Hancock v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 19, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-0182
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GARY HANCOCK, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-182 (RDM)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Gary Hancock, Jr., proceeding pro se, brings this action against the Federal

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), then-BOP Director Colette S. Peters in her official and individual

capacities, and the United States (collectively “Defendants). He challenges the BOP’s policy

authorizing certain facility population management classifications that permit inmates to be held

at higher security facilities than would otherwise be warranted. See generally Dkt. 1. (Compl.).

Understandably, he expresses concern that this policy could expose him to greater risk of

physical harm than necessary. Plaintiff seeks damages, declaratory, and injunctive relief under

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388

(1971).

Plaintiff filed his complaint on January 12, 2024. Dkt. 1 (Compl.). On July 9, 2024,

Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). Dkt. 20. The Court, in turn, issued a Fox/Neal order on July 10, 2024, advising

Plaintiff that if he did not respond to the motion to dismiss by July 31, 2024, the Court could

treat the motion to dismiss as conceded pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(b). Dkt. 21. On August 8, 2024, Plaintiff moved for an extension of time to respond. Dkt. 24. The Court granted that

motion and ordered Plaintiff to respond to the pending motion to dismiss no later than September

20, 2024. Min. Or. Aug. 19, 2024. On October 10, 2024, Plaintiff moved for a second extension

of time, Dkt. 25, and the Court again granted that motion as well. The Court directed Plaintiff to

respond to the motion to dismiss no later than January 18, 2025. Min. Or. Oct. 17, 2024.

Plaintiff did not comply with that direction. This Court, nonetheless, gave Plaintiff one final

chance to respond to the long-pending motion to dismiss. This time, the Court directed Plaintiff

to respond no later than March 14, 2025, and warned Plaintiff that, if he failed to comply, he

risked dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute. Min. Or. Feb. 26, 2025. Once again,

Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court’s order and failed to respond to Defendant’s motion to

dismiss.

When, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will hold his pleadings “to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But a pro se litigant must still

comply with the rules that govern litigation in federal court. Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(b), the Court may dismiss a complaint “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to

comply with these rules or a court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). This authority is “necessary in

order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion” in the

courts. Link v. Wabash, R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962). It is also necessary to ensure

compliance with court orders. Dismissal is warranted when, “in view of the entire procedural

history of the case, the litigant has not manifested reasonable diligence in pursuing the cause.”

Bomate v. Ford Motor Co., 761 F.2d 713, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1985). “A lengthy period of inactivity

may . . . be enough to justify dismissal,” especially when “the plaintiff has been previously

2 warned that he must act with more diligence, or if he has failed to obey the rules or court orders.”

Smith-Bey v. Cripe, 852 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, despite receiving lengthy

extensions of time and multiple warnings about the consequences of failing to respond, warrants

dismissal. Under this Court’s local rules, a party opposing a motion must serve and file a

memorandum of points and authorities in opposition within 14 days of the date of service of the

motion or “at such other time as the Court may direct.” L.C. Rule 7(b). Here, more than eight

months have passed since Defendants moved to dismiss, and two months have passed since the

expiration of the last extension that Plaintiff sought. Since that due date—January 18, 2024—the

Court extended Plaintiff’s deadline sua sponte, but Plaintiff has still declined to respond. At

some point in time, a party who initiates a lawsuit must actively participate in the litigation that

he has commenced, and he must comply with the Court’s orders. Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 1, the Court is required to administer the rules in a manner that secures “the just,

speedy, and inexpensive determination” of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. The Court concludes that

permitting the case to continue indefinitely, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s disregard for the Court’s

orders, would not serve those purposes.

The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiff’s lawsuit, without prejudice, for failure to

prosecute. See Bristol Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, 901 F.2d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing

Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962)); Cohen v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of the

D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

3 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will DISMISS the action, without prejudice, for

failure to prosecute, and will DENY Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 20, as moot. A

separate order shall issue.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: March 17, 2025