Hard v. County of Plumas

220 P.2d 2, 35 Cal. 2d 577, 1950 Cal. LEXIS 365
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedJune 29, 1950
DocketSac. 5976
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 220 P.2d 2 (Hard v. County of Plumas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hard v. County of Plumas, 220 P.2d 2, 35 Cal. 2d 577, 1950 Cal. LEXIS 365 (Cal. 1950).

Opinions

CARTER, J.

Plaintiff, a taxpayer and resident of defendant county, sought an injunction restraining defendants from proceeding .with a proposed project consisting of resurfacing a county highway under the supervision of E. G. McLain, the county road commissioner, without calling for bids or letting a contract. The project will cost over $3,000. McLain was appointed by the county board of supervisors to the position of road commissioner and was found by the board to be “qualified and competent” to handle the road work of the county. He is not, however, a registered civil engineer under the laws regulating that vocation. (Bus. and Prof. Code, § 6700 et seq.) Defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint setting forth the foregoing facts was sustained and judgment of dismissal followed.

The controversy arises from plaintiff’s assertion that no road work, the cost of which will exceed $3,000, may be done by a county except by contract let to the lowest bidder unless it is done under the supervision of a road commissioner who has qualified as a registered civil engineer under the law of this state.

One of the methods, authorized by the Legislature, under which a county may perform work on its roads is set forth in sections 1070 to 1075 of the Streets and Highways Code. Thereunder the board of supervisors may determine by a four-fifths vote that public convenience requires the work to be done, and that the expense thereof is too great to be met by the funds of the road district where the work is to be done, and, therefore, such work may be done and charged to the district fund, general fund, or general road fund. (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 1070.) When the board finds that the estimated expense of the work exceeds $3,000, surveys, plans, and specifications, etc. for the work shall be made. (Id., § 1071.) Upon receipt of the surveys, etc., the board shall call for bids for the work. (Id., § 1072.) The contract shall be let to the lowest bidder unless the board finds all of the bids too high and that the work can be done more cheaply by “day labor.” In that [579]*579ease, all bids may be rejected and the work done under the supervision of “road commissioners” in whose district the road is situated. (Id., § 1073.) Presumably the road commissioners referred to must now be read to mean a single commissioner for the entire county, inasmuch as a single commissioner system was established in 1947 (Stats. 1947, Ex. Sess. 1947, eh. 11, §§ 1 and 9.2; Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 1029, 2006.) Apparently the road work here does not come under the provision of section 1073 for it is alleged that the work is to be done without first calling for bids and is pursuant to section 1075. Where the board finds the work can be done for $3,000, or less, it may let a contract therefor without bids or may buy the materials and do the work by day labor. (Id., § 1074.) Then comes a general provision dealing with letting the work by contract and whether bids must be called for. “In any county employing a competent engineer as road commissioner, the board may have any work upon county highways done under the supervision and direction of such engineer. Such work may be done: (a) By letting a contract covering both work and material. In such event the contract shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder as provided in this article, (b) By purchasing the material and letting a contract for the doing of the work, (c) By purchasing the material and having the work done by day labor.” (Id. § 1075.) [Emphasis added.] It thus plainly appears that the quoted section qualifies the requirements of the previous sections that, under certain conditions, the work must be done under a contract and let to the lowest bidder. Under section 1075, the work, regardless of its cost, may be done without letting a contract for all or any part of it, and hence necessarily eliminating the necessity for bids. (Id., § 1075(b), (c).) If, however, it is decided that both labor and materials are to be included in one contract to be let, then there must be a call for bids. (Id., § 1075(a).)

The condition under which the procedure under section 1075 may be followed and thus avoid the requirement of advertising for bids is that the county road commissioner be a “competent engineer.” That provision in section 1075 is the same as it was when made a part of the Streets and Highways Code in 1935 (Stats. 1935, ch. 28), and prior thereto. (Pol. Code, § 2640, prior to 1935.) In 1947, the Legislature adopted a new provision stating that counties must employ a single road commissioner for the entire county, and as to bis qualifications, [580]*580stated that he “shall be a registered civil engineer except that an unregistered person may be employed as road commissioner if approved by the board of supervisors as qualified and competent to handle the road and highway work of the county . . . The county surveyor may be appointed, if a registered civil engineer, or if found by the board of supervisors to be properly qualified ...” (Sts. & Hy. Code, §2006; Stats. Ex. Sess. 1947, ch. 11, § 1.) It is upon that new section that plaintiff bases his claim that work cannot be done without a contract let pursuant to a call for bids under section 1075 unless the road commissioner is a registered civil engineer, and the attorney general rendered an opinion to that effect in 1948. (11 Ops. Atty. Gen. 93.) We cannot agree with that contention or opinion.

Section 2006 provides that a road commissioner may be either a registered civil engineer or a person found to be competent by the board of supervisors. Thus the qualifications of a road commissioner are left to the discretion and determination of the board. One, but only one, absolute test of competency is registration as a civil, engineer. Comprehensive regulations are established for the registration or licensing of persons practicing civil engineering. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6700 et seq.) Otherwise, the qualifications determined by the board are the test and not those established by the state law, providing for the registration of civil engineers, or its administrators. It is clear, therefore, that the board of supervisors are the arbiters of the competency of the person chosen to act as county road commissioner to handle .the road work of the county.

Fitting that conclusion into section 1075, it must mean, together with other factors, that a person who is found competent as road commissioner by the supervisors is also a “competent engineer.” It is to he noted that when section 2006 was adopted, section 1075 was not amended to provide for a “registered civil engineer” being selected as road commissioner. The term “competent engineer” was retained, and at the same time section 2006 was adopted, section 1331 was amended and provided that the road commissioner should have charge of bridge construction if a “competent engineer,” nothing being said about such road commissioner being a “registered” civil engineer. Furthermore, in the situation where bids have been called for and rejected as “too high,” the work may be done under the supervision of a road commissioner (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 1073, supra), and certainly such [581]*581commissioner need not be a registered civil engineer under section 2006, yet he will be performing precisely the same supervisory engineering work as when the work is done under section 1075. Since county road work is generally done under the supervision of a road commissioner appointed by the board of supervisors (Sts. & Hy.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Untitled California Attorney General Opinion
California Attorney General Reports, 1995
Johnston v. County of Yolo
274 Cal. App. 2d 46 (California Court of Appeal, 1969)
Hard v. County of Plumas
220 P.2d 2 (California Supreme Court, 1950)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
220 P.2d 2, 35 Cal. 2d 577, 1950 Cal. LEXIS 365, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hard-v-county-of-plumas-cal-1950.