Handley v. Mortland

342 P.2d 612, 54 Wash. 2d 489, 1959 Wash. LEXIS 423

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Decided: July 16, 1959
• Docket: 34463
• Status: Published

Opinions

Ott, J.

February 23, 1945, Paul Handley, aged nine, was struck and injured by a truck belonging to Pacific Highway Transport, Inc., which was being driven by Charles Mortland.

Four months later, Hazel Anderson (an aunt and now Paul’s foster mother) was appointed his guardian ad litem, and, on the same day, June 14, 1945, she commenced an action against the transport company and Charles Mort-land to recover damages for Paul’s injuries. The transport company and Mortland answered the complaint, denying liability and affirmatively pleading contributory negligence. Thereafter, the guardian ad litem petitioned the court for authority to settle. The petition for an order authorizing settlement alleged in part as follows:

“That in the opinion of your petitioner, liability for said accident and resulting injuries to the plaintiff is disputed and doubtful, and the said offer of settlement in the amount of $394.90 is a fair and reasonable compromise and settlement of plaintiff’s claim for damages for injuries arising out of said accident and sustained by said minor and for and on behalf of said minor.

“That your petitioner has been advised by the doctors who have treated said minor that said minor has made a full and complete recovery from said injuries suffered by him.”

Hazel Anderson’s testimony at the hearing upon the petition for leave to compromise and settle sustáined the allegations of her petition. The court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. The order authorizing compromise and settlement recited that the settlement “is a fair and reasonable compromise and settlement of this action.” The amount of the settlement was paid, and the judgment satisfied of record.

May 9, 1957, six months, after Paul Handley arrived at the age of majority, he filed a petition in the original'proceedings to vacate the judgment upon the grounds (1) that he was hot properly represented in the original proceedings, (2) that the damages recovered were grossly inadequate, and (3) that the parties made a mutual mistaké at the time of settlement as to the extent and nature of his injuries.

The defendants demurred to the petition upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to vacate the judgment. The court sustained the demurrer. The petitioner did not plead further, whereupon the court dismissed the petition. Petitioner has appealed.

RCW 4.72.010 provides in part:

' “The superior court in which a judgment or final order has been rendered, or made, shall have power to vacate or modify such judgment or order: . . .

“(8) For error in a judgment shown by a minor, within twelve months after arriving at full age.”

The error in the judgment claimed by appellant is that he was not properly represented, and that the settlement in the exact amount of the medical expense was grossly inadequate.

The minor’s guardian ad litem was. his aunt. He had resided with and was cared for by her from the date of the accident to the date of the settlement. She had observed the minor’s recovery, and had “been advised by the doctors who have treated said minor that said minor has made a full and complete recovery from said injuries.”

There is no allegation in the petition to vacate that the guardian ad litem was not a proper person to be appointed or that she had been overreached or defrauded, or that there was any collusion existing between his guardian ad litem and the respondents.

The appellant contends that the attorney for the guardian ad litem had made no independent investigation of the minor’s condition, and that the attorney did not properly advise or represent the guardian ad litem. The guardian was fully conversant with the minor’s physical condition. The guardian sought and obtained medical advice from medical men qualified to advise her. The petition contains no allegation of improper legal advice given, or that the guardian ad litem was overrreached or defrauded by her counsel, or that he in any manner breached his trust.

We find no merit in appellant’s contention that he was previously not properly represented.

Appellant contends that the judgment for the exact amount of the medical expenses was grossly inadequate. RCW 11.92.060 provides in part as follows:

“Guardians of minors . . . shall have power and authority to represent their wards in all matters, and may sue . . . and such wards shall be bound by any compromise or settlement made by such guardian: Provided, The court shall have ordered or approved such action of the guardian. Before making any such compromise or settlement, the guardian shall file with the court which appointed him a petition setting out the nature of the suit, claim or dispute, together with the reasons for settling or compromising the same, and the court, either with or without notice of hearing, may make such order on such petition as shall appear proper.”

There was full compliance with the statute authorizing compromises 'of minors’ claims. The petition contains no allegation of irregularity in the proceedings or of any fraud perpetrated upon the court.

Appellant next contends that there was a mutual mistake of fact, in that none of the parties, at the time of the compromise settlement, realized the full severity or extent of the minor’s injuries. Mistake of fact is not one of the statutory grounds for the vacation of a judgment. RCW 4.72.010, supra.

The general rule is that

“Unless there was fraud or collusion affecting a settlement by the guardian of a minor of a claim or debt due the latter and a discharge of the obligor or debtor, such settlement and discharge will defeat an action by the ward, brought after attaining majority, to recover from the obligor or debtor a balance alleged to be due, in the absence of a proceeding to which the former guardian is made a party, ■directly to set aside the settlement.” 39 C. J. S. 309, § 172.

In Burke v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 86 Wash. 37, 39, 149 Pac. 335 (1915), we said:

“. . . in the absence of fraud or collusion, minors properly in court are bound as. fully as persons of full age, and when properly represented, are bound by the knowl.edge of ..those who. represent them. The law recognizes no distinction between a decree in favor , of or against infants and a decree to which adults only are parties. The same invalidating vice must be found in the one case as in the other. [Citing cases:]” ’

The fact that the injuries subsequently proved to be more severe than was apparent to the parties at the time of the compromise settlement, does not constitute a mutual mistake of fact. In the absence of fraud or collusion, the compromise of a tort determines with finality all claims, known and unknown, arising therefrom. Wieland v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City R. Co., 242 Iowa 583, 46 N. W. (2d) 916 (1951), and cases cited.

In Dearing v. Speedway Realty Co., 111 Ind. App. 585, 599, 40 N. E. (2d) 414 (1942), the Indiana court was concerned with facts substantially the same as those involved in the instant case. The court therein stated:

“Fraud could not be established by proof, solely, that the amount of the judgment rendered in favor of the infant plaintiff was not full or adequate compensation for the injuries that he received. It is apparent to all who are familiar with personal injury litigation that verdicts are seldom, if ever, rendered by juries, or settlements made in the course of the litigation, where exact compensation is given for the loss or injuries sustained. There is no way to measure in money the exact amount of compensation that should be paid a plaintiff in a personal injury action. Nor is the character or extent of the injuries alone determinative of the amount of compensation that can or should be received in the adjustment of such an action. Other elements, such as the availability of evidence, the character of the proof, the financial responsibility of the defendant, the expenses incident to the procurement of testimony, the delay of judicial proceedings, and the certainty concerning the cause of action are factors which influence the amount of adjustments. . . .

“It was also necessary for appellant to show at the trial of the present case that he had. a meritorious cause of action . '.

In Ombrello v. Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic R. Co., 252 Mich. 396, 402, 233 N. W. 357 (1930), the Michigan court had this to say about a contention that the approval of the court constituted a “rubber stamp”:

“ Tn a few of the cases cited by plaintiff’s counsel, the court lays some stress upon the fact that the trial court in which the consent judgment for the minor plaintiff was entered, failed to hear any evidence as to the propriety of the settlement. The failure of the court to hear evidence was important, in those cases, because it indicated that the court had not considered the propriety of the settlement, and was (in the absence of an order passing on the fairness of the settlement) a good indication that that question had not been passed on. But (for the reasons above stated) when a valid order has been entered judicially determining that the agreement was fair and should be approved, that order (in the absence of fraud) settles the matter, whether or not the court had heard adequate evidence bearing on the fairness of the agreement. The lack of evidence in support of a part of plaintiff’s case,'or the insufficiency of evidence on any given point, is everywhere recognized as a ground for review or appeal. It is not, and it never has been, recognized as ground for setting aside, an order not appealed from in a matter of which the court had jurisdiction.

“ ‘It would be astonishing indeed if an order of a court of competent jurisdiction were subject to be impeached by seeking to prove that it was insufficiently supported by evidence. If this could be done in all cases in which minors are interested, then probate orders could never be safely relied upon, and the resulting confusion in the administration of estates and in matters relating to titles is well nigh unimaginable.’ ”

We have adhered to the reasoning of the cited cases. In Burke v. Northern Pac. R. Co., supra, and in In re Phillips' Estate, 46 Wn. (2d) 1, 24, 278 P. (2d) 627 (1955), we quoted with approval the following language from Thompson v. Maxwell Land Grant & R. Co., 168 U. S. 451, 42 L. Ed. 539, 18 S. Ct. 121 (1897):

“ ‘ “It would be strange, indeed, if, when those authorized to represent minors, acting in good faith,' make a settlement of claims in their behalf, and such settlement is submitted to the proper tribunal, and after examination by that tribunal is found to be advantageous to the minors and approved by a decree entered of record, such settlement and decree can thereafter be set aside and held for naught on the ground that subsequent disclosures and changed conditions make it obvious that the settlement was not in fact for the interests of the minors, and that it would have been better for them to have retained rather than compromised their claims. . . .

“ ‘ “Ordinarily, indeed, a court before entering a consent decree will inquire whether the terms of it are for the interests of the infants. It ought in all such cases to make the inquiry, and because it is its duty so to do it will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that it has performed its duty. . . . The consent decree shows fully the terms of the settlement, and it certainly is not straining the presumption in favor of judicial action to assume that the court would not have permitted the entry of this decree providing for a settlement whose terms were thus disclosed, without being satisfied that such settlement was for the interest of the minors who were under its charge.” ’ ”

The law favors amicable settlement of disputes, and is inclined to clothe them with finality. Wool Growers Service Corp. v. Simcoe Sheep Co., 18 Wn. (2d) 655, 690, 140 P. (2d) 512 (1943); Buob v. Feenaughty Machinery Co., 4 Wn. (2d) 276, 294, 103 P. (2d) 325 (1940).

If the facts in the instant case constitute a mutual mistake of fact sufficient to warrant the vacation of the consent judgment, no consent judgment or compromise would have finality, and the purpose of the statute authorizing the compromise of minors’ claims would be thwarted.

Finally, appellant’s petition to vacate the judgment failed to state facts sufficient to constitute grounds for the vacation of a judgment, in that it did not contain an allegation that appellant had a meritorious cause of action. RCW 4.72.050 provides in part:

“The judgment shall not be vacated on motion or petition until it is adjudged that there is a valid defense to the action in which the judgment is rendered; or, if the plaintiff seeks its vacation, that there is a valid cause of action; . . . ” (Italics ours.)

The statute contemplates an adjudication that a meritorious cause of action exists, before the judgment can be vacated. The basis for the vacation of the judgment in the instant case is that the respondents were negligent. Since appellant failed to plead, in his petition to vacate, negligence on the part of the respondents, none could be shown without an amendment of the pleadings. Appellant elected to stand on the defective petition. He relies upon his allegation that the trial court found, in the original proceeding, that the respondents were negligent. This finding was made after the trial judge had approved the compromise settlement for the reason that

“ . . . liability for said accident and resulting injuries to plaintiff is doubtful, uncertain and disputed, and that it is uncertain whether any legal liability or responsibility for said accident is attributable to the defendants, . . . ”

Where compromise settlements are made as provided by statute, the only finding of fact necessary to support the judgment is that the parties have agreed thereto, and that the court deems the settlement to be in the best interests of the minor. Any finding as to liability is neither necessary nor proper, since neither of the compromising parties admits liability, nor is that issue adjudicated.

For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.

Weaver, C. J., Mallery, Hill, and Donworth, JJ., concur.