Hardy v. Fatheree
This text of 2021 IL App (5th) 190445-U (Hardy v. Fatheree) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE 2021 IL App (5th) 190445-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/12/21. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-19-0445 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Peti ion for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
CHAD HARDY, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Clinton County. ) v. ) No. 19-MR-88 ) JONATHAN FATHEREE, Acting Warden, ) Honorable ) Stanley M. Brandmeyer, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Wharton and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Plaintiff, Chad Hardy, appeals pro se the sua sponte dismissal of his complaint for habeas corpus. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 Plaintiff pled guilty to three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault and was
sentenced to three 10-year consecutive sentences. Plaintiff’s counsel moved to reconsider
the sentence and plaintiff moved pro se to withdraw his guilty plea. Both motions were
denied, and plaintiff appealed. While that appeal was pending, plaintiff appealed the
dismissal of his petition for relief from a void judgment. The denial of his posttrial motions
was reversed and the cause remanded for failure to file a certificate of compliance with
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006), and the dismissal of his petition for 1 relief from a void judgment was affirmed. People v. Hardy, 2016 IL App (1st) 133153-U,
¶ 2 (citing People v. Hardy, 2012 IL App (1st) 100549-U, and People v. Hardy, No. 1-12-
1372 (2013) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c))).
¶3 On remand, plaintiff filed another motion to withdraw his plea, asserting ineffective
assistance of plea counsel and failure of the court to properly admonish him regarding his
potential mandatory supervised release period. His motion was denied, and the circuit
court’s judgment was affirmed. Id. ¶ 28.
¶4 In September 2019, plaintiff filed a habeas corpus complaint alleging numerous
violations of his statutory and constitutional rights. The trial court denied the complaint
sua sponte and denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.
¶5 ANALYSIS
¶6 On appeal from the denial of his habeas corpus complaint, plaintiff argues (1) that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction where the charging instrument was fraudulently obtained
and cited an erroneous statutory provision, (2) that the State and the court violated
numerous statutes with respect to the probable cause determination and preliminary
hearing, (3) that he was denied his speedy trial rights, (4) that the State breached the plea
agreement, (5) that the court failed to consider certain factors in mitigation and imposed a
disproportionate sentence, (6) that his three-year-to-life mandatory supervised release term
was unconstitutional, (7) that the circuit court committed numerous errors regarding his
petition for postjudgment relief, and (8) that the appellate court erred in denying his request
to take judicial notice of certain controlling law during his first appeal.
2 ¶7 “It is well established that an order of habeas corpus is available only to obtain the
release of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked
jurisdiction of the subject matter or the person of the petitioner, or where there has been
some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner’s conviction that entitles him to release.”
Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 58 (2008) (citing People v. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d 198, 205
(2001), and Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430 (1998)). “A petition for
writ of habeas corpus may not be used to review proceedings that do not exhibit one of the
defects set forth in the statute, even though the alleged error involves a denial of
constitutional rights. [Citations.]” Schlemm v. Cowan, 323 Ill. App. 3d 318, 320 (2001).
The circuit court may sua sponte dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is
patently nonmeritorious or insufficient on its face. Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 59; Hennings v.
Chandler, 229 Ill. 2d 18, 24 (2008). We apply a de novo standard of review to the dismissal
of an application for habeas corpus. Hennings, 229 Ill. 2d at 24.
¶8 It has long been held that subject matter jurisdiction is granted to the circuit courts
by the Illinois Constitution, and that they “have jurisdiction in all cases involving offenses
which fall within the ambit of section 1-5 of the Criminal Code [citation].” People v.
Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 26 (1976). “A criminal defendant confers personal jurisdiction upon
the trial court when he appears and joins” in the proceedings. People v. Woodall, 333 Ill.
App. 3d 1146, 1156 (2002) (citing People v. Speed, 318 Ill. App. 3d 910, 932 (2001)).
Once a court has acquired jurisdiction, no subsequent error or irregularity will oust
jurisdiction. Id. at 1157.
3 ¶9 In this case, the circuit court acquired subject matter jurisdiction when plaintiff was
charged with violations of the criminal code and it acquired personal jurisdiction when he
appeared before the court. Although plaintiff contends that the court failed to acquire
subject matter jurisdiction because the charging instrument was fraudulently obtained and
cited an erroneous statutory provision, it is well settled that defects in a charging instrument
do not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. See People v. Hughes, 2012 IL
112817, ¶¶ 27-28. None of plaintiff’s other claims implicates the court’s jurisdiction.
¶ 10 Plaintiff’s complaint for habeas relief did not allege an occurrence subsequent to
his conviction that entitles him to release. A plaintiff cannot be discharged via
habeas corpus until a judgment by the court or he is held beyond the time he can legally
be detained. 735 ILCS 5/10-102 (West 2018); see also Barney, 184 Ill. 2d at 431. The
Illinois Department of Corrections website, of which we may take judicial notice (People
v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 66), reveals that plaintiff’s projected parole date is
June 9, 2033, and his projected discharge date is yet to be determined. Thus, plaintiff
remains in lawful custody and is not entitled to immediate release.
¶ 11 Because plaintiff’s habeas complaint alleged no set of facts that would support a
finding that the court which entered his conviction lacked jurisdiction, nor did he argue the
occurrence of a postconviction event which entitles him to release, the circuit court
properly denied his complaint. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d at 205.
¶ 12 CONCLUSION
¶ 13 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Clinton County is
affirmed. 4 ¶ 14 Affirmed.
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2021 IL App (5th) 190445-U, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hardy-v-fatheree-illappct-2021.