Hardwick v. US

Opinion

TILLIE HARDWICK, et al., Case No. 79-cv-01710-EMC

Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Docket No. 392 Defendants.

Following this Court’s Order granting a motion by the Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians (“the Tribe”) to require the United States to take restored lands into trust pursuant to the 1983 Stipulated Judgment (Docket No. 364), the Tribe now moves for sanctions, arguing that the Government’s refusal to take the Tribe’s land into trust for years, until this Court ordered it, is sanctionable under the Court’s inherent powers. Docket No. 392. As stated at the hearing, the Court DENIES the motion but schedules a status conference to ensure compliance with the Court’s order granting the Motion to Enforce. The Tribe previously attempted to convey the Rancheria to the BIA under the mandatory provision of Paragraph 8 on two separate occasions, in 1996 and 2010. On July 30, 1996, the Tribe’s then-principal spokesperson (Ms. Donna Marie Potts) exercised the mandatory trust election provision under paragraph 8 of the 1983 Judgment, executing and recording a grant deed to the United States. Mot. to Enforce Judgment (Docket No. need for the Tribe to comply with the BIA’s discretionary fee-to-trust procedures described at 25 C.F.R. Part 151. Pope Decl. ¶ 5; Refusal Letter, Docket No. 364-1 Ex. 4. On July 7, 2010, the Tribe met with the BIA Sacramento Regional Office and made an in- person request that BIA restore the Rancheria lands to trust status pursuant to the 1983 Judgment. Pope Decl. ¶ 16. The Tribe alleges that BIA officials agreed that the conveyance of the Rancheria to the Government was mandatory but expressed reservations about expending political capital. Mot. at 3-4. In 2018, BIA denied the request. Pope Decl. ¶ 45. The Tribe appealed the decision to the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (“IBIA”). Pope Decl. ¶ 46. On April 18, 2019, the BIA Regional Solicitor remanded the matter back to the BIA. On October 23, 2020, while the motion before this Court was pending, the BIA reached a final decision, holding that the Tribe’s conveyance was governed by paragraph 7 of the 1983 Stipulated Judgment, and that BIA therefore lacked the authority to acquire the Rancheria through the mandatory trust acquisition provision of paragraph 8. BIA Decision Letter, Docket No. 388-1 at 5-7. A. Legal Standard for the Court’s Inherent Sanctions Authority “Three primary sources of authority enable courts to sanction parties or their lawyers for improper conduct: (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which applies to signed writings filed with the court, (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which is aimed at penalizing conduct that unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings, and (3) the court’s inherent power.” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the Tribe bases its motion only on the Court’s inherent power to impose sanctions. See Mot. at 2-3. With respect to the Court’s inherent sanctions power, “a court may assess attorney’s fees as a sanction for the willful disobedience of a court order … [and] when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2133 (1991); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001). A party acts in bad faith “by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46. However, Chambers also cautions that “[a] court must … process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees.” Id. at 50. Bad faith requires willful conduct or conduct tantamount thereto. The Ninth Circuit has held that:

“mere recklessness, without more, does not justify sanctions under a court's inherent power. But … sanctions are available if the court specifically finds bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith. Sanctions are available for a variety of types of willful actions, including recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose. Therefore, we hold that an attorney’s reckless misstatements of law and fact, when coupled with an improper purpose, such as an attempt to influence or manipulate proceedings in one case in order to gain tactical advantage in another case, are sanctionable under a court's inherent power.” Fink, 239 F.3d at 993-94. Cf. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (attorney’s knowing and reckless introduction of inadmissible evidence was “tantamount to bad faith and therefore sanctionable under the court's inherent power”). B. The Government’s Conduct Under the Fink Standard Applying Fink, the Court finds that the Government’s conduct is not sanctionable under its inherent power. At the motion hearing, the Tribe stated that the Government acted in bad faith by consistently delaying its response to the Tribe’s request to convey the Buena Vista Rancheria into trust as a mandatory acquisition. This argument is based on the ten-year delay between the Tribe’s attempted conveyance in 2010 and the decision letter which the Tribe received in 2020, which denied the Tribe’s request to take the Buena Vista Rancheria into trust as a mandatory acquisition and instructed the Tribe to proceed through the discretionary process. Docket No. 388. However, the Government’s official position (that it had no mandatory duty to take the Rancheria into trust) has been consistent. The Tribe has to show that the Government has made “reckless misstatements of law and fact” in so interpreting the 1983 Stipulated Judgment. Fink, 239 F.3d at 993-94. While the Court disagreed with the Government’s interpretation of the 1983 Judgment, it cannot say that its position was without legal basis or frivolous. As the Government noted in its Opposition to the Tribe’s Motion for Sanctions, its interpretation of the 1983 Judgment was grounded in the IBIA’s holding in Santana that “[i]f community-owned lands could be then falling under paragraph 8 of the stipulated judgment, paragraph 7 would be rendered a nullity.” Santana v. Sacramento Area Director, 33 IBIA 135, 1999 I.D. LEXIS 10, *19. While the Court found the Government’s reasoning unpersuasive, it cannot say that this argument was entirely without reason. In its ruling, this Court had to interpret the 1983 Judgment to determine that the Tribe was a “successor in interest” as defined in Paragraph 2 and a “class member” under Paragraph 8. The Court cannot say that the Government’s argument to the contrary was a reckless misstatement of facts or the law. The Government’s interpretation was not only on Santana, but also in part on a 2004 Order by Judge Fogel and1987 Stipulated Judgments approved by Judge Williams (who also approved the 1983 Judgment). See Order by Judge Jeremy D. Fogel Denying Motion for Reconsideration, Docket No. 296 at 3 (interpreting the 1987 Stipulated Judgments to find that the Picayune Rancheria could not be considered a “successor-in-interest” because the “original distributees [who received the land pursuant to the California Rancheria Act of 1958] sold the six parcels in question to non-Indians, and the Tribe was able to purchase those parcels back between 1995 and 2002”). Because the Government has had a consistent, non-frivolous interpretation of the 1983 Judgment, which was based on IBIA precedent and prior orders from this Court concerning the term “successor in interest” in paragraph 2, the Court does not find that the Government’s conduct is sanctionable under Fink. The Court therefore DENIES the Tribe’s Motion for Sanctions. However, the Court schedules a status conference for February 18, 2021 in order to receive an update on the Government’s compliance with the Court’s order granting the Tribe’s motion to enforce the 1983 /// /// /// /// /// Stipulated Judgment. The Government is directed to provide a timeline by February 11, 2021, providing an exact date for when it expects to take the Buena Vista Rancheria into trust as a mandatory acquisition. This order disposes of Docket No. 392. Dated: January 25, 2021 ______________________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN United States District Judge