Hardesty v. City Medical Nursing Center, LLC (In re Felix)

572 B.R. 892
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedSeptember 12, 2017
DocketCase No. 15-50016; Adv. No. 16-2060
StatusPublished

This text of 572 B.R. 892 (Hardesty v. City Medical Nursing Center, LLC (In re Felix)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hardesty v. City Medical Nursing Center, LLC (In re Felix), 572 B.R. 892 (Ohio 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (DOC. NO. 1)

Charles M. Caldwell, Judge

In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court issues findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the administration of assets through the extraordinary means of substantive consolidation. The goal is to combine a non-debtor entity into this bankruptcy proceeding, which Austin Chidi and Dorothy Ify Felix filed nearly three years ago (Debtors). The Chapter 7 Trustee, Clyde Hardesty (Plaintiff), filed this adversary proceeding, and the Defendants include, City Medical Nursing Center, LLC (LLC), Brian Felix (Brian), and his parents, the Debtors. The Court published an exhaustive history of the parties, their connections and prior disputes (In re Felix, 562 B.R. 700 (Bankr. S.D. Oh. 2017). A review of that Opinion provides context for the current litigation. Further, in a related adversary proceeding commenced by the United States Trustee, the Court revoked Debtors’ discharge on January 6, 2017 (McDermott v. Felix, Adv. No. 16-2033). In the interest of brevity, however, the Court limits the present discussion to those factors directly relevant to substantive consolidation.

We start with June 2, 2003, the day the LLC became a domestic limited liability company under Ohio law. This business is located at 5340 E. Main Street, Ste. 209, Columbus, Ohio 43213. The Debtor, Dorothy Ify Felix, who is an Ohio licensed practical nurse, was the incorporator. Through the LLC, Mrs.- Felix provides home health nursing services, and her spouse, Austin Chidi Felix, functions as manager. They both serve as employees of the LLC. After operating the LLC for nearly a decade, however, Debtors now claim they sold the business to their Son Brian on December 31, 2012, Approximately two years later on January 2, 2015, the Debtors filed their bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (Code). The bankruptcy filing unmasked a maze of businesses, financial transactions and family ties so complex, that the Plaintiff now seeks substantive consolidation, as the only practical means to provide a potential recovery for creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Plaintiff targets income generated by the LLC. That is the sole purpose of this litigation, as well as the primary source of recompense for creditors asserting claims that total $861,489.06.

Substantive consolidation is an extraordinary equitable remedy, and an alternative to avoidance actions and other more specific measures to corral and distribute assets. Paris v. Walker, et al. (In re Walker), 566 B.R. 503, 532 (Bankr. E.D. TN. 2017). By dissolving corporate, partnership, and individual legal boundaries, bankruptcy courts pool separately held assets, and distribute proceeds to a newly combined creditor body. Spradlin v. Beads and Steeds Inns, LLC (In re Howland), 674 Fed.Appx. 482, 487-90 (6th Cir. 2017). As an equitable remedy exclusively available to bankruptcy courts, substantive consolidation eclipses state law remedies (corporate veil theory), that bypass structural formalities for the limited purpose of holding shareholders personally liable for corporate misdeeds. Id.

In view of the breadth of substantive consolidation, plaintiffs must prove “... substantial identity between the debtor and the target.” In re Walker at 531. This requires evidence of the disregard of corporate boundaries, failure to respect joint ownership interests, or dominion over assets to the exclusion of all stakeholders. Id. In addition, courts require proof of disarray so substantial that a debtor’s creditors benefit more through substantive consolidation, compared to any potential harm to the subject and its separate creditors. Id. The subject of substantive consolidation or its creditors also have an obligation to quantify their potential injury. Id.

With this setting in mind, Plaintiff targets the LLC purportedly sold by the Debtors to their Son, Brian. Actually, there are two sale agreements- both dated December 31, 2012- but in different amounts ($l,000.00/$6,000.00). Brian does not know which agreement he signed first, but testified that he intended to follow only the $6,000.00 agreement. In any event, both “contracts” appear as poorly prepared and sloppily executed form documents. Indeed, Mrs. Felix testified that they found at least one of the contracts on the Internet.

Considering first the 3-page Agreement for $1,000.00, it covered a sale from a “City Medical Nursing Services, LLC” to “City Medical Nursing Services, LLC”, and referred to an attached list of assets (“Exhibit A”) with no assigned value. The list included, 1) inventory, 2) work in process, 3) fixed assets (not listed “below” as suggested), 4) customer lists, 5) a 2012 Lexus SUV, and 6) computers and office equipment. First, note that the name of the entity sold varies slightly from our target LLC by substituting the word' “Services” for “Center”. Second, it is a mystery why a “City Medical Nursing Services, LLC”, would sale itself- to itself. Third, at least according to the Debtors’ Amended Statement of Financial of Affairs filed on April 29, 2016, “City Medical Nursing Services, LLC”, formed on July 25, 2012, is a separate corporate entity from the LLC at issue. However, it is also located at 5340 E. Main Street, Columbus, Ohio 43213, but in a different suite on the same floor.

Turning to the other sale Agreement for $6,000.00, the parties also used the December 31, 2012, date, but this time, the transfer is from the LLC to Brian. According to this 17-page Agreement (Page 16 is missing), the LLC provides home health care services under the operating name, “City Medical Nursing Services LLC”. Brian does not recall what was on the missing page, or even signing either of the Agreements. In any event, the catalyst for this additional document remains ambiguous. It could be- an effort to right the wrongs in the other “sale”, but in any event, we do know for sure it cost Brian an additional $5,000.00. Specifically, the price was $1,000.00 down, with the balance payable by an “attached” promissory note referenced in Paragraph 8 of this Agreement. However, Plaintiff never received a copy of a note, it is not “attached” to the Agreement, and there is no other credible proof of payment.

Looking at this longer Agreement for further detail, we find that the purchaser became responsible for paying all taxes (Paragraph 9). However, Brian testified he thought the sale proceeds extinguished the tax obligation. Defying logic, under Paragraph 10.y., the seller remained as an owner of the business for one year, and after that, subject to agreement, continued on as an employee. Brian testified, however, that he never formally offered employment to the Debtors. The seller also retained authority to drive the company vehicle for the length of their tenure (Paragraph 16.-h.). Further, the sale covered all of the LLC’s assets, including equipment, inventory, sales, contractual interests, books records and files, trademarks and trade names, and goodwill, including the business name, all without any assigned value (Paragraph l.a.i.-vii). Finally, under this more detailed Agreement, the purchaser did not assume the liabilities, which remained a seller indemnification obligation (Paragraphs 35 and 36). As a result, the LLC’s creditors presently have no recourse to its assets, absent substantive consolidation.

Regarding both Agreements, Brian testified that he did not know how much money the LLC made in 2012.

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Related

Phaedra Spradlin v. Beads & Steeds Inns
674 F. App'x 482 (Sixth Circuit, 2017)
In re Felix
562 B.R. 700 (S.D. Ohio, 2017)
Paris v. Walker (In re Walker)
566 B.R. 503 (E.D. Tennessee, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
572 B.R. 892, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hardesty-v-city-medical-nursing-center-llc-in-re-felix-ohsb-2017.