Harden v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedAugust 19, 2020
Docket4:20-cv-00771
StatusUnknown

This text of Harden v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole (Harden v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harden v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, (E.D. Mo. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION DONALD HARDEN, ) Plaintiff, v. No. 4:20-CV-771 JAR MISSOURI BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, et al., ) Defendants. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court upon the motion of self-represented plaintiff Donald Harden for leave to commence this Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., action, without prepayment of the required filing fee. ECF No. 2. Having reviewed the motion and the finarcial information submitted in support, the Court will grant the motion and waive the filing fee in this matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Furthermore, after reviewing the complaint, the Court will direct plaintiff to file an amended complaint in accordance with the instructions set out below. Legal Standard on Initial Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more thana “‘mere possibility of misconduct.” Jd. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. /d. at 679. When reviewing a complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court accepts the well-plead facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and liberally construes the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even self-represented complainants are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply additional facts or to construct a legal theory for the self-represented plaintiff that assumed facts that had not been pleaded). The Complaint Self-represented plaintiff Donald Harden seeks relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (SADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., against seven named defendants: (1) Missouri Board of Probation and Parole; (2) Don Phillips (chairman); (3) Valorie Sparks (district administrator); (4) Terri Broleman (unit supervisor); (5) Dave Scrugg (unit supervisor); (6) Adrian Harris (parole officer); and (7) Missouri Intervention Fee Program. ECF No. | at 1. According to plaintiff, he suffered a serious back injury — constituting a disability under the ADA — yet defendants have ignored and denied his injury, such that they will not waive the monthly intervention fees (as

allowed under Missouri statute) assessed against him. Plaintiff asserts that this ignorance and denial constitutes intentional disability discrimination under the ADA. Plaintiff was released on parole by the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole in March 2001. ECF No.1912. In June 2003, plaintiff suffered a serious back injury in a work-related incident, and he has not been able to work since. Jd. J§14-15. Plaintiff immediately notified his parole officer of the incident and inability to work. Jd. § 16. Due to the injury, plaintiff has “consulted with more than 10-12 leading orthopedic back surgeons;” had “numerous back surgeries including 25 or more therapeutic injections, informally known as cortisone shots;” had a discectomy and a level II spinal fusion; and has required physical therapy, a walker, a back brace, cane, and pain medications. /d. 45. Plaintiff asserts that he has repeatedly informed defendants that he has a L1-L5 lumbar spine injury, for which he has been receiving medical treatment for “nearly ten (10) years constantly,” and that he has provided medical records confirming these medications and doctor visits at each visit with his parole officer. /d. J§ 6, 17-18. As recently as May 2020, plaintiff provided defendants with medical records, including an MRI scan, confirming his medical conditions. Jd. 427. Plaintiff was declared “totally disable[d]” by a Social Security disability judge in 2007 and by the Missouri Department of Social Services (MO HealthNet) in 2010. Id. §§ 19-20. Plaintiff provided copies of these decisions to defendants as well. Id. □□□ Plaintiff states that the Missouri Intervention Fee Program was established in May 2005. Id. 4 13. Under this program, plaintiff alleges that “if you are not disable[d] or otherwise exempt from paying intervention fees,” you are required to pay a monthly fee of between thirty (30) and sixty (60) dollars, during the time that you are on supervision with the Missouri Department of Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole. Jd. § 11. Plaintiff admits that he was repeatedly informed, during visits to the Probation and Parole office, that he owed intervention fees as

required by state law as a condition of his parole. /d. 4 8. Plaintiff states that he has never paid the monthly intervention fee which has resulted in an overdue amount of $3250. Jd. § 29; ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Plaintiff asserts that the defendants have ignored and denied the seriousness of his back injury and refused to exempt him from paying the intervention fees. ECF No. 1 23. Plaintiff states that he was advised that “simple back pain [is] irrelevant to the assessment of intervention fees.” Id. 4 19. Plaintiff has been placed “in (a non-official like) violation status” and has been denied lower levels of supervision (including early release from parole) without the ability to appeal, because he has not paid the fees. /d. § 1, 10, 25-26. Contradictorily, plaintiff alleges that defendants have both “threatened” and just simply provided “hints and slight indications or suggestions of continued high level of supervision,” due to the lack of payment of fees. Id. 8- 9, 29; see also ECF No. 1-1 at 2 (“Failure to pay your intervention fees may increase your level of supervision or a sanction may be imposed.).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Samvel Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
760 F.3d 843 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
James Solomon v. Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas
795 F.3d 777 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
Mark Neubauer v. FedEx Corporation
849 F.3d 400 (Eighth Circuit, 2017)
Martin v. Aubuchon
623 F.2d 1282 (Eighth Circuit, 1980)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Harden v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harden-v-missouri-board-of-probation-and-parole-moed-2020.