Hardy v. New York State Department of Labor

• Court: District Court, S.D. New York
• Decided: November 1, 2019
• Docket: 1:19-cv-05291
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RICHARD HARDY, Plaintiff, 1:19-CV-5291 (CM) -against- ORDER TO AMEND NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Defendant. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. He sues the New York State Department of Labor (“DOL”) and seeks $300,000 in damages. He states that “racism” and “discrimination” are the federal rights that DOL has violated. He also asserts claims under state law. The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims of federal constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims under state law. By order dated October 28, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s complaint is difficult to understand. He seems to allege that in 2018, at a

Manhattan DOL office, he either applied for a job with DOL or applied for a DOL-sponsored employment program. He alleges that DOL staff members retaliated against him for filing previous lawsuits or claims. He also alleges that DOL staff members made disparaging comments about his race and prevented him from working. He further alleges that a DOL staff member assaulted him by spraying mace into his face, and then attempted to use a taser on him, before calling the police. DISCUSSION A. The Eleventh Amendment Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DOL are barred by the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity or unless Congress

has abrogate[d] the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, second alteration in original). This immunity shields States from claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-74 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). “[T]he immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Congress has not abrogated the States’ immunity for claims under § 1983. See Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990). And the State of New York has not waived its immunity to suit in federal court. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). Moreover, DOL is arm of the State of New York and therefore enjoys

Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Jackson v. NYS Dep’t of Labor, 709 F. Supp. 2d 218, 225- 26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal dismissed, 431 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order). Plaintiff sues DOL – a New York State agency. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against DOL under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity and because those claims are frivolous.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii); Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’ when ‘it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’” (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989))).2 B. Personal involvement of individuals To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing an individual’s direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Colon v.

Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)). A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). An individual can be personally involved in a § 1983 violation if:

1 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that a state agency is not a “person” for the purpose of § 1983 liability). 2 The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against DOL without prejudice to any employment discrimination or retaliation claims he wishes to assert against DOL as an employer under a federal anti-employment-discrimination statute. (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of [the plaintiff] by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring. Colon, 58 F.3d at 873.3 Plaintiff has not named any individuals as defendants but alleges that individual DOL staff members violated his federal constitutional rights. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to assert § 1983 claims against those individual DOL staff members. He must name those individual DOL staff members as defendants and allege facts showing how those individuals were personally involved in the violations of his federal constitutional rights. C. Leave to amend Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims. First, Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption4 and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the

3 “Although the Supreme Court’s decision in [Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662] may have heightened the requirements for showing a supervisor’s personal involvement with respect to certain constitutional violations,” the Second Circuit has not yet examined that issue. Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013). 4 The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the amended complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff’s statement of claim. caption and the body of the amended complaint.5 The naming of “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of

any “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the statement of claim, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant named in the amended complaint. Plaintiff is also directed to provide the addresses for any named defendants. To the greatest extent possible, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must: a) give the names and titles of all relevant persons; b) describe all relevant events, stating the facts that support Plaintiff’s case, including what each defendant did or failed to do; c) give the dates and times of each relevant event or, if not known, the approximate date and time of each relevant event; d) give the location where each relevant event occurred; e) describe how each defendant’s acts or omissions violated Plaintiff’s rights and describe the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and f) state what relief Plaintiff seeks from the Court, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief. Essentially, the body of Plaintiff’s amended complaint must tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights; what facts show that his federally protected rights were violated;

5 For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty on August 31, 2018, in the Sullivan Correctional Facility clinic, during the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. shift.” when such violation occurred; where such violation occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wishes to maintain must be included in the amended complaint. Plaintiff must not reassert, in his amended complaint, any claims that the

Court has dismissed in this order. CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to assign this matter to my docket, mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, and note service on the docket. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court’s Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 19-CV- 5291 (CM). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the action will be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii). The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue). The Clerk of Court is also directed to docket this order as a “written opinion” within the meaning of Section 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002. SO ORDERED. Dated: November 1, 2019 , New York, New York hie l Wek COLLEEN McMAHON Chief United States District Judge