HANDLEY v. WERNER ENTERPRISES INC

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedSeptember 30, 2021
Docket7:20-cv-00235
StatusUnknown

This text of HANDLEY v. WERNER ENTERPRISES INC (HANDLEY v. WERNER ENTERPRISES INC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
HANDLEY v. WERNER ENTERPRISES INC, (M.D. Ga. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA VALDOSTA DIVISION

LEXIE HANDLEY, : : Plaintiff, : : v. : CASE NO.: 7:20-CV-00235 (WLS) : WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC. and : ACE AMERICAN INS. CO., : : Defendants. :

ORDER Before the Court is a “Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Cellular Phone Information,” filed by Defendants Werner Enterprises, Inc. and Ace American Insurance Company on August 23, 2021. (Doc. 18.) Therein, Defendants argue that Plaintiff produced her severely damaged phone in discovery but that it was so damaged it had to be reconstructed. Id. at 5; Doc. 18-4. After it was rebuilt, Defendants were informed that a PIN was required to access the phone, and Defendants requested the PIN from Plaintiff’s counsel in at least two emails. (Docs. 18-5 & 18-6.) Plaintiff’s counsel provided three possible PINs, but none of them worked and Defendants have been unable to access the phone’s contents. (Docs. 18-6 & 18-7.) Defendants ask that the Court compel Plaintiff to provide the correct PIN to unlock her phone so that they can discover “information central to the issues of this case – what caused the subject collision[,]” wherein Plaintiff rear-ended a Defendant’s tractor-trailer allegedly without pressing her brakes. (Doc. 18 at 1-2, 6.) Plaintiff timely responded thereto (Doc. 23), and Defendants timely replied (Doc. 26). Accordingly, the motion to compel is ripe for review. I. Compliance with the Discovery Order Plaintiff argues that the motion to compel should be denied because it is untimely and because Defendants failed to email the Courtroom Deputy for a conference prior to filing the motion. (Doc. 23 at 5-7.) The initial Discovery and Scheduling Order provides that “all motions made under

Rule 37 must be filed within twenty-one days of the date on which the response(s) was due, or twenty-one days of receipt of an allegedly inadequate response or other alleged violation of Rule 37, and no later than twenty-one days after the close of discovery, whichever first occurs.” (Doc. 7 at 2.) This is known as the Court’s 21/21/21 Rule, and it is strictly enforced. Defendants explain that they first learned that the PINs Plaintiff provided did not work on August 3, 2021, the same day that they emailed Plaintiff’s counsel requesting

the correct PIN. (Doc. 18 at 3; Doc. 18-7.) Defendants did not receive a response to their email and filed the pending motion to compel within twenty-one days of the date they learned the PINS did not work. Thus, the motion to compel is not untimely. The initial Discovery and Scheduling Order also noted that the Parties proposed that “[s]hould a party determine that there is a basis to file a motion to compel, a request for a conference must be made by e-mail to the Courtroom Deputy.” (Doc. 7 at 2 n.1.) Because this

Court does not ordinarily require parties to request a conference prior to filing a motion to compel, the Court further noted that while the Parties “may agree” to email the Court for a conference, the Court’s 21/21/21 Rule for filing Rule 37 motions still applies. Id. In other words, the Court did not require that the Parties contact the Courtroom Deputy prior to filing a motion to compel, although Defendants should have honored their agreement with Plaintiff

to do so. Furthermore, whether to grant a motion to compel is a matter of a district court’s “broad discretion.” United States v. Cuya, 964 F.3d 969, 970 (11th Cir. 2020). “Discretion means the district court has a ‘range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.’” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2011) (Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V

Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). Although a district court may “hold litigants to the clear terms of its scheduling orders,” it has the authority to do otherwise for good cause. Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1307. “Moreover, discovery rulings will not be overturned ‘unless it is shown that they resulted in substantial harm to the appellant’s case.’” Id. (quoting Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 325 F.3d 1274, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003)). Here, the record clearly indicates as follows: Defendants need a PIN to access

Plaintiff’s phone for their defense in this case, Defendants cannot get the PIN elsewhere, Defendants timely sought the phone and PIN during the discovery period, the day that Defendants learned the PINs did not work, they requested the correct PIN from Plaintiff’s counsel but received no response, and Defendants filed the instant motion twenty days after their most recent request for the PIN, in compliance with the Court’s strictly-enforced 21/21/21 Rule. Furthermore, the information sought will impose minimal burden and no

harm to Plaintiff, especially where Defendants have withdrawn their request for attorneys’ fees for filing this motion (Doc. 26). Under these circumstances, good cause exists to grant the motion notwithstanding Defendants’ failure to schedule a conference with the Court in advance.1

1 Alternatively, the Court could simply deny the motion to compel without prejudice and allow Defendants time to request a telephone conference with the Court or confer in good faith with Plaintiff’s counsel. But that II. Good-faith Attempt to Confer

Before filing a motion to compel, the movant must have in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the opposing party to obtain the discovery without court action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(1); M.D.Ga. L.R. 37. In their motion, Defendants explain that they “have made a good faith effort to obtain the requested information without involving the Court” as demonstrated by their August 3, 2021 email to Plaintiff’s counsel. (Doc. 18 at 4.) Plaintiff responds that a single email is insufficient to comply with the duty to confer and that informal discussions between counsel could have been fruitful. (Doc. 23 at 8-10.) There is no bright-line rule applicable in this Court regarding to what extent a movant must attempt to confer before filing a motion to compel. Indeed, Plaintiff cites no binding case law for her argument, and she even cites a case finding that “[n]either face-to-face nor

telephone contact is necessarily essential to the ‘good faith’ certification requirement in every case. Sometimes letters, emails, or faxes will suffice.” Jackson v. Deen, No. CV412-139, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186845, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 3, 2012) (citation omitted). Furthermore, Defendants did send more than a single email; they sent several emails requesting a PIN in the months prior to filing the instant motion, including their last email to which no response was provided whatsoever, and they have still not received a working PIN. (Doc. 26 at 5; Docs. 18-

5, 18-6, 18-7.) Although it is preferable for Parties to make additional efforts to attempt to confer, under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that Defendants failed to attempt to confer in good faith.2

would add more time to the clock and possibly an additional expenditure of the Court’s resources, which is unnecessary where, as here, Defendants have largely complied with the rules and orders, and the discovery sought is clearly relevant and proportional to the needs of this case, and it should be produced if known. 2 Numerous courts have reached a similar conclusion.

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Related

Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada
432 F.3d 1333 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)
Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc.
662 F.3d 1292 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Juan Alejandro Rodriguez Cuya
964 F.3d 969 (Eleventh Circuit, 2020)
IRAOLA & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.
325 F.3d 1274 (Eleventh Circuit, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
HANDLEY v. WERNER ENTERPRISES INC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/handley-v-werner-enterprises-inc-gamd-2021.