- evidence; (2) counsel failed to request additional expert assistance; (3) counsel
failed to object to improper prosecutorial comments; (4) counsel failed to object
to the removal for cause of six prospective jurors; and (5) counsel failed by the
cumulative effect of these errors.
In order to obtain habeas relief, Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984), which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals applied, requires
petitioner to establish both that his attorney’s representation was deficient and
that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. This court need not
address both components if petitioner failed to make the requisite showing for
one. See, e.g. , Cooks v. Ward , 165 F.3d 1283, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied , 120 S. Ct. 94 (1999).
A. Failure to Investigate or Present Additional Mitigating Evidence
Petitioner argues counsel should have presented additional mitigating
evidence at the sentencing stage, after reasonable investigation and preparation.
Because counsel allegedly did not ask petitioner or anyone in his family about
potential mitigation witnesses and did not try to interview possible mitigation
witnesses, petitioner contends counsel never learned he was generally a good
employee, had served for one year with honorable discharge in the National
Guard, and had been an excellent prisoner in the county jail. Petitioner believes
-10- that if this mitigating evidence had been presented, he would not have received
the death penalty.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded petitioner failed to
meet his burden of proving ineffectiveness. See Harjo , 882 P.2d at 1078. We
conclude this determination was not unreasonable.
Without deciding whether counsel’s performance was deficient, we
conclude petitioner has failed to show prejudice. None of the evidence petitioner
points to would have been particularly helpful. Although petitioner had been a
quiet, reliable employee who never caused problems and appeared to get along
well with coworkers and supervisors, he had been unemployed for six years.
During his twelve months of National Guard service, he had nine unexcused
absences. Evidence of a successful incarceration typically is used to show a
petitioner would not be a danger to the community if he was incarcerated for life.
See Boyde v. California , 494 U.S. 370, 382 n.5 (1990); Skipper v. South
Carolina , 476 U.S. 1, 4, 5 (1986). Whether petitioner would be a possible
danger is not at issue in this case, however. If all of this mitigating evidence had
been presented, it would have been insufficient to offset, explain, or justify the
murder of Mrs. Porter. See Nguyen v. Reynolds , 131 F.3d 1340, 1349 (10th Cir.
1997). There is not a reasonable probability that if the jury had considered this
-11- evidence it would have concluded the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695.
B. Expert Assistance
Petitioner contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to request
additional expert assistance. The trial court granted a request for a psychiatric
expert and authorized counsel to spend up to $750, the usual statutory maximum
amount. Petitioner maintains he needed additional expert assistance because his
mental capacity and sanity were at issue.
On post-conviction review, the Oklahoma appellate court decided the
record did not support this argument. The federal district court determined
petitioner failed to show prejudice, because petitioner was not entitled to further
expert assistance.
Nothing in the record suggests that a reasonable attorney would have
believed petitioner’s mental state or sanity could have been a significant factor at
either stage of trial. See Ake v. Oklahoma , 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985); Mayes v.
Gibson , 210 F.3d 1284, 1289 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Gibson , 197 F.3d
454, 463 (10th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed , (U.S. May 19, 2000) (No. 99-
9652). Considering the totality of the evidence, there is no reasonable
probability the jury would have determined petitioner was not guilty of murder.
See Boyd , 179 F.3d at 914. Petitioner has failed to prove additional expert
-12- testimony would have changed the outcome at sentencing. See Moore v.
Reynolds , 153 F.3d 1086, 1098 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 526 U.S. 1025
(1999). Accordingly, petitioner cannot show he was prejudiced because counsel
failed to request additional expert assistance. Cf. Trice v. Ward , 196 F.3d 1151,
1160 (10th Cir. 1999) (determining funding for expert in excess of $750 would
not have altered outcome of either phase of trial because there was no evidence
petitioner was insane at time of crimes or incompetent at trial and later evidence
of psychological problems would not have been sufficient to overcome three
aggravating factors), petition for cert. filed , (U.S. May 10, 2000) (No. 99-9518).
The state appellate court’s decision therefore was not unreasonable.
C. Improper Prosecutorial Comments
Petitioner argues counsel should have objected to prosecutorial comments
improperly defining reasonable doubt during voir dire, stating a personal opinion,
evoking sympathy for the victim and her family, misstating the evidence, and
denigrating the mitigating evidence. Generally, a prosecutor’s improper remark
will require reversal of a state conviction only where the remark sufficiently
infected the trial so as to make it fundamentally unfair, and, therefore, a denial of
due process. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo , 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). In
assessing fundamental fairness, the comment must be reviewed in the context in
which it was made and in light of the entire record. See Greer v. Miller , 483 U.S.
-13- 756, 765-66 (1987); Donnelly , 416 U.S. at 643. If the alleged prosecutorial
misconduct denied a petitioner a specific constitutional right, a habeas claim may
be established without requiring proof the entire trial was rendered fundamentally
unfair by the remark. See Paxton , 199 F.3d at 1217.
1. Voir Dire
Possibly implicating a constitutional right, petitioner argues counsel should
have objected to the prosecutor’s comment that “the Court has told you our
burden is to prove our case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court told you that
doesn’t mean beyond a shadow of doubt or beyond all doubt or one hundred
percent certain just said beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tr. vol. I at 82. On direct
criminal appeal, the Oklahoma appellate court concluded the prosecutor repeated
the trial court’s explanation of reasonable doubt. See Harjo , 882 P.2d at 1075.
This determination was not unreasonable. Thus, counsel’s failure to object was
not prejudicial.
2. Sympathy
Petitioner complains the prosecutor improperly asked for sympathy for the
victim and her family during first stage closing argument. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals decided the prosecutor merely reiterated uncontroverted
facts that Mrs. Porter was sixty-four years old when she was killed, she struggled
for her life, and she was found by her son-in-law who kept his wife from seeing
-14- her mother. See id. at 1075-76. This determination was reasonable. Further, the
evidence makes it probable the nature of the crime, strangling and suffocating an
elderly lady, produced sympathy before the prosecution made any closing
remarks. See Duvall v. Reynolds , 139 F.3d 768, 795 (10th Cir. 1998). Because
the prosecutor’s remarks did not render the trial fundamentally unfair, counsel’s
failure to object was not prejudicial.
3. Personal Opinion
Petitioner believes the prosecutor improperly expressed his opinion on
petitioner’s guilt and deserving the death penalty. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals agreed that the prosecutor exceeded his bounds and engaged in
“improper and reprehensible” conduct when he expressed his personal opinion.
Harjo , 882 P.2d at 1076. Nonetheless, the court determined the comments were
harmless because, in light of its acquittal verdict on the rape charge, the jury did
not follow the comments. See id. (citing Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18
(1967)). Accordingly, the court concluded petitioner could not show prejudice
due to counsel’s failure to object to the remarks. See id. at 1077. Petitioner has
failed to show the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably applied
Chapman , see Pickens v. Gibson , 206 F.3d 988, 996 (10th Cir. 2000), and
unreasonably determined petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
object.
-15- 4. Misrepresentation of the Evidence
Petitioner believes the prosecutor, during first stage closing argument,
invaded the province of the jury and made improper representations concerning
the forensic evidence by indicating a positive identification could be made from
hair comparisons and saliva samples. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
determined “[t]he record plainly shows the prosecutor argued inferences from the
evidence and did not misstate it.” Harjo , 882 P.2d at 1076. This determination
was not unreasonable. The prosecutor is given reasonable latitude in drawing
inferences from the evidence during closing arguments. See Duvall , 139 F.3d at
795. Because the prosecutor’s representations did not cause the trial to be
fundamentally unfair, counsel’s failure to object was not prejudicial.
5. Negating Mitigating Evidence
Without further explanation, petitioner argues the prosecutor attempted to
destroy his right to have the jury consider mitigating evidence and denigrated the
mitigating circumstances set forth in the jury’s instructions. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals held the prosecutor’s argument went to the weight of
the evidence and did not limit the evidence the jury could consider. See Harjo ,
882 P.2d at 1079. A prosecutor is permitted to comment on the weight to be
afforded mitigating evidence. See Fox , 200 F.3d at 1299-1300. The state
-16- appellate court’s denial of relief therefore was not unreasonable, and counsel’s
failure to object to the prosecutor’s remark was not prejudicial.
D. Removal of Jurors
Petitioner argues trial counsel failed to object to the removal of six jurors
for cause and did not attempt to rehabilitate these jurors. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals rejected this argument on direct appeal:
The record could not be clearer in this regard: each of the excused veniremen had been thoroughly questioned by the trial judge who made clear throughout the record that mere reservation about the death penalty did not disqualify one from service, and each stated explicitly that under no circumstance could he or she impose the death penalty. These veniremen were properly removed under Witherspoon [v. Illinois , 391 U.S. 510 (1968)]. Defense counsel did not fall below the standard of reasonable effectiveness by failing to question them further after each emphatically stated unwavering opposition to the death penalty.
Harjo , 882 P.2d at 1077. This determination was not unreasonable.
E. Cumulative Effect
Petitioner argues the cumulative effect of counsel’s deficient performance
created a risk the death sentence was arbitrary and capricious. Finding no
instance of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court concluded there
was no cumulative error. We agree. “Cumulative error analysis applies where
there are two or more actual errors; it does not apply to the cumulative effect of
non-errors.” Moore , 153 F.3d at 1113
-17- V. AKE
Petitioner argues (1) Oklahoma’s $750 maximum payment for experts
violates Ake , 470 U.S. 68, and (2) the federal district court erred in finding that
petitioner failed to make a sufficient threshold showing that his sanity or mental
capacity would be an issue at trial or sentencing. In light of our resolution of
petitioner’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request
additional expert assistance, we conclude petitioner is not entitled to relief on
this argument.
VI. ANTI-SYMPATHY INSTRUCTION
Petitioner argues the trial court effectively prohibited the jury from
considering mitigating evidence when it instructed the jury not to consider
sympathy at the second stage. On direct appeal, the Oklahoma appellate court
found the argument unsupported by the record. See Harjo , 882 P.2d at 1079.
The trial court instructed the jury at the first stage not to allow sympathy,
sentiment, or prejudice to influence its deliberations. At the second stage, the
trial court directed the jury to consider the first stage instructions where
appropriate. Also, the court instructed the jury regarding several mitigating
circumstances, and directed the jury to consider whether the circumstances
existed and whether they were mitigating. Further, the court informed the jury
the
-18- [m]itigating circumstances are those which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame. The determination of what are mitigating circumstances is for you as jurors to resolve under the facts and circumstances of this case.
O.R. at 102.
Viewing the instructions as a whole, see Cupp v. Naughten , 414 U.S. 141,
146-47 (1973), we conclude there was not a reasonable likelihood the jury
applied the anti-sympathy instruction in a way that prevented consideration of the
mitigating evidence, see Boyde , 494 U.S. at 380, 381, 386. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals’ decision therefore was not unreasonable.
VII. UNANIMOUS FINDING OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Petitioner argues the trial court effectively instructed the jury it was
required to find mitigating circumstances unanimously. This argument, as
petitioner concedes, is foreclosed by Duvall , 139 F.3d at 791-92.
VIII. CONFESSION
Petitioner argues he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive
his right to counsel before confessing to the murder of Mrs. Porter. Rather, he
maintains the totality of the circumstances show the confession was a result of his
mental limitations, his state of intoxication, his past chronic abuse of alcohol, his
lack of sleep or food before his confession, the coercive nature of the interview,
-19- and the illegal seizure of his tennis shoes without being informed of his right to
withhold consent.
On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded
petitioner’s confession was knowing despite his consumption of alcohol and low
intelligence. See Harjo , 882 P.2d at 1071. In so concluding, the court found that
(1) he had been given Miranda warnings twice; (2) he understood the questions
asked; and (3) he understood the importance of his answers. See id. The court
also determined the confession was voluntary, finding no evidence of
exploitation or overreaching by law enforcement. See id. at 1071-72 (citing, e.g.,
Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 (1986)). The court noted petitioner’s initial
elaborate fabrication that another committed the murder indicated he was well
aware of the consequences of talking to law enforcement and the totality of the
circumstances showed his waiver of the right to remain silent was not invalid due
to his consumption of alcohol or his low intelligence. See id. at 1072 (citing
Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412 (1986)).
A defendant may waive his rights if, considering the totality of the
circumstances, the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Moran ,
475 U.S. at 421. The waiver must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception.” Id. A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it was “made with a full
-20- awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences
of the decision to abandon it.” Id.
The record is devoid of evidence of overreaching by the sheriff or other
officers. See Connelly , 479 U.S. at 170. Further, there is no real question of
petitioner’s comprehension of the Miranda rights and of the potential
consequences of waiving them. See Moran , 475 U.S. at 422. Thus, the state
appellate court’s determination that petitioner’s waiver of his Miranda rights was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
IX. SEIZURE OF TENNIS SHOES
Petitioner argues the State failed to provide him with a full and adequate
opportunity to litigate whether his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
seizure of his tennis shoes prior to his confession. Petitioner believes the state
courts failed to conduct a hearing to determine whether exigent circumstances
existed justifying immediate seizure of the tennis shoes.
The trial court ruled there was probable cause to believe petitioner was
involved in the murder and therefore it was proper to seize the shoes. On direct
appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals first determined petitioner did
not consent to the seizure of the tennis shoes. See Harjo , 882 P.2d at 1073. The
court decided probable cause existed to believe the shoes were evidence of the
-21- murder and immediate seizure was reasonable due to exigent circumstances:
(1) tennis shoe footprints were the only ones found at the crime scene;
(2) petitioner admitted being at Mrs. Porter’s home; (3) petitioner stated the
alleged murderer wore boots; and (4) petitioner could have destroyed the shoes or
their tread. See id. 1073-74 (citing Cupp v. Murphy , 412 U.S. 291 (1973);
Brinegar v. United States , 338 U.S. 160 (1949)). Concluding the claim was fully
and fairly considered at the state court level, the federal district court declined,
pursuant to Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465 (1976), to address the merits of the
claim that there were no exigent circumstances justifying warrantless seizure of
the shoes during interrogation.
“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for a full and fair litigation
of [the] Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal
habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at this trial.” See Stone , 428 U.S. at 494
(footnote omitted); cf. Locks v. Sumner , 703 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1983) (full
and fair hearing even though state appellate court considered evidence not
offered at suppression hearing). The transcript from the evidentiary hearing,
which lasted more than two days, confirms that petitioner had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims. The federal district court
therefore properly declined to address the merits of this claim.
-22- The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge
-23-