Hanchar Industrial Waste Management, Inc. v. Wayne Reclamation & Recycling, Inc.
This text of 418 N.E.2d 268 (Hanchar Industrial Waste Management, Inc. v. Wayne Reclamation & Recycling, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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Hanchar Industrial Waste Management, Inc. requested certification for appeal of an interlocutory order of the trial court and petitioned the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction pursuant to Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 4(B)(5). The petition was granted. The dispositive issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in permitting Wayne Reclamation & Recycling, Inc. to file answers to Hanchar’s requests for admissions after the time specified in the requests had expired.
On September 27, 1979, Hanchar brought an action against Wayne Reclamation on account for goods and services. A set of requests for admission to which Wayne Reclamation was requested to respond within thirty days accompanied the complaint. After Wayne Reclamation was granted an extension of time to answer the complaint, it filed its answer and a counterclaim on November 15, 1979. Hanchar filed a motion for summary judgment on January 9, 1980, based on facts which Wayne Reclamation admitted due to its failure to respond to Hanchar’s requests for admission within the thirty day time limitation. A second set of requests for admission, also containing the thirty day limitation, was filed on the same day. On February 27, 1980, Wayne Reclamation petitioned the trial court for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing and for an extension of time to respond to Hanchar’s requests for admission. Wayne Reclamation based its petition for extension of time on the grounds of inadvertence and excusable neglect under Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 6(B)(2).1 The trial court granted Wayne Reclamation’s petition for an extension of time and accepted its answers to the requests for admission. The trial court also denied Hanchar’s motion for summary judgment. It is these rulings from which this appeal arises.
It is well established that once the time limit specified in a request for admission has passed, a party who has failed to timely respond is deemed to have admitted everything requested. This is done by operation of law. Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 36(A);2 Pathman Const. Co., etc. v. Drum-[270]*270Co Engin. (1980), Ind.App., 402 N.E.2d 1. An extension of time granted by a court after the time specified in the request has passed is in reality an opportunity for the party to withdraw or amend the admissions made by operation of law.
Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 36(B) specifically establishes the standard to be utilized by a trial court in determining whether a party should be allowed to withdraw or amend its admissions. The rule provides in part:
“. .. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pre-trial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.... ”
The above standard makes no reference to Trial Rule 6(B) nor to excusable neglect. Excusable neglect therefore has no bearing on whether Wayne Reclamation should be permitted to withdraw or amend the admissions it made by operation of law. See also, Pathman Const. Co., etc. v. Drum-Co Engin., supra.
Wayne Reclamation’s petition for extension of time was based solely on the excusable neglect standard of Trial Rule 6(B)(2). In granting the extension on this ground the trial court employed an erroneous standard. This matter must therefore be remanded for a determination of whether the presentation of the merits will be subserved by withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. A determination must also be made whether such withdrawal or amendment will prejudice Hanchar in maintaining its action on the merits.
For the above reasons this case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Remanded.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
418 N.E.2d 268, 1981 Ind. App. LEXIS 1322, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hanchar-industrial-waste-management-inc-v-wayne-reclamation-recycling-indctapp-1981.