GLASSMAN, Justice.
The plaintiff, Vincent Hare, claiming coverage under the Uninsured Motorists Coverage of his automobile liability insurance policy, brought this action against his insurer, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company. The Superior Court, Aroostook County, found the language of the policy precluded the plaintiff’s claim, and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff contends there exists a genuine issue as to the proper interpretation of language in the policy, making summary judgment inappropriate. We agree, and vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.
In order to test the propriety of the entry of summary judgment, we accept the following uncontroverted facts as true. The plaintiff was operating his farm tractor on Route 1 in Hodgdon, Maine, on September 20,1979, when it was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by a Donald J. McGary, Jr. The plaintiff sustained extensive personal injuries and property damage as a result of the collision.
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff’s farm tractor was not insured, but two automobiles he owned were covered by a liability insurance policy issued by the defendant.
On October 15, 1980, the plaintiff signed a release and settlement of his claim against McGary for $23,859.71. The plaintiff did not notify or communicate with the defendant prior to entering into this settlement agreement.
On December 17, 1982, the plaintiff instituted this suit against the defendant, demanding recovery under the uninsured motorists coverage of his liability policy, pursuant to 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902 (Supp.1983-1984).
The plaintiff sought payment of $45,000 for injuries and loss of income not compensated by the settlement he received from McGary. The defendant asserted among other affirmative defenses (1) an
exclusion in the plaintiffs uninsured motorists coverage barred the plaintiff’s claim, and (2) the plaintiffs release of McGary, entered into without notice to or consent of the defendant, prohibited any recovery by the plaintiff under the terms of his policy.
The defendant moved for summary judgment. The court granted the defendant’s motion, finding the language contained in the policy permitted the plaintiff to insure his tractor and, therefore, the exclusion to the policy’s uninsured motorists coverage precluded the plaintiff’s recovery.
The court stated:
The definition of “your covered auto” ... is broad enough to have permitted Plaintiff to have insured his tractor. Other uses of “vehicle” in the policy make it clear that the phrase includes more than cars and trucks. Because Mr. Hare was operating an uninsured vehicle at the time of the accident, and that vehicle was his own, he does not benefit from the fact that he had provided insurance on other vehicles.
In reviewing the correctness of the court’s grant of the motion for summary judgment, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been granted and accord that party the full benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.”
Lidstone v. Green,
469 A.2d 843 at 845 (Me.1983). Having examined the present record in this light, we decide the entry of summary judgment for the defendant was erroneous.
We agree with the Superior Court that uninsured motorist coverage on one of a number of vehicles owned by an insured does not extend the benefits of such coverage, for no premium, to all other vehicles owned by that insured.
See
8C J. Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice
§ 5078.15 at 179 (1981);
Rhault
v.
Tsagarakos,
361 F.Supp. 202, 206 (D.Vt.1973). In
Wescott v. Allstate Insurance,
397 A.2d 156, 166 (Me.1979), t9e recognized the “obvious design” of our uninsured motorist coverage statute: “The legislative intent is to benefit all insured motorists by throwing the burden of compensating for injuries which would otherwise go without redress from the individual victim to the insurance industry for a premium.”
The policy’s exclusionary language, on which the Superior Court relied, states:
EXCLUSIONS
A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any person:
1. While occupying,
or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle.
The language of the exclusionary provision in the policy prevents recovery if, at the time the bodily injuries are sustained, the insured is occupying his own uninsured “motor vehicle.” We find it by no means clear that a farm tractor is properly deemed a “motor vehicle.” As we recognized in
Lane v. Hartford Insurance Group,
447 A.2d 818, 820 (Me.1982), Title 24-A does not define “motor vehicle,” and the definitions of “motor vehicle” and “farm tractor” given in Title 29
are specifically limited in application to that title.
See
29 M.R.S.A. § 1 (1978 & Supp.1983-1984). In the absence of a statutory definition, we look to the policy
itself. The definition there must control our interpretation of the policy’s language, unless it is more restrictive than 24-A M.R. S.A. § 2902 permits.
Lane,
447 A.2d at 820.
The definitional section of the policy provides no definition of “motor vehicle”
per se,
but defines “Your covered auto” as:
“Your covered auto” means:
1. Any vehicle shown in the Declarations.
2. Any of the following types of vehicles on the date you become the owner:
a. a private passenger auto; or
b. a pickup, panel truck or van, not used in any business or occupation other than farming or ranching
3. Any trailer you own.
4. Any auto or trailer you do not own while used as a temporary substitute for any other vehicle described in this definition which is out of normal use because of its:
a. breakdown;
b. repair;
c. servicing;
d. loss; or
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GLASSMAN, Justice.
The plaintiff, Vincent Hare, claiming coverage under the Uninsured Motorists Coverage of his automobile liability insurance policy, brought this action against his insurer, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company. The Superior Court, Aroostook County, found the language of the policy precluded the plaintiff’s claim, and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff contends there exists a genuine issue as to the proper interpretation of language in the policy, making summary judgment inappropriate. We agree, and vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.
In order to test the propriety of the entry of summary judgment, we accept the following uncontroverted facts as true. The plaintiff was operating his farm tractor on Route 1 in Hodgdon, Maine, on September 20,1979, when it was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by a Donald J. McGary, Jr. The plaintiff sustained extensive personal injuries and property damage as a result of the collision.
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff’s farm tractor was not insured, but two automobiles he owned were covered by a liability insurance policy issued by the defendant.
On October 15, 1980, the plaintiff signed a release and settlement of his claim against McGary for $23,859.71. The plaintiff did not notify or communicate with the defendant prior to entering into this settlement agreement.
On December 17, 1982, the plaintiff instituted this suit against the defendant, demanding recovery under the uninsured motorists coverage of his liability policy, pursuant to 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902 (Supp.1983-1984).
The plaintiff sought payment of $45,000 for injuries and loss of income not compensated by the settlement he received from McGary. The defendant asserted among other affirmative defenses (1) an
exclusion in the plaintiffs uninsured motorists coverage barred the plaintiff’s claim, and (2) the plaintiffs release of McGary, entered into without notice to or consent of the defendant, prohibited any recovery by the plaintiff under the terms of his policy.
The defendant moved for summary judgment. The court granted the defendant’s motion, finding the language contained in the policy permitted the plaintiff to insure his tractor and, therefore, the exclusion to the policy’s uninsured motorists coverage precluded the plaintiff’s recovery.
The court stated:
The definition of “your covered auto” ... is broad enough to have permitted Plaintiff to have insured his tractor. Other uses of “vehicle” in the policy make it clear that the phrase includes more than cars and trucks. Because Mr. Hare was operating an uninsured vehicle at the time of the accident, and that vehicle was his own, he does not benefit from the fact that he had provided insurance on other vehicles.
In reviewing the correctness of the court’s grant of the motion for summary judgment, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been granted and accord that party the full benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.”
Lidstone v. Green,
469 A.2d 843 at 845 (Me.1983). Having examined the present record in this light, we decide the entry of summary judgment for the defendant was erroneous.
We agree with the Superior Court that uninsured motorist coverage on one of a number of vehicles owned by an insured does not extend the benefits of such coverage, for no premium, to all other vehicles owned by that insured.
See
8C J. Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice
§ 5078.15 at 179 (1981);
Rhault
v.
Tsagarakos,
361 F.Supp. 202, 206 (D.Vt.1973). In
Wescott v. Allstate Insurance,
397 A.2d 156, 166 (Me.1979), t9e recognized the “obvious design” of our uninsured motorist coverage statute: “The legislative intent is to benefit all insured motorists by throwing the burden of compensating for injuries which would otherwise go without redress from the individual victim to the insurance industry for a premium.”
The policy’s exclusionary language, on which the Superior Court relied, states:
EXCLUSIONS
A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any person:
1. While occupying,
or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle.
The language of the exclusionary provision in the policy prevents recovery if, at the time the bodily injuries are sustained, the insured is occupying his own uninsured “motor vehicle.” We find it by no means clear that a farm tractor is properly deemed a “motor vehicle.” As we recognized in
Lane v. Hartford Insurance Group,
447 A.2d 818, 820 (Me.1982), Title 24-A does not define “motor vehicle,” and the definitions of “motor vehicle” and “farm tractor” given in Title 29
are specifically limited in application to that title.
See
29 M.R.S.A. § 1 (1978 & Supp.1983-1984). In the absence of a statutory definition, we look to the policy
itself. The definition there must control our interpretation of the policy’s language, unless it is more restrictive than 24-A M.R. S.A. § 2902 permits.
Lane,
447 A.2d at 820.
The definitional section of the policy provides no definition of “motor vehicle”
per se,
but defines “Your covered auto” as:
“Your covered auto” means:
1. Any vehicle shown in the Declarations.
2. Any of the following types of vehicles on the date you become the owner:
a. a private passenger auto; or
b. a pickup, panel truck or van, not used in any business or occupation other than farming or ranching
3. Any trailer you own.
4. Any auto or trailer you do not own while used as a temporary substitute for any other vehicle described in this definition which is out of normal use because of its:
a. breakdown;
b. repair;
c. servicing;
d. loss; or
e. destruction.
The definition obviously does not specifically exclude farm tractors, but the emphasis here, and in numerous other parts of the policy,
on private passenger autos, pickups, panel trucks, vans, and trailers, at least makes the intent to exclude farm tractors one plausible interpretation of the policy’s terms. Nor is there any explicit inclusion of farm tractors anywhere in the policy.
As we have previously recognized, “[w]hether contract language is ambiguous is a question of law for the court.”
Lidstone v. Green,
469 A.2d 843 at 846 (Me.1983). “Contract language is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations.”
Portland Valve, Inc. v. Rockwood Systems Corp.,
460 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Me.1983). In the present case, we find the terms “vehicle” and “motor vehicle” in the policy to be susceptible of various interpretations,
and the court’s finding that no ambiguity exists to be erroneous.
The proper interpretation of ambiguous contractual language is to be determined by the trier of fact.
Lewiston Firefighters Association v. City of Lewiston,
354 A.2d 154, 163 (Me.1976), appeal after remand, 444 A.2d 1009 (1982);
Blue Rock Industries v. Raymond International, Inc.,
325 A.2d 66, 72-73 (Me.1974). In the present case, the entry of summary judgment for the defendant deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to present to a trier of fact evidence tending to support his contention that his farm tractor was not insurable under the defendant’s liability insurance policy. The entry of summary judgment, while the factual issue of the policy’s proper interpretation remains unresolved, was erroneous and must be vacated.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated.
All concurring.